# THE American POLITICAL SCIENCE Review

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# THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY ENLIGHTENMENT

CUSHING STROUT
*Yale University*

It is no longer the rule among American intellectuals that to describe oneself as a conservative is to confess to intellectual bankruptcy. The new conservatives, on the contrary, make much of their sophistication in matters of philosophy and history, compared with the naiveté of the liberals. That such a reversal of roles has been possible says much about what has passed for liberalism in modern America, for if the liberals had been historically realistic, profoundly humanistic, and uncompromisingly individualistic, the present case for conservatism would lose much of its force. One is tempted to say, if only there had been more liberalism among the liberals, there would be less need for conservatism. To understand this curious situation it is essential to realize that it has been not the liberal but the progressive mentality that has held sway.

When William James distinguished the "tough-minded" from the "tender-minded" he made a distinction that the progressive mind prided itself on making, and it was frank to say that "tough-mindedness" was its peculiar virtue. It is for this trait that men like Thorstein Veblen, John Dewey, James Harvey Robinson, Harry Elmer Barnes, Carl Becker, and Charles A. Beard have been widely praised. This toughness was, supposedly, an empirical-mindedness that led to a healthy "revolt against formalism,"[1] as Morton G. White has aptly called it. The rebels were joined by a mutual stress on history and the "seamless web" of culture, as opposed to the abstractness and atomicity of the utilitarianism of Mill, Bentham, and Austin. This older tradition of English empiricism was not empirical enough; it was tainted by formalism and rationalism. The rebels wanted to break down the artificial distinctions between politics, economics, law, and literature; they wanted to get away from first principles and study pragmatic consequences. Empirical "tough-mindedness" was to drive out rationalistic "tender-mindedness."

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[1] *Social Thought in America: The Revolt against Formalism* (New York, 1949).

This version of the progressive mentality (admirably anatomized by Mr. White) has been well recognized by the progressives themselves. It is, after all, a flattering picture—but, nevertheless, a distorted one. It was not just a new empiricism that arose to challenge an old empiricism; it was also a new rationalism that challenged an old rationalism. If these progressives were insulated from the utopian and rationalistic allures of Marxian communism, with its "science" of society and its alleged cure for evil, it was partly because they were committed to a utopian rationalism of their own. What really distinguished the progressive mind was not mere "tough-mindedness," but a "tough-mindedness" that was only the other side of a "tender-mindedness." This less flattering but more realistic portrait of progressivism needs to be examined.

Such a double-sided strain of tough-tenderness is shot through the whole skein of Thorstein Veblen's ponderously ironic system of economics. He was proud to possess the virtues he ascribed to David Hume: "an alert, though somewhat histrionic, scepticism touching everything that was well received" and "an insistence on the prosy, not to say the seamy, side of human affairs." It was Hume's special talent to be irreverently skeptical of the need for any knowledge "that outruns the reach of his own matter-of-fact, step-by-step argument from cause to effect."[2] To go beyond this was to indulge in animism, a defect Veblen observed in Christianity, Marxism, and the hedonistic utilitarianism of the classical economists. Thus Veblen praised the growth of modern science and the discipline of the machine process in industrial societies, because they promoted a factual habit of mind; and he witheringly condemned the pecuniary system of capitalism, based on absentee ownership, because it developed minds that had "habits of recourse to conventional grounds of finality or validity, to anthropomorphism, to explanations of phenomena in terms of human relation, discretion, authenticity, and choice."[3] Capitalism, in short, was too "tender-minded."

Yet for all this bleak positivism, indeed because of it, Veblen was quite prepared to hitch his wagon to a star. His wife, Ellen Rolfe, claimed that their reading of Edward Bellamy's utopian novel *Looking Backward* helped turn Veblen away from philology towards economics. Nor was it accidental that, while a university tutor at Chicago in 1900, he translated Ferdinand Lassalle's *Science and the Workingmen*, a violent socialist tract. In Veblen's view, socialists, in standing on the materialistic ground of class solidarity and antagonism, were only reflecting the incidence of the machine process on culture. Indifferent to dynastic, national, or business ideals, socialists were "merely the extreme exponents of the spirit of the age in the modern industrial communities."[4] Veblen's socialists were, in fact, conceived quite as abstractly as any utilitarian's "economic man" with his hedonic calculator, of which Veblen made so much fun. As a "tough-minded" Darwinian, Veblen had no use for Marxian dialectics; yet he scarcely disguised his sympathy for the Bolshevists when he analyzed the Russian Revolution as an editor of the *Dial* in 1919. Six months before his death in 1929 he even told a neighbor that communism seemed to offer the best hope at the present time.[5] His insistence on the seamy side of human affairs was (no less than Marx's) quite compatible with a utopian longing for social salvation.

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[2] "The Preconceptions of Economic Science," *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization and other Essays* (New York, 1919), pp. 96–97.

[3] *The Theory of Business Enterprise* (New York, 1904), p. 319.

Veblen's literary pose of professorial ponderosity did not conceal the embittered venom of his satirical jibes at the Vested Interests. The Communists expressed openly the hostility that was coiled in his style, and Veblen may have found their free display of aggressive disrespect for capitalism emotionally difficult to resist. As a theorist, however, he had his own characteristic solution for the problems of industrial society: technocracy. The whole system of property relations, involving state, church, university, and corporation, was rooted in anthropomorphic habits of thought; the Humean capacity to observe only factual sequences of material cause and effect characterized the engineer. Social salvation lay with the passage of power from the pecuniary-minded businessman to the industrially-minded engineer. It was this technocratic rationalism that Veblen worked out when he came in 1919 to the New School for Social Research as its most honored faculty member. The original faculty of the New School, and its visiting lecturers, made a dazzling constellation of some of the brightest stars in the progressive firmament: Charles A. Beard, James Harvey Robinson, John Dewey, and Harry Elmer Barnes. In all these men the vein of technocratic rationalism ran deep.

In Veblen's view, absentee ownership and the price system were irrational hindrances to the technological development of industry. In his story the syndicate of investment bankers were the villains; the

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[4] *Ibid.*, p. 359.

[5] Joseph Dorfman, *Thorstein Veblen and His America* (New York, 1934), p. 500. On Veblen's interest in socialism, see also Lewis Feuer, "Thorstein Veblen: The Metaphysics of the Interned Immigrant," *American Quarterly*, Vol. 5, pp. 99–112 (Summer, 1953).

"Soviet of Technicians" were the heroes. The issue was melodramatically clean-cut and pristinely simple in its solution. A general strike of engineers (typically termed by Veblen "a conscientious withdrawal of efficiency"), supported by aggressively sympathetic elements of the trained working force of the major industries and the tolerant consent of an indoctrinated "underlying population," would bring the animistic and pecuniary "Guardians of the Vested Interests" to their knees. In this utopia, sketched in his *The Engineers and the Price System* in 1921, the ruling principle would be that there could be no "ownership of an industrially useful article by any person or persons who are not habitually employed in the industrial use of it,"[6] and the leadership of the community would fall to the "Soviet of Technicians."

That Veblen and his friends took this dream seriously cannot be doubted.[7] He and Robinson and Barnes attended a conference of technicians, including the president and secretary of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, to put the idea into action. Howard Scott and Stuart Chase listened devoutly to Veblen at the New School, and the first steps were taken which led to Scott's being ensconced finally at Columbia as the prophet of Technocracy, after the depression had given many minds a hunger for some simple solution. The crisis of depression and the burgeoning of the technocratic movement brought Veblen's reputation to a new luster. His *The Engineers and the Price System* was reissued and became a best-seller. At a Conference for Progressive Political Action in 1933, a delegate made a Veblenian proposal for outlawing absentee ownership. Veblen, always something of a martyr because of his views, his prose, his taciturnity, his manners, and his love-life, was hailed as America's neglected genius by such molders of progressive opinion as Lewis Mumford, Stuart Chase, Matthew Josephson, John Chamberlain, and Rexford Guy Tugwell. The progressive mind had been seduced by technocratic rationalism.

Nothing, quite naturally, came of Technocracy as a political movement. It was, after all, profoundly anti-political, even more so than the Platonic ideal of the philosopher-king. Technology can do nearly anything with Nature, it is clear, but it is necessarily silent about society. The technician may work to satisfy man's necessities, but these are, in their turn, as Ortega has pointed out, inventions: "Man is the animal that considers necessary only the objectively superfluous." It is the other animals who confine themselves to what life objectively requires—and they have no technology. Technology itself is rooted in man's superfluous desires, his aspiration to be more than a biological creature.

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[6] *The Engineers and the Price System* (New York, 1921), p. 156.

[7] For Veblen's relation to technocracy, see Dorfman, pp. 453–55, 459–60, and 510–18.

What could be farther from this spirit than Veblen's caustic exposure of the "invidious" non-utilitarian aspects of the leisure class! But even Veblen could not make of the rational engineer what he expected of him; he could not make a leader of a servant. Just because technology can do anything, to be an engineer and nothing but an engineer, as Ortega says, means "to be potentially everything and actually nothing." What could be more formalistic than mere possibility? If technology is unlimited in capacity, it will nevertheless "irretrievably empty the lives of those who are resolved to stake everything on their faith in it and it alone."[8] We may suppose that Veblen discovered as much in his last years, though he did not recognize it. Why else was the father of Technocracy compelled, finally, to look to communism for his hopes? The vacuum had to be filled. If the Soviet of Technicians seemed too abstract to bolster hope and relieve despair, then there remained the Soviet of Bolshevism.

In philosophy it was, of course, John Dewey who spoke for the progressive mind. His *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920) challenged classical, traditional philosophies as "compensatory," "dialectically formal," and arrogantly concerned with an alleged absolute, "superior" Reality. Against this tender-mindedness Dewey opposed the Baconian vision that Knowledge is Power; but for all his stress on the matter-of-fact achievements of empirical science, Dewey believed that "the patient and experimental study of nature, bearing fruit in inventions which control nature and subdue her forces to social uses, is the method by which progress is made." Applied science, moving into new areas, insured us a glorious future: "The Golden Age lies ahead of us not behind us."[9]

Though Dewey confessed[10] that Veblen's distinction between the technical and commercial factors in business had been "quite fundamental" to his thinking ever since he became acquainted with it, he did not draw up, like Veblen, any blue-print of a technocratic utopia. "Men have constructed a strange dream-world when they have supposed that without a fixed ideal of a remote good to inspire them, they have no inducement to get relief from present troubles, no desires for liberation from what oppresses and for clearing up what confuses present action."[11] Dewey was a meliorist, settling for present and piecemeal increments of progressive reconstruction. But if he sensibly shunned any ideological certitude about the end of progress, he was quite sure of its method. For Dewey was also in his way hypnotized by the achievements of modern technology, that knowledge which was power. When Beard edited a book of essays on the theme of progress, rather anxiously called *Whither Mankind*, it was Dewey who wrote the piece on philosophy. For him it was clear that any modern philosophy worthy of the name was essentially a theory of "the relation of means and ends, of the materially existent and the ideally possible based on the control of agencies and instrumentalities which the new technology has brought with itself. . . . "[12]

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[8] José Ortega y Gasset, "Man the Technician," *Toward a Philosophy of History* (New York, 1941), pp. 100, 151.

[9] *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, enlarged. (Boston, 1948), pp. 48–49.

[10] Dorfman, p. 450.

[11] *Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York, 1922), p. 282.

If technology is the means, what are the ends? They emerge, rather vaguely, at the end of his *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, after an appeal to "the method of intelligence," symbolized by the triumphs of science and technology. Somewhat tender-mindedly for a tough-minded empiricist, Dewey speaks of "the mystic force" of communication and "the miracle of shared life" which will, apparently, bathe "the hardness and crudeness of contemporary life . . . in the light that never was on land or sea." In this brave new world, poetry and religious feeling will be "the unforced flowers of life."[13] This fragrant future is to be our compensation for having put well behind us the compensatory and contemplative philosophies of the past, so tender-minded in their approach to reality!

A genuinely hard-headed feeling for reality must be nurtured, one would think, on the historical sense, with its awareness of the stubborn variety of human life and its changing, concrete responsibilities so impervious to the demands of hedonists and reformers alike. But when we turn to the progressive historians, we see how completely the historical sense has been blunted in them by a utopian, technocratic rationalism. This anti-historical mood appears, at its most popular level, in the sloganeering of the "New History" movement that arose at Columbia University under the leadership of James Harvey Robinson and Harry Elmer Barnes. It was the burden of their message to historians that the time had come to talk of shoes and ships, and sealing wax and cabbages, instead of kings. They inveighed against the "orthodox historian" who seemed to be by their definition, as Carl Becker once remarked, "a timid, refined professor, a little apprehensive about holding his job, who is interested in political, military, and diplomatic events, is unaware of the importance of economic, social, and cultural influences, and greatly exaggerates the role of individuals as causal factors in the historic process."[14] But the turn to economic, social, and cultural history had already begun even in America before the "New History," and it was the research and theorizing of Frederick Jackson Turner, rather than the campaigning of Robinson and Barnes, that signified the change. Nevertheless, the contempt of the "New Historians" for their predecessors was indicative of their generally contemptuous view of the historical past.

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[12] "Philosophy," *Whither Mankind: A Panorama of Modern Civilization* (New York, 1928), p. 328.

[13] *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, pp. 211, 213.

Robinson had been a scholarly historian, however, before he became the bearer of the glad tidings of the "New History." In his title-essay, therefore, of *The New History: Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical Outlook*, he made a sensible plea for busying ourselves with the reasons why thoughtful, well-intentioned people defended the evils of the past instead of wasting our time in a gratuitious denunciation of them. Yet his ideology corrupted this historical sense in the same essay: "The present has hitherto been the willing victim of the past; the time has come when it should turn on the past and exploit it in the interests of advance."[15] In the concluding essay, "The Spirit of Conservatism in the Light of History," he spoke, in the tones of a vague, pulpit unction, of "the refusal to cooperate with the vital principle of betterment" as the "long-disputed sin against the Holy Ghost."[16] For all his sociological and psychological skepticism of religion, it was perfectly clear that Robinson was forming a new mystery cult dedicated to Intelligence. It was he who wrote the debunking essay on religion for Beard's *Whither Mankind*, and he made it plain that to the query *quo vadis?* he had his own answer: "The effort to engineer life in the light of already existing intelligence would in itself be perhaps as holy a task as any hitherto essayed by saint or martyr."[17]

The anti-historical tendencies of this point of view come out boldly in Robinson's vastly popular *The Mind in the Making*, a plea for the application of "liberated Intelligence" to man's problems. History is chiefly illustrative, in his view, of the residues of the animal, the savage, and the child in adult mentality. The past is seen as an encumbrance of illusions and maladjustments from which man needs freedom—like the habit of metaphysical thinking which Robinson tolerates, as he would the tobacco habit, provided the indulgence is moderate. Modern man is urged to take his cues from the founders of science, Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes: "These founders of modern natural science realized that they would have to begin afresh. This was a bold resolve, but not so bold as must be that of the student of mankind to-day if he expects to free himself from the trammels of the past."[18] Rational action, then, was based on a Reason that did not come trailing clouds of glory, but sprang up full grown from the thinker's brow, and the glory it did not trail was all the more golden for being anticipated in tomorrow's sunrise. Modern knowledge had cracked open all the seals on the Book of History: "The book at last lies open before those who are capable of reading it, and few they be as yet; for most of us still cling to the guesses made in regard to its contents before anyone knew what was in it."[19]

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[14] "What Is Historiography?," *American Historical Review.*, Vol. 44, pp. 20–28, at p. 22 (Oct., 1938).

[15] *The New History* (New York, 1912), p. 24.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 265.

[17] *Whither Mankind*, p. 286.

Contemptuous of the past, complacent about the present, and starry-eyed before the future, the progressive revived all the anti-historical proclivities of the Enlightenment rationalists. Like them, he saw his own age in such terms that it could not be historically continuous with the past; scornful of miracles, he seemed to make of the sudden emergence of his own age into rationality an incomprehensible miracle. How had such dazzling light sprung from such bleak darkness? Crusading against superstition and prejudice, he had a touching, if narrow, faith in the efficacy of science to solve all problems and a passionate prejudice that his technical view of reason would promote progress. Traditionally, the liberal and the democrat have both been primarily concerned with making political power responsible and with attacking the pretensions of any class to wield a privileged authority. But the progressives were so infatuated with their sense of being specially enlightened that they felt free to indulge an unchecked dream of absolute power. Harry Elmer Barnes warmed to the idea of placing the present technological age "under the control and direction of those who combine an adequate command of scientific and technological facts with the broad and constructive outlook which comes from acquaintance with the social sciences."[20] Under the benevolent despotism of this self-elected élite, we could relax in the assurance of social progress. The Guardians of social science would maintain the Republic. "If this extension of scientific control over society is an impossible aspiration," warned Barnes in an apocalyptic vein, "then the 'jig is up' with the human race."[21] With a bland blindness to what they were proposing, the progressives urged the manipulation of society by social "scientists," as if individual and social values were mere laboratory data.

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[18] *The Mind in the Making: The Relation of Intelligence to Social Reform* (New York, 1921), p. 154.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 227.

[20] Barnes, *The New History and the Social Studies* (New York, 1925), p. 401.

[21] "James Harvey Robinson," *American Masters of Social Science*, ed. Howard Odum (New York, 1927), p. 405.

Historians, we are apt to think, are generally the first to question the pretensions of social scientists and to defend the higgledy-piggledy untidiness of their subject, so recalcitrant to the lust for law and order. Carl L. Becker and Charles A. Beard, it is true, made themselves known in the historical profession as eloquent and scathing skeptics of the old-fashioned "science of history," with its pseudo-scientific determinism. But even their pragmatic relativism, which led them to kneel humbly at Clio's feet to say, in Becker's epigram, "O History, how many truths have been committed in thy name!" had its strong undertow of utopian rationalism. If they challenged the illusions of the "scientific" historian, neutral in thought and deed, they did so in order to defend the historian's right to be a reformer. History, Becker used to say, quoting Voltaire, was "a pack of tricks we play on the dead," and the illusion was performed by mixing memory and desire, documents and hopes, to fabricate a useful image of the past. Beard, too, challenged scientism to defend the historian's "act of faith" in history as an "upward gradient to a more ideal order"—in his case, collectivist democracy. The historian endures, he felt, "only in so far as he succeeds in casting through the warp of the past the weft of the future—the future which he can behold only by prophetic discernment."[22] Both Becker and Beard, in short, were devotees of the idea of progress which had so enchanted the Enlightenment thinkers.

Becker was most at home as a historian with the rationalist philosophers of the Enlightenment whose intellectual world he analyzed with eloquent wit, precision, and love. His affinity for this subject was profound, for, as his colleagues and students have sometimes wisely remarked, he was himself a twentieth-century *philosophe*, his *Progress and Power* being a modern version of Condorcet's *Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind.* The "heavenly city of the eighteenth-century philosophers" was to be built anew on the solid foundations of technology and social science instead of rationalistic republicanism. Becker's idea of progress defined power as man's use of tools, from the stone flint of the ape-man to the electric eye in the Pennsylvania Station. Invention was, in his view, the mother of necessity, and history could be meaningfully periodized into four phases by the discoveries of fire, writing, and magnetic force. Through these stages man advanced from farming and hunting to politics, to religion, and finally to science. Progress had really become systematically possible only with the elaboration of mathematical science, for progress came about "by the slow, often interrupted, but fairly persistent extension of matter-of-fact knowledge and matter-of-fact apprehension to an ever widening realm of experience."[23]

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[22] "James Ford Rhodes," *New Republic,* Vol. 21, p. 83 (Dec. 17, 1919). Becker's and Beard's historical relativism is most familiarly set forth in Becker's "Everyman His Own Historian," *Everyman His Own Historian* (New York, 1935), pp. 233–55 and Beard's "Written History as an Act of Faith," *American Historical Review,* Vol. 39, pp. 219–29 (Jan., 1934).

Becker is well known among historians for his trenchant criticisms of "scientific" history, allegedly devoted to cold, hard facts, as isolatable as marbles, and supposedly set forth by the omniscient and passive neutrality of the historian's mind. To write history, he kept maintaining, was not like "dumping a barrow of bricks"; it was, on the contrary, to engage in an inevitably relative and limited evaluation of human thoughts and deeds. Yet, in his theory of progress, Becker was committed to the conviction that history, in the long run, "gives its validation to matter-of-fact knowledge while dismissing value judgments as useless or insufficiently discriminated." He had quite unwittingly thus made a low bow to an idol he had already condemned as a superstition. He had begun his meditation on progress with a repudiation of any absolutes that would enable one to measure progress in terms of passage to some known good end, but this gesture of skepticism was only a ritual performed as part of his devotions at the altar of science. What he prophesied was a time when new sources of power would be exhausted and man would face a stable world. Progress would then become unnecessary because its purpose would be fulfilled. In this "stabilized and scientifically adjusted society," man would make a complete adjustment of his ideas and habits to the body of matter-of-fact knowledge he had accumulated about himself and the world.[24] History *was*, then, heading toward a fixed, known good end: the adjusted society. O brave new world that had so much reason in it!

On Becker's time scale of 506,000 years, the third phase, in which the consequences of the invention of writing are explored, is a mere interlude between the age of primitive man, who achieved balance by seeing the outer world as an extension of himself, and the age of modern scientific man, who finds his poise through seeing his personality as an extension of the outer world of things. The development of non-technical thought resulted in futile attempts to reconcile man to his gods through conceptualization and idealization. Becker implicitly condemns it as a kind of fall from grace. Here his radically unhistorical view of man's destiny is dramatically revealed, for he transforms the historical situation into the scientific situation of man's relation to nature through techniques. In this scheme, history's fulfillment is its termination, and the course of events is made meaningful only at the price of interpreting it in terms of a static goal beyond and outside of history. Yet the "adjusted" society is a pernicious abstraction, for it is either a society without basic human purposes or a tyranny in which the scientific élite executes its own private purposes under the pretense of mere engineering.

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[23] *Progress and Power* (Stanford, 1936), p. 96. See Leo Gershoy, "Carl Becker on Progress and Power," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 55, pp. 22–35 (Oct., 1949).

[24] *Progress and Power*, pp. 97–98.

Becker had confused liberalism with technocratic rationalism, which was based not on moral and political principles but on the techniques for manipulating objects. Reason, from his point of view, was a far cry from that interpreter of the "self-evident truths" of the Declaration of Independence. He had felt the confidence in 1915 to conclude an account of the American Revolution with the judgment that the sweeping generalities of the Declaration had formulated "those basic truths which no criticism can seriously impair, and to which the minds of men must always turn, so long as faith in democracy shall endure."[25] But a world war and a mass depression had shaken that confidence to its foundations, while at the same time he was coming to think that science dictated a pragmatic view of reason as only "a function of the animal organism, and truth no more than the perception of discordant experience pragmatically adjusted for a particular purpose and for the time being."[26] By 1936 he had concluded, with astringent skepticism, that both liberal democracy and communism were only "useful social myths" based on "emotionally held preconceptions" that determined the selection of facts that appeared to support them. Yet for all this mood of disillusionment he hoped to bring "spiritual first-aid to a harassed generation," and his disenchantment was only with one version of reason; he was thoroughly and naively enchanted by technical reason. Reason drunk speculated on moral and political principles; reason sober pragmatically adjusted itself to circumstances or advanced tentative hypotheses. "One may suppose then," said Becker, appealing from reason drunk to reason sober, "that in the future (the distant future no doubt, if one is to judge from present-day trends of thought) the realm of the matter-of-fact apprehension of experience may be so greatly extended that the effective social ideology will take on the flexible, pragmatic character of a scientific hypothesis."[27]

The vacuum of value he had created, however, gave him little support in the wind-tunnels of modern history when they were being filled with a violent rush by the blasts of totalitarianism. If Becker gave his loyalty to the coming society of statically adjusted forces, the process of "scientific" stabilization might involve the humane and liberal values he wanted to believe in, or it might not. It could be that they would be eliminated as mere value judgments "insufficiently discriminated." In any case, what glad tidings of the future were being sung by Nazis and Communists just then had little music in them to please the liberal and humane ear. The scientist, in putting nature on trial, could calmly await the results of his tentative hypothesis. But Becker was not in the laboratory; he was in history, himself on trial, the stakes too high for tentativeness.

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[25] *Beginnings of the American People, The Riverside History of the United States,* ed. William E. Dodd (Boston, 1915), Vol. 1, p. 253.

[26] "Afterthoughts on Constitutions," *New Liberties for Old* (New Haven, 1941), p. 93.

[27] "New Liberties for Old," *Ibid.*, p. 43.

By 1940 he felt his position direly threatened by the rise of Hitler and Stalin to enormous power. This certainly was not what he meant by successful adjustment to circumstances! Reason was limited, but it was not so bankrupt that it could not challenge such hyperbolic pretensions as these. Somewhere a stand had to be taken; the difficulty was that now it was very hard to find solid ground. Old-fashioned reason and principle had been debunked as mere ideology. The mood of hard-boiled realism had led to a drastic undervaluation of the merit of democratic institutions, and it was believed that scientific reason had made its grim report that there was no order in man or nature. It was a strange paradox that "the astonishing conclusion was somehow reached that an age which regarded every belief as open to doubt had at last got the low-down on men and things."[28] A generation which would not on any account be "taken in," he concluded in 1944, had been "taken in" by its very fear of being "taken in." The heavenly city of the eighteenth-century philosophers had been erected, for all its brave show of reason, on dogma and faith, that is, the "laws of Nature and of Nature's God," and it was Becker who had pointed it out with an appreciative irony. Yet he was now himself, as his life drew to a close, retracing his steps to those sweeping generalities. There were, after all, "Some Generalities that Still Glitter." By the time he wrote his essay on "What is Still Living in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson," he had decided that the values of democracy were enduring, for they had a life of their own apart from any particular civilization: "one reason for believing so being the fact that the values we cherish are the same as those which Jefferson proclaimed and the same as those which for more than two thousand years the saints and sages of the world have regarded as the ideal aim and ultimate test of civilized living."[29]

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[28] "What We Didn't Know Hurt Us a Lot," *Yale Review*, Vol. 33, pp. 385–404, at p. 391 (March, 1944).

[29] *American Historical Review*, Vol. 48, pp. 691–706, at p. 706 (July, 1943). *Cf.* "Some Generalities that Still Glitter," *New Liberties for Old*, p. 150.

This was an odd conclusion for an historian, but Becker's technocratic rationalism had done little to nurture his historical-mindedness. What, after all, could this consensus of saints and sages be but a pale abstraction from history, not only doing violence to the tensions and oppositions of the past, but soaring at last beyond history altogether? The facile detachment from history that had generated Becker's spiritual problem reappeared in his return to the dreams of the Enlightenment. "In all of his dealings with men and affairs," he once wrote, "one feels that Franklin was never wholly committed."[30] But surely this judgment was in part an act of self-criticism. Becker's extraordinary charm, his amiable, urbane disenchantment, which is the play of a bitter-sweet reason over the fancies and fanaticisms of a violent world, has a certain fragility. In the drama of history we cannot pretend to enjoy the privileged detachment of either actor or writer. History proposes tasks, not parts, and to bear its burdens man must always finally assume a responsibility and a risk which are, for him, absolute. The relativity of history is not pragmatic; its conflicts are not local troubles that can be adjusted as a plumber might fix a leaky pipe. The pragmatist, who sees man as a manipulator of history, is blind to history's desperation, the grimness of a process which demands absolute decisions from men who live in a relative, finite situation. Nor does this historical relativity nurture a skeptical indifference, for the relativity of history is only its pluralism: the fact that men meet its challenges and suffer its changes as representatives of a particular, finite vehicle of the historical process, a community that has its life only in history. This pluralism is the real toughness of history and its intolerableness to those who wish to lay up their treasures where the rust and stain of time cannot corrupt them. The heresy of history—a stumbling block to both scientists and theologians—is that it proclaims the finite absolute when its heroes are pressed to say, "Here I stand; I can do no other." For history has its being not in man's power over his environment or in his communion with self-evident, immutable truths, but rather in the creative labors of the human will seeking to organize its values in the world of formal institutions. History's conflicts can be composed by neither technology nor intellect, however skilled; they can be resolved only by the will that suffers them.

One might expect that Charles A. Beard, so widely revered for his "tough-minded" emphasis on economic interests that shape history, would be sarcastically scornful of the utopian dreams of the technocratic rationalists. But utopianism is, after all, particularly evident in Karl Marx's economic determinism. However rigorously fated the course of events is claimed to be, it issues, nevertheless, in the vaguely imagined classless society where every prospect pleases and not even man is vile. The paradox is deeply imbedded in Beard's thought too. With almost Calvinistic grim satisfaction, he remarks how the hopes and fears of both slaveholders and abolitionists were finally confounded by the consequences of annexing Texas that ended in civil war: "So dim is the vision of the wisest of statesmen! So far astray do the calculations of the learned and the great lead them!"[31] As the war approaches, Beard's sense of the havoc fate plays with man's schemes grows: "In that milling tumult, not one statesman foresaw the immediate future or read correctly the handwriting on the wall. . . . All were caught up and whirled in a blast too powerful for their wills, too swift for their mental operations." Yet in this same history, the impressively sweeping two volumes of *The Rise of American Civilization,* he brings his narrative to a radiant conclusion:

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[30] "Benjamin Franklin," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (1931), Vol. 6, p. 421.

> If the generality of opinion, as distinguished from that of poignant specialists, was taken into account, there was no doubt about the nature of the future in America. The most common note of assurance was belief in unlimited progress—the continuous fulfillment of the historic idea which had slowly risen through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to a position of commanding authority. Concretely it meant an invulnerable faith in democracy . . . [and] a faith in the efficacy of that new and mysterious instrument of the modern mind, "the invention of invention," moving from one technological triumph to another . . . effecting an ever wider distribution of the blessings of civilization . . . conjuring from the vasty deeps of the nameless and unknown creative imagination of the noblest order, subduing physical things to the empire of the spirit—doubting not the capacity of the Power that had summoned into being all patterns of the past and present, living and dead, to fulfill its endless destiny.[32]

It was, Beard felt in 1927, "the dawn, and not the dusk of the gods." But if he could call spirits from the vasty deep, it was clear two years later that they would not come when called. Yet he never wavered in his faith in this idea of progress; it was a theme that unified his dramatic intellectual career, from his early association with the founders of the British Labour party to his last embittered days as a defender of Republican isolationism. His first book, *The Industrial Revolution,* written at the turn of the century when he was a young graduate student in

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[31] *The Rise of American Civilization,* revised enlarged ed. (New York, 1934), Vol. I, p. 596. The quotation immediately following is from the same work, Vol. 2, p. 62. This work was written in collaboration with his wife, Mary R. Beard, and it is impossible to say which author is directly responsible for particular parts. Technically, one might refer to the Beards' views, but Charles A. Beard developed his relativism and his economic interpretation under his name alone in other books.

[32] *Ibid.,* Vol. 2, p. 831.

England and designed as a contribution to the cause of workingmen's education, had as its chief hero James Watt, inventor of the steam engine, whose life and work seemed to Beard a symbol of how man could solve the problems that everywhere confronted him. It was man's ability to build machinery competent to replace manual labor with the infinite power of nature that gave him the "material key to man's spiritual progress,"[33] and it was in this way that modern *philosophes*, spurning sham battles with "ancient devils, fog giants, metaphysical dragons," could find a common-sense remedy to the evils of the Industrial Revolution. When he was made president in 1926 of the American Political Science Association, he reiterated this theme by hailing technology as the means of implementing the concept of indefinite progress sketched in the eighteenth century by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre.[34] It was entirely fitting that Beard should write the introduction to J. B. Bury's *The Idea of Progress* for its first American edition in 1932. As a relativist, who was, in the following year, to address as president his colleagues of the American Historical Association on "Written History as an Act of Faith" and who was soon after to scorn historical objectivity as "That Noble Dream," Beard was prepared to concede for the sake of argument that the past had been "without order or design"; yet he was still "haunted by the shadowing thought that by immense efforts of will and intelligence, employing natural science as the supreme instrumentality of power, mankind may rise above necessity into the kingdom of freedom, subduing material things to humane and rational purposes."[35]

What, then, were these ends, if science was only a means? Beard was not so utopian as to expect something for nothing: he sensed, more clearly then Veblen or Becker, Robinson or Barnes, that technical machines could not fulfill non-technical hopes. Yet Beard believed that American life has always been "tough-minded": "in the main hard, economic, and realistic—a conquest of material things, and [that] American thought has been essentially empirical, not metaphysical and theological."[36] So progress in America would be materialistic, "mass progress, measurable in averages and susceptible of graphic presentation."[37] It would be identifiable as the economy of abundance; this was

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[33] *The Industrial Revolution* (London, 1901), p. 42. The quotation immediately following is from the same work, p. 91.

[34] "Time, Technology, and the Creative Spirit in Political Science," this REVIEW, Vol. 21, pp. 1–11, at p. 5 (Feb., 1927).

[35] Introduction to J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into Its Growth and Origin* (New York, 1932), p. xl.

[36] "That Promise of American Life," *New Republic*, Vol. 81, pp. 350–52, at p. 352 (Feb. 6, 1935).

[37] Introduction to Bury, p. xxv.

"The Promise of American Life." This goal could be obtained, he felt, through planning, that talisman of rationalism. He had himself concretely observed the power of planning when he had gone to Tokyo at the Home Minister's request to advise on municipal politics during the reconstruction of the city after the earthquake of 1923. There the vision seemed almost a reality, and when the depression had struck America, Beard sketched a Five Year Plan to bring into existence the economy of abundance by a centralized authority adequate to control the planless irrationality of the market place.[38]

Beard had long ago defined the great historian as a man of faith who cast the weft of the future through the warp of the past by an act of prophetic discernment: he was now prepared to qualify for the role himself. With increasing passion his historical work became a tendentious argument for the necessity of fulfilling the Promise of American Life. President Roosevelt had begun well with the New Deal, but there lurked the dangers of distraction by involvement in foreign quarrels. By the time of the Nye Committee's investigations in 1934, Beard had become finally convinced that it was the pressure of bankers that had forced Wilson into war. Thus his habitual confidence that the economic interpretation was a mark of "tough-mindedness" enabled him to join the ranks of the highly emotional and sensationalistic "revisionists," whom, in the person of Harry Elmer Barnes, he had once correctly criticized for forgetting the realities of the balance of power and its effect on America in order to indulge in an unhistorical shifting around of "heroes" and "villains." For all his lectures against "The Devil Theory of War," Beard was engaged in concocting one, and by February, 1935 he had already ominously predicted that President Roosevelt would plunge the country into a Pacific war in his efforts to escape the domestic economic crisis.[39]

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[38] For Beard's advocacy of centralized planning, see his introduction to *Toward Civilization*, ed. C. A. Beard (New York, 1930), p. 17; "A 'Five-Year' Plan for America," *Forum*, Vol. 86, pp. 1–11 (July, 1931); "A Search for the Center," *Scribners*, Vol. 91, pp. 2–7 (Jan., 1932); and *The Open Door at Home: A Trial Philosophy of National Interest*, collab. G. H. E. Smith (New York, 1935), pp. 216 ff.

[39] "National Politics and War," *Scribners*, Vol. 97, pp. 65–70, at p. 70 (Feb., 1935). For Beard's defense of Wilson's intervention and his criticism of Barnes' revisionism see "Heroes and Villains of the World War," *Current History*, Vol. 24, pp. 730–35 (Aug., 1926). For all his polemic against dogmatism about historical causality, he concluded by 1936 that the "President of the United States avoided an immediate domestic crash by leading the country into war." See *The Devil Theory of War* (New York, 1936), pp. 107. Beard then became a passionate pamphleteer and advocate before congressional committees of an isolationist policy which he expounded as "continentalism" in such works as *The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy*, collab. G. H. E. Smith (New York, 1934); *Giddy Minds and Foreign Quarrels: An Estimate of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1939); and *A Foreign Policy for America* (New York, 1940).

His last two books, dogged attempts at documenting his indictment of Roosevelt's foreign policy,[40] seem in retrospect to be offerings on the altar of his dream of the Promise of American Life. By September 1, 1948, when America's most influential historian faced death in the belief that all over the world the dusk of the gods had darkly fallen at last, he must have felt that his dream was even more remote than it had been in 1927 when he saluted the new technology that would usher in the dawn. With what a bitter sense of outraged sanity must Beard for the past decade have watched history move, not towards his cherished goal of a last outpost of "collectivist democracy" where men reaped the harvests of technological triumph, but instead toward intervention in another world war! With all his utopian passion Beard had urged the American people and their Congress to create a last "stronghold of order and sanity even against the gates of hell."[41] His "act of faith" had been a bold toss of the dice, and the stakes were too high for him to lose gracefully. Someone must have rigged the game. There had, therefore, to be some dark soul who had arrogantly upset the best laid plans of thinking men. So his last works were counter-plots against the arch-conspirator Roosevelt, bringing to bear against the latter's record all of Beard's formidable powers of scholarly assault and analysis. His brilliant career thus blazed out at the end like a spent rocket's last flare, glittering but erratic, as he became unhappily entangled in the unhistorical simplicities of a conspiratorial theory of history, the nemesis of all utopians because, as Karl Popper has remarked, "the only explanation of their failure to produce their heaven are the evil intentions of the devil who has a vested interest in hell."[42]

The systematic errors of political rationalism have been lucidly analyzed by Michael Oakeshott[43] in terms that can be applied most fruitfully to these progressive thinkers. He has pointed out that it is a characteristic mistake of the rationalist to attribute to tradition the rigidity which really characterizes his ideology of Progress. The rationalist is at odds with history because he thinks of reason as a neutral instrument, stripped bare of all historical atmosphere and encumbrances. Being blind to reason's rich historical dimension, he reduces thinking man to the power to imitate the process of a machine that tabulates mechanically. For reason must operate within a tradition, and it is tradition alone that generates the shape of the problem to be solved. For the pragmatic rationalist, however, mere existence or long existence have no value, as Dewey put it, "independent of what deliberate action might make out of the existent."[44] Since the rationalist does not believe that action should be performed in the light of the past, he is easily led to find his illumination in an abstract future, radiant with the glitter of utopia. For him the method of intelligence is simply the method of science, and by this equation he not only blinds himself to the non-scientific but responsible uses of reason—as in philosophy and history—but he fails as well to grasp the historical character of scientific reason itself. To be genuinely scientific, after all, is not to be merely intelligent; for, as Oakeshott has warned, if you are "merely 'intelligent' about a boiler or an electrical generator, you are likely to be pulled up short by an explosion; but in politics all that happens is war and chaos, which you do not immediately connect with your error."[45] The progressive development of science itself depends upon a scientific community based on a sophisticated awareness of the complex conventions of a traditional activity. If he did not know his scientific tradition, every scientist would have to begin from scratch; yet it is just this absurdity that the progressive political mind recommends in human affairs.

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[40] *American Foreign Policy in the Making 1932–1940: A Study in Responsibilities* (New Haven, 1946) and *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War: A Study in Appearances and Realities* (New Haven, 1948). For cogent criticisms of Beard's errors see Basil Rauch, *Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor: A Study in the Creation of a Foreign Policy* (New York, 1950) and Samuel Eliot Morison, "Did Roosevelt Start the War? History through a Beard," *Atlantic*, Vol. 182, pp. 91–97 (Aug., 1948). Unfortunately, both Rauch and Morison imply that Beard distorted his evidence dishonestly, but this is to attack one devil theory with another. Beard's point of view simply blinded him to the non-invidious implications of his evidence.

[41] From Beard's testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, put into the Record by Senator Burton K. Wheeler. *Congressional Record*, 77th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 87:10, p. A627 (Feb. 13, 1941).

[42] *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, rev. ed. (Princeton, 1950), p. 288.

[43] "Rationalism in Politics," *Cambridge Journal*, Vol. 1, pp. 145–57 (Dec., 1947).

Utopian rationalism is, of course, historically connected with the Enlightenment *philosophes*. Yet in America, as Louis Hartz and Daniel J. Boorstin have recently shown[46] with great acumen, our revolutionary heroes and founding fathers were remarkably free from the pretensions and illusions of the "age of reason." Jefferson, Madison, and Adams agreed that a constitutionally limited government of checks and balances was the only protection against both anarchy and tyranny. It was, indeed, the devoutly liberal Jefferson who argued that confidence in the men of our choice was the very parent of despotism; "free government," he said, "is founded in jealousy and not in confidence; it is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited constitutions to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with power. . . ."[47] Traditionalists, trained as practical lawyers, inspired by the English parliamentary struggles of the seventeenth century and the "common sense" of John Locke, sensitive to their historically achieved rights as English colonists, our early liberals were modest in their expectations of human nature, realistic about political power, and devoted to the legal forms of liberty. Rousseau or Condorcet inhabited a world intellectually, as well as historically, alien.

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[44] "Philosophy," *Whither Mankind*, p. 330.

[45] "Rational Conduct," *Cambridge Journal*, Vol. 4, pp. 3–27, at p. 14 (Oct., 1950).

[46] Louis Hartz, "American Political Thought and the American Revolution," this Review, Vol. 46, pp. 321–42 (June, 1952); Daniel J. Boorstin, "The American Revolution: Revolution without Dogma," *The Genius of American Politics* (Chicago, 1953), pp. 66–98.

Not until the twentieth century, when the triumphs of the machine and the scientist had seduced men's imaginations into dreaming of unlimited and perpetual progress through technology, and the "revolt against formalism" had devalued the importance of principles, did utopianism capture the American liberal mind. The revival of a genuinely tough-minded and principled liberalism may depend on a renewed sense of the vitality and significance of forms, for it should be the special pride of liberalism that it alone puts its ultimate confidence in moral and legal procedures, not in pragmatic programs, in respect for democratic political institutions, not in dreams of a planned society, in the complexities of the historical sense, not in the simplicities of a surrender to "scientific" progress. If the refurbishing of such forms as these has lately been partly in the hands of the "new conservatives," then it is an ominous sign that liberals have been letting conservatives do their work for them. But liberals may perhaps find ground for confidence in the possibility that some of the luster and popularity of the new conservatism is only a reflected glow of light from the liberal lamp that once belonged and should return to its proper guardians.

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[47] Kentucky Resolutions, November 16, 1798. See *Documents of American History,* ed. Henry Steele Commager, 5th ed. (New York, 1949), p. 181.

# THE INTENTION OF THE FRAMERS: A NOTE ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION*

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In discussions of the United States Constitution, the phrase "the intention of the framers" is often used, but it is hardly ever adequately analyzed. The search for the intentions of the framers is made obviously in the hope of finding out what they meant by the words they put into the written Constitution. This leads to the examination of various evidences outside the Constitution, and implies a feeling that there is a lack of clarity in the words of that document.

The discussion that follows was written in order, *first,* to raise some of the questions that I think have to be answered before the phrase about intentions can have fullness of meaning as a tool of constitutional analysis; *second,* to express certain warnings against a too-confident assumption that "the intention of the framers" can actually be known; and, *third,* to consider briefly the possible significance today of the intention of the framers in case it could be discovered.

An alternative phrase, "the intention of the Constitution," is also encountered at times, as are several variations of it. "The Constitution," as used in such contexts, clearly refers to the written document. Such expressions concerning the intention of a document are obviously elliptical and to a considerable extent inaccurate and misleading. It is as if the written document is personified and endowed with intentions and a will instead of being a mere verbal memorandum. It is individual human beings who have intentions and wills, who make choices, and who seek to accomplish things.

As I have indicated, my purpose is to analyze the phrase "the intention of the framers" as a tool or aid in constitutional analysis of an objective or scientific sort. It happens, however, that the phrase has also been put to use in propaganda. As one might expect, it is the extremists of the right and of the left, such as, for example, the ultra-nationalists at one end of the scale and the convinced and unyielding states'-righters at the other end, who make the most frequent use of the phrase. The fact that opposite schools of extremists can both find some support in the records for their views of what the framers intended should give pause to more careful scholars. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to distinguish completely between the scientific and objective student of the Constitution and the propagandist.

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*The Original Framers and Their Supposed Intentions.* The first difficulty in discussing "the intention of the framers" is to determine what individual persons are to be included under the rubric of "the framers." This is a point seldom if ever made clear. A closely related question is "framers of what?" Most users of the phrase appear to think entirely of the men who formulated the original written Constitution in 1787. They seemingly forget that the present Constitution, while it still includes most of the original document, has been profoundly changed through the adoption of 22 Amendments and through the making of numerous other constitutional decisions. These decisions have come not only from the Supreme Court but also from Congress and the Executive, from the arbitrament of arms, and in a sense from the acceptance of the people. But the nostalgic desire to find and to return to the supposedly beneficent prescriptions emanating from the presumably greater wisdom of the "founding fathers" is, I think, for many persons at the center of their interest in discovering what the framers intended. If this be true, it is also understandable why more selfishly interested propagandists play upon the phrase about the framers' intentions to achieve their objectives in influencing public opinion.

In passing, let it be said that in concentrating their attentions upon the *framers* and their intentions, many persons seem to forget about the *ratifiers or adopters* of the Constitution, i.e., the men who in the several state ratifying conventions studied the Constitution and voted to approve it. Without their actions the Constitution would have remained a mere proposal. Surely their understanding of the document and their intentions with respect to it also had considerable importance.

Let us consider first the evidences concerning the intentions of the *original framers.*

The so-called Federal Convention of 1787 consisted at the maximum of 55 members, but that total number of members probably was not present on any one day. Members came and went. Some were present for only relatively short periods of time. At the end, apparently just over 40 members were participating.

The records of what men did and said in the Convention are mainly unofficial and decidedly incomplete. Apparently a number of members spoke very little during the proceedings. Some did not serve on any committee. Clearly if a member attends but little, says little or nothing for the record, serves on no committee, and leaves little or no other record in the form of private letters, memoranda, or a diary, it is hard to reconstruct his intentions. At the other end of the scale were a number of members who attended regularly, spoke often, served on committees, and in other ways contributed to the work of the Convention and to the record of what it did. The records as to the views and intentions of these more active and vocal members are in some instances fairly substantial, but in other cases, like that of Gouverneur Morris, one of the principal final stylists of the Constitution, they are disappointingly incomplete.

The original intentions of the members, whatever they were, did not remain steadfast throughout the Convention. As the discussion developed, new topics were taken up, new ideas and arguments were presented, and the interrelations of various problems of government were brought out. Decisions were made one day and changed or rescinded the next. On such matters as the election and the position of the chief executive, intentions were changed almost from day to day. Also, having first voted to authorize Congress to legislate in all cases in which the several states would be incompetent, the Convention later did not include this language in the Constitution. What did the framers intend on this major point? Can we be sure that even at the end, when agreement was voted on certain verbal formulations, there was full concurrence also in intentions? This raises questions as to the meanings of words to which we shall devote our attention later.

At the end of the deliberations 39 members signed the Constitution, but four active participating members (Elbridge Gerry, Luther Martin, George Mason and Edmund Randolph) refused to do so. As to the 39 signers, it is perhaps safe to say that they all thought it best to put the proposed Constitution up to the people for approval, and thus avoid the delays and uncertainties that would accompany any attempt to get a better constitution drafted. That there was a considerable area of agreement not only upon general objectives as set forth in the Preamble but also upon the general plan of the Constitution—a consensus that it was at least better than the scheme of the Articles of Confederation—we must assume. Otherwise not enough members would have been likely to sign the document. Whether every member of the Convention who signed it had read the completed document or heard it read is unknown. Some of the more casual participants may well have accepted it upon the reassurance of others. In any case no one will ever know how much each signer actually knew about the document, how many of his own wishes or intentions upon specific points were embodied in it, or how fully the members were in agreement upon the meanings of the words in the document.

We know that some of the men who signed it had definite reservations about some parts of the Constitution. Alexander Hamilton was one of these. Apparently a number of members thought there should have been a bill of rights, but Hamilton thought otherwise. George Washington advised that men should put aside any personal objections, support the Constitution as drafted, and then try to improve it by amendments after its adoption. To what extent these unsatisfied members agreed with others on the meaning of what the Constitution actually provided is not clear.

On the basis of the record as we have it, therefore, I cannot understand how anyone can assert positively that all the signers agreed fully even upon the words in the Constitution, much less upon what the words meant. How their individual views deviated from the general plan will never be known from the present record. The signers who spoke in the state ratifying conventions put up a fairly united front in favor of adopting the Constitution, but even such collaborating members as Hamilton and Madison in *The Federalist* essays clearly had divergent ideas about the nature of the Union, the respective powers of the national and state governments, and national taxes—to name only a few important subjects.

In the preceding paragraphs I have treated the signers of the Constitution as most clearly entitled to be called framers of that document, although a number of them did very little in the Convention. But what about those who refused to sign? Are they to be counted among the framers whose intentions scholars should try to ascertain? At the end they were opponents and not friends of the proposal. It did not express their wishes or intentions.

Outside the membership of the Convention there were a number of public men of considerable influence. John Adams, Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, and Thomas Jefferson may be mentioned in particular. Supreme Court Justices and other careful students of the Constitution are not likely to quote the words of such persons as having any particular relevance to what the framers intended. On the other hand, those who speak and write as propagandists for some particular interpretation of the Constitution frequently proceed otherwise. Men who favor a compact theory of the Union and a states'-rights emphasis in construing the Constitution frequently quote the later views of Jefferson as if they expressed the intentions of the framers. Actually, during the framing and ratification of the Constitution, Jefferson was in France and was not adequately informed as to what the Convention was doing. After having passed through a period of uncertainty, he swung around to support the Constitution provided a bill of rights were added to it. His later views on states' rights and on the nature of the Union have little or no relevance to what the framers intended. They are entitled to weight only as Jefferson's expression of what he believed the Constitution ought to be. It is a curious fact, however, that Jefferson, who was not one of the framers, should be so widely quoted on the Constitution whereas George Washington, "the father of his country," who was an effective member and the president of the Convention, should be so little quoted. To be sure, Washington wrote and said very little, but what he did was sensible and carried a great deal of weight.

To me it seems fairly obvious that the testimony of persons who were not in the Convention has only indirect and circumstantial value as indicating what the original framers intended. Those who quote Jefferson on the Constitution, for example, must do so (a) because they like his views and wish to have them prevail, and (b) because they think the name of Jefferson has considerable propaganda value. Perhaps they overlook the fact that when he wrote and spoke about the Constitution after it went into effect, he was trying not to explain what the framers did and intended but to interpret the Constitution so as to bend it to his own ideas of sound public policy.

In each state convention to which the Constitution was submitted, there were a few persons who had also served in the Federal Convention. What they said in the state conventions, though intended to persuade the other delegates, and obviously conciliatory toward the opposition, may be taken generally as some additional evidence of what these framers intended. Unfortunately, the records of the debates in the state conventions are far from being complete.

What other members of the state conventions said, being contemporary comment, has some evidential value, but is valuable mainly as revealing what men of that time thought about the provisions of the proposed Constitution, as noted above, and not about the intentions of the framers.

If there was a decided consensus among the adopters that in adopting the Constitution they understood it to mean so-and-so, that interpretation should carry much weight as an interpretation by those who alone could bring the Constitution into effect. On the other hand, the words of these delegates have little more value for determining the intentions of the members of the Federal Convention than the words of the numerous authors of pamphlets, letters to newspapers, and private letters written at the time by non-members of the Federal Convention. An entirely different status must, naturally, be accorded to those *Federalist* essays that were written for the New York papers by two brilliant young members of the Federal Convention—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. (John Jay was not a Convention member.) The essays written in advocacy of the Constitution by these two men, like the post-Convention utterances of other former members thereof, must be accorded very great weight as evidence of the intentions of the framers—unless one can substantiate the charge that these men shifted their positions after the Convention. What might have caused such a shift? One possibility would be forgetfulness as to what was decided or intended, but such a charge has not been seriously pressed. Another would be duplicity, arising from a desire so strong to have the Constitution adopted that deception was practiced on the public and on the members of the state conventions as to the real meaning of the Constitution and the true intentions of the members of the Convention.

As I understand him, Professor Crosskey has expressed grave doubts concerning in particular the candidness of James Madison's contributions to *The Federalist*. On the one point that I have looked into in this connection, namely, the powers delegated to the national government and those that were to be left to the states, I do not think his charges against Madison are supported by the weight of the evidence. I recognize that Hamilton and Madison expressed different views in *The Federalist* on this important point, at least so far as emphasis is concerned, but that is in line with what I have been trying to say, namely, that intentions are individual and are rarely wholly-unified group intentions. It seems to me that on the whole the *Federalist* essays are still the best explication of what several of the leading members of the Convention intended to accomplish, and an excellent interpretation of the areas of agreement reached by the Convention's majority.

Up to this point my conclusions are that intentions are the intentions (purposes, choices, acts of will, desires for a certain outcome) of individual human beings. Every man, being a different and distinct individual, unavoidably has intentions that are somewhat different from those of everyone else. Such a thing as a solid, completely unified intention of all the members in any group would be hard if not impossible to find.

Furthermore, intentions are highly subjective and personal things. They are not like badges pinned to a coat lapel. They lie deep in the hearts and minds of men. They are not always clearly stated by those who have them, nor even capable of clear and specific formulation. The words used to convey them seldom do so perfectly.

As I read the evidence, there was no single "intention of the framers" as to the Constitution as a whole, beyond perhaps the generalities of the Preamble and the intention to submit the Constitution to the people for adoption as a measure that might result in more effective government. There were broad areas of general agreement among the majority on such matters as national supremacy, three branches of government, and a comprehensive national taxing power. When one tries to spell out precisely what was agreed upon on any specific point, however, the evidence is incomplete and contradictory.

*The Constitution as the Best Evidence.* The Constitution itself is the best evidence of what agreements were reached in the Convention. It is the best evidence, but like comparable documents (statutes, treaties, contracts), it is not irrefutable proof of the *intentions* of the framers on a number of subjects, for several reasons already implied or now to be given. Undoubtedly men would be happier to set their hands to a document of agreement if they knew that it expressed perfectly their intentions and agreements, but sensible and experienced men do not expect perfection in the products of the human mind.

As a document the written Constitution is in many ways a superb piece of work. It is short, terse, and comprehensive. It outlines a practical system of national government that the first Congress and President found understandable and workable. By the breadth of its terminology and by its provision for amendments, it makes it possible for Congress and the people to adapt it in practice to changing needs, ideas, and conditions as the occasion arises. It does not say that the governing authorities are to govern only in accordance with the intentions of the original framers, but in the main leaves them free to interpret their own powers and the form of government according to their own practical judgment. Nevertheless, the Constitution, like every other comparable human creation, has its limitations.

1. Every such document is unavoidably incomplete. The Constitution is a memorandum of agreement upon the points discussed and agreed upon, and to a lesser extent upon such points as the final drafters or stylists of the document thought it important to insert for clarity or for other purposes. Time was short and the pressure to reach some agreement and to finish the main task was great. Some subjects were overlooked, or simply not dealt with.

Those who set going the new government under the Constitution soon learned how incomplete it was. Almost at once they faced a series of constitutional questions to which that document gave no explicit answer: Had Congress the power to charter a bank? To impose a protective tariff? To assume for the national government the obligation to pay the state debts? Had the President alone the power to remove an officer whom he had appointed with Senate consent? To declare American neutrality in a war in which its ally, France, was involved? Had the Supreme Court the power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress? What did the framers intend on these issues? The Constitution did not say.

Now incompleteness of coverage on various important matters does not prove to the hilt that the Constitution does not fairly reflect the members' intentions on the points that were covered. Experience shows us, however, that in any deliberative group whenever a new and relevant issue is raised after agreement has already been reached on some points, it is necessary to go back and revise what has been written in the light of what needs to be said on the new point. Intentions on one point affect intentions on other points. If members had realized, for example, that the President was to develop a substantially complete and independent executive power of removal of officers, they might have qualified his appointing power more than they did, or have had serious questions about the executive power they had already stated. Probably no two men present understood "the executive power" of the President in quite the same way. Some might have said it did not include the power of removal of officers. At any rate, their agreement to submit the Constitution did not prove that all members were agreed as to what the Constitution did and did not provide on this or on any other issue.

2. No document recording an agreement is likely to be perfectly satisfactory to all its signers. Compromises are reached in discussion that go only part way toward satisfying the various members or parties. This was certainly true of the Constitution, as has already been noted. What can we say about "the intention of the framers" in such cases except that various members decided to yield on some points in order to gain what they wanted and intended on others? How can we be certain that all members or even a majority understood each compromise provision in the same way?

3. Being couched in words, phrases, sentences, as documents must be, the Constitution was immediately susceptible to varying interpretations on a number of points. The longer it remained in force, the more points of dispute arose. The meanings of words, phrases, and clauses were debated in the effort to prove that the intended meaning was this and not that. Even punctuation marks became the subject of dispute in a few instances, because a difference in punctuation can make a difference in meaning.

Every word is likely to have two or more variant meanings at the same time. For all practical purposes the making of dictionaries of the English language began in England in the 18th century, about sixty years before the Constitution was drafted. The lexicons or dictionaries available in America in the 1780's were mostly one-man efforts that were based largely on the usages of literary men and public figures, and not upon an exhaustive sampling of all kinds of spoken and written language. In short, they were good beginnings but were distinctly incomplete by modern standards. Even so they recorded several meanings for many words—good evidence that with more research, especially among more remote and perhaps more plebeian users of the king's English, even more variants might have been found.

Into the Constitution the framers put such words and phrases as "jury trial," "commerce," "among the several states," "ex post facto law," and "direct taxes." It is conceivable that when jury trial was agreed upon for Federal criminal cases various men thought of jury trial as practiced in their own states (and the state practices were different), while a few English-trained lawyers in the Convention might think primarily of jury trial as practiced in England. Which would be right?

Likewise, "commerce" had several meanings in current usage, as did "trade" and other comparable terms. How can anyone be sure which meaning, or that any single meaning, was intended by all the framers or by a majority of them? If Congress may regulate commerce "among the several states" does not this mean "between the several states"? James Madison, writing in *The Federalist,* No. 53, seems to have thought so, and the early Congresses acted upon this understanding. To be sure, "among" has also a somewhat different meaning, as in the sentence, "He was among his own people." But when a man is among people he is between people to the right and to the left, in front of him, and behind him, and he is not *inside* any other person. To say positively that "commerce . . . among the several states" means all commerce, trade, and manufacture, not only *between states* but also *within each state,* is indeed going very far. The dictionary evidence is too incomplete and uncertain to warrant any such dogmatic conclusion as to the intentions of the framers, especially in view of the contrary interpretation that was adopted in practice. Had competent legal draftsmen like Gouverneur Morris and his associates intended any such sweeping grant of power to Congress they could certainly have made their meaning clearer. If the intention was to give Congress full power to regulate all internal commerce, it would then as well as now have been more natural to have said "all commerce within the United States."

Conditions change in time and the words in a memorandum of agreement must be applied to the new and unanticipated circumstances. Men drafting a constitution can have intentions as to things they know about, but can hardly have any intentions concerning the unknown and unpredictable. The production of oil and natural gas, the electrical transmission of power, messages, music, and pictures, the regulation of aviation and automotive traffic, the production of atomic energy, cloud-seeding for artificial rain-making, and other modern developments, could not have been within the minds and intentions of the framers of the Constitution when they distributed the powers of government between the nation and the states. Knowing something of flux and change in human affairs, the drafters of the Constitution in stating the powers of the national government used words of broad and generic types that proved to be susceptible to considerable expansion of meaning, but they could not have foreseen the particular expansions that have taken place. That "commerce" today has a different content of meaning from what it had in 1787 is too obvious to emphasize.

Washington made it clear that in his judgment the people who came after his time would be able to decide their own constitutional questions as they arose. He disclaimed any monopoly of wisdom for himself and his fellow members of the Federal Convention. He seems to have accepted the idea of Thomas Jefferson, without quoting Jefferson's words, that a constitution of government belongs to the living and not to the dead. As far as Washington was concerned, the amending article of the Constitution was one of its principal provisions. Hamilton and Madison in their different ways, while conceding a role to the Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution, looked to the people acting through political channels as the ultimate power over the Constitution. Presumably, then, the people would not be tied down forever to the meanings of words in the Constitution as they stood in 1787.

With the passage of time, new generations of interpreters of the Constitution have arisen, and more will arise, who in spite of all the improved historical aids available to them are farther and farther from the events of 1787 and 1788; who use words differently; and who look back through a constantly lengthening and thickening maze of public events and decisions going all the way back to 1787 and beyond, but of which the most recent are likely to seem most important. The effort that would be required to overcome some of these major obstacles so as to achieve an immediate grasp of the intentions of men in 1787 is too great for most men to undertake, if indeed the result is even possible of attainment.

4. Since the Constitution was designed by its authors to supersede the Articles of Confederation, the intentions of the leading framers upon some points may be inferred from the fact that certain key words used in the Articles were left out of the Constitution. I refer to such words as confederation, confederacy, and sovereignty (of the states). The omission of such words from the Constitution could hardly have been a mere oversight. Thus it may be argued that the original Constitution was as revealing by virtue of its omissions as it was by reason of the words it included. It seems strange that this mode of arriving at the intentions of the framers has not been more fully exploited.

*The Intentions of the Later Framers.* Twenty-two amendments to the

Constitution have been adopted and put into effect. These include the Bill of Rights, the three Civil War Amendments, the Income Tax Amendment, the Direct Election of Senators and Woman Suffrage Amendments, and several others of considerable importance. Other great decisions affecting the Constitution, like the political and military defeats of nullification and of secession, have also wrought great changes in the basic rules of government in the United States. Also, as already mentioned, various Presidents, the Congress, and the Supreme Court have made numerous decisions of great constitutional significance; and the people have on the whole acquiesced in what has been done.

Thus in addition to the men of 1787 who sat down together in Philadelphia presumably to revise the Articles but actually to make a new Constitution, there have been unnumbered "framers" in later years who have impressed some of their words and intentions upon the Constitution. The original document has been overlaid with a thick and growing encrustation of constitutional rules and principles by these later framers. Just what they intended is also not always clear. What the framers of the 14th Amendment intended has become a subject for debate almost as keen as the debate over the intention of the original framers. In cases of obvious conflict, which shall be given priority, the earlier or the later framers? Can there be much doubt that in cases of conflict the later framers should prevail?

And these later additions to the Constitution raise their own questions of verbal interpretation. What is meant by the phrases "due process of law" and "equal protection of the laws," in the 14th Amendment? Here are phrases of great potential amplitude from which lawyers and judges have been able to extract various procedural and substantive restrictions on the powers of the states without reaching agreement on what the phrases mean or their framers intended.

What, then, were the intentions of the framers of these amendments? Is a definite and final answer any more nearly possible in these cases than it is in the case of the intentions of the original framers? My own answer would be no. I simply am unable to imagine what types and quantities of records would be needed to clinch any important point in the several major problems that arise. Neither can I imagine how any known method of psychoanalysis, content analysis, or plain crystal-ball gazing applied to such records or to the people who left them could give thoroughly reliable and irrefutable answers concerning the intentions of these later framers. The transition that needs to be made from the enduring and objective facts of the written words used to the fleeting, largely unexpressed, and subjective facts of the intentions of framers who passed away many years ago is beyond human capacity to make.

*The Pertinence Today of the Intentions of the Original Framers.* I am not one to discourage scholarly attempts at historical analysis in order to get at, as far as is humanly possible, what the framers of the original Constitution and of the later amendments had in mind when they formulated their respective parts of the present Constitution. On the contrary, I think that such efforts are to be commended and that students of the Constitution should be encouraged to read as widely as time permits in the offerings of historical scholarship. The nearer men can get to knowing what was intended, the better. Indeed, the search for intentions is justified as a search for the meanings that the framers had in mind for the words they used, but it is a search that must be undertaken in humility and with an awareness of its great difficulties.

At the same time, I think that the intention or intentions of the original framers should no longer be a main object of search or of emphasis by students of the Constitution, nor a principal rule of guidance for the public authorities. For this conclusion I offer several reasons.

1. If the Constitution were a contract or a treaty with definite parties in continuing existence who could claim specific guarantees of rights under the agreement, then the intentions with which those parties went into the agreement would have continuing importance, although even then they would not ordinarily override the actual terms of the agreement. But the Constitution is not of this nature. It is not a contract between the national government and the states, or a contract or treaty among the several states. It is a Constitution ordained by the people of the United States; and the people by their continued acceptance of it in a sense ordain it anew every day. "We, the people . . . ordain and establish . . . " The statement is in the present tense. The Constitution does belong to the living, and not to the dead.

2. However important the intentions of original framers may have seemed at one time, the Constitution as a total set of working rules has been so modified by "the later framers" as to give the intentions of the original framers much less significance today. The Constitution in the second half of the 20th century is a far cry from what it was in 1787–1788. If intentions are important, and I think they are to some extent, then today we must consider the intentions of many more people, and not just those of the original framers.

3. Insofar as the intentions of the original framers are still important, the recorded evidence as to those intentions has now been so fully exploited for over 160 years by competent scholars that very little really new and reliable interpretation is likely to be distilled out of it. Of course there will be reinterpretations from time to time, but insofar

as the reinterpreters keep close to what the original framers themselves said and did, and use scientifically testable methods of historical and legal analysis, no great new contributions to an understanding of the intentions of the original framers can be expected.

Several things might happen to change this judgment, however. Important collections of letters, diaries, and other records by some of the original framers may yet be discovered. Furthermore, the methods of content analysis may become so improved as to become reliably usable in the analysis of the recorded evidence, old as it is. If some improved method of content analysis can be turned toward the discovery of the intentions of the original framers from the records that they left, some further knowledge of those intentions may be gained. I should be happy to see both of these things happen—the discovery of new evidence and the improvement of the methods of analyzing the evidence.

4. Even if the new evidence and the new interpretation pointed toward a considerable revision of present ideas about what the original framers intended, they should not of themselves result in a corresponding change in the Constitution. As it stands today, the Constitution has been developed through a variety of amendments, court decisions, statutes, and practices to meet the needs of the nation of today and tomorrow. Any new discovery about the intentions of the original framers could have little more than antiquarian interest today.

# INTERPERSONAL FREEDOM AND FREEDOM OF ACTION*

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When speaking of freedom, La Bruyère's word comes to mind—that everything has been said and that we come too late to add anything. Yet an analysis of the concept of freedom may be warranted for the very reason that it is being used by everyone to refer to whatever he considers valuable, from obedience to law (positive or natural) to autonomy and economic abundance. I believe that it is possible to assign to "freedom" in its different aspects meanings which are emotively neutral and operationally testable, and thereby to rescue for the social sciences generally and for political science in particular an important set of concepts, closely related as they are to those of power and control.

One would have to start with disentangling the widely different senses in which "freedom" is being used indiscriminately.[1] I shall deal with freedom in only two of its many meanings, interpersonal freedom and freedom of action. One of the difficulties will be to steer a middle course between the vagueness of conversational language and the awkwardness of a precise terminology; but I hope to demonstrate that such an endeavor is no idle exercise in semantics but a necessary prerequisite for the fruitful investigation of social and political phenomena.

## I. INTERPERSONAL FREEDOM

"Americans are free to vote Republican or Democratic." "In Belgium (where voting is compulsory) citizens are unfree to abstain from voting, but elections are free." "Soviet citizens are free to vote, but there is no freedom of opinion in Russia." Such statements refer to what I shall call interpersonal freedom, using this term in a broad sense to include intergroup freedom. Strictly speaking, one should not use the noun "freedom" at all because it suggests the existence of some intangible object, of some abstract entity, Freedom. To protect oneself against the fallacy of reification, one should use only the adjectives "free" and "unfree" (if the words "freedom" and "unfreedom" should occur occasionally hereafter it is as a concession to ordinary language). Furthermore, the adjectives "free" and "unfree" will not refer to properties of persons, actions, or other things; hence, expressions such as "I am free," "I feel free," "I paid my income tax freely,"[2] "I live in a free society" will not occur. "Free" and "unfree" in the interpersonal sense will be used to designate *relations*. Just as "between" can be meaningfully used only in expressions of the kind: "B is between A and C, " "free" and "unfree" in the interpersonal sense acquire meaning only in contexts such as: "With respect to A, B is unfree to do x"; "A leaves B free to do $x_1$ or $x_2$."

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[1] For examples of the innumerable ways in which the words "freedom" or "liberty" are being used, see Dorothy Fosdick, *What is Liberty?* (New York, 1939), and *Freedom—Its Meaning*, ed. Anshen (New York, 1940). In these and other volumes, I have found no definition of freedom which would be satisfactory from the point of view of the present analysis, not even in Maurice Cranston's stimulating and penetrating *Freedom, A New Analysis* (London, 1953).

*1. Interpersonal Unfreedom Defined.* I shall first give a definition for the concept of interpersonal unfreedom, which is the simpler of the two. Like all terms which stand for relations, "unfree" cannot be defined in isolation, as we could define "hard," but only contextually, as we would define "between." Accordingly, I shall inquire into the meaning, not of "unfree," but of the expression: "A makes B unfree to do x." Indeed, whoever speaks of unfreedom in the interpersonal sense asserts, at least implicitly, that, with respect to some particular individual or group A, some other individual or group B is unfree to perform some particular action or kind of action x. I believe that the following definition of interpersonal unfreedom captures as adequately as possible the meaning which is generally implied when this concept occurs in political writings:[3] "A makes B unfree to do x" means that *A makes it impossible for B to do x or A would punish B if B did x.* A and B stand for individuals or groups. x stands for anything which it is logically possible for anyone to do. "Doing" refers to any kind of behavior, including abstaining from doing something. x may refer to an instantaneous act (e.g., voting) or to a course of action (e.g., running for President). In the expression: "A *makes* B unfree to do x," x refers to something which B will or might do in the future. When we say that A *made* B unfree to do x, x stands for an action which B did perform or might have performed in the past. As to the words "impossible" and "punishment," which occur in the definition of "unfree," they refer, like "unfree" itself, to relations, and will in turn be contextually defined as follows: "A makes it impossible for B to do x" means that, were B to attempt to do x, A would restrain him from carrying out x; i.e., B's attempt would be fruitless because of some action of A, whatever other reasons may account for B's failure to bring about x.[4] "A punishes B for having done x" means that A (rightly or wrongly) believes that B did x and for this reason intentionally imposes some deprivation on B.

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[2] Actions may be said to be free or unfree, but in a sense quite different from that of interpersonal freedom, as will be shown.

[3] The kind of definition which occurs in this article is what logicians call *explication*. "Taking its departure from the customary meanings of the terms, explication aims at reducing the limitations, ambiguities and inconsistencies of their ordinary usage by propounding a reinterpretation intended to enhance the clarity and precision of their meanings as well as their ability to function in hypotheses and theories with explanatory and predictive force. Thus understood, an explication cannot be qualified simply as true or false; but it may be adjudged more or less adequate according to the extent to which it attains its objectives." Carl G. Hempel, *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science* (Chicago, 1952), p. 12.

[4] The definition of unfreedom could therefore also be stated as follows: "A makes B unfree to do x" means that, were B to *attempt* to do x, A would restrain B from doing x; or, were B to *do* x, A would punish B for having done x. Unfreedom is thus defined in terms of the *disposition* of A to act in a certain way (to restrain or to punish) under

It can readily be seen that this definition fulfills the requirements of operationalism, and hence of a useful scientific terminology, namely, that statements in which the defined term occurs can in principle be empirically tested, provided the term is understood in the sense in which it has been defined.[5] Thus, an observer can in principle determine whether or not B is *objectively* unfree to do x[6] regardless of whether or not B *feels* free or unfree to do x. A simple and homespun example may be helpful. With respect to his parents, John was unfree to go to the movies yesterday, if any of the following conditions hold: 1. John attempted to go, but his parents did not give him money. 2. John stayed home; had he tried to go, he would have been unable to do so because his parents would not have given him money.[7] 3. John did go; afterwards his parents deprived him for having gone. By a similar procedure we could test the statement: "With respect to his parents, John is unfree to go to the movies tomorrow." We would ask whether the parents would restrain John if he tried to go or deprive him if he were to go.

These examples show that the concept of interpersonal unfreedom has been defined in such a way that statements about interpersonal unfreedom can be objectively tested. As will be pointed out, the concept of interpersonal unfreedom has not been identified with that of social control.

*2. Interpersonal Freedom Defined.* One might think that "free" in the interpersonal sense is simply the opposite of "unfree." If John was not punished for having gone to the movies, or if the parents would not punish him if he went, may we not conclude that he was or is free to go? That this conclusion does not follow can be shown by another example: Were I to pay my income tax, the Treasury would not penalize me. Am I free to pay my income tax? I am required to pay (since I would be penalized if I did not pay); it would therefore be counterintuitive to say that I am free to do so. Perhaps we should say that A leaves B free to do x provided A makes B neither unfree to do x nor unfree not to do x. This definition might be satisfactory if everyone were always confronted with the choice between exactly two actions, doing something and not doing it.

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certain conditions. "Soluble in water" is another example of a disposition term. "x is soluble in water" means that, were x immersed in water, x would dissolve.

[5] For a concise and lucid presentation of the modern view on operationalism, see Hempel, pp. 39–50. See also the symposium on "The Present State of Operationalism" in *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 79, pp. 209–31 (Oct., 1954). Our approach is similar to Lasswell's endeavor "of relating scientific ideas to materials ultimately accessible to direct observation" by analyzing key concepts of political science "in terms of *concrete interpersonal relationships* of influence and control. The experiential data of political science are *acts* considered as affecting or *determining other acts*." Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven, 1950), p. xiv (italics mine).

[6] I should add: "with respect to A," but shall from here on omit this and similar clauses with the understanding that they are always implied.

[7] Such contrary-to-fact conditionals can in principle be verified by reference to general laws, like other empirical statements. See Roderick M. Chisholm, "The Contrary-to-Fact Conditional," *Mind*, Vol. 55, pp. 289–307 (Oct., 1946); reprinted in *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, ed. Feigl and Sellars (New York, 1949), pp. 482–97.

Such a definition would be of no avail, however, when there are more than two alternative courses of action open to the actor, as in the following fictitious case: If it were possible, but punishable, to vote Communist in the United States, would the voters be free to vote Republican? They would not be punished if they voted Republican, nor if they voted not Republican but Democratic.

We must therefore conclude that a statement such as: "A leaves B free to do x" is meaningless. We would have to reply to the question whether voters (in our example) are free to vote Republican by pointing out that they are free with respect to the alternative: voting Republican or voting Democratic, and unfree to vote Communist. While one is unfree to do something, one is free to pursue any one of a series of alternative actions.[8] I shall therefore use only expressions of the kind: "A leaves B free with respect to the series of alternative actions $x_1$, $x_2$, . . . etc." The concept of interpersonal freedom will be defined by defining the expression just quoted to mean that, *A does not make it impossible for B to do either* $x_1$, *or* $x_2$, *or . . . etc., and A would not punish B for doing any of those actions.* For example, with respect to his parents, John was free to go to the movies (which he did) or to the game yesterday, if his parents did not punish him for having gone to the movies, if they did not make it impossible for him to go to the game, and if they would not have punished him had he gone to the game.[9]

Freedom in the interpersonal sense has generally been defined as absence of restraint upon some specific kinds of actions rather than with reference to alternatives. This inaccuracy has opened the way to proclaiming that there should be freedom to propagate "truth" but not "error," or that Russians are free to work (instead of saying that they are unfree to abstain from working), or that citizens are "free to obey the law"—and from here it is only one step to the doctrine that freedom *is* obedience to law (or to the "general will"). The alternatives must be clearly specified to avoid misunderstanding. If "freedom of religion" means that one is free with respect to joining any denomination or adhering to none, then Americans enjoy freedom of religion with respect to their government, but not with respect to influential groups in small communities who would subject "atheists" to all kinds of non-institutional deprivations.[10]

*3. Some Criteria Examined.* The definitions of interpersonal freedom and unfreedom may seem either unnecessarily complicated or trivial—or perhaps both.

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[8] Several actions form a series of alternative actions for someone if it is impossible for him to perform any two of these actions simultaneously (he need not be able to perform a single one). Thus, going east and going west constitutes a series of alternative actions; not so, having a wife and having a mistress (provided "simultaneously" is not taken too literally).

[9] While interpersonal freedom must refer to series of alternative actions, interpersonal unfreedom may refer either to actions or to alternatives. In our example, voters are unfree to vote Communist; unfree with respect to: voting Republican, or Democratic, or Communist; free to vote either Republican or Democratic.

[10] The definition of "freedom of religion" shows that it is not always necessary to specify all alternatives explicitly.

That they are neither may be shown by considering the reasons for which certain criteria were included and others excluded from these definitions.

(*a*) *Deprivation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of unfreedom.* While every punishment is by definition a deprivation and an instance of unfreedom, there are deprivations which do not constitute punishment and do not restrict the victim's freedom. Suppose A hits B, simply because he dislikes him, and does so regardless of B's behavior. If someone asserted that A thereby made B unfree, he would be unable to answer the question: unfree to do what? Or, suppose that A threatens B with punishment in case B did x. Listening to A's threat may be disvaluable to B and thus deprive him. Yet, A has not made B unfree to disregard the threat. Whether B is unfree to do x with respect to A depends only on whether A would apply the threatened penalty to B if B were to do x. Thus, a "no trespass" sign may be a frustrating sight to me, and I am unfree in a legal sense (not to be discussed here) to trespass; in a behavioristic, interpersonal sense, I am unfree to trespass only if I were caught and fined in case I trespassed.

One might argue that there is little difference in one's experience between being threatened before or deprived after one starts acting. Yet, to make the concepts of interpersonal freedom and unfreedom fruitful for the social sciences, one must distinguish between making someone unfree to do something and influencing him by means of threats not to do so. It might also be objected that one often succeeds in deterring someone else from doing something merely by threatening him beforehand, even if one were unwilling or unable to carry out one's threat. This shows that making someone unfree to do something is only one of several methods of controlling him.[11] Another way of modifying his behavior is to instill in him, by means of threats, the mistaken belief that he is unfree to do what in fact he remains free to do or not to do. People have been controlled by the mere threat of divine sanctions which could hardly be carried out—at least not in this world. Whether a government has limited the freedom of its citizens in a particular area of activity depends therefore not so much on the legislation it has enacted as on the extent to which the sanctions contained in the laws would be applied in case of violation.

Not only can there be deprivation without unfreedom, but also unfreedom without deprivation, as may be illustrated by the following example: B attempts to do x against his will, because C compels him to do so; A makes it impossible for B to carry out x. With respect to A, B is unfree to do x, even though B is likely to be gratified rather than deprived by A's restraining action.[12]

(*b*) *Deprivation is a necessary condition of punishment.* While deprivation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for interpersonal unfreedom in general, unfreedom by punishment does involve deprivation. Whether some (actual or hypothetical) action of A constitutes a punishment of B depends on whether B does or would experience A's action as a deprivation.

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[11] Concerning the different control techniques, see Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (New York, 1953), pp. 93 ff.

[12] It seems at first tempting to define the concept of interpersonal unfreedom (and, by analogy, of freedom) in terms of deprivation, as follows: "A makes B unfree to do x" means that A would deprive B if B attempted to do or did x. It can now readily be seen that our definition, while less elegant and more complicated, constitutes a more adequate explication (see note 3).

The necessity of finding out whether B disvalues or would disvalue A's behavior may be a practical, but unavoidable, disadvantage of the proposed definition. It involves no theoretical difficulty, however, since assertions about somebody else's valuations and preferences are of empirical character and can in principle be tested behavioristically. Besides, social scientists are interested in intergroup freedom rather than in interpersonal freedom in the strict sense. In general they do not need to know whether some particular person would feel frustrated by someone else's behavior, but only to answer the simpler question whether people belonging to a certain group would on the whole be adversely affected by certain measures applied to them by some other group.

Furthermore, we need not specify the degree to which A's action is disvaluable to B. The slightest deprivation would be sufficient to make B unfree to do x.[13] Thus, almost everybody is unfree to disregard parking regulations, because paying a dollar fine is felt as a deprivation by almost everybody—by some as a severe, by others as a light deprivation, too light to some to deter them from parking in prohibited areas. Those to whom paying a dollar means no deprivation whatsoever are free to park where they want. While everyone is legally unfree to do what is penalized, some may be interpersonally free to obey or to violate a legal norm, either because the sanction would not be applied to them (as mentioned before) or because they would suffer no deprivation from its application. In this respect, the very wealthy and those with a stoic disposition fall into the same category.

(*c*) *A's intention is irrelevant.* Whenever A makes B unfree to do x by punishing him if he did x, A would do so intentionally, since punishment is by definition an intentional deprivation. If A makes B unfree to do x by making it impossible for B to do so, A may do so unintentionally. The low price at which Swiss watches were sold in the United States prompted the American government to raise the tariff on watches. Its intent was, not to impose a deprivation on any particular Swiss watch manufacturer, but to protect domestic industry and national defense. Swiss watch makers were nevertheless made unfree to export their products to the United States without paying increased duties. Having hired someone, the employer makes everybody else unable to fill the position, and unfree to do so, even though he may not intend to deprive anyone in particular of employment.

(*d*) *B's behavior is irrelevant.* To determine whether B is unfree to do x, we need not predict what B *will* do; we need only ask: If B *were* to try to do x, or did x, would A restrain or punish him? Nor do we need to know whether B believes, rightly or wrongly, that A would restrain or punish him; B may not know of the impending sanction and thus *feel* free to do x even though he *is* objectively unfree to do so. Nor do we need to anticipate what will motivate B to do whatever he will do. Everybody is free to do or not to do various things he never intends to do, and unfree to do many things he would not want to do or could not do if he wanted to. Our definition is therefore incompatible with statements such as: "Freedom in general may be defined as the absence of obstacles as to the realization of *desires*,"[14] or "A penal law against murder only limits the freedom of would-be murderers."[15] This law, or rather its application, makes everyone unfree to murder: murderers, would-be murderers, and those who never intend to engage in such activity. True, the latter abstain from murdering "freely," whereas the would-be murderer's abstention is "unfree" because motivated by fear of punishment. If we speak in this manner of an *action* being free, we are using "free" in a sense which has nothing to do with the concept of interpersonal freedom, nor with that of freedom of action to which we shall now turn.

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[13] It is beyond the scope of this article to define degrees of interpersonal unfreedom and to demonstrate that the degree to which A makes B unfree to do x can in principle be measured, so that one can speak of being more unfree to do $x_1$, than to do $x_2$.

## II. FREEDOM OF ACTION

"Liberty connotes the fullest and richest possible development of the possibilities of the personality of the citizens."[16] "One who has not the material means with which to gratify his desires is, other things being equal, less free than one who has."[17] Such statements are concerned not so much with interpersonal freedom as with someone's ability to do certain things under certain circumstances. This may be referred to by the term "freedom of action," although it will be shown that it is misleading to use the word "freedom" at all in this connection.

*1. Freedom of Action Defined.* Freedom of action in the sense of possibility of acting designates again a relational property; but unlike the concept of interpersonal freedom, that of freedom of action refers to a relation between *one* individual or group and an action or kind of action. "It is possible for A to do x under given circumstances" means that if A should decide to do x under these circumstances, x would come about as a consequence of A's action.[18] If we anticipate that x would not materialize if A decided to bring x about, we conclude that it is impossible for A to do x, or that x is not open to A, or that A is unable to do x in a given situation and at a given time. A's inability to do x may be due to some physical obstacle outside of A or to a psychological factor in A. Either kind of impediment may or may not be caused by some other person's interference.

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[14] Bertrand Russell, "Freedom and Government," in *Freedom—Its Meaning,* p. 251 (italics added).

[15] E. F. Carritt, *Ethical and Political Thinking* (Oxford, 1947), p. 161.

[16] Charles E. Merriam, *Systematic Politics* (Chicago, 1945), p. 56.

[17] J. Roland Pennock, *Liberal Democracy: Its Merits and Prospects* (New York, 1950), p. 60.

[18] We can therefore say of every past action that it was possible for its actor to perform it. "Possible" is taken here in the sense of empirically possible rather than logically possible. The following are two classical examples of the use of "liberty" in the sense of freedom of action: " . . . liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind" (John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* Bk. 2, Ch. 21, Sec. 8); "By liberty, then, we can only mean the power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will" (David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* Sec. 8, Pt. 1, Art. 73).

It can now readily be seen that it is misleading to say that A is free to do x when we mean that it is possible for A to do so. Perhaps this misuse of the word "free" is due to the unfortunate doctrine of "free will." It is true that, whenever an action (in the sense of purposive behavior) is open to someone, there exists at least one alternative action which it is possible for him to perform instead. Indeterminists hold, erroneously, that, when several alternative actions are open to someone, one can never predict which of them he will perform. Adding to this error the confusion between "law" in the predictive and in the prescriptive sense, they conclude that the actor is "free" from the laws of causality just as a citizen in a democracy is free from despotic rule.

*2. Freedom of Action and Interpersonal Freedom.* What are the possible interrelationships between so-called freedom of action and interpersonal freedom, or rather, between being able or unable to do something, and being free or unfree to do it with respect to some particular individual or group?

(*a*) *B may be able to do x, and free to do or not to do x, with respect to A.* For example, if A persuades B to refrain from doing x, B may nevertheless be able to carry out his original intention. Furthermore, A, by persuading B not to do x, does not thereby make B unfree to do x, even if A uses threats, and even if B experiences them as deprivations. While B's refraining from doing x is controlled by A, B remains free, with respect to A, to do or not to do x, as well as able to act either way.[19]

(*b*) *B may be unable to do x, yet free to do or not to do x with respect to A.* Inability does not necessarily imply unfreedom. So-called unfreedom of action is compatible with interpersonal freedom. Indeed, B may be incapable of doing x because of some natural obstacle or because of his own lack of intelligence or patience. When B's inability to do x is not due to anybody else's behavior, B remains free, with respect to everybody, either to refrain from doing x (which he cannot help but do) or to do x (which he is unable to do). Expressions such as: "nature, or my own conscience, makes me unfree to act" refer to inability, not to interpersonal unfreedom. Furthermore, if B's inability to do x is caused, not by A, but by C, B is unfree to do x with respect to C, but free to do or not to do x with respect to A.

(*c*) *B may be unable to do x, as well as unfree to do x with respect to A.* If, however, B's inability to do x can be causally linked to some definite action (or abstention) of some definite person or group A, then B is both unable to do x, and unfree to do x with respect to A. A may either make it impossible for B to do x before B attempts to do so (B may not even make such an attempt), or react to B's endeavor to do x by restraining him from reaching his goal. The former situation is the more typical of political and economic relations. For example, most sellers determine the sales price beforehand, and thereby make everybody unfree as well as unable to acquire an article without paying the price. On the other hand, the seller leaves everyone free to buy or not to buy it. Some, however, will be unable to buy, or unfree to do so with respect to someone other than the seller.

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[19] For the sake of simplicity, we assume in this section that B is confronted with exactly two alternative courses of action, doing x and abstaining from doing x.

Another example: before the enactment of minimum wage laws employers were free, with respect to the government, to hire workers for any wage, and often they were able to hire them at starvation wages. Workers were unable to earn a living wage, and unfree to do so with respect to the employers. With respect to the government, however, workers were free to earn any wage. By enacting and enforcing a minimum wage law, the government made employers and employees unfree to settle for less than a minimum wage. Workers were enabled to earn the legal wage, free to earn that much or more with respect to the government, and free to earn that much or less relative to the employers. The latter continued to be able to hire cheap labor, but not to escape penalties if they did.

(*d*) *B may be able to do x but unfree to do so with respect to A.* In the last example, the employers are able to violate the minimum wage law, but unfree to do so with respect to the government. If the prediction is warranted that, should B do x, A would afterwards punish him for having done so, we conclude: (1) that with respect to A, B is unfree to do x; (2) that it may be possible for B to do x; (3) that it is impossible for B to do x without suffering some deprivation afterwards.

Now it becomes clear that there can be, not only control without unfreedom, but also unfreedom without control. As indicated before, A may control B by threatening him beforehand, but doing so does not make B unfree to disregard the threat (unless A would carry it out). On the other hand, by deciding to punish B if he should do x, A makes B unfree to do x, but A does not thereby necessarily control B's behavior with respect to x. If A actually punishes B for having done x, he implicitly acknowledges that he was unable or unwilling to control B's behavior with respect to x, although he might still hope that the punishment will deter B from doing something similar a second time. If, on the other hand, A makes it impossible for B to do x, then A not only does make B unfree to do x but also controls B's abstaining from doing x.

*3. Freedom of Action and Positive Freedom.* Perhaps one is left with the impression that the difference between interpersonal freedom and ability to act is nothing but the textbook distinction between negative freedom or "freedom from" of classical liberalism which became modern conservatism, and positive freedom or "freedom to" of the neo-liberals and Socialists. It will be shown that this is not the case, and that both doctrines must be criticized from the point of view of our analysis.

In both theories the word "free" designates a property of individuals, and has a purely normative meaning. Both say that "men are free" even when government makes them unfree to do certain things (as it always does), provided it *ought* to make them unfree to do so. Thus, classical liberalism considers men free when the government makes them unfree to encroach upon each other's "basic rights," provided it leaves them free in all other respects. Accordingly, to be punished for larceny does not limit one's freedom, while the application of a minimum wage law would. The modern doctrine proclaims that "necessitous men are not free men,"[20] and that government restricts freedom by "arbitrary restraint" but not by "reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community."[21] According to our definition, interpersonal freedom is always "from" and "to"; thus, if one would be punished for doing something, one is unfree to do it, regardless of whether such a measure is "reasonable" or "arbitrary," i.e., desirable or not. To consider only those measures as restricting liberty of which one happens to disapprove is to use the terms "free" and "unfree" in an emotive sense and thus to make them unsuitable for empirical science.

Furthermore, classical liberalism regarded government as the only agent capable of limiting individual freedom, and the neo-liberals are correct in pointing out this error of their predecessors. Unfortunately, the advocates of positive freedom often state this criticism ambiguously by emphasizing that "the most ancient, persistent, and oppressive enemies of liberty are not external hindrances, whether physical or human, but poverty and ignorance."[22] One may be *unable* to do something because of "physical hindrances"; one is *unfree* to do certain things only because of the interference by other men.

It might be argued in defense of the neo-liberals' way of speaking that they mean to refer, not to interpersonal freedom, but to freedom of action, and that they can therefore be criticized only for using the term "free" where it would be less ambiguous to speak of being *able* to act. It seems questionable, however, whether the advocates of positive freedom really mean to urge the government merely to enable citizens to do certain things which it would be impossible for them to accomplish without government aid. "Freedom from want" certainly does not mean only that everyone should be *free,* with respect to government and employers, to earn a certain minimum wage. Nor does it mean simply that government should make it *possible* for everyone to earn enough to be "free from want" (e.g., by making both employers and employees unfree to settle for less than a certain wage). "Freedom from want" means absence of want and presence of a certain minimum living standard for all. It is true that to enable everyone to earn a certain wage is one of the necessary conditions for bringing about this state of affairs, and that, if everyone enjoys economic security, everyone will be able and free to do things he would otherwise be incapable of doing and unfree to do. However, the neo-liberals value the existence of economic security for all intrinsically, and not merely because of the conditions necessary for bringing it about or because of its consequences. The word "freedom" is being used in "freedom from want" in a purely metaphorical sense

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[20] Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress, January 11, 1944, quoted by Edward S. Corwin, *Liberty against Government* (Baton Rouge, 1948), p. 4.

[21] *Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.* v. *McGuire,* 219 U. S. 549 (1911).

[22] Ralph B. Perry, "Liberty in a Democratic State," in *Freedom—Its Meaning,* p. 269.

(unlike in "freedom of speech"), and the same may be said of expressions such as "freedom from fear" or "freedom from ignorance." Because "freedom" has a favorable emotive connotation one is inclined to stretch its meaning to make it cover whatever social state of affairs one happens to consider desirable.[23] It would make for clarity to distinguish between the value judgment that economic security for all is intrinsically desirable, and the empirical statement that this goal will be reached only if government makes citizens unfree to do certain things and leaves them free in certain other areas of activity.

## CONCLUSION

While it would be advisable not to use the terms "freedom of action" and "positive freedom" at all, it is possible to speak of interpersonal freedom and unfreedom in the sense specified by the definitions given here. The two concepts enable us to distinguish between being free and being able to do something, as well as between making someone unfree to do something and controlling his behavior. It has been shown that both pairs of categories, unfreedom-inability and unfreedom-control, may or may not overlap in particular instances.

The words "freedom" and "free" and their opposites are being used in many other contexts. Only a few of them have been mentioned here: to be legally free, to feel free, to act freely. Some of these expressions can be operationally defined; others are purely normative, as, for example, "a free society"; a society is free if its members are interpersonally free in those areas of activity with respect to which they *ought* to be left free. An analysis of freedom in all of its meanings might lead to the conclusion that this term might profitably be replaced by its various defining expressions. This would be no objection against attempting such an analysis, but on the contrary a justification, since "to define a sign is to show how to avoid it."[24]

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[23] For example, an UNESCO Committee of Experts arrived at the following "working definition" of "liberty": "By liberty they mean more than only the absence of restraint. They mean also the positive organization of the social and economic conditions within which men can participate to a maximum as active members of the community and contribute to the welfare of the community at the highest level permitted by the material development of the society." Quoted by Richard McKeon, "Philosophic Differences and Issues of Freedom," *Ethics*, Vol. 61, pp. 105–35, at p. 107 (Jan., 1951).

[24] Willard V. Quine, *Mathematical Logic* (New York, 1940), p. 47.

# PERCEPTIONS OF CLASS AND PARTY IN VOTING BEHAVIOR: 1952*

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Political differences among people are not a matter of chance; they are significantly related to such interdependent variables as party identification, issue orientation, and candidate preference.[1] The national sample survey of 1,614 respondents conducted by the Survey Research Center during the 1952 presidential election gives us a sound basis for investigating this phenomenon: 1,200 of the respondents were classified as "middle class" or "working class."[2] Of the 389 middle class people, 69 per cent said they preferred the Republican candidate, but only 43 per cent of the 811 working class people expressed this preference (Table I).

TABLE I. VOTING PREFERENCES OF MIDDLE AND WORKING CLASS PEOPLE IN 1952
[Per cent]

| Voting Preference | Middle Class Respondents N=389 | Working Class Respondents N=811 |
|---|---|---|
| Democratic | 30 | 54 |
| Republican | 69 | 43 |
| Other, Don't Know, Refused | 1 | 3 |
| Total | 100 | 100 |

Voting for one party or the other is obviously very much related to people's socio-economic position and to the social structure of society generally. Indeed, from Aristotle to Harold J. Laski, the relationship between "class" and "party" has been one of the "grand problems," so-called, of political speculation. It has also remained one of the most neglected areas of political analysis. This is all the more ironic because, as Oliver Garceau has suggested, "class has been a central and perhaps the most persistent conceptual schema in political theory."[3]

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[1] See Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill., 1954); and "Political Issues and the Vote: November, 1952," this REVIEW, Vol. 47, pp. 359–85 (June, 1953).

[2] Of the original sample of 1,614 respondents interviewed both prior to and after the election, 414 cases, including farmers, housewives, and other occupational groupings, had to be dropped because they could not be properly classified as "middle class" or "working class."

[3] Oliver Garceau, "Research in the Political Process," this REVIEW, Vol. 45, pp. 69–85, at p. 82 (March, 1951).

This analysis seeks to relate class to party through an examination of certain facets of voting behavior in the 1952 presidential election. In particular, it is designed to investigate the following questions:

1. Just what do party differences among America's two major classes mean to class members themselves?
2. To what extent and under what conditions do "class" and/or "party" enter the voters' focus of attention in the voting decision?
3. Is perception of social class as a factor in giving direction to voting behavior a function of "class awareness," or is such perception a function of projecting one's party preferences on class?
4. Does perception of how one's class will vote influence the voting preferences of members of a given class?
5. To what extent is perception of how one's class will vote related to an attitudinal orientation in terms of "interest?"
6. Is such "interest-orientation" derived from a class-related or a party-related frame of reference, or possibly from both?
7. How is perception of how one's own class will vote related to perception of how the other class will vote?
8. How do the classes perceive each other's "interest-orientation" in regard to party preferences?
9. How does inter-class perception of class voting behavior compare with actual voting preferences?
10. What consequences for the two-party system are implicit in the crystallization of perceptual differences between the classes, on the one hand, or the perceptual blurring of class differences, on the other hand?

For the purposes of this study, two "classes" were constructed by dichotomizing the 1,200 respondents who could be classified as "middle class" or "working class" on an Index of Status Characteristics based on occupation, income, and education. Forty-five different combinations of occupational, income, and educational status were placed in a cross-tabulation matrix which permitted each respondent to occupy suitable positions in the three status hierarchies, and which yielded nine summary scores for every combination of status positions possible in the matrix. The resultant status categories were combined into "upper middle class, lower middle class, upper working class, lower working class" on the basis of the frequency distribution of all respondents found in the matrix. The terms "middle class" and "working class" were adopted as descriptions for convenience only; they are admittedly arbitrary and ambiguous concepts.[4]

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[4] However, there may be some legitimacy in using these terms. On a "subjective" index of social class, not used here, 35 per cent of the respondents identified themselves as "middle class," 58 per cent as "working class," two per cent as "upper class," and another two per cent as "lower class," while three per cent did not know or could not be ascertained. In other words, 93 per cent of all respondents accepted either "middle class" or "working class" as properly descriptive of their class position.

An analysis of the relationship between class and party in voting behavior must deal with latent as well as with manifest variables. For the relationship need not be a direct one: it may be mediated by the perceptions of people in different classes of their own voting behavior and that of others. An inquiry, therefore, into people's perceptions of the voting behavior of their own class and of the other class should contribute to a fuller understanding of the relationship between class and party in American politics. Moreover, in this context voting appears not as an isolated act, but as an act which is intrinsically connected with a more or less structured social situation. Finally, this type of analysis may explain at least in part why it is that the class basis of political behavior—a fact which cannot be denied—is not as easily identified as is the party basis of political behavior.

The political process in a democratic society is predicated on the operation of a party system precisely because society-wide decision-making cannot be entrusted to groups or classes which are exclusively oriented towards the achievement of some special values in preference to others. Indeed, it has been argued that an effective party system implies agreement "both on basic processes and on basic issues."[5] It is admitted, of course, that "in practice socio-economic classes are affiliated in various degrees with different political parties," but it is maintained that "any full identification of party and class is perilous to the democratic structure,"[6] and the conclusion is drawn that "where the party system really operates there cannot be an identification of party and class."[7]

For operational purposes of empirical research we may assume a degree of association between class and party which varies with time and conditions. One would want to ascertain not only the precise degree of such association, but also the factors which make for variation of association. The relationship between class and party can then be conceptualized as a continuum from "no association" to "full association."

If the party system operates with considerable indifference to class stratification, the social situation is presumably one of high mobility and relatively weak "class awareness." The parties are hardly distinguishable from one another with respect to principles or objectives. The party struggle is one between the "ins" and the "outs."

On the other hand, if the social situation is one of low mobility and high "class awareness," the parties are likely to divide on issues, notably economic issues—with voters higher in the class scale preferring one party or group of parties, and those in the lower strata preferring another party or group of parties.

The two-party system is endangered, therefore, if the parties become too closely identified in voter perceptions with particular classes. Of course, if by

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[5] Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (New York, 1953), p. 295.

[6] Robert M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York, 1947), p. 211.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

"class consciousness" in political behavior is meant the frank admission that a person should vote for one party rather than the other because such support would serve his "class interest," class consciousness probably does not exist in America. But if it can be shown that in people's perceptions of the voting behavior of their own class and the voting behavior of the other class, elements of relevance to their class position are present, some kind of "generalized class awareness" may be said to operate in the political situation. Moreover, if one class perceives itself as voting in one direction (and in fact does so vote) and also perceives the other class as voting significantly in the direction of another party, the perceptual image may have certain consequences for the future of the two-party system. For the reality of political behavior is reflected in these perceptions.

It is assumed, therefore, that while the two-party system by no means presupposes an altogether open-class society, and while a certain amount of identification with class interests would not *ipso facto* stamp the parties as class parties, the problem is one of relative fluidity and flexibility of party composition in terms of specified class attributes.

Needless to say, the hypothesis that the party system is a function of class structure and class perceptions, even if empirically verified, would assume a pretty one-sided picture of the total political situation. In the first place, many aggregates other than classes exert a considerable influence on the functioning of the American party system.[8] And secondly, there are structural properties in the voting situation which make for the continuance of the two-party system.[9]

No categorical claim, therefore, can be made for the class hypothesis. Yet the facts of class may be useful in understanding the social composition of the competing parties and the party identification or issue orientation of party followers. They may be indicative of the degree to which the parties must mobilize different strata of the population. Questions arise concerning the cohesiveness of classes and their mutual perceptions. The mobilization function of the parties is either facilitated or obstructed by these facts. And, finally, gradual alteration of the class structure may influence the structure of the party system—if not alone, possibly in combination with variables tending in the same direction.

The general question is raised, then, whether voting behavior and political perceptions are influenced, if not determined, by people's position in the social structure. And if they are, the further question arises whether people are aware of the influence—to the point of letting their political choices be affected by their awareness of class-related political differences.

## I. SELF-PERCEPTION OF SOCIAL CLASSES

"If men define situations as real," W. I. Thomas wrote many years ago, "they are real in their consequences." It is of some importance, therefore, to determine whether the reality of social class in voting behavior and perception of it correspond to one another. For failure to perceive the political situation realistically may be as significant for the operation of the party system as a more accurate assessment. Interest is focused here not so much on the effect of perceptions or mis-perceptions of individuals, as on the collective images which the two classes have of themselves and each other with respect to their voting practices.[10]

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[8] See Dahl and Lindblom, pp. 330–33, for a list.

[9] See V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York, 1952), p. 231, for relevant items.

The pre-election interview was conducted between September 15 and election day of 1952 by the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. Respondents were asked the following question:[11]

> Now I'd like to ask some questions about how you think *other* people will vote in this election—How about *working class* people—do you think they will vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or do you think they will be about evenly split?

In order to place subsequent findings in their proper quantitative context, it is essential to note the total distribution of perception of middle and working class voting behavior regardless of political direction. Of the total of 1,200 respondents, only a little more than a majority could definitely say whether their own class would vote either Democratic or Republican. The rest saw their class as about evenly split in its political commitments or did not know how their class would vote. In other words, 42 per cent of the 1,200 respondents were ambiguous in their expectations of the voting behavior of their own class or had no expectations at all. Among 389 middle class respondents, 55 per cent ventured to give their perception of the expected middle class vote, while 59 per cent of 811 working class respondents indicated awareness of their own class vote (Table II).

TABLE II. MIDDLE AND WORKING CLASS EXPECTATIONS OF OWN CLASS VOTE IN 1952

[Per cent]

| Own Class Will Vote: | Middle Class Respondents N=389 | Working Class Respondents N=811 |
|---|---|---|
| Democratic | 15 | 52 |
| Republican | 40 | 7 |
| Split | 32 | 25 |
| Don't Know | 13 | 16 |
| Total | 100 | 100 |

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[10] From the point of view of the individual person, the tendency of people to see themselves and others in similar ways may be explained in terms of "perception" theory: because people have the need to feel supported in their political practices and opinions, they tend to perceive those whom they like and are associated with as seeing things in very much the same way as they do themselves. These perceptions may be close to reality, or they may be distorted. In either case they fulfill the same psychological function.

[11] The same question was asked concerning the expected voting behavior of the middle class people, farmers, big business men, labor unionists, Negroes, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews.

Of the 212 middle class respondents giving a directional answer, a majority of 73 per cent perceived their class as voting Republican, while of the 481 working class respondents only 12 per cent saw their class as voting Republican. In other words, of those who could identify their class as voting in the direction of one party or the other, working class people overwhelmingly saw their class as voting Democratic, while middle class people almost equally strongly perceived their class as committed to the Republicans (Table III).

TABLE III. PERCEPTION OF OWN CLASS VOTE OF MIDDLE AND WORKING CLASS PEOPLE WHO GAVE VOTE DIRECTION

[Per cent]

| Own Class Will Vote: | Middle Class Respondents N=212 | Working Class Respondents N=481 |
|---|---|---|
| Democratic | 27 | 88 |
| Republican | 73 | 12 |
| Total | 100 | 100 |

About the same distribution holds if the two classes are divided into upper and lower sub-classes (Table IV).

TABLE IV. PERCEPTION OF OWN CLASS VOTE BY UPPER AND LOWER MIDDLE AND WORKING CLASS PEOPLE WHO GAVE VOTE DIRECTION

[Per cent]

| Own Class Will Vote | Upper Middle Class Respondents N=77 | Lower Middle Class Respondents N=135 | Upper Working Class Respondents N=265 | Lower Working Class Respondents N=216 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Democratic | 27 | 27 | 86 | 89 |
| Republican | 73 | 73 | 14 | 11 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

The major classes, then, perceived themselves as voting in opposite directions. If this finding were taken at face value, it would indicate that both parties are well on the way to becoming "class parties," in the sense that they are perceived as deriving their main support from different and distinct sectors in the social structure. But before accepting this finding as a conclusion, the perceptual image of the parties held by the two classes must be subjected to further and more detailed scrutiny.

The hypothesis suggests itself that the perceptual image of the two parties noted above is not so much a function of accurate perception as of "projection" of class members' own political preferences. It is necessary, therefore, to "control" for party preferences. If party preferences are held constant, it appears that while the general picture does not change to any considerable extent, middle class Democratic voters are less willing than are middle class Republican voters to concede the middle class vote to the Republicans. On the other hand, whether they prefer the Republicans or the Democrats, working class people perceive their own class as voting Democratic (Table V).

TABLE V. PERCEPTION OF OWN CLASS VOTE BY REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC MIDDLE AND WORKING CLASS PEOPLE

[Per cent]

| Own Class Will Vote: | Preferred Vote | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Republican | | Democratic | |
| | Middle Class Respondents N = 269 | Working Class Respondents N = 346 | Middle Class Respondents N = 116 | Working Class Respondents N = 431 |
| Democratic | 7 | 33 | 32 | 70 |
| Republican | 52 | 14 | 10 | 3 |
| Split | 28 | 36 | 44 | 15 |
| Don't Know | 13 | 17 | 14 | 12 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

It is interesting to note in Table V that 53 per cent of the working class Republicans and 58 per cent of the middle class Democrats either did not know or could not make up their minds concerning the party direction of their class vote. Both of these groups find themselves in a social environment which is probably more divided and ambiguous than that in which middle class Republicans or working class Democrats are located. In both cases the ambiguity of the situation is apparently decisive enough to make for the large percentage of the "don't know" and "split" perceptions. However, while in the case of the middle class Democrats the ambiguity leads to perception of the middle class vote in a party-related frame of reference, i.e., projection of party preference, in the case of the working class Republicans the ambiguity inherent in their social situation is not sufficiently strong to prevent perception of the working class vote in a class-related frame of reference. This is understandable in view of the traditional American political folklore which identifies the working class with the Democratic party. It is apparently easy for the working class Republicans to see the connection between their class as a whole and its Democratic voting tendency. What projection may have taken place among working class Republicans is immediately corrected by the well-known relationship between working class and Democratic party.

## II. VOTE PERCEPTION AND PARTY PREFERENCE

It has been seen (Table V) that only in the case of middle class Democrats does party preference provide the frame of reference in which middle class voting behavior is perceived. In the case of the other groupings—middle class Republicans, working class Democrats, and working class Republicans—social class position seems to be the significant factor which determines people's perceptions of how their class is likely to vote. However, in order to avoid implying too categorical a causal relationship between class position and class vote perception, it may be desirable to reverse the independent and dependent variables of Table V, i.e., to make voting preference dependent on perception of how one's class will vote. To what extent, then, does perception of how one's own class is likely to vote influence a person's voting preference? One should be able to say that if there is a significant relationship between the direction of perceived class vote and voting preference, both class and party serve as referents in voting behavior. Table VI indicates a direct relationship between the direction of their perceived class vote and their voting preferences on the part of either class. It is clearest in the case of those middle class people who see their class voting Republican, but it is also strong in the case of those working class people who perceive their class as voting Democratic. It appears, then, that perception of party direction in class vote behavior is related to political behavior for those who perceive the political relevancy of class.

TABLE VI. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIRECTION OF PERCEIVED CLASS VOTE AND VOTE PREFERENCE

[Per cent]

| Vote Preference | Own Class Vote | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Democratic | | Republican | |
| | Middle Class Respondents N = 56 | Working Class Respondents N = 414 | Middle Class Respondents N = 152 | Working Class Respondents N = 59 |
| Democratic | 67 | 72 | 8 | 18 |
| Republican | 33 | 28 | 92 | 82 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

This finding is strengthened if the voting preferences of those who perceive their class as split, or do not know how it will vote, are examined. The distribution of vote preferences in Table VII indicates that whether they belong to the middle class or the working class, respondents who see their class as split or do not know how it will vote tend to express a Republican preference. In other words, those for whom class has positive salience, in the sense that they do have an opinion concerning the direction of their class vote, also tend to have

TABLE VII. VOTING REFERENCES OF THOSE WHO FAIL TO PERCEIVE DIRECTION OF OWN CLASS VOTE

[Per cent]

| Vote Preference | Own Class Vote | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Split | | Don't Know | |
| | Middle Class Respondents N = 126 | Working Class Respondents N = 189 | Middle Class Respondents N = 51 | Working Class Respondents N = 115 |
| Democratic | 40 | 34 | 31 | 49 |
| Republican | 60 | 66 | 69 | 51 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

voting preferences in terms of this salience; while those for whom class has relatively little political meaning, in the sense that they have no directional expectations concerning their class vote, do not seem to be influenced by their class status in their voting preferences.

## III. VOTE PERCEPTION AND INTEREST ORIENTATION

So far it has been assumed, but not proven, that awareness of class in political behavior is psychologically meaningful to those who see their class as voting in one direction or another, and who actually vote along class lines. In order to prove the relevance of perceptions in voting behavior, it is desirable to examine the attitudinal content of these perceptions. Only if those who agree on the political direction of a given class vote also agree on the reasons for their perceptions can it be said that class vote perception is politically important. For instance, one should expect that working class people who see their class as voting Democratic will also be reasonably homogeneous in the reasons which presumably underlie their perceptions. It is postulated that if these reasons are "interest-oriented," evidence is available for the general hypothesis of the interdependence of political behavior and social class position.

To what extent, then, is class belongingness politically meaningful in terms of class interest? In order to investigate this question, respondents' answers to the following pre-election question will be considered:

> Now let me check back and ask you why you feel that *working class* people (or middle class people, etc.) are more likely to vote Republican (or Democratic, etc.)?

Responses to this question were coded and are reported here according to two major categories:

(1) those clearly interest-oriented—such as that party benefits one class or the other, supports legislation in favor of class, or creates conditions advantageous to class;

(2) those not directly interest-oriented—such as that party is against corruption, promises things, time for a change.

Table VIII shows that whether they are middle class or working class, those perceiving their own class as voting Democratic give interest-oriented reasons to a significantly greater extent than do those who see their class as voting Republican. Vice versa, whether they are middle or working class, those perceiving their class as voting Republican tend to give non-interest-oriented responses to a significantly greater extent than do those who see it voting Democratic.

These data are of considerable importance in placing the class hypothesis in a more comprehensive psycho-political context. If the class hypothesis alone accounted for the perceptions of people as to how their class is likely to vote, one should expect a significant difference in interest-orientation between those middle and working class respondents who perceive their class as voting in one direction or the other. But, as Table VIII demonstrates, there is no such statistically significant difference between middle and working class people whose class vote perceptions are identical. We may conclude that though more middle class people prefer the Republicans to the Democrats (Table I), and though both classes perceive themselves as voting in one direction rather than the other (Tables II and III), not only do both classes let their vote preferences be influenced by the perception of party direction of their class' expected vote (Table VI), but also the attitudinal content of class voting behavior perceptions seems to derive as much from a party-related as from a class-related frame of reference (Table VIII).

TABLE VIII. CONTENT OF REASONS OF THOSE WHO PERCEIVE DIRECTION OF OWN CLASS VOTE

[Per cent]

| Content of Reasons | Own Class Vote | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Democratic | | Republican | |
| | Middle Class Respondents N=58 | Working Class Respondents N=421 | Middle Class Respondents N=154 | Working Class Respondents N=60 |
| Interest | 67 | 76 | 32 | 36 |
| No Interest | 24 | 16 | 51 | 48 |
| Don't Know, etc. | 9 | 8 | 17 | 16 |
| | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

However, party-related attitudinal orientation only modifies class members' perceptions of how their class will vote. Otherwise one would expect that, regardless of class position, interest-oriented people would see their class as voting mainly Democratic, and non-interest-oriented people would see their class as voting Republican. This is not the case. For when class is controlled by attitudinal content of perceptions, class-related rather than party-related attitudes seem to give class vote perceptions their meaning. As Table IX, reversing Table VIII, shows, class rather than orientation is significantly related to perception of how one's class is likely to vote. However, it may also be noted that a significantly larger percentage of interest-oriented working class people than non-interest-oriented working class people perceive their own class as voting Democratic, while non-interest-oriented middle class people perceive their class as voting Republican to a significantly greater degree than do interest-oriented middle class people. The difference can be explained by the fact that when class vote perception is controlled by interest-orientation, which, as Table VIII indicated, is related to a party-determined frame of reference, the attitudinal content of perceptions appears to be derived from both class and party frames of reference. If one compares these results with those of Table III, it appears that in the case of the middle class more non-interest-oriented respondents perceive their class as voting Republican than do interest-oriented middle class respondents, while in the case of the working class more interest-oriented people see their class as voting Democratic than do non-interest-oriented members of this class.

TABLE IX. OWN CLASS VOTE PERCEPTION OF INTEREST-ORIENTED AND NON-INTEREST-ORIENTED MIDDLE AND WORKING CLASS PEOPLE

[Per cent]

| Own Class Will Vote | Orientation | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Interest | | Non-Interest | |
| | Middle Class Respondents N=88 | Working Class Respondents N=340 | Middle Class Respondents N=93 | Working Class Respondents N=95 |
| Democratic | 44 | 94 | 15 | 69 |
| Republican | 56 | 6 | 85 | 31 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

The distribution of interest-oriented middle class respondents in Table IX suggests that in 1952, at least, the Democratic party was perceived by a very large percentage of these people as serving their class interest as well as the Republican party. On the other hand, non-interest-oriented middle class people perceived their class as voting Republican in a ratio of almost six to one. Apparently these respondents found attractive those appeals which were an important element in the Republican armory of campaign arguments, such as the prospect of change or the promise of ending corruption. That these issues should be accepted as politically relevant reasons for class vote perceptions, though they are not directly class-interest-oriented, again suggests that class- and party-related frames of reference interact in giving perceptions their attitudinal content. In 1952, certainly, the Republican party succeeded in shaping the political perceptions of a large section of the middle class and even of non-interest-oriented members of the working class, though a majority of the latter still perceived their class as voting Democratic.

One can only speculate as to what might happen in an election situation in which interest orientation becomes mobilized, such as economic crisis or social unrest. But since we know that, regardless of class, seeing one's class vote Democratic is associated with interest orientation, as shown in Table VIII, and that the perception that one's class will vote Democratic is associated with respondents' preference in actual voting for Democrats, as shown in Table VI, it may be surmised that if middle class people become more interest-oriented, they will increasingly perceive the Democratic party as more congenial to their interests than the Republican.

## IV. INTER-CLASS PERCEPTION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR

Shared perceptions of its voting behavior may be symptomatic of some kind of class awareness. But while such identification of class and party may tend to create a political "we," or Self, awareness of the Self is also predicated on awareness of the "not-we," or Other. There can be no Self without the Other. Class-related political behavior is assumed to be based, therefore, not only on awareness of one's own class, but also on awareness of the other class as a politically significant grouping.

The question arises as to how the other class is perceived in terms of voting behavior. If there is no significant difference between the perceptual image and the actual behavior of the other class in voting, "inter-class perception" may be said to be present in the political situation. If, on the other hand, there is a significant difference between the way a class is perceived by another class and its actual behavior, inter-class perception may be said to be absent.

How do the two classes perceive each other? In general, the overall picture of the relationship between class and party is similar to that found in intra-class perception. However, the alignment of class and party seems to be somewhat attenuated by the tendency of working class people to project their party preferences on the expected voting behavior of the other class. Of the 389 middle class respondents, 55 per cent perceive the working class as voting Democratic and 12 per cent as voting Republican. However, of the 811 working class respondents, only 19 per cent see the middle class as voting Republican, while 24 per cent see it as voting Democratic (Table X).

TABLE X. INTER-CLASS PERCEPTION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1951

[Per cent]

| Other Class Will Vote | Middle Class Respondents N = 389 | Working Class Respondents N = 811 |
|---|---|---|
| Democratic | 55 | 24 |
| Republican | 12 | 19 |
| Split | 24 | 30 |
| Don't Know | 9 | 27 |
| Total | 100 | 100 |

Tabulating only those giving party-directional responses tends to sharpen the picture (Table XI).

The discrepancy between actual middle class voting preferences (69 per cent Republican—Table I) and working class perception of the middle class vote (56 per cent of direction-giving respondents seeing it vote Democratic—Table XI) is evident. In order to account for the discrepancy, the hypothesis may be advanced that the more distant, in social terms, people are from a perceived group, the more likely they are to misperceive the behavior of that group. Or, reversely, the closer people are in social status to the perceived group, the more likely is accurate perception. To test this hypothesis, Table XII breaks down the working class into upper and lower sub-classes. While this breakdown by no means eliminates the discrepancy for the upper working class, it reduces it for this grouping and increases it for the lower working class. In other words, it highlights the possible relevance of social distance in projection.

TABLE XI. INTER-CLASS PERCEPTION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1952 BY THOSE WHO GIVE DIRECTIONAL RESPONSES

[Per cent]

| Other Class Will Vote | Middle Class Respondents N=260 | Working Class Respondents N=342 |
|---|---|---|
| Democratic | 82 | 56 |
| Republican | 18 | 44 |
| Total | 100 | 100 |

TABLE XII. UPPER AND LOWER WORKING CLASS PERCEPTION OF MIDDLE CLASS VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1952

[Per cent]

| Middle Class Will Vote | Upper Working Class Respondents N=213 | Lower Working Class Respondents N=129 |
|---|---|---|
| Democratic | 52 | 63 |
| Republican | 48 | 37 |
| Total | 100 | 100 |

It is hypothesized, then, that working class mis-perception of middle class voting behavior is a function of the working class' inclination to project its own strong pro-Democratic self-perception on the middle class. In order to examine this hypothesis, we must analyze the inter-class perception of those working class people who perceive their own class as voting Democratic. Moreover, given the tentative relevance of the social distance hypothesis, one would expect that lower working class people will project their Democratic perception in a significantly greater degree than will upper working class people. Table XIII indicates that there is in fact a strong association between party-related self-perception of the upper and lower working class, on the one hand, and working class perception of middle class voting behavior, on the other. But though 10 per cent more lower working class people perceive the middle class as voting Democratic than do upper working class respondents, the difference is statistically not significant enough to warrant the conclusion that projection is in fact a function of social distance.

If projection of working class self-perception on the middle class is not a function of social distance alone, how can it be explained? In part it may be explained by the ambiguity of the situation in which working class people must necessarily perceive middle class voting behavior. While the working class vote is traditionally associated in public perception with the Democratic party, the same cannot be said of a possible association of the middle class vote with the Republican party. It is true that the middle class actually did go Republican in 1952, but in October of that year there was little information on the basis of which working class people could have had a more accurate preception of how the middle class would vote. On the other hand, given the well-known association of working class vote and the Democratic party, projection on the part of middle class people of their own preferences on the working class was comparatively less likely. It is probably for this reason that middle class people find it easier to have a more accurate perception of working class voting behavior than for working class people to have an accurate perception of middle class voting behavior.

TABLE XIII. INTER-CLASS PERCEPTION OF UPPER AND LOWER WORKING CLASS PEOPLE WHO PERCEIVE OWN CLASS AS VOTING DEMOCRATIC

[Per cent]

| Middle Class Will Vote | Own Perceived Class Vote: Democratic — Upper Working Class Respondents N = 126 | Own Perceived Class Vote: Democratic — Lower Working Class Respondents N = 90 |
|---|---|---|
| Democratic | 68 | 78 |
| Republican | 32 | 22 |
| Total | 100 | 100 |

Working class mis-perception of middle class voting behavior appears to be the more paradoxical if one compares the actual voting preferences of the upper and lower categories in each social class. While in the 1952 election 73 per cent of the upper middle class and 68 per cent of the lower middle class preferred the Republican party, upper working class people (or 53 per cent of the total number of working class respondents) divided their preferences about evenly be-

TABLE XIV. VOTING PREFERENCES OF UPPER AND LOWER MIDDLE AND WORKING CLASS PEOPLE IN 1952

[Per cent]

| Voting Preference | Upper Middle Class Respondents N=127 | Lower Middle Class Respondents N=262 | Upper Working Class Respondents N=428 | Lower Working Class Respondents N=383 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Democratic | 26 | 32 | 50 | 56 |
| Republican | 73 | 68 | 49 | 38 |
| Other | 1 | 0 | 1 | 6 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

tween the Democrats and the Republicans. On the other hand, lower working class people voted more Democratic, though their support of the Democratic party was considerably smaller than the support given the Republicans by the lower middle class (Table XIV).

In spite of the fact that working class people were in very general agreement among themselves in 1952 with respect to the expected voting behavior of their class, they exhibited much less cohesiveness in their actual voting preferences than did middle class people. Only in times of economic crisis, such as prevailed during the New Deal elections, is it likely that the public's identification of the working class and the Democratic party will serve as a motivating mechanism in creating working class solidarity in voting. In other times, as in 1952, the fact that the working class splits its actual vote more than the middle class does suggest why the margin of electoral victory has remained relatively so small through the years, in spite of the fact that the working class outnumbers the middle class by two to one.

At least one reason for this seems to be that only in periods of social stress

TABLE XV. CONTENT OF REASONS GIVEN BY MIDDLE AND WORKING CLASS PEOPLE WHO PERCEIVE EACH OTHER AS VOTING DEMOCRATIC OR REPUBLICAN

[Per cent]

| Content of Reasons | Other Class Will Vote | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Democratic | | Republican | |
| | Middle Class Respondents N=196 | Working Class Respondents N=139 | Middle Class Respondents N=37 | Working Class Respondents N=77 |
| Interest | 77 | 68 | 32 | 48 |
| No Interest | 23 | 32 | 68 | 52 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

does class interest become sufficiently activated as a motivating force in voting behavior. And it is likely that in such situations both classes will vote Democratic. For voting Democratic is perceived by members of both classes as more relevant from a class-interest point of view than voting Republican. Table XV shows that regardless of whether they belong to the middle class or the working class, respondents perceiving the other class as voting Democratic tend to give interest-oriented reasons, while those seeing the other class as voting Republican give non-interest-oriented reasons. These data suggest that when socio-economic considerations enter the focus of attention of people in either class, both classes perceive the other's interests as being better served, or at least as well served, by the Democratic party. Only working class respondents perceiving the middle class as voting Republican are almost evenly divided concerning the question whether middle class interest is better served by the Democrats than the Republicans—48 per cent giving interest-oriented reasons and 52 per cent giving non-interest-oriented reasons. But in general the Democratic party is recognized by both classes as the party which is more likely to promote the interests of either class. In other words, as in the case of intra-class perception, so in the case of inter-class perception, interest-orientation is recognized in a combination of party- and class-related frames of reference that is noticeably favorable to the Democrats.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study sought to answer a number of questions concerning the relationship between class and party in voting behavior—in particular, whether the voter makes up his mind within a frame of reference that is set for him by class-related perceptions, party-related perceptions, or both. For, on the surface at least, there seems to exist a significant relationship between social class position and voting behavior—with a majority of the middle class preferring the Republican party and a majority of the working class preferring the Democratic party (Table I).

The question was next raised whether this relationship actively enters into the perceptions of people, i.e., whether some kind of "generalized class awareness" exists and is psychologically meaningful. In examining the perceptions of respondents concerning the expected voting behavior of their own class, it was found that while only a little more than a majority of respondents can definitely say whether their class will vote Democratic or Republican (Table II), among those giving an answer regarding the direction of their class' expected vote, middle class people perceive their class as voting Republican, and working class people perceive their class as voting Democratic (Table III). About the same finding was made in regard to the upper and lower sub-categories in each class (Table IV).

In other words, both classes not only express actual vote preferences in opposite directions, but also perceive themselves as doing so. This finding would seem to support the class hypothesis. But further inquiry revealed that if perceptions are controlled by respondents' actual vote preference, middle class Democrats see their class as voting not Republican, but Democratic (Table V). The tentative hypothesis was advanced that class vote expectations are not so much a function of class-related perceptions as of projection of party preferences. However, projection was not found to characterize working class Republicans who, in spite of their voting preference, yet perceive their class as voting Democratic. But the projective thinking on the part of middle class Democrats made a dent in the pure class hypothesis.

The further hypothesis suggested itself that perception of how one's class will vote influences one's actual voting preference, i.e., that class vote perception has a bandwagon effect. If a relationship between direction of expected class vote and actual vote preference were found to exist, both class and party could be considered relevant referents in voting behavior. It was discovered, indeed, that regardless of whether they are middle or working class, those perceiving their class as voting in one direction express a voting preference in the same direction (Table VI). This finding was strengthened by the further finding that those who see their class vote as split or do not know what it will be tend to prefer the Republican party, regardless of what class they belong to (Table VII).

The hypothesis was advanced that those agreeing on the direction of a given class vote will also be reasonably homogeneous in the reasons which presumably underlie their perceptions. Testing this hypothesis, it was found that whether they are middle or working class, those perceiving their class as voting Democratic give "interest-oriented" reasons, while those seeing their class as voting Republican tend to give "non-interest-oriented" reasons (Table VIII). In other words, the attitudinal content of class voting behavior perceptions seems to derive as much from a party-related as from a class-related frame of reference, interest-orientation being associated with pro-Democratic perception irrespective of class.

But this does not mean that interest-oriented people will necessarily see their class as voting mainly Democratic, and non-interest-oriented people theirs as voting chiefly Republican. When class was controlled by respondents' orientation, it appeared that class still plays a part in perceptions of class voting behavior. Regardless of whether they are interest- or non-interest-oriented, middle class people perceive their class as voting Republican, while working class people see their own class as voting Democratic (Table IX). In other words, party-related attitudinal orientation tends to modify the perceptions of class members as to how their class will vote, but it is by no means decisive. Both class and party serve as frames of reference that give perceptions their attitudinal content.

Though a majority of interest-oriented middle class respondents see their class as voting Republican, a very substantial minority, 44 per cent, see it as voting Democratic. Does this mean that they perceive middle class interests as possibly well served by the Democratic party? One can only speculate on what might happen in an election in which interest orientation becomes more mobilized among middle class people, as during an economic crisis. But since we know that, regardless of class, the perception of Democratic voting is associated with interest orientation (Table VIII), and that the perception that one's class will vote Democratic is associated with actual Democratic voting preference (Table VI), it may be surmised that if middle class people become more interest-oriented, they will increasingly perceive the Democratic party as more congenial in terms of their interests than the Republican party.

It was hypothesized that class awareness in voting behavior depends not only on perception of one's own class' vote, but also on one's perception of the other class' voting behavior. Interclass perception was postulated to be present if either class perceives the other accurately, i.e., if there is no difference between a given class' actual vote preference and the perceptual image of that class held by another class. It was found that the overall picture of the relationship between class and party is similar to that found in intra-class perception, though there is a tendency on the part of working class people to project their party preference on the image they have of the middle class (Tables X and XI). The hypothesis was advanced that the more distant people are in socio-economic terms from a perceived group, the more likely they are to misperceive the behavior of that group. A breakdown of the working class into its upper and lower sub-classes revealed that while the discrepancy is not eliminated for the upper working class, it is reduced for this grouping and increased for the lower working class (Table XII).

In order to test the likelihood of projection in terms of the social distance hypothesis, we examined the inter-class perception of those working class respondents who perceive their own class as voting Democratic. It was found that there is in fact a strong association between party-related self-perception and perception of middle class voting behavior on the part of both upper and lower working class people, but the difference between them in this regard is not enough statistically significant to warrant the conclusion that projection is a function of social distance (Table XIII).

Projection, then, is probably a function of the ambiguity of the situation in which working class people must necessarily perceive middle class voting behavior. Unlike the working class, which has been traditionally connected in public perception with the Democratic party, the middle class is not generally perceived as being tied to the Republican party. Hence, working class people find it more difficult to perceive middle class voting behavior accurately than middle class people find it to perceive working class voting behavior correctly.

Yet, in spite of the perceptual association in both intra- and inter-class perception of the working class and the Democratic party, in 1952 upper working class people (53 per cent of the total working class) divided in their actual voting preferences about evenly between the Democrats and the Republicans (Table XIV). This suggests that only in times of economic crisis is the identification of the working class with the Democratic party likely to serve as a motivating force in creating working class solidarity in voting behavior.

Moreover, regardless of whether they are middle or working class, respondents perceiving the other class as voting Democratic tend to give interest-oriented reasons (Table XV). As considerations of interest tend to enter into people's focus of attention in times of economic crisis, the Democratic party may be expected to attract more people from either class than the Republican party. In other words, interest-orientation is recognized in inter-class perception, just as it is in intra-class perception, in a combination of party-related and class-related frames of reference which is favorable to the Democrats.

What are the implications of these results for an understanding of the relationship between class and party in American politics? It has been suggested that working class mis-perception of middle class voting behavior is probably due to the ambiguity of the social situation in terms of which middle class conduct must be perceived. The same is probably true of the low degree of working class inter-class awareness. For the purpose of political analysis, this ambiguity has two apparently conflicting, but really unresolved consequences. And it is the very absence of a resolution which prevents the American party system from being as class-bound as even the British party system has become, not to mention continental party systems.

On the one hand, clear-cut inter-class awareness of political differences might tend to increase actual class differentiation in political behavior. For if people define a situation as real, it may be real in its consequences. An acute and perhaps even exaggerated awareness of the other class might tend to reinforce whatever actual differences do exist. This might lead to viewing party in a class-related frame of reference, and it might interfere with a necessarily desirable flexibility in the party system. Insofar as the middle class preponderantly sees itself as voting Republican, and the working class overwhelmingly sees itself as voting Democratic, the condition exists for perceiving the Republican party as *the* party of the middle class and the Democratic party as *the* party of the working class. From this point of view, the perceptual blurring of working class inter-class awareness tends to maintain the flexibility of the two-party system. And, as has been seen, working class people do in fact vote Republican to a greater extent than is generally assumed to be the case.

On the other hand, the fact that the parties may be perceived within a class-related frame of reference, as in the case of the working class, as well as the fact that the two parties actually derive a significant proportion of support from one class or the other, suggests that the two-party system is closely related to the existence of two large class blocs whose relatively persistent voting behavior injects an important element of stability into the political scene. Inspection of the 1948–52 voting pattern (Table XVI) indicates that in spite of the desertion of 8 per cent of the working class people from the Democrats to the Republicans in 1952, 28 per cent stayed Democratic, while 15 per cent of middle class people deserted and only 16 per cent stayed Democratic. In other words, the class system allows the parties to form reasonably stable expectations concerning the voting behavior of major sectors of the population and so facilitates the mobilizing activities of the parties during campaigns. While American parties are not "class parties" in the continental sense, class and party interact closely in determining the voting behavior of the American electorate.

TABLE XVI. 1948–52 VOTING PATTERN OF MIDDLE CLASS AND WORKING CLASS

[Per cent]

| 1948–52 Voting Pattern | Middle Class Respondents N = 389 | Working Class Respondents N = 811 |
|---|---|---|
| From No Vote to Democratic | 7 | 7 |
| Stayed Democratic | 16 | 28 |
| From Republican to Democratic | 1 | 1 |
| From Democratic to No Vote | 2 | 4 |
| No Vote Either Year | 6 | 24 |
| From Republican to No Vote | 2 | 1 |
| From Democratic to Republican | 15 | 8 |
| Stayed Republican | 39 | 18 |
| From No Vote to Republican | 8 | 7 |
| No Answer, Refused | 4 | 2 |
| Total | 100 | 100 |

## STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Chi square ($\chi^2$) was used as the tool to determine whether a statistically significant relationship exists between respondents' class position and voting preferences, vote perceptions, or interest orientation. It is an advantageous measure because it permits the application of mathematical procedures to categories which are not strictly quantitative, and because it allows the weighing of every case proportionately to every other case.

For the purpose of this study the 1 per cent level of probability was accepted as the standard of significance. This means that the distribution of the dependent variables (in the rows), when measured against the independent variable (in the columns), results in a $\chi^2$ that is significant at the 1 per cent level of probability when $p < .01$ is presented in this way. We may assume with confidence, then, that the relationship specified between the variables is real rather than chance, or that the chances are at least 100 to 1 that it is the result of respondents' class position rather than of the chances of sampling.

The following tabulation presents the tests of significance for the various relationships demonstrated in the tables of this analysis. Where $p < .01$, class may be accepted as the factor that determines the frame of reference within which political behavior or perceptions are meaningful; where $p > .01$, party seems to be the determining factor.

TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE

| Table | Relationship | Control | $\chi^2$ | d/f | $p$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| I | Class and Vote Preference | None | 63.74 | 1 | $< .001$ |
| II | Class and Ability to Perceive Direction of Own Class Vote | None | 2.64 | 1 | $.10 < .20$ |
| III | Class and Own Class Vote Perception | None | 252.77 | 1 | $< .001$ |

TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE (*continued*)

| Table | Relationship | Control | $\chi^2$ | d/f | $p$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IV | Class and Own Class Vote Perception | Upper Sub-Classes | 104.28 | 1 | $<.001$ |
| | | Lower Sub-Classes | 138.02 | 1 | $<.001$ |
| V | Class and Own Class Vote Perception | Democratic Preference | 33.09 | 1 | $<.001$ |
| | | Republican Preference | 112.96 | 1 | $<.001$ |
| VI | Class and Vote Preference | Democratic Perception | 0.89 | 1 | $.30<.50$ |
| | | Republican Perception | 6.29 | 1 | $.01<.02$ |
| VII | Class and Vote Preference | No Perception of Class Vote | 0.67 | 1 | $.20<.50$ |
| VIII | Class and Orientation | Democratic Perception | 2.25 | 1 | $.10<.20$ |
| | | Republican Perception | 0.12 | 1 | $.50<.90$ |
| IX | Class and Own Class Vote Perception | Interest Orientation | 130.24 | 1 | $<.001$ |
| | | Non-Interest Orientation | 58.85 | 1 | $<.001$ |
| X | Class and Ability to Perceive Direction of Other Class Vote | None | 64.28 | 1 | $<.001$ |
| XI | Class and Other Class Vote Perception | None | 46.77 | 1 | $<.001$ |
| XII | Upper-Lower Working Class and Other Class Vote Perception | None | 4.08 | 1 | $.02<.05$ |
| XIII | Upper-Lower Working Class and Other Class Vote Perception | Democratic Self-Perception | 2.37 | 1 | $.10<.20$ |
| XIV | Class and Vote Preference | Upper Sub-Classes | 22.17 | 1 | $<.001$ |
| | | Lower Sub-Classes | 48.99 | 1 | $<.001$ |
| XV | Class and Orientation | Democratic Inter-Class Perception | 4.01 | 1 | $.02<.05$ |
| | | Republican Inter-Class Perception | 2.61 | 1 | $.10<.20$ |

# AMERICAN JEWS AND THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE*

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It has been generally agreed since the publication of Professor Holcombe's *The New Party Politics*[1] that the urbanization of American society has tended to produce class differences in our politics. The sectional alignments of the 19th century gave way to class and urban-rural politics in considerable measure as Americans continued to move to the cities. By the 1932 and 1936 elections there was a marked tendency for wealth and high prestige to be associated with Republican choice.[2]

Paradoxically, the most urban of all our citizens, American Jews, have not divided their presidential vote along class lines. As a group they rapidly improved their jobs, extended their incomes, and became highly educated during the 1930's and 1940's. At the same time, they drastically switched their predominant major party choice from the Republican party to the Democrats. And within the group itself differences in income or occupational prestige appear to have been of practically no significance in the formulation of presidential vote preference since 1936.

The purpose of this article is threefold: first, to trace briefly the shifts in Jewish vote preference in recent decades through the use of aggregate election statistics;[3] second, to probe the significant motivations of Jewish voters in 1952, primarily by analyzing the results of a sample survey conducted after the 1952 election in the city of Boston; and third, to suggest some of the basic reasons for Jewish resistance to class influences at the polls.

Between the election of William McKinley in 1896 and the beginning of the World War in 1914, more than two million Jewish immigrants came to the United States. Most of them were refugees from the anti-semitism and poverty of Eastern Europe. They crowded into the tenements in the slums of New York and, to a lesser extent, those of Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia. A large majority became laborers and peddlers or worked as cutters and tailors in the needle-trades.

While to an extraordinary number of these Russian and Polish Jews the parties of the radical left (particularly the Socialists) provided the only political answers,[4] the majority chose between the major parties. Of these politically orthodox Jews, more voted for Republicans than Democrats in every presidential election from 1900 to 1928, with the possible exceptions of 1900 and 1916.

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[1] Arthur N. Holcombe, *The New Party Politics* (New York, 1933). See also Professor Holcombe's *The Middle Class in American Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1940).

[2] W. F. Ogburn and Estelle Hill, "Income Classes and the Roosevelt Vote in 1932," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 50, pp. 186-93 (June, 1935). See also W. F. Ogburn and L. C. Coombs, "The Economic Factor in the Roosevelt Election," this REVIEW, Vol. 34, pp. 719–27 (Aug., 1940).

[3] Nearly all of these data are based upon original research.

Republicans were preferred for a wide variety of reasons. Among the most important were hostility towards the Irish; gratitude to the philo-semitic Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft; and advice from established coreligionists.

The radical shift from Republican allegiance in the 1920's to the current predominantly Democratic loyalties of American Jews is dramatically expressed in the party enrollment figures for Ward 14 in the city of Boston, a consistently heavy Jewish area from 1924 until this day. In 1928, 78 per cent of the enrolled voters there were Republicans. By 1952, only 14 per cent of the enrolled electors in Ward 14 called themselves Republican.

American Jews have spurned Republican candidates in every presidential election since 1936. In 1936, Ward 24 in Chicago was probably the most Jewish ward in the nation. There Roosevelt received 96 per cent of the vote. Elsewhere Jews were not as solidly Democratic. Four years later, Jewish wards in Boston and assembly districts in New York showed an appreciable increase in Democratic strength. Over 90 per cent of the Jews in New York County's 17th Assembly District cast ballots for F.D.R. In 1944, Jewish Democratic strength increased still further. In Boston's Jewish Ward 14, more than 95 per cent of the Jewish votes cast went to Roosevelt.

The results of national sample surveys conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion and by the National Opinion Research Center show that more than 90 out of every 100 Jews voted Democratic in 1940 and 1944.[5]

The results of these surveys also revealed that American Jews had considerably improved their relative economic position since the twenties. By 1944 they were among the best paid and best educated of all denominational groups. On occupational prestige scales the Jews were consistently rated higher than the most Republican denominational groups—the Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and Episcopalians.[6]

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[4] The literature on this subject is rich. See Morris Hillquit, *Loose Leaves from a Busy Life* (New York, 1934); Harry Rogoff, *An East Side Epic: The Life and Work of Meyer London* (New York, 1930); and Louis Waldman, *Labor Lawyer* (New York, 1944).

[5] The Denver results are analyzed by Samuel J. Korchin, "Psychological Variables in the Behavior of Voting," unpub. diss. (Harvard University, 1946). The Gallup results are presented and analyzed by Wesley and Beverly Allinsmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 12, pp. 377–89 (Fall, 1948), and by Liston Pope, "Religion and Class Structure," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 256, pp. 84–92 (March, 1948). See also an unpublished study by Robert T. Bower, "Voting Behavior of American Ethnic Groups," New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University (Sept., 1944).

[6] Allinsmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude," p. 385. Jews were first in occupational status, third in educational status, and fourth in economic status. Pope, "Religion and Class Structure," pp. 84–91, lists Jews as first in occupational status

Results from surveys also showed that the Jews constituted the only ethno-religious group in which differences in Democratic-Republican strength could not be correlated with differences in occupational prestige, amount of income, or education.[7]

Jewish Democratic strength diminished in 1948, but the combined Truman-Wallace vote was almost as high in Jewish wards and assembly districts as it had been for F.D.R. in 1944. The Wallace vote was essentially Democratic. In Ward 14 the Progressive candidate received over 12 per cent of the vote. In the heavily Jewish Bronx 7th Assembly District he won 27 per cent of the vote. In the not-quite-as-Jewish Bronx 2nd Assembly District he received 21 per cent. The combined Truman-Wallace vote in both districts reached almost 90 per cent. In Hartford, Wallace ran strong only in predominantly Jewish Wards 4 and 12. In Los Angelos all five precincts which Wallace carried comprised Jewish neighborhoods. Even in suburban Brookline, Massachusetts over nine per cent of the votes in its most Jewish precinct were counted for Wallace.

Although 1948 was a year when most Democrats could be sharply separated from Republicans by status characteristics, Jewish voters could not be so simply divided. The most radical candidate, Wallace, won the votes of many well educated upper-middle class Jews who had heretofore voted for Franklin Roosevelt, but the Republicans gained very little over 1944.

In 1952 all segments of Truman-Wallace strength except Negroes shifted somewhat to Eisenhower.[8] But analysis of aggregate returns from Jewish areas and the results of national surveys show that the Jewish defection was slight indeed.[9] In Jewish Assembly Districts in New York City, in Boston's Ward 14, in Hartford's Wards 2 and 4, in Cleveland's Ward 27, in Pittsburgh's Ward 14, and in Cincinnati's Ward 13, Stevenson appears to have matched or increased the Truman percentage of the *two-party* vote.

It was primarily in the suburbs that inroads were made on the Jewish Democratic vote—in such places as Westchester, New York; Newton, Massachusetts; and West Hartford, Connecticut.

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and fourth on his income and education indices. "Distribution (by classes) of the Jewish group is very much like that of Episcopalians; a majority of the members of both still come from the middle and upper classes . . . " (p. 86).

[7] Bower, "Voting Behavior of American Ethnic Groups," p. 16; Korchin, "Psychological Variables in the Behavior of Voting," p. 93 and pp. 184 ff. See also Ernest Havemen and Patricia S. West, *They Went to College* (New York, 1952), an analysis of a *Time* magazine survey of 9,483 college graduates. The Jewish graduates, though earning more money in better jobs than the Gentiles, were far less Republican. Only six per cent of the Jews called themselves Republicans (pp. 187–88).

[8] Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill., 1954), pp. 70–73. See also Louis Harris, *Is There a Republican Majority?* (New York, 1954), p. 161. As Mr. Harris reports, the Democratic loss was a Progressive and not a Republican gain.

[9] Harris, *Is There a Republican Majority?*, pp. 160–63. The Roper organization reports that 74 per cent of the Jewish vote went to the Governor. There were 52 Jews in the Survey Research Center sample, 73 per cent of whom preferred Stevenson.

## I. RESULTS OF A POST-ELECTION SURVEY IN BOSTON'S MOST JEWISH WARD

In the big cities the Jews were loyal to the Democratic party; according to the results of a "quasi-random" sample survey[10] of eligible voters conducted in Ward 14 in the city of Boston following the 1952 election, differences in Stevenson strength in the urban Jewish population cannot be accounted for by differences in income, occupational, or educational levels.

The total number of Jews in any national sample is invariably too small to permit the sub-division of the sample into meaningful sub-groups. Thus a quasi-random or "systematic" sample of 351 names was drawn from the 1952 Boston police list for Ward 14. Of these, 276 were finally interviewed.

The main purpose of the survey was to discover what the salient motivations of Jewish voters were in 1952. Questions were designed to produce responses which could be scaled by indices for socio-economic status, political liberalism, and ethno-religious involvement. Other census-type questions were asked on age, sex, education, nationality background, and other matters. One question called for an explanation of the vote. All questions were pre-tested on Brandeis University students; some were also pre-tested in a pilot mail questionnaire sent to the parents of students.

Nearly 84 per cent of the voters in the sample were Jewish. Of the 37 voting non-Jews, 28 were Catholic (nearly all Irish). The Jews in the sample lived in better homes, held better jobs, and made more money than the Christians; nonetheless, the Israelites gave Stevenson 70 per cent of their vote while their Gentile neighbors voted only 46 per cent Democratic.

*Socio-Economic Status and the Jewish Vote.* A total SES score was computed by

TABLE I. DEMOCRATIC VOTE OF JEWS AND GENTILES IN BOSTON'S WARD 14 BY OCCUPATIONAL-INCOME STATUS

| Occupational-Income Group | Jews | | Gentiles* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number | Voted Democratic % | Number | Voted Democratic % |
| Low SES | 36 | 64 | 15 | 60 |
| Middle SES | 101 | 66.3 | 12 | 41.7 |
| High SES | 53 | 72 | 10 | 30 |

* The distribution of Gentiles is like that found in the Roper national survey for three income groups of Irish descent: upper income 15%, lower-middle income 45%, and low income 75% Democratic. See Louis Harris, *Is There a Republican Majority?*, p. 222.

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[10] Mildred Parten, *Surveys, Polls, and Samples: Practical Procedures* (New York, 1950), pp. 266–67. The procedure described in these pages under the heading "Sampling at Regular Intervals from a List" was the one followed in the Ward 14 survey. Miss Parten calls this type of sampling "Quasi-random" (p. 303) and suggests that the method, if executed carefully, "seems close enough to random sampling" to permit the use of confidence limits which can be estimated for pure random samples.

combining income and occupational prestige scores, giving a double weight to occupation. Non-Jews in the sample, as in all national surveys, displayed much greater Republican strength in the high SES groups than they did in the low groups. However, differences in Stevenson strength among Jews in Boston cannot be accounted for by differences in socio-economic status.

*Education and the Jewish Vote.* There was a slight tendency for better-educated Jews to prefer Eisenhower in 1952, but the pattern is hardly significant. In fact, the percentage of Jewish college graduates in Ward 14 voting for Stevenson was almost as high as that for all Jews in the sample. The results for Gentile voters support the accepted view that Republican choice is associated with high education among non-Jews.

TABLE II. DEMOCRATIC VOTE OF JEWS AND GENTILES IN BOSTON'S WARD 14 BY EDUCATIONAL GROUPS

| Educational Group | Jews* | | Gentiles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number | Voted Democrat % | Number | Voted Democrat % |
| Some elementary school or less | 39 | 79.5 | 1 | 100 |
| Elementary school graduate | 21 | 71.5 | 4 | 75 |
| Some high school | 24 | 73.9 | 9 | 66.6 |
| High school graduate | 62 | 64.4 | 9 | 33.3 |
| High school plus vocational or business school | 15 | 53.4 | 4 | 0 |
| Some college | 14 | 64.3 | 5 | 20 |
| College graduate | 22 | 68.3 | 5 | 60 |

* There appears to be a slight inverse correlation between SES and education among Jews because so many successful Jewish businessmen have little or no formal education, while some of the college graduates are young men and women not yet established in whatever they do.

*Age and the Jewish Vote.* The results of surveys in which a breakdown of ethno-religious groups by age is made reveal that when any group—Irish Catholics, Italians, Negroes—shift from their expected political pre-disposition,

TABLE III. DEMOCRATIC VOTE OF JEWS AND GENTILES IN BOSTON'S WARD 14 BY AGE GROUPS

| Age Group | Jews | | Gentiles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number | Voted Democratic % | Number | Voted Democratic % |
| 21–34 | 53 | 70 | 12 | 25 |
| 34–54 | 86 | 63 | 20 | 50 |
| 54 plus | 54 | 76 | 5 | 80 |

it is the younger voters who swing the most. Since the Jews did not shift their loyalties appreciably in 1952, there was little difference in the Democratic vote among age groups in Ward 14, while the pronounced defection of Irish Catholic voters to Eisenhower was most noticeable among the younger voters.

Thus, in Ward 14 the presidential choice of non-Jews in 1952 was oriented along class lines. High education, high SES, and youth all disposed Gentiles favorably toward Eisenhower. On the other hand, Jewish voters for Stevenson could not be distinguished from the Eisenhower electors by any of the usual separators. It is not clear from the demography of the Jewish vote in Ward 14 just what it was that made one in every four Jewish voters choose the General while the large majority preferred the Governor.

*Ethno-Religious Involvement and the Jewish Vote.* Questions were designed to test the depth of Jewish involvement felt by the respondents. Separate questions were used to measure the depth of cultural, religious, and social Jewishness. When added together, the scores of all three yielded a total ethno-religious involvement score which could be scaled.

It was recognized that voters might have commitments to Judaism which ran deep but which were psychological or intellectual and could not be measured by the EI scale. For that reason all Jewish respondents were also asked to pick three statements from a list (made originally by respondents in the pilot survey in answer to an open-end question) which best expressed what their religion meant to them.

Results show that Stevenson voters scored slightly higher EI scores on the cultural and social Judaism tests, while Eisenhower voters scored slightly higher on the religious Judaism scale. The overall means of each group were quite close, only one-tenth of a point separating them on a five-point scale.

From the results given in Table IV, it is not likely that differences in the vote could be attributed to differences in ethno-religious involvement, at least as measured by these scales.[11] Moreover, Eisenhower and Stevenson voters chose approximately the same kinds of statements in about the same distribution to express best what their religion meant to them.

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[11] It is always possible that the scales, which were elaborately worked out and pretested, are something less than a perfect measure of Jewishness. Eighteen questions in all were asked. For example, respondents were asked to rate the importance of such religious practices as saying prayers for dead parents. They were also asked to rate their approval or disapproval of such things as intermarriage and to state whether or not they regularly read a Yiddish newspaper, kept a Kosher home, etc. While the results here show that Democratic Jews are just about as Jewish as Republican Jews, the findings of Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954), p. 72, are somewhat different. The authors found that in Elmira, New York those Jews expressing a strong commitment to Judaism were more Democratic than those Jews with low EI. The number of Jews involved was 108, less than half the number in the Boston survey, but sizable. However, certain sub-groups are quite small. Those Jews who neither attended services nor favored orthodox customs numbered only 12. Still the results may be quite sound. In Elmira, Jewish involvement may have correlated significantly with Democratic choice in 1948, while in Ward 14 no such correlation was forthcoming for 1952. However, even in Elmira, Republican choice among Jews may be less a function of low EI than a function of primary group contact with non-Jews. Probably both factors go somewhat together. Those Jews with low EI probably go to non-Jewish neighborhoods and partici-

As with the results from the SES, EI, education, and age questions, the breakdown of the Jewish vote by nationality background and generations offered no clue to explain continued Jewish Democratic strength in the face of the Eisenhower landslide. Nor do any of the results reported so far suggest what it was that prompted a minority of the Jewish voters to vote for Eisenhower.

TABLE IV. DEMOCRATIC VOTE OF JEWS IN BOSTON'S WARD 14
BY ETHNIC-INVOLVEMENT GROUPS

| Ethnic-Involvement Group | Number | Voted Democratic % |
|---|---|---|
| High EI | 13 | 46.2 |
| High-medium EI | 47 | 72.4 |
| Medium EI | 72 | 69.5 |
| Low-medium EI | 43 | 60.5 |
| Low EI | 20 | 80.1 |

*The Jewish Response to Stevenson.* What did the Jews perceive in Stevenson and the Democratic party in 1952 that made them so preponderantly Democratic, almost without regard to socio-economic and religious characteristics?

It was hoped that the answer to that question would be forthcoming in the replies to three questions placed in the interview schedule. One question was designed to test the political liberalism of respondents. This particular test was aimed at discovering the basic attitudes of respondents toward the use of power. Because of this and because the liberalism index was also used for purposes not discussed in this paper, the criteria for defining liberalism on which the question was based were: (1) a disposition to share power with out-groups, and (2) a disposition to respect those who are different.[12]

It may be said that these criteria actually define political altruism and not liberalism at all as it is commonly understood. Whether the question yields an altruism index or a liberalism index is not crucial. The results show that there

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pate in non-Jewish groups more than those with high EI. Those Jews who for one reason or another have frequent contact with non-Jews probably become less orthodox as a result. If both results are correct, Elmira Jews must be different from Ward 14 Jews in some important respect. It is likely that the difference lies in the sheer concentration of Ward 14 Jews. Even the low EI Jews in Ward 14 live in an intensely Jewish community. Outside of such sociological enclaves, it might well be that the EI scale used here would be a significant separator of Republicans and Democrats.

[12] It is recognized that the word "liberalism," like the word "class," is bound to be controversial when injected into any discussion of American politics. I am not at all certain that the definition of liberalism used in this survey is a useful one. Criteria which measure altruism in politics do not measure those elements of political ideology which have relevance in shaping the electoral choices of most voters. Later the liberalism of the Jews will be discussed in terms of specific issues.

was considerable difference in the Jewish and Gentile response to the question in Ward 14. After the answers were scaled, respondents were divided into six categories ranging from 'very strong liberals' to 'very strong illiberals.' While 40 per cent of the Jews qualified as liberals or altruists, only 26 per cent of the Gentiles did so.

The results were not surprising in the light of reports on other liberalism-conservatism or egalitarian-authoritarian tests.[13] No matter what criteria have been used to define liberalism and conservatism, Jews invariably have been rated overwhelmingly more liberal than Christians.

Did Jews perceive liberalism in Stevenson and the Democratic party? All Stevenson voters were asked to pick three statements from a list (all statements were originally made by respondents in answer to an open-end question in a pilot survey) which best expressed why they preferred Stevenson. They were also asked to choose two statements from another list which best expressed what they liked least about Eisenhower.

The results are instructive. To a much greater extent than the Christians the Jews in the sample emphasized the personal qualifications and liberalism of Stevenson and/or the Democratic party. Christians tended to stress the fact that the Democrats and/or Stevenson favored their own economic group while Eisenhower and the Republicans did not.

The results from these questions do not prove that it was the political liberalism of the Jews which kept them Democratic in 1952, but this evidence, taken together with the findings of Mr. Louis Harris of the Elmo Roper organization, at least suggests that the Jews did tend to think of Stevenson as the more "liberal" candidate and the Democratic party as the more "liberal" party.[14]

*Liberalism and the Stevenson-Eisenhower Choice.* If, as suggested, it was the "liberalism" of the Jews which oriented them toward a Democratic choice, it might be supposed that those Jews who were least liberal were the Eisenhower

TABLE V. DEMOCRATIC VOTE OF JEWS AND GENTILES IN BOSTON'S WARD 14 BY LIBERALISM GROUPS

| Liberalism Group | Jews | | Gentiles | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number | Voted Democrat % | Number | Voted Democrat % |
| Liberals (Altruists) | 25 | 87.5 | 4 | 50 |
| Moderates | 124 | 67 | 24 | 52.3 |
| Illiberals | 43 | 64.5 | 9 | 38.5 |

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[13] Gordon W. Allport, "The Composition of Political Attitudes," *American Journal of* Sociology, Vol. 25, pp. 220–38 (Sept., 1939). See also Allinsmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitudes," pp. 379–80; Haveman and West, *They Went to College,* pp. 98–101. All studies emphasize the egalitarianism or liberalism of the Jews.

[14] Harris, *Is there a Republican Majority?,* pp. 161–63.

voters. Although it is true that a higher proportion of liberal or politically altruistic Jews voted for Stevenson than voted for him in the moderate or illiberal groups, the total number of liberals is quite small, and the differences between groups are not large.

It is entirely possible that the overwhelming disposition of the Jews to vote Democratic in recent decades is a function of their liberalism, but it is also possible that Jewish votes for Eisenhower were something other than a manifestation of illiberalism. Literally dozens of Jewish voters indicated in their replies to open-end questions that they thought Eisenhower was a liberal himself.

## II. INTERPRETATION

*Primary Group Influences and the Jewish Eisenhower Vote.* For a satisfactory explanation of the slight Jewish Democratic defection in 1952, it would be well to start with the proposition that a certain proportion of Jews were bound to be affected by the factors which caused an Eisenhower landslide in the nation at large. But which Jews were influenced and which Jews were not? It was not necessarily the rich Jews, or the well educated Jews, or the third generation Jews, or the less ethnically involved Jews, or the young Jews who showed disproportionate Republican strength in 1952.

Such evidence as is available strongly suggests that the Republican vote went up among those Jews who had the most frequent and extensive contact with non-Jews in primary groups.

While it is not possible to prove this hypothesis quantitatively with the results of the Ward 14 survey (the appropriate questions were not asked), inferences can be drawn from some of those results and from a further discussion of aggregate returns.

Three sets of data tend to support this hypothesis: first, the difference in the Stevenson vote between the men and the women in Ward 14; second, the results of election surveys in predominantly Jewish colleges; third, the election results from Jewish suburban areas compared with those for metropolitan centers.

*Jewish Men and Women Voters in the 1952 Election.* Although the Survey Research Center reported[15] that males and females in the nation as a whole voted for Eisenhower in about the same proportion, the results of the survey in Ward 14 show that 83.3 per cent of the Jewish women voters preferred Stevenson as compared with only 59.4 per cent of the men, while there was no difference in the Stevenson vote between Gentile males and females. To be sure, the results of national surveys in the past have shown Jewish women to be somewhat more Democratic than Jewish men,[16] but the percentage difference between them was three or four and not 24.

Keeping in mind the possibility of sampling and reporting bias, the results still appear to defy explanation until consideration is given to the importance of primary group contacts in the formulation of electoral decision.

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[15] Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, *The Voter Decides*, p. 70. The Roper organization found that women were generally more attracted to Eisenhower than men. Harris, *Is There a Republican Majority?*, Ch. 7.

[16] Bower, "Voting Behavior of American Ethnic Groups," p. 11 and Korchin, "Psychological Variables in the Behavior of Voting," p. 97.

It is now well established that face-to-face contacts are of major importance in the shaping of vote choice.[17] And there is evidence from the results of the Ward 14 survey to suggest that differences in the male-female vote can be largely explained by the fact that Jewish women in Ward 14 have little contact with primary groups which include non-Jews, while their husbands, fathers, and brothers are thrust into such groups quite often.

Most of the women rarely leave the Ward itself. Their contacts are almost exclusively neighborhood and family contacts, nearly all of which are Jewish. One young woman reported that she had never met a Protestant in her life until she went to college. On the other hand, the men from Ward 14 often work outside of the area, and are thereby exposed, in Lazarsfeld's phrase, to "cross pressures" in mixed work and friendship groups.

In 1952 the Jewish group held fast to its Democratic moorings while the nation, for many reasons, swung to Eisenhower. While Jewish men were exposed to the opinions of non-Jewish friends at the work bench, of customers in the store, or of clients in the office, Jewish women were insulated from those cross-pressures to a considerable extent.

But, it will be asked, were not those pressures to which men were subjected filtered to most wives through their husbands? Yes, but they were diluted. It is apparent that in many cases male Eisenhower voters were either unsuccessful in attempting to dissuade their wives from a Democratic choice, or failed to make the attempt at all.[18] In at least two cases in Ward 14 such efforts were rewarded.

One young housewife, whose husband was an electrical appliance salesman for a non-Jewish firm, volunteered at the end of her interview: "I was for Stevenson until the last minute when my husband made me change my mind. He felt it was time for a change, and then I thought maybe Eisenhower would end the Korean war." Another middle-aged woman was married to a sales-executive at Jordan Marsh department store, "the only Jew in his department," she volunteered. Throughout the campaign he tried to persuade her to switch to Eisenhower without success. She changed to Eisenhower after she entered the voting booth. As she recalled: "I told him that morning that I would vote for Stevenson. But then I changed. I don't know why."

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[17] As Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, *The Voter Decides*, p. 207, point out, even in Lazarsfeld's "explanation of the influence of the demographic characteristics (of voters) these are primary group influences . . . " See Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1948), Ch. 16.

[18] In the Ward 14 survey respondents were not asked for the votes of their spouses, but in a pilot survey of the parents of Brandeis College students which preceded the Ward 14 survey, many of the respondents were married. The results of that survey are as incredible as those for Ward 14. Of the 33 men who voted, only 23 said they chose Stevenson (69.8 per cent). Of the 26 women voting from the Brandeis parents' sample 24 voted for Stevenson (92.3 per cent). Of course, confidence limits cannot be applied to the results of such a survey, but the respondents constituted a cross-section of American upper-middle class Jewry. The average family income of respondents was over $6,500.

In both cases the husbands for Eisenhower were in frequent and sustained contact with non-Jews in their primary work groups. Both families were well educated, the kind in which the political opinions of wives and husbands are likely to be exchanged. Both wives vicariously experienced the cross pressures their husbands felt first hand. It is probable that most other housewives in the sample were less exposed to non-Jewish and Republican influences than these two.

There is one additional check on this primary group explanation for the disparity in the male-female vote. Some of the women were working women. Presumably they would be in greater contact with non-Jews and Republican cross pressures. Such contact should be reflected in their vote, and it was. While only 70 per cent of the working and single women in the Ward 14 sample voted for Stevenson, 84 per cent of the housewives chose the Governor.

There may be other reasons for the stronger female response to Stevenson. There is some evidence from the survey results that the women were slightly more disturbed than the men because Eisenhower was a military man and that Stevenson's urbane and learned manner was more pleasing to the Jewish women than to the men, but the evidence available is shadowy at best.

*Jewish College Communities and the 1952 Election.* At least suggestive of the importance of immediate group contacts for the Jewish vote in 1952 are the results of polls taken at Yeshiva college and Brandeis University. At Yeshiva, a school which is 100 per cent Jewish, Eisenhower received a mere four per cent of the vote. Brandeis is a non-sectarian Jewish-sponsored school. Probably as much as 10 per cent of the student body there is not Jewish.[19] In the Brandeis poll Stevenson received 88 per cent of the vote.

The Jewish Brandeis students represent a cross-section of American Jewry—religious, irreligious, urban, small town, suburban, poor, well-to-do. Yet the Brandeis vote for Stevenson, including the vote of the non-Jewish students, was 14 per cent higher than that reported for the national Jewish population by survey organizations and 10 per cent higher than that reported for the sample of 59 of their own parents and relatives questioned in a pilot survey.

Jewish students came to Brandeis and Yeshiva with strong Democratic leanings. Finding their own opinions almost unanimously reinforced in student face-to-face groups, there were few defections. At home their parents were exposed to more frequent contacts with non-Jews in Republican-oriented groups.

*Suburban Jewry and the 1952 Election.* It has already been shown that returns from Jewish wards and assembly districts in the large cities revealed little Democratic loss from 1948. It is reasonable to conclude that what Democratic losses there were (national surveys show some overall loss) occurred among those Jews who are dispersed in Gentile areas or who live in the suburbs. The votes of the former group cannot be reported, since, as in San Francisco, they are buried in the aggregate returns for non-Jewish wards. But simple arithmetic suggests that defections took place in just such cases.

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[19] Of course, it is impossible to know just how many non-Jews there are at Brandeis. While the number is growing all the time, the percentage quoted here is probably correct within five per cent for 1952.

Moreover, the returns from suburban Jewish areas support the hypothesis of the importance of primary group contacts for Jewish voting choice in 1952. Reports from Westchester and Long Island in New York, and from Brookline and Newton, near Boston, indicate that Jews in the suburbs were primarily responsible for the Jewish defections which did take place.

Although Jews may cluster together in tree-lined neighborhoods and country clubs in the suburbs, they are exposed to much greater contact with Gentiles in primary groups than are the Jews of Ward 14 or the Bronx. Jewish families in the suburbs participate in community affairs. Both men and women meet their non-Jewish neighbors in primary groups. They discover a common interest in the tax rate or the problems of the high school. Their interest in the local Synagogue may be more lively than it ever was back in Brooklyn, but their associations are no longer so preponderantly Jewish.

In 1944, suburban Jewry was hardly less Democratic than coreligionists in the city, because Jewish group involvement in the outcome of the election was so high. Even in Precinct 8 in suburban Brookline, F.D.R. received 79 per cent of the vote. In 1952 the vote there slipped to 52 per cent of the total. Brookline is a bedroom area for Boston. Its voters were subjected to cross pressures in primary groups which even many of the well-to-do in Dorchester and Mattapan (Ward 14) did not experience, and in 1952 those pressures were strongest in the suburbs where the Eisenhower plurality was the greatest.

*The Democrats and the Jews.* More important than the reasons for Democratic defection in 1952 are the causes of persistent Democratic attachment over the last three decades. In order to understand the fidelity of Jewish voters to the Democrats in 1948 and 1952, it is necessary to go back to Franklin Roosevelt and the almost solid Jewish vote for Roosevelt in his last three contests.

Roosevelt had the overwhelming support of Jews in his quest for a "New Deal" and his efforts at intervention in behalf of the Allies against the Fascists and Nazis. As interventionists the Jews were "internationalists," in the political parlance of the 1930's, and as New Dealers they were "liberals." The internationalism and liberalism of Roosevelt were both congenial to the interests of the Jews.

*Jewish Internationalism.* During the late 1930's there was no stronger interventionist group in the United States than the Jews. The survival of world Jewry itself made such a course mandatory in the 1930's and 1940's. Roosevelt, of course, had begun in 1935 a series of private and public protests against anti-semitism in Germany and was the political leader of the interventionist forces in the country. Jews could not help but be drawn to the one man who could lead Americans to a more active role in European affairs.

Recent studies show that Jewish support for internationalism persisted long after the defeat of Hitler. Survey results for 1948 and 1952 reveal that Jews support, much more strongly than Gentiles, the United Nations, Point Four, aid to Europe, liberal immigration policies, and world government plans. According to one survey of college graduates in 1948, almost twice the proportion of Jews as Catholics and Protestants were classified as internationalists, i.e., displayed stronger enthusiasm for the United Nations, liberal immigration, lower tariffs, helping other nations, and the reconciliation of international conflict.

Did Jews think that internationalism would be best served by the election of Truman or Wallace rather than Dewey in 1948? Presumably the answer is yes, otherwise it would be impossible to explain the extraordinary Jewish vote for Wallace. The Progressive candidate based much of his campaign on the failure of Truman to carry on the internationalism of Roosevelt (negotiation with Russia) while the Republicans, when they debated foreign policy at all, chided Truman for being too internationalist.[20]

What of 1952? Did Jewish internationalism manifest itself then? In the Ward 14 sample, a much higher proportion of Jews than Gentiles supported the United Nations and the extension of aid to Africa and Asia. Elmo Roper found that Jews were much more for the United Nations and world government plans than non-Jews.[21] According to Louis Harris, one of the chief attachments of Jews to Adlai Stevenson was the compatibility of the Jewish and the Democratic positions on foreign policy.

*Jewish Liberalism.* Other than foreign policy issues, the questions which have divided Americans in recent years have dealt with the distribution of economic power, Negro rights, and freedom of the mind. On each of these questions the Jews have taken what in everyday parlance has been called the "liberal" position. In each case Jewish opinions have been closer to the position of the Democratic candidates for President than to the one held by their Republican adversaries.

The results of surveys show that Jews have been strong supporters of the "New Deal" and the "Fair Deal." In 1932 and 1936 such views made economic sense to the Jews themselves. Like other Americans of recent immigrant stock, they felt the cruel blows of the depression and were no doubt grateful to Roosevelt for his efforts to lessen the effect of those blows. However, even though the Jews began to climb the economic class ladder in the late 1930's and 1940's, they persisted in their adherence to "New Deal" and "Fair Deal" ideas.

According to the results of American Institute of Public Opinion surveys in 1944, the Jews were the only high economic status group to look with favor on governmental guarantees against economic insecurity. The results show that 53.8 per cent of the Jewish business and professional men were for such government guarantees, as compared to an average of about 20 per cent for non-Jews in these same occupations.

Other survey evidence showed that, even though there were proportionately fewer Jewish manual laborers than in any other religious denomination, a higher proportion of Jews than of any other group wanted to give more power and influence to working people. While 58.8 per cent of the Jews wanted to give more power to working people, only 31.1 per cent of the Congregationalists, 37.1 per cent of the Presbyterians, and 34.7 per cent of the Episcopalians—the other high occupational status groups—agreed.[22]

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[20] It ought to be pointed out that the Wallace stand on Zionism was unequivocal, while some Jews were unconvinced that Truman was a firm Zionist.

[21] Elmo Roper, "American Attitudes on International Organization," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 7, pp. 405–35, at p. 410 (Winter, 1953).

In 1948 Jewish college graduates were less hostile to socialism and government planning than non-Jewish college graduates. Sixty-six per cent of the Jews were indexed as pro-New-Deal compared to 39 per cent of the Catholics and 34 per cent of the Protestants, in one study.[23]

In the survey of Ward 14, respondents were asked one question on the role of the national government in aiding economically underprivileged groups. Proportionately three times as many Jews as Gentiles were in strong agreement with such action.

The results of all studies show American Jews to be economic "liberals," in the sense of looking with approval upon the growth of governmental and labor power in economic affairs—even though they themselves are a favored economic group. Such economic views were crucial in the shaping of Jewish vote choice in the 1932 and 1936 elections. They were unimportant in 1940 and 1944, when Jewish interest in interventionism-internationalism was sufficient to unite them behind Roosevelt. In 1948 and 1952 the economic liberalism of the Jews again played a contributing role in sustaining their Democratic attachment.

On the issues of civil rights (in particular, Negro rights) and civil liberties (freedom of the mind) Jews have tended strongly to favor what is usually called the "liberal" position. The Jews were solid in their backing of President Truman in his quest for a Federal FEPC. Samuel Lubell reported that no white group was stronger in 1948 for FEPC measures than the Jews.[24] Again in 1952, the results of surveys on Negro rights questions showed that Jews were zealous in their quest for legislation protecting those rights. And in 1952, as in 1948, Jews thought that the Democrats could do much more about accomplishing such legislation than the Republicans.[25]

What is here labeled the "freedom of the mind" issue is really made up of a number of different issues, including communism in government, the rights and wrongs of congressional investigating committees, the Federal security program, and the use of high position to make reckless and unsubstantiated charges. According to 1952 surveys on these issues, the opinions of Jews were at variance with those of the rest of the population. Gallup and Roper public opinion polls found the Jews more hostile to McCarthy, less disturbed by charges of Democratic tolerance of communism in government, and more zealous in defending non-conformity than Catholics and Protestants. While these issues played little or no part in the 1948 campaign, the Jewish view of them no doubt fortified their Democratic leanings in 1952, and perhaps even played a vital role in bolstering Democratic loyalties.

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[22] Allinsmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitudes," p. 379.

[23] Haveman and West, *They Went to College*, pp. 98–99.

[24] Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York, 1952), pp. 96–97.

[25] Harris, *Is There a Republican Majority?*, p. 162.

Economic hardship may have made the Jews Democrats in 1932 and 1936; concern for the fate of coreligionists abroad may have made them Democrats in 1940 and 1944. But by 1948 and 1952 Jews were perched high on the economic status ladder, and the Nazis had been beaten, yet they continued to be "liberals" on economic issues, on civil rights, and on civil liberties. They continued to be internationalists in matters of foreign policy. And they continued to vote for Democratic candidates for President.

*Sources of Jewish Internationalism and Liberalism.* It must be clear that Jewish support for internationalism and liberal government is no transitory thing. Both are deeply rooted in the history and character of the Jewish people. It is no surprise that Jews support internationalist policies. They have been dispersed over the face of the globe for over 2,000 years, never long in one homeland and often in contact with co-religionists abroad. Jewish culture, language, folklore, and religion are truly international. Moreover, the experience of the last three decades has convinced American Jews that their own security lies in international guarantees (United Nations world government, genocide convention, international bill of human rights) and in the playing of a strong international role by the United States, whose beneficence in international affairs in behalf of Jews has been well demonstrated.

There are two primary sources of Jewish political liberalism. One is the basic insecurity of the group. The other lies in Jewish group values. Of the first, it may be said that Jews are engaged in a continuing quest for security even in free and pluralistic America. No matter how high they are placed on socio-economic scales, Jews are considered by non-Jews to be an out-group, and more often than not an undesirable one.[26] There are few Jews who do not feel this in their bones. And there are few indeed who do not sense that the security of the Jewish group depends in great measure upon the largess of liberal government. Those who had doubts of this had them smashed for our time by the forces of anti-semitism unleashed by Adolph Hitler and now so strong in Soviet Russia. Thus, while American Jews may be members of high income and occupational status groups, there are other reference groups in which their involvement, even when vicarious, runs deeper—those of the underprivileged and oppressed.

The second primary source of Jewish liberalism, probably less obvious and less understood than group insecurity, is in the ethno-religious values of the Jewish group. According to a vast impressionistic literature and growing systematic study of Jewish culture, those elements of culture most valued by Jews (including American Jews) are: Learning (*Torah*), Charity (*Zedakeh*) and, for want of a better word or phrase, Non-asceticism.

In probably no other American sub-culture is so high a value placed upon learning and intellectuality, or upon the helping of the poor by the rich and the weak by the strong, or upon living a good life upon earth in full use of one's body.

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[26] For a discussion of prestige and social-distance scales, see Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, *Groups in Harmony and Tension* (New York, 1953), pp. 78–79. Bogardus and others have consistently shown since 1926 that Jews are thought of by all other ethnic groups as an undesirable group to live with, to marry, or to work with.

American Jews are practically unaffected by the bleak influence of Calvinism or by the harsh political implications of Social Darwinism. Nor are the American Jews as yet more than touched by the American pragmatic tradition disparaging learning for its own "impractical" sake.

These Jewish values have had special relevance to some of the major issues and candidates of our time.[27] *Zedakeh*, which is the word for charity used in the Old Testament and the Talmud, and which is one of the few Hebrew words carried over into the Yiddish idiom, actually means "righteousness" or "justice" —"social justice" would be more accurate. Even though most American Jews may be unfamiliar with the word itself, the concept of *Zedakeh* is still highly prized in Jewish community life. To give is still a *mitzvah* (blessing). Within the framework of the Jewish cultural tradition, wealth, learning, and other tangible possessions are channeled from the strong to the weak and from the rich to the poor *as a matter of right*. It is easy to see the relevance of *Zedakeh* to politics, for both deal with the distribution of power. *Zedakeh*, as well as Jewish insecurity, would help promote Jewish sympathy for the Negro, and help induce a favorable attitude toward progressive taxation, Roosevelt's war on economic royalism, social security, and most of the programs which constituted the New Deal. It would also explain the favorable attitude of Jewish business and professional men toward an extension of power to labor, as long as they thought of laborers as being relatively weak or underprivileged. It would also explain the results of the liberalism or altruism test given to the voters of Ward 14 in 1953, the much greater willingness of the Jewish voters to be taxed to aid the less fortunate in Kentucky, or even in Africa and Asia.[28] *Zedakeh* would also help explain why the results of referenda studied by the writer show that Jewish wards and precincts are more favorable to such things as pensions for the aged, raising the minimum wage, and aiding the disabled than are non-Jewish voters.

The Jewish reverence for learning has also played a role in making the Jews political liberals in recent decades. It has influenced the Jewish response to individual candidates as well as to specific issues. The positive Jewish response to Wilson and to Stevenson was in part a function of Jewish respect for learning. Twenty-two and one half per cent of the reasons given by Jewish Stevenson voters in Ward 14 for preferring the Governor concerned his personality and intelligence, compared to only 13.8 per cent of the reasons given by non-Jewish Stevenson voters. It was partly the Jewish love of learning that assured their positive response to the Roosevelt brain trust. The idea of professors in government did not seem incongruous to them, as it did to many Gentiles. For centuries Jews have been taught that the most learned men ought to run the affairs of the community. They were not repulsed by the notion of planning in government as were many of their fellow Americans. Charity (welfare) requires planning. That is a Jewish tradition. If the state is to take an active role in assuring the welfare of its citizens, it ought to put its best brains to work to plan how this will be done.

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[27] A more complete discussion of the relevance of Jewish group values to political behavior will be forthcoming in the author's book on the subject.

[28] When asked whether they ought to help pay for the roads and education of the people in Kentucky, 56.9 per cent of the Jews and 39.8 per cent of the Christians agreed that they should. When asked whether they ought to be taxed to help raise standards of living in Asia and Africa, 44.5 per cent of the Jews and 28.9 per cent of the Christians agreed that they should.

The respect of Jews for learning has also helped to make them fierce defenders of intellectual independence in connection with civil liberties issues. While almost 12 per cent of the Jewish voters in the Ward 14 sample were in strong agreement that even Nazis and Communists ought to have free speech, not a single Gentile respondent was in agreement with that position. To be sure, the insecurity of the Jews prompts their anxiety about civil liberties, but the value which Jews place on knowledge plays a role as well.

The influence of Jewish non-asceticism on the political behavior of American Jews has been subtle, but probably no less important than the influence of *Zedakeh* and *Torah*. On such questions as the liquor or birth control issue it is easy to see how the non-asceticism or this-worldliness of the Jews influenced their position. But how has the non-asceticism of the Jews helped to make them political liberals as that term has been used in recent decades? The answer is that by Jewish emphasis on this-worldliness and the enjoyment of life here and now, Jews have been made more receptive to plans for a better life, for reconstructing society, for remaking man's environment, for socialism, and for millennialism.

*Zedakeh*, *Torah*, and this-worldliness have, along with the insecurity of the group, all promoted political liberalism among Jews in our time. Their liberalism and internationalism have favorably disposed them to a Democratic choice in recent presidential elections and largely explain the resistance of Jews to class politics.

# THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A "PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY"*

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Of all the countries that have so far fallen under the rule of communism, Czechoslovakia is undoubtedly the one whose prewar system of government and ways of life and traditions approximated most nearly those of a typical Western European nation. This is particularly true of the administration of justice. Thus Czechoslovakia furnishes an ideal setting for a case study of the impact of the Marxist-Leninist conception of the administration of justice on a previously Western-oriented community.

## I. PRE-WAR BACKGROUND

Prior to World War II the Czechoslovak judicial system[1] provided for four tiers of courts having general jurisdiction over both civil and criminal matters. The judges, all of whom had to have a law degree and pass a special judicial examination, were appointed by the President of the Republic and the cabinet for life. They enjoyed as complete a security of tenure as judges anywhere in the world. Except in case of a complete reorganization of the judicial system by an Act of Parliament, judges could be removed, transferred, or have their salaries reduced only upon conviction by a special senate of five judges of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals for gross malperformance of their duties.[2] Their independence was fully guaranteed. They were bound by law and had both the right and the duty to deny validity to any government ordinance (executive order) in conflict with an Act of Parliament. They had, however, no power to question the constitutionality of duly enacted laws. Judicial review of legislation was reserved exclusively for a special Constitutional Court, and could be exercised on a very limited scale only.

With a few exceptions, all cases of original and appellate jurisdiction were tried before professional judges. A lay element took part in judicial proceedings in special labor dispute courts, in courts dealing with commercial matters, in cases arising out of social insurance, and in certain types of offenses committed through the printed word. There was, of course, a jury system, which was used in criminal trials for felonies punishable with a minimum penalty of five years in the penitentiary.

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* This article is based mainly on primary sources, such as the Czechoslovak Communist and Communist-directed periodicals and other printed material, and evidence obtained from various refugee sources. Much of the material has been made available to the author by the Free Europe Committee, for which he would like to express his gratitude. Dr. P. Korbel's mimeographed summary of the main provisions of Czechoslovak laws bearing on the subject was particularly helpful.

[1] A good review of the Czechoslovak judicial system of prewar days may be found under *Soudy a soudnictví* in *Slovník veřejného práva československého*, Vol. 4 (Brno, 1938), pp. 429 ff.

[2] The retirement age was 66 and was to have become 65 by 1940.

Protection against unlawful acts of the administration was afforded, not by the ordinary courts, but by a special Administrative Court, composed of experts in public law and administration appointed for life by the President of the Republic.[3] Acting under the same guarantees of complete independence enjoyed by the judges of the Supreme Court, the judges of the Administrative Court became intrepid protectors of individual rights against interference on the part of any government agent,[4] from the President of the Republic down to the village constable, thereby exercising a function similar to that performed by the French *Conseil d'État.*

In fact, the resemblance to the French system of courts was marked throughout, except that there were neither *juges de paix* nor any lower administrative tribunals comparable to the French Interdepartmental Prefectural Councils. There was an even closer similarity to the French system with respect to methods of the juridical preparation[5] and appointment of judges, to the actual functioning of the courts, and to the role of the Minister of Justice, who had the power to admit law school graduates to judicial apprenticeship, to recommend judges for promotion, and to supervise in general the whole judicial system. The Czechoslovak system of prosecution and the organization of the legal profession were also close to the French models. All the members of the *parquet* were appointed by, and were fully subordinate to, the Minister of Justice.[6]

## II. THE 1945–1948 INTERMEZZO

In 1945 the judicial system was restored essentially in the form in which it had existed before the war. The only major postwar changes were the creation of special "people's courts" to handle certain crimes committed during the Nazi occupation and the failure to re-establish the Constitutional Court.[7] Due to the chaotic conditions prevailing during the months following the liberation, the judiciary experienced some difficulties in reasserting itself and in attaining its high prewar standards. However, backed by the strong tradition of judicial independence and impartiality, as well as by the firm "hands-off" attitude taken by the democratic Ministers of Justice Jaroslav Stránský and his successor, Prokop Drtina, the judicial branch of the government made a quite spectacular comeback.

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[3] For details see Eduard Taborsky, *Czechoslovak Democracy at Work* (London, 1945), pp. 131 ff.

[4] According to the statistical data available for the period from 1931 to 1935, 28,947 cases had been handled by the Court, of which 7,803 were decided against the government. See *Statistická Ročenka republiky Československé* (Praha, 1937), p. 279.

[5] On the preparation and training of lawyers and judges in Czechoslovakia, see Eduard Taborsky, "The Legal Profession in a People's Democracy," *Tulane Law Review*, Vol. 28, pp. 362–70 (April, 1954).

[6] This similarity of the prewar Czechoslovak and French judicial systems is hardly surprising if we keep in mind that Czechoslovakia, while retaining certain older rules of her own in some fields, came quite early under the influence of the Roman law and based her whole civil law system on the *Code Napoléon.*

[7] Another court which failed to be reinstated was the Electoral Court, a special tribunal with the authority to rule on electoral disputes. For details see Taborsky, *Czechoslovak Democracy at Work*, pp. 78 ff.

The Communist leaders had correctly anticipated that any restoration of the prewar judiciary would only make the fulfillment of their plans more difficult. For that reason they quite assiduously claimed the Ministry of Justice for their party during the strenuous negotiations between them and the leaders of democratic parties in Moscow in March, 1945.[8] Their failure to get this post was one of the few setbacks they suffered in their early bid for power. And when the public prosecutors began to demand, and the courts to mete out, jail sentences against Communist-commanded policemen for having exceeded their authority, and when, in addition, the Administrative Court even went so far as to throw out as illegal some of the confiscatory measures taken against private property by Communist-directed local authorities, the Communists' ire erupted. They gave full expression to their feelings later on when, in their criticism of the judicial system of pre-Communist days, they complained bitterly that "the reactionaries had taken advantage of legal opportunities within the state apparatus," among them the judiciary, and that "many judges were directly reactionary, while many others were non-political, made decisions according to the 'law' only," and thus "kept on thwarting the struggle against the bourgeoisie."[9]

### III. THE FEBRUARY COUP

The events of February, 1948 rang the death-knell of a free and impartial judiciary in Czechoslovakia. The Communist leader Klement Gottwald, having finally forced President Beneš into submission, triumphantly announced to the gathering of his followers awaiting him at Prague's *Václavské náměstí* that the Ministry of Justice would be taken over by Alexei Čepička. The choice of the most rabid of the younger Communist generation to succeed the judicious Drtina was a perfect symbol of the changes to come.

Čepička, who was also Secretary General of the Central Action Committee of the "Regenerated National Front," the main purging body, wasted no time. A colossal purge was immediately carried out in the Ministry of Justice, on all levels of the judiciary and the public prosecution. When it was finished, the backbone of the pre-Communist judicial system was broken and its whole character defaced beyond recognition. Almost overnight the independence of the judiciary was done away with, and what had once been the staunch guardian of individual rights and freedom was turned into a tool of coercion and subjection.

All this was achieved without any change in the structure of the judiciary, and without formal amendment of the rules of procedure or the canons of substantive law.

In fact, we find in the field of the judiciary and the agencies related to it trends and developments rather similar to those that had occurred in the other two branches of the government, i.e., a speedy taking over by the Communists, a sweeping purge of unreliables, and complete subjection to Communist will, but with little change in structure, machinery, and formal procedures. Sovietization came later, gradually, almost grudgingly, and mostly under the stress of necessity created either by direct or indirect Soviet "suggestions" or by pressure on the part of overzealous homegrown ultra-Muscovites.

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[8] Concerning the Moscow negotiations in March, 1945 see Eduard Taborsky, "Beneš and Stalin—Moscow, 1943 and 1945," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. 13, pp. 181–82 (July, 1953). See also Josef Josten, *Oh, My Country* (London, 1949).

[9] See *Lidové Noviny*, a daily paper published by the Communist-dominated Syndicate of Czechoslovak Authors, Oct. 15, 1950.

## IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE "NINTH OF MAY" CONSTITUTION

The Czechoslovak Communist Constitution was drafted by the Communist party legal experts under the direct guidance of the party leadership and was unanimously adopted by the Constituent Assembly on May 9, 1948. Hence it is usually referred to as the Ninth of May Constitution.[10] It consists of two unequal parts. The first, entitled the "Fundamental Articles of the Constitution," is a brief enumeration of basic principles; the second, styled the "Detailed Provisions of the Constitution," further expounds the "Fundamental Articles." Provisions relative to the judicial branch of the government are included mainly in Article XI of the "Fundamental Articles" and in Article VII of the "Detailed Provisions." The essential provisions may be summarized as follows:

1. The judiciary is kept separate from the administration on all levels of government.
2. The judges are to act independently in the discharge of their office.
3. The courts are to adjudicate as a rule through benches composed of both professional judges and lay assessors.
4. Professional judges are to be appointed by the executive branch of the government and are subject to involuntary transfer, dismissal, or retirement only in case of a general reorganization of the judiciary, by virtue of a disciplinary finding, or upon reaching a prescribed age or length of service.
5. Lay judges are to be appointed by people's committees (the organs of local government) on the corresponding territorial level and are subject to recall under conditions laid down in a special Act.
6. All judges are to abide by the laws and government ordinances and are to interpret both in the light of the Constitution and the "principles of the People's Democratic Order," the right to declare an Act of the legislature unconstitutional being reserved exclusively to the Presidium of the National Assembly.[11]
7. Jurisdiction is to be exercised by civil courts in matters of civil law, by criminal courts in matters of criminal law, and by an Administrative Court in administrative matters, while the authority of military courts may be extended to civilians "only in time of war or of increased danger to the State, and only in respect of acts committed in such a time."

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[10] The English translation of the Constitution was published in pamphlet form by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Information (Praha, 1948). It may also be found in A. J. Peaslee, *Constitutions of Nations* (Concord, N. H., 1950).

[11] Section 65, Article II of the "Detailed Provisions."

8. The liability of the state and the judge in respect of damages arising out of a violation of the law committed by the judge in the discharge of his office is to be prescribed by law.

9. The organization of the courts, the qualifications of judges, methods of court procedure, and other arrangements relative to the exercise of judicial powers are to be stipulated by acts of the legislature, thus withdrawing the regulation of such matters from the authority of the executive branch of the government.

10. No one is to be arrested, unless detected in the act itself, "except on a written and circumstantiated warrant granted by the judge," such a warrant to be "served at the time of arrest or, if this is not possible, within 48 hours thereafter."[12]

If we compare these principles with the corresponding provisions of the Czechoslovak ("bourgeois") Constitution of 1920 we find, with some amazement, that they are for the most part identical or represent only a rewording. A few items have been added and a few former provisions omitted, most of them of slight importance. The jury system is abandoned and the use of lay judges to sit with professional judges is made a general rule in both civil and criminal matters. The authority of the legislature to subject civilians to the jurisdiction of military tribunals is somewhat enlarged, being now available not only in time of war, but also in "time of increased danger to the state." These and a few other changes of lesser consequence could by no means in themselves have had an important effect on the character and the operation of the judicial branch.

There are, however, one omission and two additions which cannot be dismissed so lightly. The omission concerns the Constitutional Court, the only Czechoslovak Court entitled to review the acts of the legislature.[13] For a true Communist, any type of judicial check on the legislative branch of the government has always been anathema. Whenever an attempt had been made since World War II to provide for judicial review, the Communists have been in determined opposition.[14] It is therefore not surprising that the Ninth of May Constitution provides no Constitutional Court. Instead, the exclusive power to rule upon the constitutionality of the laws is vested in the Presidium of the National Assembly.

The two additions of essential importance reflect the Communist concept of the judiciary as merely a subordinate organ of law enforcement instead of a coordinate branch of government with checks on the other two branches. The first states specifically that the judges must abide not only by the laws of the legislature, but also by government ordinances.[15] That is, of course, a far-reaching departure from a well-established principle, rigidly adhered to in Western democracies of both the presidential and the parliamentary variety.

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[12] Section 3, Article I of the "Detailed Provisions."

[13] For details see Taborsky, *Czechoslovak Democracy at Work*, pp. 74 ff.

[14] This was the case in France, Italy, and Western Germany.

[15] Section 143, Article VII of the "Detailed Provisions."

Indeed, the framers of the 1920 Constitution valued this particular principle so highly that they chose to emphasize it twice. It was stated in one section of the Judiciary Article that judges "shall be bound only by law,"[16] which by clear implication gave them the right to disregard a government ordinance in conflict with a statute. A few sections further on, it was provided that "the judges shall have the right, in determining a point of law, to inquire into the validity of a government ordinance."[17] The Ninth of May Constitution takes from the Courts this important right and rests it solely in the Presidium of the National Assembly, following the Soviet pattern[18] and going even beyond the Stalin Constitution, which says that the judges are "subject only to the law."[19]

The second notable Communist addition serves to instruct the judges as to the proper ways of legal interpretation by directing them to interpret statutes and ordinances "in the light of the Constitution and the principles of the People's Democratic Order."[20] The purport of this clause is self-evident and is fully borne out by its practical application, considered below. No longer is the judge expected invariably to follow the traditional channels of legal interpretation: he must instead apply the law as required by the party leaders. For the "People's Democratic Order" is what the rulers say it is, and its substance changes constantly as the march goes on toward the ultimate utopia of "pure" communism.

## V. THE STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF THE COURTS

Having achieved through a ruthless purge and a few constitutional changes their main objective of transforming the courts into obedient executors of their orders, the Communist rulers were content for a time to make only a few relatively unimportant changes in the judicial machinery. To expedite the business of liquidating the enemy classes, the so-called "people's courts," which had gone out of existence in January, 1947, were speedily re-established in April, 1948, with their personnel thoroughly communized. In October, 1948, a special State Court was created to deal with certain categories of crimes against the state and its external and internal security under a simultaneously-promulgated People's Democratic Republic Protection Act. And by January, 1949, the four-tiered arrangement of prewar days had become a three-tiered system through the discontinuance of the provincial courts of appeals.[21] None of these changes can be considered as essential or as having anything to do with Communist doctrine.

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[16] Section 98, *ibid.*

[17] Section 102, *ibid.*

[18] Under Article 49 of the Soviet Constitution the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR has the power to annul decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers if they do not conform to law.

[19] Article 112. Of course this difference is no more than a technicality, since a Soviet Court could hardly be expected to declare a government ordinance illegal.

[20] Section 143, Article VII of the "Detailed Provisions."

[21] In pre-Communist Czechoslovakia the four levels of courts of ordinary jurisdiction were the district courts (*okresní soudy*), regional courts (*krajské soudy*), provincial courts of appeals (*vrchní soudy*), and the Supreme Court (*nejvyšší soud*).

Nor were any really substantial changes made in the formal court procedure in the first years of the Communist rule. The results obtained, particularly in criminal matters, were, of course, quite different from what they had been in pre-Communist days. Drastic sentences against "spies, traitors, and saboteurs," as well as against the "village rich," the *kulak*, began to be meted out in ever-increasing quantities. But the *processes* through which such judgments were reached continued to follow, on the whole, the pattern of earlier days.

Considering the well-known Soviet mania for imposing rigid uniformity on satellite governmental systems, it was obvious that such a situation could not last long. There remained far too many deviations from the Soviet model. Professional judges still continued to be appointed for life by the executive branch of the government, not elected for a definite term of office as in the Soviet Union. There were no popularly-elected courts with broad general jurisdiction corresponding to the Soviet people's courts.[22] The Czechoslovak Supreme Court, unlike the Supreme Court of the U. S. S. R., enjoyed no authority of general supervision over the other courts. There were two other courts of final jurisdiction, both fully independent of, and on a footing of equality with, the Supreme Court: a Supreme Military Court and an Administrative Court. This was still another deviation from the Soviet pattern. And, above all, the whole system of prosecution was completely out of step with that in the Soviet Union.

Eager to please the Soviet masters and conscious of the risk he would run if he failed to communize quickly enough in the field under his responsibility, the new Minister of Justice announced, as early as March, 1948,[23] and soon thereafter began to prepare, a "Juridical Two-Year Plan," which was intended to do away with "bourgeois" law and replace it with "socialist" law. It was an ambitious, all-embracing program, involving all major branches of law.[24] By the fall of 1950 the program was virtually completed and was speedily acted upon by the National Assembly. The results, aided by what was termed "the broadest utilization of the experience of Soviet jurisprudence,"[25] were embodied in several voluminous codes covering with few exceptions the whole field of civil and criminal law, substantive and procedural.

A number of far-reaching innovations imitative of Soviet law were thus brought into the substantive law, but only a few changes of essential importance were made with respect to judicial procedure.

Most of the procedural changes were motivated by the need to eliminate

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[22] The previously-mentioned Czechoslovak "people's courts" were only extraordinary criminal courts with a limited purpose of providing speedy retribution for wartime activities of the Nazis and their collaborators.

[23] See *Právo Lidu*, the main daily of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic party, March 17, 1948.

[24] A good discussion of the Plan as it affected the Czechoslovak legal system may be found in Václav Beneš, "The New Legal System of Czechoslovakia," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. 12, pp. 215 ff (Oct., 1952).

[25] *Zpráva o Československu* [Report on Czechoslovakia], a monthly documentary digest published in New York by the Free Europe Committee, Vol. 1, No. 18, p. 5 (1950).

"old-fashioned bourgeois formalism."[26] For example, the Court could no longer decide for the plaintiff on the sole ground that the defendant failed to file a reply to the suit. Again, new facts were allowed to be brought into the trial even on the appellate level. The main procedural change, however, and the one most detrimental to the position of the judiciary, was the transfer of the exercise of certain rights from the judge to the public prosecutor. Under the prewar rules of criminal procedure, only a judge could order a suspected person to be held in custody for purposes of investigation for a limited time, and only the judges could conduct such investigations, or authorize searches and seizures of persons, dwellings, and mail. The new Criminal Court Procedure Act of 1950, borrowing once again from the Soviet system, gave all these powers to the prosecutor without even imposing a definite limit on the period for which he could hold a person incommunicado.[27]

As these changes were being prepared and enacted, the Communist rulers kept on emphasizing the changed ideological foundation upon which the new "people's democratic" courts and their work were to be based. "The starting point for the solution of all legal questions," said Čepička, addressing the National Congress of Czechoslovak lawyers in September, 1949, "is Marx-Leninism, which enables us to express in a precise and understandable way legal conceptions which the bourgeois legal science sought to obscure."[28] In mentioning some of the purposes to be achieved by the new juridical order, the Communist Minister of Justice emphasized primarily the need to strengthen the "people's democracy" and "Socialist legality," while relegating to third place the need of "legal security of the workers."

Čepička's successor as Minister of Justice, Stefan Rais, expressed similar views. In December, 1950, he told the National Conference of the Presidents of the Courts and public prosecutors:

> In the struggle for the socialist rebuilding of the villages, the prosecutors and the judges have the task to protect the agricultural cooperatives,[29] to prosecute saboteurs, to hit hard the village bourgeoisie. The trials in the village must become effective means to convince the broad masses as to who is the sworn enemy of their interests. The proceedings against the saboteurs found among the village rich and their associates have a great political importance. . . . The courts must be prepared and take advantage of every means suitable to unmask the true face of the village rich . . . in reaching decisions they have to consider the class character of the accused and the threat his act represents for the community. . . . The basic task of the judiciary in connection with the building of socialism in the village is to pursue consistently the general line of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia. . . .[30]

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[26] Explaining the intended reforms on December 17, 1948, *Lidové Noviny* stated: "The purpose of this new judiciary will not any longer be the preservation of certain meaningless formalities. The purpose will be above all to find material truth. The finality of a judicial decision will remain untouched, but it will no longer prevent the Court from admitting its mistakes and from remedying them."

[27] Other important powers granted the procurators by the new rules of criminal and civil procedure will be considered below.

[28] *Lidové Noviny*, Sept. 24, 1949.

[29] These cooperatives are the nuclei of future collective farms.

[30] *Rudé Právo*, Dec. 6, 1950.

Fifteen months later, addressing another national conference of judges and prosecutors, he listed as the main functions of the judiciary such things as "helping to carry out the resolutions of the Party and of the government concerning industrial and agricultural production, and intensifying the struggle against those who steal national property as well as against those violating Socialist legality and working discipline."[31] He also advised the judges how to tackle these all-important tasks: "There is no judicial case, be it criminal or civil, which would not require the judge to apply a political viewpoint in dealing with it. It is not enough that the judge knows the provisions and the sanction of the laws. He must also know its essence and function, its political contents and its political purpose."[32]

These and the many similar public explanations of the ideology underlying the function and operation of the judicial branch were *not* intended to pave the way for further structural reforms. Having completed and put into operation their "Juridical Two-Year Plan," the Czechoslovak Communist leaders apparently believed that their reorganizing work in the judicial sphere had been substantially concluded. In January, 1952, however, the *Sovietskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, the principal Soviet review of political science and law, published an article strongly criticizing the Czechoslovak judicial system for not yet having done away with the subordination of the Prosecutor to the Minister of Justice. Its author, the Soviet jurist W. S. Tadevosian, expressed a hope that the situation would soon be improved and that the prosecutor's office would be made into "a centralized and independent organ which would exercise supreme supervision over the exact implementation of laws."[33] A criticism coming from such a source, especially when accompanied by a definite suggestion for remedial action, can be left unheeded behind the Iron Curtain only at mortal risk for the responsible officials. The hint was not lost on Stefan Rais and his associates. Within a few months the Minister could report that appropriate laws had already been drafted. On October 30, 1952, the National Assembly approved with customary unanimity a constitutional amendment and three laws reorganizing the judiciary and the prosecutors, and once again amending the rules of civil and criminal procedure.

The most notable changes concerning the judiciary proper[34] brought about by this latest adaptation to the Soviet pattern can be summed up as follows:

1. The Administrative Court and the Supreme Military are abolished.
2. Three *collegia* are established within the Supreme Court, one for criminal matters, one for civil law matters, and one for military matters, the last of these taking over the function previously exercised by the Supreme Military Court.
3. The Supreme Court is vested with supreme supervisory and directive

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[31] *Rudé Právo*, March 18, 1952.

[32] *Lidové Noviny*, Jan. 30, 1951.

[33] English translation taken from *News from behind the Iron Curtain*, Vol. 1, No. 8, p. 15 (1952).

[34] The changes effected in the field of public prosecution will be considered later.

powers over all the other courts, including even the right to issue directives to the lower courts regarding the proper interpretation of laws and regulations.

4. Similar powers of supervision are given to the Courts of Appeals over the district courts, which are renamed "people's courts" to match the Soviet courts of the same name.

5. The Supreme Court can also "for important reasons" withdraw a case from one subordinate court and assign it to another. A similar authority is vested in the Courts of Appeals with regard to cases handled by the inferior courts within their circuits.

6. The oath which all judges take upon being sworn into office includes a promise to decide cases "in accordance with the principles of Socialist legality."

7. All judges, professional and lay, are made elective.

8. The function of the courts is redefined in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist conception, the Court Organization listing as their first task the protection of "the social order and the state machinery of the Republic, of its socialist upbuilding and socialist property" and only secondarily the protection of "the personal work and property rights and interests of the citizens, which are safeguarded by law."

9. Some guidance is provided for the work of the courts, which are told to "educate the citizens in devotion and loyalty toward the Czechoslovak Republic, in strict and consistent observance of the laws and other legal regulations, in respecting socialist property, in labor discipline, in the fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon them by the defense of the state, and in the orderly observance of the rules of socialist common life."

These changes follow closely the corresponding Soviet arrangements and reflect the intention of the new rulers, as they put it, to benefit by the "rich experience of the most mature, solely correct, and truthful science in the world, the Soviet jurisprudence."[35]

A similar endeavor to emulate the Soviet Union is noticeable in the practical operation of the courts. The general trend of the development is away from civil law litigation and towards increasing emphasis on criminal matters. With the rapid disappearance of private enterprise in industry and business and its swift eclipse in the field of agriculture, there is far less room for such civil law cases as usually arise under a free enterprise system. And the continuous need to enforce rigid discipline and break every resistance necessarily multiplies the number of law violations and sharpens the application of criminal law.

Also, with the new emphasis on socialist ownership and its protection, the evaluation of offenses has shifted considerably. While personal guilt still continues to be the main consideration, penalties are increasingly assessed according to the object against which the offense has been perpetrated. The case was stated clearly in an editorial in *Lidové Noviny* which insisted that "stealing nationalized property is something essentially quite different from stealing property of a private entrepreneur."[36] And, according to the new Criminal Code, the maximum penalty for larceny against socialist property is twice that prescribed for larceny against private property. Moreover, an act otherwise criminal ceases to be considered criminal when it has been committed in order to "avert danger of the People's Democratic Republic, its socialist upbuilding, and the interest of the working class."

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[35] As stated by the Minister of Justice in an address to a conference of attorneys in June, 1952. *Rudé Právo*, June 12, 1952.

The new attitude is also borne out by the new motivation of punishment. As defined by the new Criminal Code, the aims of punishment are to destroy the enemies of the working class, to prevent the offender from committing further criminal activities, and to teach him to accept the rules of socialist life. Perhaps most indicative of the manner of operation of the "people's democratic" judicial system is the possibility that even after having served a sentence one may be assigned to a Forced Labor Camp for a period up to two years—in case one has failed, while serving his sentence, "to achieve change of disposition showing that one would lead the orderly life of a working man."

The most dreaded court is the State Court, which handles matters of major political importance, such as high treason and espionage. All of the political monster trials, such as the one involving Slánský, Clementis, and others, were held before this court. The sentences usually impose penalties of death or confinement in the penitentiary for life or for a long term.

Most trials are held in the district courts, now called the people's courts, which are the main tool for enforcing "Socialist legality," as far as the judiciary proper is concerned. A few typical cases will illustrate what offenses the people's (district) courts deal with and what sort of penalties they impose. In February, 1952, two members of the local committee (the organ of local government) were tried by the district court of Liberec for having granted ration cards for clothing, sugar, and soap to a few peasants not entitled to them because they had not met their quotas of deliveries to the State. The men were sentenced to eight and nine months of imprisonment.[37] In August, 1952, two peasants got ten and seven years and fines of 100,000 and 50,000 crowns (2,000 and 1,000 dollars) respectively from another district court on the ground that "they infiltrated into a peasant cooperative in 1949–1950 and endeavored to create mistrust toward the regime and the cooperative idea by spreading false rumors."[38] In September, 1952, two men were found guilty by the district court of Prague of having sold "anti-Soviet and other prohibited books," including such works as *Masaryk in Photography*, *Masaryk the Liberator*, and the like. They were sentenced to seven and a half years in the penitentiary and all their property was confiscated.[39] Although most death sentences are pronounced by the State Court, occasionally even the (people's) district courts impose capital punishment. In

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[36] *Lidové Noviny*, July 21, 1948.

[37] The case was reported in *Stráž Severu*, a regional newspaper, on Feb. 15, 1953. See *Zpráva o Československu*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 27–28 (1952).

[38] *Rudé Právo*, Aug. 2, 9153.

[39] *Zpráva o Československu*, Vol. 3, No. 10, p. 30 (1952).

July, 1951, for instance, three men were condemned to death by the Prague district court for "counterfeiting food ration cards";[40] and the district court of Bratislava in Slovakia delivered a like decision in April, 1952 in the case of a former factory owner who concealed considerable quantities of jewelry and precious stones from the government authorities.[41]

One Communist writer characterized the situation by stressing the point that a judge must act not as a "sentimental old woman" but as a physician who does not hesitate to make a surgical cut or to isolate a patient who could communicate his disease to others.[42]

In civil law cases matters are somewhat different. Where socialist property and socialization clash with private interests, the latter invariably lose, for this is in full accord with "Socialist legality." That at least is the consensus as borne out by the reports of refugees coming from Czechoslovakia, and it seems to be fully confirmed by what various Communist spokesmen themselves say regarding the function and purpose of "Socialist law."[43] The Communist Minister of Justice himself helped to prove the accuracy of such reports when, in a speech before the National Conference of Czechoslovak Lawyers in June, 1952, he angrily condemned the lawyers who "descended so low" as to "secretly" (sic!) prepare letters of appeals for the village rich.[44]

Where no political issue is in the balance, in litigations involving divorce, inheritance matters, and the like, justice apparently still obtains. However, as various reports and even some Communist admissions indicate,[45] the courts of first instance are often plagued by inefficiency. Judicial records are lost or misfiled and are unavailable when hearings are supposed to take place, and lay judges fail to appear, causing delays and postponements of sessions. In many communities these "people's" judges are selected from among persons with little education and no understanding of judicial processes.

## VI. THE PUBLIC PROSECUTION

In the Soviet Union the judiciary is closely integrated with the public prosecution. The courts and the prosecuting organs are dealt with in the same chapter of the Constitution, under a joint heading. And all experts on the Soviet judicial system agree that the office of the Procurator General of the U.S.S.R. overshadows in importance and authority every court in the Soviet Union. Said Vyshinsky, who certainly ought to know, having served as Procurator General for so many years: "The Soviet Prosecuting Officer is the watchman of

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[40] *Rudé Právo*, July 13, 1951.

[41] *Rudé Právo*, April 30, 1952.

[42] *Lidové Noviny*, Aug. 12, 1948.

[43] See for example the statements by Čepička and Rais above.

[44] *Rudé Právo*, June 12, 1952.

[45] *Východoslovenská Pravda*, a regional Communist newspaper in eastern Slovakia, which reported on April 12, 1952 that a scheduled court hearing had to be cancelled because the court had forgotten to produce the records pertinent to the case. *Zpráva o Československu*, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 28 (1952).

Socialist legality, the leader of the policy of the Communist party and of Soviet authority, the champion of socialism."[46]

The Soviet arrangement stood in absolute contradiction to the very basis of the Czechoslovak prewar system of prosecution. However, being anxious to gain the good will of as many people as possible in the initial years of their rule, and hoping that they could achieve their objective better by avoiding sudden drastic structural changes, the native Communist leaders shrank from remodeling the public prosecution along Soviet lines. To be sure, they made the prosecutors the central figures in the administration of criminal justice, but they did this by simply purging all prosecutors whom they considered unreliable and replacing them with full-fledged Communists. They dealt similarly with the personnel of the courts and thus placed both the prosecuting officers and the judges under the rule of rigid party discipline. It was therefore no problem for them to make both cooperate along the desired lines and to induce both to comply obediently with whatever wishes the party expressed. To coordinate more efficiently the work of both these tools of "Socialist legality" and to make sure that the party goals were well understood, the Communist leaders resorted to the device of calling frequent conferences of judges and prosecutors. Such conferences became a sort of workshop where the participants obtained ideological refreshment and were given general directives for the performance of their duties by the Minister of Justice and other high-ranking officials. All this explains why the Communist leaders felt no urgent need of any sweeping reorganization of the prosecuting branch.

A few formal alterations, however, were made. When in December, 1948 the previous four-tiered judicial structure was changed into a three-tiered system, the prosecution was re-arranged accordingly. There was thus a Procurator General as the highest prosecuting officer and below him the regional and district prosecutors (procurators).[47] The Procurator General was granted somewhat broadened powers insofar as he was authorized to lodge "complaints to ensure observance of the law" against judicial decisions which he deemed to have violated the law, not only in criminal matters but in civil law suits as well.[48] However, he was given no such authority with regard to the decisions of the Supreme Court. Moreover, he could lodge such complaints only if authorized to do so by the Minister of Justice, who continued to be the Procurator's boss. Nor did Čepička's "Juridical Two-Year Plan" bring any basic change in the Procurator's position. As indicated earlier, the investigative powers and the right to authorize arrests and searches, hitherto belonging to the judge, were vested in the prosecutors. So was the supervision of prisons and penitentiaries.

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[46] Andrei Vyshinsky, *The Law of the Soviet State* (New York, 1948), p. 537.

[47] The terms procurator and prosecutor are used here as being identical.

[48] Under the prewar Criminal Procedure Code (Articles 33, 292, and 79) the Procurator General could lodge with the Supreme Court a "complaint for the preservation of the law" against final judgments of *criminal* courts which he believed to be incompatible with the law. However, a person already acquitted under such a judgment could not be tried again for the same offense even though the judgment was pronounced illegal . . . .

And the procurator's authority to join in civil proceedings was further enlarged. He could intervene in civil cases at any stage whenever he deemed it necessary in the interests of the state or of the "working people." He could appeal against any judgment, and he could demand the resumption of proceedings in such matters as had already become *res judicata.*

Despite these extensive powers, going considerably beyond those granted to the prosecutors in pre-Communist days, the Czechoslovak Procurator General and his prosecuting aides were still far behind their Soviet counterparts in the extent of their authority and in their overall position in the structure of the government. No wonder that serious fault was found with the Czechoslovak prosecution when the Soviet lawyer Tadevosian chose to review its organization in the People's Democracies in his article in the *Sovietskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo* in January, 1952. Tadevosian's remarks touched off, as we have seen, a hasty reform of the judiciary proper. They were bound all the more to lead to a radical reorganization of the prosecuting branch, which had become the direct object of Soviet criticism.

The result of that reorganization, undertaken simultaneously with the judicial reform of October, 1952, was that, with one exception, the Czechoslovak system of prosecution became almost a duplicate of the Soviet model. A constitutional amendment, adopted by the National Assembly on October 30, 1952, vested in the Procurator General the power to supervise strict observance of the laws and regulations not only by courts but by all ministries, all agencies of central and local government, and all institutions as well as all officials and even private individuals. An additional act, passed on the same day, spelled out the above general definition in more detailed terms, including among the Procurator's specific tasks such items as "watching over, carrying through, and strengthening Socialist legality," the "protection of the social order and the State machinery of the Republic, of its socialist upbuilding and socialist property as well as of the interests of the working population against enemies and other saboteurs"; the "protection of the fighting ability of the armed forces and their discipline and order"; the "strengthening of the authority of the commanders and contribution towards the safeguarding of the defense of the motherland"; and the "education of the citizens in the observance of the laws and other rules of the socialist common life and the fulfillment of civic obligations."

Thus, only a few years since the Communists hoisted the Red banner over Prague's august Hradčany Castle, the whole edifice of the Czechoslovakian judicial system has been leveled to the ground and a new structure has been erected on its ruins. It is a structure which bears the indelible label, "Prefabricated in Moscow."

# FEDERALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA

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## I

Yugoslav federalism does not begin with the federal constitution adopted eight years ago. Federal ideas among the South Slavs followed the stirrings of nationalism and the struggle for independence at the end of the eighteenth and early in the nineteenth century as the logical solution for a situation in which the various tribes wished to be united but not unitary.

With the exception of the Serbian Highlanders in Montenegro, who had been enjoying a precarious independence since 1697, the South Slav tribes were divided between the multi-national Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires. They generally showed little political consciousness either as separate tribes or as members of the Slav family. The first integrating movement among them began in the last three decades of the eighteenth century in the shape of vague Pan-Slav ideas stimulated by the Russian advance towards the Balkans. Pan-Slavism appealed both to many South Slav intellectuals and to the illiterate masses, but was too vague and too weak to counteract the various religious, linguistic, political, and historical differences among the tribes. Moreover, the relations between the three major tribes were disturbed by violent territorial disputes: Macedonia was the bone of contention between the Serbs and the Bulgarians, while Bosnia and Herzegovina were disputed by the Serbs and the Croats.[1]

Consequently, the South Slavs did not follow the clarion call of the French Revolution or respond to Napoleon's short-lived experiment of establishing an "Illyrian" language and nation. Their political consciousness as Slavs gradually developed in the first half of the nineteenth century, but the simultaneous development of tribal particularisms prevented integration. The Serbs and the Croats established at least a common literary language, although it was written in two different alphabets, but the Bulgarians and the Slovenes developed separate languages. Some Serbs and Croats did, indeed, think of the unification of all South Slavs, but they generally did so in terms of a Great Serbia or a Great Croatia, which were clearly unacceptable to the other tribes.[2]

The Serbian Karadjordjević dynasty, having liberated the Serbs from Turkish rule and leaning heavily on Russian support, aimed at dynastic aggrandizement and sought for Serbia the role of a Piedmont among the South Slavs. The Croats, however, generally remained legitimists and aspired to autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Already at the first Pan-Slav Congress held in Prague in 1848 they formulated vague federal plans for the Empire; later they developed the idea of trialism, in its narrow sense meaning the unification of all the Hapsburg Slavs in a separate unit of the Empire, but in its broad sense including also the Slavs from outside the Empire.[3]

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[1] Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism, Its History and Ideology* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1953), pp. 50–52.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 52–57. These Great Serbian and Great Croatian movements before unification must be distinguished from similarly-named movements after it. The former envisaged integration, while the latter were separatist. *Cf.* Ferdo Čulinović, *Razvitak Jugoslavenskog Federalizma* [The Development of Yugoslav Federalism] (Zagreb, 1953), pp. 3–5.

Federalism as a solution of the great practical difficulties impeding the unification of the westernized Catholic Hapsburg Slavs and the Oriental Orthodox Serbs and Montenegrins, appealed to many of the best brains on both sides. The eminent Croatian Bishop Strosmayer (1815–1905) was ready to place the Croats under the political rule of the Serbian dukes on the basis of a federal union. The Vojvodina Serbs, attracted to Serbia by their national sentiments but tied to the Hapsburg Empire by their cultural traditions and economic interests, strongly favored a federation.[4] Also the radical Serbian thinker, Svetozar Marković, advocated a federation, in the first instance with the Bulgarians but later also with the other tribes.[5] These first advocates of Yugoslav federalism were not political theoreticians. They did not study *The Federalist*, but they knew of the United States and, from closer quarters, of Switzerland.

## II

The early stages of the First World War boded ill for the South Slavs: an Allied victory would have spelled Russian domination, while a victory for the Central Powers would have strengthened German and Magyar preponderance in the Balkans. However, the political situation in 1915 was sufficiently fluid to encourage secret talks of unification between the representatives of the Serbian King and those of the Yugoslav Council, which represented the Croats and the Slovenes living under Hapsburg rule. Despite these, the views remained divergent—the Serbs were thinking in terms of other South Slav lands being joined to Serbia and of a centralist government, while the Hapsburg Slavs desired a union based on the principle of the preservation of the identity of the historical units. Some of them, as well as a few Montenegrin emigrés, supported the federal idea.[6]

This tug of war between the opposed concepts of unification continued throughout the war. At first the Serbs were in the stronger position, since Serbia was a recognized state fighting on the side of the Allies and enjoying strong Tsarist support. The fall of the Tsars weakened their insistence on their own terms and induced them to meet again the representatives of the Hapsburg South Slavs at the prolonged Corfu Conference in the summer of 1917, but the ensuing Declaration was ambiguous and left to the future the determination of the political system of a unified Yugoslavia. It accepted only the basic idea of Yugoslavia as distinct from an enlarged Serbia.

No further developments took place until October 26, 1918, when the National Council of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, representing the South Slavs living within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, severed its relations with the Empire and constituted what may be legitimately considered a state. This forced the Serbs to meet the delegates of the Council at another Conference. The resulting Geneva Declaration of November 6, 1918 agreed to the unification of three historical units—Serbia, the lands previously within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Montenegro—and to the retention of separate governments and systems of law in the three units until the final determination of the constitution. Owing to strong Serbian opposition, however, this seemingly federal plan for the transitional period was not adhered to. Outside political pressure, namely, the danger of Italian encroachments and the necessity of a united stand at the Peace Conference, strengthened the centralist forces and resulted in the Declaration of Union on December 1, 1918. This Declaration provided no safeguards for the preservation of separate institutions but established a unitary provisional coalition government, leaving the determination of the system of government to the future Constituent Assembly.[7]

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[3] Čulinović, pp. 17–23; Kohn, pp. 70–73 and 191.

[4] Svetozar Pribičević, *Diktatura Kralja Aleksandra* [The Dictatorship of King Alexander] (Belgrade, 1952), p. 153; Kohn, p. 55.

[5] Pribičević, p. 153; Čulinović, p. 31.

[6] Čulinović, pp. 42–52.

The unification of the South Slavs was not only imperfect but also incomplete. The Bulgarians, who did not participate in the negotiations and remained outside the new state, had great cultural and religious affinities with the Serbs, although the two nations were divided by historical conflicts and had developed separate languages. The relations between the Serbs and the Croats were even more difficult: the common Serbo-Croat language scarcely compensated for the conflicts between the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox Churches, between the Western and the Oriental cultural heritages, or for the feud over Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Considerable difficulties arose out of the vague agreement of December 1, 1918. The provisional Government persecuted all the opponents of a unitary, centralist system as separatists and traitors, but despite its pressure the centralist bloc obtained little more than half the votes in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, eventually held on November 28, 1920.

The Constituent Assembly had before it six draft constitutions, ranging from a rigidly centralist governmental draft, through proposals involving varying degrees of devolution, to one advocating a true federation. The newly-formed Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), profiting by the discontent of the various Yugoslav nationalities with the oppressive Serbian-dominated Government, had obtained 58 mandates to the Constituent Assembly and ranked as the third-largest party. It was, however, unable to follow up this electoral success, owing to lack of a political program and to inefficient leadership. The Communists did not present a draft of their own; on May 11, 1921, they withdrew from the Constituent Assembly in protest against the governmental terror. After some further withdrawals, the Government supporters prevailed and adopted on June 28, 1921 the Vidovdan Constitution, establishing Yugoslavia as a strictly unitary state.

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[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 52–67.

The centralist Constitution failed to meet the requirements of the multinational society, but the King was unwilling to compromise with the demands of the non-Serbian nationalities. To outside political pressures endangering the very existence of the new state, the King responded by increasing the severity of the police-regime. Eventually, on January 6, 1929, he suspended the Constitution and established a dictatorship. Even the Yugoslavs themselves did not take the stability and the frontiers of their state for granted. The Croat peasant leader, Stjepan Radić, who advocated the transformation of Yugoslavia into a federation, wanted to include the Bulgarians.[8] The Yugoslav Communists, under Comintern pressure, reluctantly decided to support a Communist Balkan Federation, which would have involved the disintegration of Yugoslavia.[9]

Dissatisfaction with Serbian oppression grew stronger among all the Yugoslav nationalists, particularly among the Croats. Confronted with the growing German menace, the Government, in August, 1939, made a last-minute attempt to meet the Croatian grievances and, by the so-called Maček-Cvetković Agreement, granted the Croats part of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a special constitutional position in the Kingdom involving broad autonomy but not statehood. The Croats were not satisfied. Some claimed the inclusion of more Croat-inhabited lands within their territory; others demanded complete separation. Moreover, no attempt was made to meet the grievances of the smaller nationalities. In the face of the German onslaught in April, 1941, Yugoslavia rapidly disintegrated.

Thus ended the first chapter in the history of the unification of the South Slavs. Forced union under Serbian domination had ended in bankruptcy and the unitary state was replaced by three political units: the German and the Italian Occupation Zones and the nominally independent puppet state of Croatia.

## III

The disintegration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia created favorable conditions for the rise to power of the CPY, which, after its initial success in 1920, had led an uncomfortable underground existence, rent by violent struggles among its factions and their leaders. The party had accepted reluctantly and only under Comintern pressure the slogans of national equality and of the right of self-determination, including that of separation, for all the Yugoslav nationalities, but these slogans remained the only stable element in a rapidly changing program. At the outbreak of the war, the CPY was numerically small but consolidated under the leadership of Tito, installed as its Secretary from 1937; it was well prepared to make good use of its national program and to attract adherents for the Partisans, a guerrilla organization which the CPY called into being after the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

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[8] *Ibid.*, p. 104.

[9] *Istorijski Arhiv Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije* [*Historical Archives of the CPY*], Vol. 2 (Belgrade, 1950), pp. 110–12. See also Elizabeth Barker, *Macedonia—Its Place in Balkan Power Politics* (London, 1950).

Having entered the war without a clear plan for the final solution of the national question[10] and being preoccupied with fighting for their survival, the Partisans naturally were not at first concerned with constitutional problems. Wartime conditions imposed on them a loose, quasi-federal organization, since the Partisan detachments were hard-pressed and could not maintain a close liaison. National Liberation bodies, vaguely resembling the Soviets in Russia during the civil war, were formed in the various parts of Yugoslavia and were co-ordinated by the Council of National Liberation (AVNOJ). The first session of this Council, held in November, 1942, stressed as its goal the establishment of conditions for the "full freedom and equality in the liberated brotherly union" not only for the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but also for the Macedonians, Montenegrins, and others.[11] A year later, in September, 1943, the Second Session of the AVNOJ proclaimed the federal principle:

> On the basis of the right of all nations to self-determination, including the union with or the secession from other nations, and in accordance with the true will of all the nations of Yugoslavia, the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia passes the following decisions: . . .
>
> 2. . . . Yugoslavia is being built on the federal principle, which will ensure full equality to the nations of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
>
> 3. In accordance with the federal organization of Yugoslavia . . . organs of the people's authorities have been established in different lands of Yugoslavia in the form of National Liberation Committees and Provincial Anti-Fascist Councils of National Liberation.
>
> 4. National minorities of Yugoslavia will be secured all their rights.[12]

The proposed federation was thus based on the principle of nationality: the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins were each given a separate Republic. In order to solve the age-long conflict between the Serbs and the Croats over Bosnia and Herzegovina, this territory was constituted as the sixth Republic, the only one that was not the expression of a separate nationality. In this case the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina were an historical unit was utilized, but the identity of other important historical units, such as Vojvodina or Dalmatia, was not recognized and they were not granted the status of separate Republics.

During the war, the Partisan movement spread beyond the frontiers of prewar Yugoslavia; Yugoslav organizers were busy in Albania and in Bulgaria. Undoubtedly the Yugoslav leaders worked for the eventual incorporation of these two countries into the Yugoslav Federation, although they were to be frustrated in their plans. Anticipating developments in Yugoslavia proper, the facts may be here briefly stated. After the war, the Yugoslavs extended considerable economic aid to Albania and sent to that country numbers of technical personnel, thus achieving an advanced degree of economic and political integration. They also dangled before the Albanians the bait of unification with their compatriots living within the confines of Yugoslavia, and organized the latter in readiness for a union in an Autonomous District. The incorporation plans were not, however, openly discussed or officially admitted.[13] By contrast, the project for the inclusion of Bulgaria as the seventh Federal Republic was officially formulated in November, 1944 by the Serbian Jewish leader, Moša Piyade, and was pursued in subsequent years. The Bulgarians, however, insisted on a federation on terms of equality with the whole of Yugoslavia.[14] The Russians opposed the establishment of a strong Balkan *bloc*, and both the Albanian and the Bulgarian schemes were finally destroyed by the Cominform ban on Yugoslavia declared in June, 1948.

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[10] Milovan Djilas, "O rešenju nacjonalnog pitanja u Jugoslaviji" [On the Solution of the National Problem], *Clanci 1941–1946* [Articles 1941–1946] (Belgrade, 1947), pp. 233–34.

[11] Quoted in Čulinović, p. 133.

[12] Text in *New Yugoslavia*, published by the United Slav Committee (London, 1944), pp. 12–13.

As might have been expected from Partisan-organized and controlled bodies, the local assemblies throughout Yugoslavia voted for unification on the basis of the AVNOJ resolution and none utilized the right of separation. They constituted themselves as the governmental organs of the new Republics. Also, two autonomous units were formed—the multi-national Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the predominantly Shipetar (Albanian) Autonomous District of Kosovo-Metohija (KOSMET). Thus, before the final liberation of Yugoslavia and a long time before the adoption of a formal constitution, the system of government was determined in fair detail. Unlike the first Yugoslav federalists, the Communist leaders did not study Western federations, but several of them, including Tito, had first-hand knowledge of the Soviet Union. Moreover, as the Yugoslavs themselves admit at present, they were at the time under the "hegemonist pressure of Soviet ideology,"[15] and there is no doubt that the federal framework, complete with the autonomous units, closely followed the Soviet pattern.

The Interim Assembly, a body consisting of the members of the AVNOJ with the "uncompromised" individual members of the last Yugoslav National Assembly, amounting to about one-third of their numbers, met in the summer of 1945 and decided on a two-house Constituent Assembly. The Second House, the Assembly of the Peoples, consisting of 25 representatives of each Republic, 15 of the Autonomous Province, and 10 of the Autonomous District, was given complete equality with the Lower House, ensuring that the rights of the nationalities would be adequately protected and the federal structure preserved.[16]

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[13] *Cf.* Vladimir Dedijer, *Jugoslovensko-Albanski odnosi, 1939–1948* [Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 1939–48] (Belgrade, 1949).

[14] *Cf.* Čulinović, p. 165 and Lazar Mojsov, *Bugarska Radnička Partija* (*Komunista*) *i Makedonsko nacjonalno pitanje* [The Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communist) and the Macedonian National Question] (Belgrade, 1948).

[15] Edvard Kardelj, "The New Social and Political System of the Federal Peoples' Republic of Yugoslavia," in *New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade, 1953), p. 5.

[16] Dr. Jovan Djordjević, *Ustarno pravo Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije*

## IV

The Constitution proclaimed on January 31, 1946 really registered, then, the existing state of government. Eight years later the Vice-President of the Federation, Edvard Kardelj, freely admitted that this Constitution was burdened with the "mechanical transplantation of some forms from the Soviet system,"[17] but to a certain extent it undoubtedly gave expression to peculiarly Yugoslav conditions.[18]

Article 1 of the Constitution defined the system of government in general terms and based it on the principles of equality and voluntariness:

> The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people's State of republican form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, basing themselves on the right to self-determination, which includes the right to separation, have expressed a will to live together in a federal State.[19]

The right of separation, theoretically open to the local assemblies after the second session of the AVNOJ but not used by any of them, had scarcely been more real in Yugoslavia than its prototype in Communist Russia. In any case, its mention in the Constitution was no more than an historical reminiscence, but it is interesting to note that some Croatian scholars attributed to it a real meaning.[20]

According to the Constitution, all authority is derived from the people, who realize it through organs of State authority ranging from the People's Committees (the Yugoslav equivalent of the Russian Soviets) through Republican to Federal organs. The Constitution vested original sovereignty in the Republics and limited their competence only by the powers transferred to the Federation, leaving them residual powers (Articles 6 and 9). Professor Djordjević, one of the authors of the 1946 Constitution, warns us, however, that "sovereignty" here did not have the meaning usual in constitutional or international law in the West. He stresses that the terminology was used "not in confirmation of the scientific validity of definitions," but in order to express "the voluntary character of the union, the sovereignty and equality of the peoples, and the state character of their legal position within the union."[21] In fact the "sovereignty" of the Republics amounted to very little, since the Federation was given an extremely wide competence—"to protect the security as well as the social and political order of the People's Republics"—and its jurisdiction in-

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[Constitutional Law of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia] (Belgrade, 1953), p. 269.

[17] Kardelj, p. 6.

[18] Professor Djordjević (*op. cit.*, p. 31) goes so far as to claim that the Constitution was in considerable measure independent of the Soviet pattern.

[19] The principle of voluntariness was confirmed in Republican Constitutions, as in the *Constitution of the Peoples' Republic of Serbia,* Article 2.

[20] *Cf.* Čulinović, p. 151 *n,* quoting Professor Jovan Stefanović.

[21] Djordjević, p. 201.

cluded such a wide range of activities that very little scope remained for the exercise of the federal principle.[22]

There were provided the outer paraphernalia of sovereignty for the Republics, namely separate flags and separate coats of arms.[23] The Law of Nationality of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia introduced a system of dual citizenship under which every citizen of Yugoslavia was "as a rule" a citizen of one of the People's Republics.[24] This, however, did not affect in the slightest his position in the other Republics.

The constitutions of the People's Republics, although made by the Republics themselves, were to conform with the Federal Constitution (Article 11). They did, in fact, follow it closely, but there was no procedure to deal with a breach of this provision.[25]

Full expression was given to the federal principle only in the composition of the Federal legislative bodies. The second house, the House of Nationalities, consisting of 30 representatives of each Republic, 20 of the Autonomous Province, and 15 of the Autonomous District, received equal powers with the lower house. Bills could be introduced in either House and had to be passed by both (Articles 54, 57, and 63).

The organization of the executive, however, clearly revealed the predominance of the Federation. General Federal Ministries were put in charge of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Communications, and Foreign Trade, while "Federal-Republican" Ministries commanded Finance, Interior, Justice, Industry, Mining, Commerce and Supply, Agriculture, and Labor and Building. Parallel Republican Ministries were to work on the basis of "regulations, instructions, orders, and decisions" of their Federal counterparts; in other words, they were little more than subordinate organs.[26] In order to administer the relatively unimportant affairs exclusively within their competence, the Republics were given also exclusively Republican Ministries (Article 101). Finally, within the wide bounds of Federal jurisdiction, the Federal Government obtained the power to suspend any act of a Republican Government and to annul any act of a Republican Minister not in conformity with Federal or Republican legislation (Article 131).

The judicial system included separate Republican systems of courts and the

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[22] Articles 9 and 44 (*Cf.* the *Stalin Constitution,* Article 14). Moreover, Article 44 spoke of the powers "comprised" within the Federal jurisdiction and the enumeration was not, apparently, exhaustive. At present the Yugoslavs themselves freely admit that the 1946 Constitution was strongly centralist, e.g. Kardelj, pp. 7–8 or Djordjević, p. 192.

[23] See, for instance, the *Constitution of Serbia,* Articles 3–5.

[24] *Collected Yugoslav Laws, 2* (Belgrade, 1952), p. 37.

[25] This, of course, confirms the view that the Republics were so subordinate that lack of compliance was unthinkable.

[26] Article 100. *Cf.* the *Stalin Constitution,* Articles 76 and 85. Professor Djordjević admits the principle of hierarchial subjection but claims that, in contrast to the Soviet example, the Yugoslavs endeavored to delimit the Federal and Republican spheres of competence.

Supreme Court of the Federal Republic as the court of highest instance in matters concerning the application of Federal laws.[27] However, following the Russian example, the important office of Public Prosecution was fully centralized and Public Prosecutors and their Deputies were appointed by the Federal Legislature.[28]

The Yugoslav Army was also established as an exclusively Federal institution. In this instance the Yugoslavs ignored the 1944 amendment to the Stalin Constitution allowing the Union Republics to maintain their own military formations.[29]

Thus, according to the criteria prevalent among Western scholars, the Yugoslav Constitution of 1946 was not of a true federal type where "the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, coordinate and independent": following the Stalin Constitution, it established a system termed "quasi-federal" by Professor Wheare.[30] Moreover, it must be stressed that in Communist Yugoslavia, no less than in Communist Russia, constitutional forms had and still have much less importance than in Western democracies, since real power is concentrated in the strictly centralized machinery of the Communist party, which remains outside the constitutional framework.

Furthermore, the Yugoslavs adopted from Russian practice the institution of autonomous units. Since the establishment of these units, their boundaries, and their very existence in the Soviet Union have been quite arbitrary,[31] it is not surprising that their theoretical basis has not been properly analyzed.[32] The Yugoslavs applied the system to two territories only. In Vojvodina, inhabited by Serbs and by two-thirds of the Shipetars living in Yugoslavia, and differing from Serbia through its economic and cultural backwardness, autonomy was also a preparatory step for the expected incorporation of Albania into the Federation.[33]

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[27] Chapter 13. *Cf.* the *Stalin Constitution,* Articles 102–12.

[28] Chapter 14. *Cf.* the *Stalin Constitution,* Article 147.

[29] Chapter 16. *Cf.* the *Stalin Constitution,* Article 16b. The authorization in the Soviet Union was not utilized in practice and Western scholars generally agree that the amendment was only part of the window-dressing calculated to obtain separate United Nations membership for the Union Republics. The fact that the provision was not imitated by the Yugoslavs seems to confirm this view.

[30] Kenneth C. Wheare, *Federal Government* (London, 1947), pp. 11 and 27–28. Reference of Yugoslav institutions to the authoritative definitions of Professor Wheare is necessary in order to couch the analysis in terms generally understood in the West and the statement that they are not "true" to them does not involve a value judgment.

It may be noted that "federalism" has become one of those emotionally charged political terms, like "democracy" or "freedom," which are understood differently by Western and by Communist scholars. Both sides agree that the absence of coercion of the federal units by the central government is desirable and disagree only in their estimate of the actual conditions. E.g. Professor Djordjević (*op. cit.*, pp. 185 ff.) condemns Western Federations because essential powers have been usurped by the center.

[31] *Cf.* Walter Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies* (London, 1952).

[32] See the complaint of Professor Djordjević, p. 204.

[33] See above, pp. 420–21. There is no documentary confirmation for this view and it is denied by Dedijer, *op. cit.*, but the writer heard it generally expressed by the inhabitants of KOSMET in 1953 and found it fully convincing.

Vojvodina, being the more advanced unit, received the more exalted status of an Autonomous Province, while KOSMET became an Autonomous District. Both were governed by statutes enacted by their own legislatures and confirmed by the People's Assembly of Serbia. The Vojvodina legislature received the name of the "People's Assembly," while the KOSMET legislature was more humbly called the "Regional People's Committee." Both units were given separate executives, Regional Executive Committees, and separate judicial systems—in Vojvodina culminating in a Supreme Court, but in KOSMET subject to appeals to the Supreme Court of Serbia (Chapter XI).

Finally, the Constitution confirmed the People's Committees as the organs of state authority in villages, districts, towns, counties, and regions (Chapter XII).

## V

Political life in Yugoslavia differed from that in the Soviet Union in one fundamental respect: there was no equivalent of the "leading nation." The Serbs, amounting to over 40 per cent of the total population, had been the dominant element in prewar Yugoslavia, but the Communist tradition was to reject Serbian hegemony emphatically. Moreover, the next-largest ethnic group, the Croats, numbered over 30 per cent of the total and were in a position to dispute Serbian domination. This is the major reason why in postwar Yugoslavia the backward nationalities have been subsidized and developed with a genuine goal of equalization with the more advanced and have not been subject to the economic exploitation and cultural subjection prevalent in the Soviet Union and thinly disguised by ideological proclamations.

Although Yugoslav writers at present tend to exaggerate the differences in Yugoslav and Soviet constitutional developments in order to stress the independence and originality of Yugoslavia, their views are justified to a certain extent. The 1946 Constitution has indeed been a slavish copy of the Stalin Constitution, but Yugoslav institutions developed independently and were much more a political reality than their Russian prototypes. The People's Committees as local organs of government, drawing on their wartime tradition, exceeded the importance of the local soviets in the Soviet Union, and were ready to play a greatly enhanced role after the reforms which started in 1951. The statutes of the autonomous units were passed in 1947 and the units functioned much more effectively than their Russian counterparts.[34] In contrast to the frequent alterations of boundaries and to the cases of complete abolition in the Soviet Union, the two Yugoslav autonomous units remained constant.

On the other hand, as in the Soviet Union, bureaucracy grew in numbers and in power, and central organs gradually enlarged their competence and eventually controlled rigidly the whole of Yugoslavia's political and economic life. The number of Federal and Federal-Republican Ministries increased and various Federal committees, going beyond the constitutional framework, gradually assumed full control over the Republican organs operating within their spheres. The legal status of these committees was consolidated in 1950, when they were transformed into General Directorates. Undoubtedly Yugoslavia until then had been true to the Russian example in developing a centralized reign of bureaucracy.

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[34] *Cf.* Djordjević, pp. 33 and 204–7.

From 1950, after the break with the Cominform had become final, the Yugoslav leaders began to grope towards a system which, without reversion to Western constitutional forms, would become more efficient and less oppressive and would eliminate excessive centralization. This process of breaking down centralism has not, however, resulted in the transformation of Yugoslavia into a federation closer to Western concepts of federalism or in the transfer of real powers to the People's Republics. While in 1946 the six People's Republics representing the Yugoslav nationalities were the foundation of the constitutional structure, in 1953 the Yugoslav leaders considered that the federal system had fulfilled its aims: it had secured the advance towards cultural and economic equality of the People's Republics during the transitional phase. They felt that the economic and social integration of Yugoslavia had proceeded so far that division by nationalities and Republics had lost most, though not yet all, of its importance. In Kardelj's opinion, the Federation has become "no longer only a union of *nationalities* and of their *states*, but has above all become a bearer of the *social functions* of a unified *socialist community* of *Yugoslav working people.*"[35] Both the Federation and the People's Republics were, in a certain sense, regarded as "superstructure" over the self-government of the working people and therefore their relations could not be reduced, even nominally, to the level of constitutional relations in classical federations. The Yugoslav rulers acknowledged that the age of national forms had not yet completely passed, and therefore they did not wish to discard the nominal state character of the Republics, but they considered that the notion of the "sovereignty" of the People's Republic, even in the restricted sense of the 1946 Constitution, had become untenable.[36]

Consequently, the devolution of central powers during the constitutional reform was less favorable to the Republics than to the newly established Producers' Councils, governing economic life, and to the People's Committees, greatly enhanced in their importance and status. The "federation" no longer applied to the national Republics but to the new forms of social life. As Kardelj expressed it:

> Moreover, a Federation of Republics equal in rights is indispensable in our country not only because of the national composition of our country. It stems also from our social system as such, from our concept of the people's sovereignty and social self-government. Our country would be a "Federation" in that new sense, i.e., as a system founded on social self-government,—even if it were not multi-national.[37]

The Republics are now clearly considered only one of the several links in the chain of authority of the "working people." They have functions and powers wider in scope than those of the People's Committees but not really different in nature from them.

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[35] Kardelj, p. 27.

[36] *Cf.* Djordjević, pp. 201–2.

[37] Kardelj, p. 25

Admittedly, the Yugoslavs have been successful with their nationalities policy: they have eliminated postwar reprisals and have been able to develop politically, economically, and culturally the backward areas, particularly Macedonia and Bosnia. The official opinion that the national problem has been finally solved[38] does not, however, fully square with the complicated situation. The process of integration has not advanced sufficiently to be declared decisive. Traditional antagonisms are no longer in evidence, but they are by no means dead and, given an opportunity, they could break out again. In all likelihood the major division lines among the Yugoslavs are still national. If devolution has not been more in favor of the People's Republics, this may be due not so much to their relative unimportance, as, on the contrary, to the still real danger of strengthening the rallying points for the separate national loyalties.

Since 1951 the process of devolution has advanced considerably, but it again clearly demonstrates that the Yugoslav federation differs from the classical Western type. The Republics are not co-ordinate and all decisions concerning the division of power are made at the center.

The ideological basis of the recent constitutional changes is not clear. The Yugoslav Communists claim that they are the legitimate heirs of Marx and Engels and, less emphatically, of Lenin, and that they are developing the original ideas of these thinkers after having removed the distorting Stalinist glosses. They strongly stress the fundamental differences between their system and both the Russian and the Western systems. On the other hand, they have lately evinced some interest in the indigenous sources of federalism[39] and the recent edition of the treatise on constitutional law by Professor Djordjević discusses in some detail federal institutions in the West. In fact, the present Yugoslav system seems to incorporate some ideas of the early socialists, especially Proudhon, but the Yugoslav theoreticians dismiss Proudhon as "petit-bourgeois." It is likely that in their difficult endeavor to find an alternative both to Russian communism and to Western capitalism they have developed their solutions in an empirical way without studying Proudhon.

## VI

Constitutional changes have been expressed in the Fundamental Law Pertaining to the Bases of the Social and Political Organization of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and of the Federal Organs of the State Authority of January 13, 1953.[40] The form adopted is original, since the 1946 Constitution has been retained despite the basic alterations in the system, and the

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[38] *Cf.* Josip Broz [Tito], *Sur le nationalisme et l'internationalisme* (Belgrade, 1948), p. 7: "The problem of nationalities has been regulated, and even very well regulated, to the general satisfaction of all the peoples."

[39] *E.g.*, the books by Čulinović and Pribičević, both published in 1952.

[40] The English translation has been published by the Union of Jurists Associations of Yugoslavia under the title *New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade, 1953).

Fundamental Law has replaced and supplemented only some of its provisions. Similar Fundamental Laws have been passed by all the People's Republics.

The Fundamental Law reveals clearly the changed status of the People's Republics. In Article I, it vaguely refers to the "sovereign peoples equal in rights," but it eschews any reference to the sovereignty or the sovereign powers of the Republics. It also omits the concept of the original competence of the Republics and of the transfer of part of their powers to the Federation. The unitary element of the Yugoslav "working people" is emphasized at the beginning of both the Federal and Republican Fundamental Laws.[41]

The Republics are no longer the original bearers of sovereignty but are reduced to one of the several channels through which the sovereignty of the "working people" is expressed. Although the Republics exercise a degree of control over the lower organs of State authority on their territories, the competence of the latter is not delegated but original, deriving directly from the Constitution, and the residual powers are vested in them and no longer in the Republics.[42]

In Yugoslav constitutional theory the Federal organs now fulfill all the central social functions without limiting any sovereign rights of the Republics, since none are inherent in the latter. Although the People's Republics are still described as states, the relations between them and the Federation cannot be considered as relations between states and governments. The Republican organs remain, however, the necessary intermediaries between the Federal organs and the various state organs on the territories of the Republics; Federal organs do not, as a rule, maintain direct contact with them.[43]

Three types of legislation are provided for by the Fundamental Law: (1) exclusively Federal laws; (2) basic Federal laws to which the Republics may introduce supplementary laws; and (3) general laws laying down only the principles for related Republican laws and applied directly only where no Republican laws have been passed in the field. Federal laws prevail over Republican laws but, as in the 1946 Constitution, there is no procedure for enforcing this provision; there is, however, a procedure open to the People's Republics: they may initiate proceedings for determining the conformity of the Federal and the Republican laws with the Federal Constitution (Article 11).

Executive functions are distributed between the Federal and the Republican Administration and the People's Committees. The Fundamental Law abolishes the previous system of dual responsibility under which executive organs were responsible not only to the appropriate legislative body but also to the higher administrative organs in the same branch.[44] This strengthens the position of the Republics vis-à-vis the Federation, and also the position of the People's Committees vis-à-vis the Republics.

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[41] *Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia,* Article 2, and *Fundamental Law of Serbia,* Articles 1 and 2.

[42] *Fundamental Law,* Article 3; Djordjević, p. 194.

[43] Djordjević, p. 232–33.

[44] Kardelj, pp. 21–22.

The Fundamental Law includes a formal guarantee of the equality of the rights of the People's Republics in the form of the Council of Nationalities. This Council has been retained despite the diminished status of the Republics, but its place as the second house has been taken by the newly established Council of Producers. The representative bodies of the six Republics and of the Autonomous units elect, as previously, members to the Federal Legislature, but these normally sit in the Federal Council, together with the members elected in general elections. They are constituted as a separate Council of Nationalities when proposals concerning constitutional reform or the draft of the Federal economic plan are on the agenda. Moreover, on the proposal of the majority of the deputies elected by the representative body of any one Republic and adopted by the majority of the members of the Council of Nationalities, the Council meets separately also when a law or other act concerning the relations between the Republics and the Federation comes on the agenda. When separately constituted, the Council of Nationalities has full rights as a separate house. There is a provision for reaching agreement if the Federal Council disagrees with its proposals. If this fails, the proposed measure is put aside for one year and then apparently the same procedure is repeated. If disagreement relates to the terms of the Federal economic plan, discussion is postponed for two months and if agreement is not reached within this period the Federal Council is dissolved. Finally, the Council of Nationalities meets separately to render an opinion on the necessity of passing general Federal laws and has the power to prevent the placing of bills proposing them on the agenda of the Federal Council (Articles 44–48).

Elaborate as these provisions are, they have only a purely formal significance. It is now officially admitted that even as a full-fledged second house, the Council of Nationalities did not fulfill, until 1953, any functions connected with the defense of the rights of the Republics and did not even endeavor to hamper the gradual accumulation of power in the center.[45] It cannot be expected that it would be more effective in its new, humbler guise. In fact, as Kardelj himself admits, the provisions are unlikely to be utilized, since social interests in Yugoslavia are coordinated by many other, apparently more effective instruments. The Council of Nationalities has been retained for purely formal reasons—as "the ultimate legal consequence" and a renewed declaration of the Yugoslav system of national equality.[46]

It is difficult to ascertain the powers exercised by the Republics in the economic sphere, where the basic reforms have not yet fully crystallized. The Republics adopt their own economic plans within the framework of the Federal economic plan. This could, of course, mean simply filling in the details in a centrally determined framework. On the other hand, it could and to a certain extent does involve initiative by the Republics on important matters. Economic decentralization in Yugoslavia has been pursued with great vigor and not only the new Producers' Councils but also the People's Committees and the Republics have received some share of the previously centralized powers. Nevertheless, there is no real analogy with the all-important control of finances in Western federations. If, as is likely, the Republics actually exercise important economic powers, they are still not coordinate with the Federation and may forfeit these powers through a decision at the center.

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[45] *Borba* [Belgrade newspaper], September 3, 1953.

[46] Kardelj, pp. 25–26.

So the second phase of constitutional development in Yugoslavia is nearing its end. After the first period of centralism, federal institutions of the Communist type, although not exactly of the Russian pattern, have been tried. The present trend is towards complete unitarianism, but it differs from that prevailing in the interwar period, since it is based on the unity of the "working people" and is not a mask for Serbian predominance. If the process of consolidation continues, national divisions may, in time, disappear from the political scene and remain only in the form of localisms within an all-embracing Yugoslav patriotism; the remnants of federal forms would then naturally disappear. On the other hand, it is possible that national divisions may persist beyond the expectations of the Yugoslav rulers and that the existing constitutional forms may still be adapted for really federal institutions.[47]

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[47] For a more detailed analysis of nationalism in Yugoslavia, see J. Frankel, "Communism and the National Question in Yugoslavia," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. 15, pp. 49–65 (April, 1955).

# AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND MEASUREMENT OF INFLUENCE*

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The science of politics is a science of human behavior. It concerns itself with a specific segment of the activities of humans—those which either take place in, or have a clearly discernible effect upon, the formal governmental machinery of the community. The characteristic feature of a political scientist, therefore, is not his unique theoretical framework but his special empirical interest. Two main consequences follow. First, it is trivially true, and widely recognized, that the major concepts of other behavior sciences are necessarily an integral part of the study of political behavior. Second, it is equally true that, within the social sciences, it is the responsibility of political science to develop those elements of behavior theory that are particularly relevant for the analysis of action in the sphere of politics.

Much of current empirical and theoretical work in political analysis is organized around the observation that many political data can be conceived to represent results of mechanisms for decision-making used (consciously or unconsciously) by individuals or collectivities.[1] In a similar fashion, students of a significant number of other types of behavior have tended to formulate their problems within a decision-making framework.[2] When one examines these apparently disparate branches of behavior theory, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there exist potentially fruitful parallelisms among such theories as those of consumer behavior, administrative behavior, price setting, legislative enactments, propaganda, learning, foreign affairs, and social control.

Once decision-making is accepted as one of the key focal points for empirical social science, the necessity for exploring the operational meaning and theoretical dimensions of influence is manifest. Interest in decision-making stems from the conviction that a large number of events involving the be-

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[1] See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, *Congress and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1950), Part I; Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven, 1950), pp. 74–83; Seymour M. Lipset, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Allen H. Barton, and Juan Linz, "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," in the *Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. Lindzey (Cambridge, 1954), Vol. 2, pp. 1124–75; Martin Shubik, *Readings in Game Theory and Political Behavior* (New York, 1954); Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (New York, 1950), Ch. 3; Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, Burton Sapin, *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (Princeton, 1954).

[2] Ward Edwards, "The Theory of Decision-Making," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 51, pp. 380–417 (July, 1954); Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Elihu Katz, *et al.*, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe, 1954); L. J. Savage, *The Foundations of Statistics* (New York, 1954); *Decision Processes*, ed. Thrall, Coombs, and Davis (New York, 1954).

havior of human organisms can be treated as exemplifications of pervasive mechanisms for reaching decisions. The interest in influence stems, in turn, from its conception as the fundamental intervening variable for the analysis of decision-making. Influence is to the study of decision-making what force is to the study of motion—a generic explanation for the basic observable phenomena.[3] It is the general goal of the present paper to suggest a definition of the influence concept and to explore with reference to the suggested definition some key problems in the study of influence processes. An assessment of some of the major problems in influence analysis is made in section I. In section II, a definition of influence as a causal relation is formulated. On the basis of this definition, a formal model of a decision-making organism is presented and its implications discussed; this is done in sections III, IV, and V. Finally, in section VI, measurement techniques are considered briefly in the light of the framework outlined earlier.

## I. SOME PROBLEMS IN THE ANALYSIS OF INFLUENCE

*Problems of Generality.* The empirical study of influence has been hampered by a tendency toward *ad hoc* formulations. As will be indicated in greater detail below, operational definitions of influence for research purposes tend to be markedly divergent and their relationship to the general concept at best vague. Although it may be desirable or necessary to consider different types of influence under different conditions, one should be in a position to define the way in which any given type (or its concomitant index) is related to a theoretically formulated variable. Failure to achieve generality in the study of influence has had two major consequences. On the one hand, it has limited the comparability of studies of interpersonal influence (i.e., those studies that label a major variable as "influence"). On the other hand, it has concealed the potential relevance of studies in quite different areas of theory and research.[4]

*Problems in Determining Influence Order.* The difficulties of identification in a system of interacting variables have been explored most fully by economists.[5] In the analysis of influence the problem is frequently severe. Consider, for example, a rather common type of problem in the area of public opinion. Assume that we are interested in exploring the relationship between domestic public opinion on foreign affairs and overseas propaganda by the State Department. In such an investigation, there is a tendency to take domestic public opinion as given and ask the question: how do changes in public opinion influence changes in overseas propaganda? But if the propaganda has an effect on foreign countries, and if changes in the attitudes and/or actions of other countries have an effect on domestic public opinion (neither of which are entirely unreasonable conditions), one can no longer legitimately treat public opinion as a given. The identification of an influence order in such systems (particularly when they are observed in an equilibrium state) is exceptionally difficult, and many influence relations represent closed-loop[6] systems of this type—either directly or through the operation of the so-called "rule of anticipated reactions."

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[3] Note that this does not commit one to a Newtonian psychology; nor is it anticipated that an analogical approach to the theory of influence will prove particularly useful.

[4] Because it partially avoids this pitfall by relying heavily on learning theory, the recent Yale volume on persuasion has considerable merit. See Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, and Harold H. Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion* (New Haven, 1953).

[5] See, for example, Tjalling C. Koopmans, "Identification Problems in Economic Model Construction," in *Studies in Econometric Method*, ed. Hood and Koopmans (New York, 1953), pp. 27–48.

*Problems of Unanticipated or Delayed Consequences.* Influence is frequently defined in terms of behavior change over a given time interval and measured by overt motor or verbal activities. Such procedures have the major theoretical objection that they ignore changes in the individual's latent readiness to act. An adequate theory of influence must be more general than that implicit in a simple stimulus-response treatment. A slightly different manifestation of the same difficulty results from the failure to account for the side effects of particular influence procedures. It is clear that in any interpersonal relationship involving repetitive interaction, both the long and the short run consequences of influence attempts must be calculated. For example, it is a commonplace observation in child psychology that although a child can be induced to conform to parental demands by a number of methods, these methods are rarely neutral as to the latent alteration in the child's propensity to meet future demands with hostility. Finally, insofar as the "sleeper effect" discussed by Hovland and his associates[7] is anticipated, there is a further complication. Manifest action in response to an influence attempt may vary without regard to any variables other than time.

*Problems of the Dimensionality of Influence.* We wish to be able to characterize an influence relationship between two individuals. In order to make such a characterization, it is necessary to know the dimensions for which measurements are required. Since the empirical study of influence is still in its infancy, it is not at all clear what the actual dimensions of an influence relationship between two individuals are. However, it is clear that such a relation frequently cannot be defined by simply citing a single influence index.[8] On the contrary, the evidence that exists indicates that the influence relationship between two individuals varies according to the subject matter under consideration.[9] One of the most obvious examples of this fact can be found in the operation of the United States Senate, where for most senators influence is highly specific to the subject matter involved.[10] It is necessary to specify one index at least for each important subject-matter area.[11] Moreover, it seems reasonable to believe that there are other dimensions and that an important function of any theoretical formulation of influence will be to provide clues to them.

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[6] A 'closed loop' system is one in which the variables within the system are related in such a way that one can trace a chain of relationships from a given variable through other variables and back to the original starting point without retracing one's steps. Thus a fairly common set of hypotheses in voting behavior forms the following closed loop: voting intention→exposure to party position on the state of the economy→perception of the state of economy→voting intention. An 'open loop' system is one in which such circles do not exist. The terms were borrowed originally from servo-mechanics, where they are used primarily to describe different types of automatic control devices.

[7] Hovland, *Communication and Persuasion,* Ch. 8, and the articles there cited.

[8] To be sure, one can define something in any way he pleases. What is meant is that a uni-dimensional influence index will rarely be of much utility.

[9] James G. March, "Husband-Wife Interaction over Political Issues," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Vol. 17, pp. 461–70 (Winter, 1953–54); Albert H. Rubenstein, "Problems in the Measurement of Interpersonal Communication in an Ongoing Situation," *Sociometry,* Vol. 16, p. 86 (Feb., 1953).

*Problems of Measurement.* The problem of influence measurement is considered more specifically in section VI, after some theoretical considerations have been presented. However, it should be obvious from what has already been indicated with respect to other problems of analysis that measurement is one of the crucial difficulties. At the present time, available measures of influence, like influence theory, lack generality. The more obvious modes of introducing such generality into measures tend to make the measures operationally unfeasible. In addition, the major problem of comparison values remains unsolved. Insofar as possible, a measure should be in terms of an interchangeable unit that will facilitate comparisons of such things as the influence relationships between two pairs of individuals without any direct comparison between the members of the pairs involved. At present, there is lacking not only an immediately obvious unit of measurement, but even a generally feasible means of providing simple rankings.

The theoretical framework outlined in the remaining sections of the present paper was motivated by a consideration of such problems of influence analysis as these. Some of the ways in which the conceptualization of influence that is presented here contributes to at least the partial solution of these major problems, and the continuing theoretical and empirical gaps in the concept of influence, are indicated below.

## II. INFLUENCE AS THE INDUCEMENT OF CHANGE

Consider the individual in a specified environment (i.e., reacting to a set of specified cues, both internal and external). Assuming that the behavior laws relating individual activity (neural, glandular, muscular, etc.) with the specified environment are known, it is possible to define a path of behavior that will be observed in the individual organism. For the moment, the extent to which the laws provide a complete and precise prediction is relatively unimportant, so long as they possess the minimum characteristic of delineating a boundary between behavior consistent with the prediction and behavior inconsistent with it. It is in harmony with the more frequent uses of the term "influence" and with the present sense of that term to say that if the individual deviates from the predicted path of behavior, influence has occurred, and, specifically, that it is influence which has induced the change.

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[10] George Galloway, *The Legislative Process in Congress* (New York, 1953), Ch. 14.

[11] If the index has only two values, it is possible to talk of a set theoretical model for describing the relationship, defining a partitioning of the joint decisions of A and B into mutually exclusive sets of decisions made by either A or B alone. Comparison of influence positions then depends either upon the development of comparison values or upon the existence of a situation in which the set of decisions made by A alone at time $t_0$ is properly included in the set made by A alone at time $t_1$, or in the set made by B alone at some given time. If a multi-valued index is used, vector notation seems to be indicated and the development of standard measurement units to be of central importance.

Suppose that a prediction of the following form is made: "Congressman X will vote for bill Y." Suppose further that a sequence of events is observed culminating in Congressman X, in fact, voting for the bill. Such an observation obviously is consistent with the proposition that no influence has occurred. But it is also consistent with the negation of that proposition. The prediction is a narrow one, dealing with only a quite limited sequence of muscular activities, and refers to only a small part of a complete definition of a behavioral path. Inasmuch as a similar observation can be made concerning virtually any prediction of human activity, it is clear that although it is frequently possible to establish the fact that interpersonal influence has occured, it is peculiarly difficult to establish the fact that no such influence has taken place. Partly for this reason, a distinction needs to be made between the influence relationship between two events (e.g., 'A votes yes,' 'B votes yes') and the relationship between two individuals (e.g., A, B). As has previously been mentioned, one of the fundamental problems in the assessment of interpersonal influence becomes apparent precisely at the point at which it is recognized that there is no necessary isomorphism among the causal relationships holding between the several activities of two individuals.[12]

On the other hand, suppose that a sequence of events is observed culminating in the Congressman's not voting for the bill. It can then be said that influence has occurred. Depending upon how refined are the observational instruments utilized and upon the complexity of interactions among variables within the organism, it may be possible to make more or less explicit the influencing event and the mechanisms of influence; but, in any case, one is usually prepared to say that whatever the mechanisms involved (and assuming the original prediction to be correct), what has occurred between the original prediction and the observed nonfulfillment of the prediction will fall within the general definition of influence.

For example, suppose that one of the events observed between the prediction that Congressman X will support the bill and his failure to do so is the announcement by the President of his opposition to the passage of bill Y. It might well be assumed that this latter event influenced the activities of the Congressman and specifically his inclination to support the bill.[13]

Such an assumption would presumably be based either on one or on both of two types of calculations. On the one hand, observation of the events occurring and comparison with the predicted pattern of events may reveal only two 'unanticipated' observations: the President's announcement and the Congressman's failure to support the bill. Under the prior assumption that the endogenous laws of the system are known, it is necessarily assumed that at least one (but not necessarily only one) of the unexpected events is determined by exogenous forces. So long as the two events continue to co-vary through a number of trials, parsimony and some reasonable respect for the laws of probability suggest that there exists a necessary relationship between them. On the other hand, since such an analysis fails to provide any causal ordering between the events, it fails to satisfy the intuitive feeling that an explanation of events that gives causal precedence to the Congressman's failure to vote for the bill should be rejected. Consequently, the observation of co-variation is supplemented by the attempt to find explanatory propositions for the two events.[14]

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[12] Lasswell and Kaplan, *Power and Society*, p. 76; David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951), pp. 188–93.

[13] For the moment, at least, we will not consider the complications introduced by the possibility that the President's announcement is induced by certain previous activities on the part of the Congressman.

To any student of general scientific methodology, these comments on influence ring a familiar bell. As Simon has pointed out,[15] there exist some key similarities between what is ordinarily considered to be influence and that which is considered under the more general rubric of causality. Since the definition of influence to be proposed here draws heavily upon these similarities, it may be well to indicate two important characteristics of an influence relation on the one hand and a causal relation on the other by means of which their interrelation is made clear.

1. Both relations are asymmetrical. That is, the statement that A *causes* B excludes the possibility that B *causes* A. Similarly, the statement that A *influences* B excludes the possibility that B *influences* A. Here again, much of the confusion in the theoretical discussion of influence stems from the failure to distinguish the influence relationship between events (i.e., subsets of activities by individuals) and the influence relationship between individuals (i.e., the complete sets of activities by individuals). The fact that it appears to be possible to speak of asymmetries holding between events but not so frequently possible to speak of influence asymmetries between individuals (e.g., the sharing of influence may often be exhibited in the form of influence specialization according to 'area') suggests that the appropriate model for the description of an influence relationship between two individuals is one in which the influence-related activities of the individuals are partitioned into mutually-exclusive sets in such a way that within each set asymmetry holds between the individual agents of the activities.[16]

2. In both cases, ordering of the relationship (i.e., causal or influence precedence) requires the specification of a set of propositions 'explaining' any two observed events so that there exists a set of propositions explaining one without reference to the other, but no such set explaining the second without refer-

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[14] H. O. A. Wold, "Causality and Econometrics," *Econometrica*, Vol. 22, pp. 162–77 (April, 1954). For a general discussion of the function of explanatory laws in the construction of theory, see Clark L. Hull, *Principles of Behavior* (New York, 1943), Ch. 1.

[15] Herbert A. Simon, "On the Definition of the Causal Relation," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 49, pp. 517–28 (July 31, 1952); and "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 15, pp. 500–16 (Nov., 1953).

[16] Simon, "Notes" (cited in note 15), pp. 513–14; March, "Husband-Wife Interaction" (cited in note 9), pp. 469–70.

ence to the first. The specification of a unique ordering for the relationship requires, at the minimum, more than one observation, and under some circumstances is impossible. In particular, if all variables are explicable in terms of other variables within the system, at best only a partial ordering is possible.

In general, it appears to be true of any statement of influence that it can just as easily be formulated in terms of causality. Since in common parlance (and the present framework) it is not true that all statements of causality can be treated as statements of influence (i.e., influence and causality are not equivalent), the set of all influence relations can be understood to be a proper subset of the set of all causal relations. Specifically, the set of all influence relations is here defined to be that subset of all causal relations such that the behavior of an individual appears as the terminal point in the causal linkage. Alternatively, we can say that two individuals are in an influence relation if their behaviors are linked causally.[17]

From this, it is obvious that whether a particular causal link is considered to be a part of an influence relation will in some cases depend upon the inclusiveness in definition of the causal system and upon the more or less arbitrary specification of the boundaries of an event. Consider, for example, the following causal chain:

(a) If A places a lighted match next to the firecracker fuse, the fuse will light.
(b) If the fuse lights, the fuse will burn.
(c) If the fuse burns, the firecracker will explode.
(d) If the firecracker explodes, a series of sound waves will travel in the direction of B.
(e) If sound waves travel in the direction of B, B will contract the muscles in his hand.

Clearly, each of the specified five events could be further subdivided (i.e., the boundaries are arbitrary), and as influence has been defined above, not every segment of this particular causal chain defines an influence relation. Only those segments (four in number) terminating in B's muscle contraction fall within the definition.

Under some circumstances (i.e., if the system is an open-loop system) a lack of inclusiveness in the system is not felt to be critical. The first event in the chain can be treated as an independent variable. Some of the measurement considerations associated with the non-inclusiveness of an open-loop system are discussed below, but they should not be confused with the much more serious problems associated with the potential interaction among partially defined systems. Where the system under investigation is, in fact, closed-loop but is segmented into an apparent open-loop system, serious consequences for the measurement (or even ordering) of influence relations are introduced.

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[17] Note the problem of spurious correlation that exists here as elsewhere in the treatment of causality. The fact that the behaviors of the premiers of Hungary and Roumania appear to co-vary is not sufficient evidence upon which to establish an influence relationship between them.

## III. A FORMAL MODEL OF THE STATE OF THE ORGANISM[18]

Up to this point, influence has been defined as that which induces behavior on the part of the individual at time $t_1$ different from that which might be predicted on the basis of a knowledge of the individual organism at time $t_0$. By behavior is meant any change in the state of the organism.[19] Thus, any changes in the organism are considered except those that are implicit in the original condition of the organism and, therefore, predictable on the basis of knowledge held at time $t_0$.[20]

The definition of influence as that which induces a change in the state of the organism makes the problem of specifying that state in meaningful terms of paramount concern for the theory of influence. At one level of abstraction, it is possible to say that this is simply a question of strategy. We consider the set of changes, of all possible types, in the organism, a set containing a perhaps finite but certainly extremely large number ($n$) of elements. Then, in principle, we might define the state of the organism at a given time as a vector in $n$-dimensional space, the components of which are the measurements made on those elements of the set at the specified time. The strategic problem becomes that of determining what subset of this extremely large set will be used as the operational definition of the state. The difficulty in approaching the organism from this point of view stems from the difficulty in measuring many of the changes in the organism.

Consider, for example, a physiological specification of changes—certainly, in one sense, the most 'natural' type of characterization of the organism. At the moment, at least, the capabilities of physiological recording devices do not extend much beyond the most peripheral organismic responses.[21] Consequently, a neuro-physiological specification of the state of the organism must, in order to be useful in the study of influence, involve the creation of a series of hypothetical constructs relating the several peripheral responses to each other. In particular, some conception of the decision-making processes of the brain seems manifestly necessary. Thus far, experimental work in neural psychology has shed some important light on such questions as the areal specialization of the brain, but somewhat less light on the dynamics of its operation.[22] That this is substantially true is borne out by an examination of the recent attempts by physiologically-oriented scientists to define a theoretical model for the brain.[23] Although the terminology is frequently different, the content of such "physiological" models is quite similar to the content of models drawn by analogy from electrical systems[24] or based directly upon inductive logic.[25] For these reasons, there appears to be no advantage to be gained by formulating the present model in the terminology of neuroanatomy. It is explicitly a logical construct, based upon a conception of the functional needs of the brain as a decision-making instrument. Nevertheless, studies of influence in the future may fruitfully utilize neuro-physiological measures of emotional alteration as a close adjunct to the more traditional attitudinal measures.

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[18] Special acknowledgement is due to Professors Harold Guetzkow and Herbert Simon and to Messrs. Douglas K. Mims, Frederick Stern, and Fred M. Tonge for their criticisms and suggestions with respect to the model outlined in this section.

[19] For a similar definition, see Donald B. Lindsley, "Electroencephalography," in *Personality and the Behavior Disorders*, ed. Hunt (New York, 1944), Vol. 2, p. 1033.

[20] Excluded, consequently, from the present discussion is the influence analysis of a wholly self-contained system—that is, one in which all variables are determined by system variables exclusively. This applies whether the system involved is the individual personality or a number of such personalities.

[21] Charles E. Osgood, *Method and Theory in Experimental Psychology* (New York, 1953).

[22] Donald B. Lindsley, "Emotion," in the *Handbook of Experimental Psychology*, ed. Stevens (New York, 1951), pp. 473–516.

The model of the organism to be presented here represents an attempt to develop a conception of the decision-making process upon which to build a theory of influence. It is hoped that this theory will suggest at least partial solutions to the major problems of influence analysis outlined above. For example, an attempt has been made to provide sufficient generality so that any of the types of influence ordinarily considered (e.g., authority, sense of legitimacy, control over communication) fit naturally into the structure. Such a conception will provide clues both to the underlying similarities between apparently different types of behavioral premises (e.g., habit and legitimacy) and to underlying differences between apparently similar types of behavior (e.g., the private who salutes because he feels he ought to, and the private who salutes in order to avoid the guardhouse).

In the model to be developed, the formal terminology of set theory is used, as well as a series of symbols. For the following symbols, read the indicated English equivalents:

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|---|---|
| $\{\cdots\}$ | "the set of · · · " |
| $\epsilon$ | "is contained in," or "is an element in the set of" |
| $\mid$ | "such that" |
| $a \xrightarrow{p=P} b$ | "if $a$, then $b$, with probability $P$" |

Upper case letters are used to designate sets, and lower case counterparts are used to designate elements of a set (e.g., $a \epsilon A$).

Two undefined terms are introduced. First, "*state of affairs*" (s). From previous attempts to do so, it appears to be impossible to define *state of affairs* in terms any less ambiguous than itself. Consequently, it is hoped that the intuitive meaning of the expression will be moderately clear. Some examples of states of affairs are 'sleep,' 'the solar system destroyed,' 'a light blinking.'

The second undefined term is the verb "to evoke." A state of affairs is said *to be evoked* when it is activated within the organism so as to impinge upon action. A state of affairs is *evocable* if it can be evoked. The term denotes a causal relationship between an evoking state of affairs and an evoked state of affairs.

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[23] William R. Ashby, *Design for a Brain* (New York, 1952); Donald O. Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior* (New York, 1949).

[24] Norbert Wiener, *Cybernetics* (Cambridge, 1948).

[25] Rudolph Carnap and Y. Bar-Hillel, *An Outline of a Theory of Semantic Information,* Technical Report No. 247, Research Laboratory of Electronics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, October 27, 1952.

The characterization of evoking as a causal relationship introduces certain difficulties into the model. As indicated above, a causal relationship is ordinarily treated as asymmetric (i.e., $aRb \rightarrow b(\sim R)a$). However, if the present model is to conform to psychological reality, one must be able to speak both of the 'state of hunger' evoking the 'state of eating' and of the 'state of eating' evoking the 'state of hunger.' Consequently, the evoking set of states of affairs ($E$) is considered to be external to the system at the time-space point examined. In this sense it is treated as an experimental variable.

With these primitive terms, it is possible to develop a formal model of the state of the organism for purposes of influence analysis.

(1) Let $S = \{\text{all states of affairs}\}$

(2) Let $R = \{s \epsilon S \mid s \text{ is evocable in the individual}\}$

(3) Let $v$ be a three-valued function defined over a domain consisting of all of the elements contained in the set $R$, such that to each element $(r_i)$ there is associated a value, $v(r_i)$, equal to $+$, $0$, or $-$.

The psychological meaning of the partitioning of $R$ thus defined will be left unclarified in the formal structure defined here. At the same time, however, there appears to be no great advantage to be gained by suppressing the motivation for the introduction of such a function. The role of $v$-values in the present system is approximately the same as that performed by valences in Lewinian psychology.[26]

Alternatives to using only three equivalence relations as indicated here might be the introduction of a greater number of such relations or the use of a complete ordering of elements on the basis of a utility function. The latter possibility has long appealed more to the economist than to the behavioral scientist.[27] It offers the advantages (and they are not to be ignored) of mathematical elegance and productivity, but there is some evidence to suggest that the demands implied by a utility function are probably beyond the capabilities of the human organism and almost certainly foreign to its normal operations. On the other hand, a number of classes somewhat greater than those defined here has something to be said for it (e.g., $++$, $+$, $0$, $-$, $--$), and the rejection of such procedures is based primarily upon a general inclination to be most parsimonious in the definition of the model in those areas where information is the least reliable.

(4) Let $G = \{r \epsilon R \mid v(r_i) \neq 0\}$

(5) Let $Q = R - G$

That is, the set $R$ is partitioned into two subsets, $Q$ and $G$. $G$ is the set of all elements (in $R$) to which are associated a $v$-value of $+$ or $-$. $Q$ is the set of all elements to which are associated a $v$-value of 0.

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[26] Kurt Lewin, *The Conceptual Representation and the Measurement of Psychological Forces* (Durham, 1938).

[27] Kenneth J. Arrow, "Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situation," *Econometrica*, Vol. 19, pp. 404–32 (Oct., 1951); John von Neumann and Oskar Morganstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton, 1947), pp. 15–31.

(6) Let the elements of $R$ be related by a web of probability connections. For example:

$$q_1 \xrightarrow{p=.9} q_2 \xrightarrow{p=1.} g_1$$

Given the limited discriminatory ability that is ordinarily associated with human behavior, it might be predicted that the model would most accurately approximate the decision-making activities of the individual if the values of $p$ were restricted to extremes (e.g., $p$ greater than .9 or less than .1). However, again by the iron law of parsimony, situations where the values of $p$ are moderate are not excluded arbitrarily from the present model. (As will be made clear below, decision-making problems arise not only where the probability connections involve moderate $p$-values but also where the starting point in a chain is simultaneously associated by means of chains of high probability with two states of affairs having opposite $v$-values.)

(7) Let $A = \{r \epsilon R \mid r \text{ is evoked in the individual}\}$

The set $A$ will contain at least one "alternative of action" (defined as a starting point in a chain of connections between $Q$ and $G$—thus, an immediately achievable state of affairs) and at least one element of the set $G$. Further, each chain of probability connections among the elements of $A$ terminates in an element of $G$. Thus, it is possible to say that each alternative of action in $A$ has a probability, $u$, of resulting in a $g \epsilon G$ having a $v$-value of $+$, and a second probability, $w$, of resulting in a $g \epsilon G$ having a $v$-value of $-$. (Note that $u$ and $w$ do not necessarily sum to 1.) The set of behavior alternatives with a $u$-value greater than a given figure (e.g., $u > .9$) and a $w$-value smaller than a second figure (e.g., $w < .2$) can be considered a viable set of alternatives. Unless that set contains only a single element, the model does not uniquely determine the action of the individual.

(8) Let $T = \{s \epsilon S \mid s \text{ evokes an } s \text{ in the individual}\}$

This set is implied by the interpretation of "evoking" as a causal relationship between two elements of $S$ and by the existence of the set $R$.

(9) To each $t \epsilon T$ let there be associated one or more $r \epsilon R$ by means of probability connections.
For example:

$$t_1 \xrightarrow{p=.9} r_1$$

$$t_1 \xrightarrow{p=.3} r_2$$

(10) Thus, to each set $A$ there is associated a set

$$E = \{t \epsilon T \mid t \text{ is connected to an } a \epsilon A\}$$

The set $E$ can be called the evoking set. It conforms to what is normally called the "cue" or the "stimulus."

## IV. INFLUENCE PROCESSES

The model outlined above defines the state of the organism in terms of a number of elementary sets, $v$-values attached to the elements of those sets, and probability connections among the elements. One of the advantages of thus formalizing the state of the organism lies in the possibilities thereby afforded for identifying general influence processes. Since influence has previously been defined as that which induces change in the state of the organism, the present model focuses attention on four basic processes by means of which influence is exercised.

1. *By changing the v-values associated with the elements of R.* A change in $v(r_i)$ from $+$ to 0, for example, makes a potential change in the value of $u$ (i.e., the probability of a given alternative leading to a $+$ $v$-value) and thereby potentially alters the viable set of behavior alternatives. Such a phenomenon is that which is ordinarily called the "internalization of values." When an individual is persuaded to internalize a desire for a particular state of affairs (e.g., the election of a Republican President) which was desired previously simply for its instrumental character, the equivalent representation in the model is one in which the $v$-value of the state of affairs changes from 0 to $+$. Similarly, socialization falls in this category, as well as most of those forces that are commonly regarded as cultural determinates of individual activities.

2. *By changing the probability connections among the elements of R.* Such an alteration can take the form of changing the probabilities attached to an existing link or the form of introducing a new linkage into the system.[28] This is probably the form of most of the activities ordinarily called "influence." The threat of sanction, the promise of reward, or the provision of information, are examples of activities primarily directed toward restructuring the connections between different elements of $R$. For example, the President who wishes to exercise influence over the vote of a Congressman on a particular bill can (among other things) attempt to alter the Congressman's perception of the probability that a pro-administration vote will lead to desirable consequences with respect to (a) the substantive matter at hand, (b) the Congressman's re-election, and (c) the Congressman's future influence in Washington.

3. *By changing the connections between T and R.* This involves restricting or expanding the set $A$ with respect to a given set $E$. Stimulus-response conditioning of any sort falls in this general category. Consider, for example, the creation and extinction of habitual reactions. Habit is based (in part) upon the inclusion of only a single alternative in $A$, and a typical form of habit-breaking is one in which the set $A$ is expanded to include other alternatives. Similarly, the inculcation of a "sense of legitimacy" represents, at least in part, a case of the alteration in $T$-to-$R$ connectives, as does also the phenomenon of behavioral rigidity frequently associated with old age or with organizational behavior.

4. *By changing the elements of E.* This represents an alternative way of

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[28] The latter can be treated as a special case of the former if the probability web be taken as completely defined but having frequent instances where $p=0$.

changing the set $A$, and thereby—at least potentially—changing the content of the viable set of alternatives. The result is to induce a "change in set" in both the traditional psychological and present meaning of the expression. In problem-solving activities, the influence of a hint occurs through the mechanism of changing the elements of $E$. Similarly, the provision of information designed to define the situation for the individual actor frequently alters not only the probability connections between the elements of $R$ but also the elements contained in $E$.

## V. THE PROBLEM OF SYMBOLIC LEARNING

If one operates within the general framework outlined above, some of the more complicated problems in the study of influence tend to become, if not always simplified, at least clarified.[29] For example, some of the confusion that has found its way into influence analysis appears, from the present point of view, to stem from the identification difficulties in handling influence through symbolic communications. So long as our "rats" stay in their Skinner box and learn primarily through direct experience, we are not greatly perplexed. But when they exhibit some ability to communicate the wisdom of their experience to each other, some of our more simple-minded approaches to influence begin to break down. Consider the rule of anticipated reactions.[30] It has been suggested that whenever the reaction of alter to ego's behavior is correctly anticipated by ego (and vice-versa), it is not possible to untangle the influence relationship involved. Superficially, this appears to be the most direct application of the statements made in section I of the present paper with regard to the problems associated with identification in the absence of an exogenous variable. But in fact, if influence is defined as that which induces a change in the state of the organism different from that predictable, the common statement of the rule of anticipated reactions obscures a fundamental empirical assumption that is not always true, and, in any event, should be made explicit.

The usual statement of the difficulty follows approximately this outline: consider two conditional predictions, the first held to be true by Congressman Brown, the second held to be true by Mr. Jones, a constituent of Congressman Brown:

*Brown:* "If I vote against higher taxes, Jones will vote for me."

*Jones:* "If I vote for Brown, he will vote against higher taxes." So long as

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[29] One example of such clarification is presented in the present section. The writer is persuaded it is far from an isolated case. For example, some of the respects in which the problem of generality is attacked have been indicated in the discussion of influence processes (e.g., the elements of similarity between habit—and therefore the extended literature on habit—and legitimacy). With respect to the dimensionality of an influence relationship, the model suggests that in addition to the subject matter under consideration it may be necessary to differentiate influence over alternative suggesting from influence over choice among given alternatives, influence over highly specific acts or attitudes from influence over underlying value premises, etc.

[30] Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston, 1941), pp. 589–91; Simon, "Notes" (cited in note 15), pp. 505–6.

Brown votes against higher taxes and Jones votes for Brown, it is argued, it is impossible to discern who is influencing whom and to what extent. However, it is compatible with the present definition of influence, and these propositions, for Jones to have *no* influence over Brown and Brown *no* influence over Jones, since it is the source and not the form of the anticipation that is decisive.

The anticipated reaction of alter to ego's behavior is part of the states of affairs chains by means of which the state of the organism (ego) is defined at a given point in time. It is a conditional statement of the general form:

$$a \xrightarrow{p=P} b$$

The form of influence that is relevant here consists in altering this statement. Such an alteration need not be induced by the agent of the conditionally predicted event, and influence is wielded by the person inducing the alteration.

Consider the following commonly believed conditional prediction:

> "If I am a good boy, Santa Claus will come to my house and leave some gifts for me. ($p=1$)"

Santa Claus is not perceived to be exercising influence over a boy who believes this prediction; instead, influence is understood to be held by the individuals who persuade the boy to anticipate this reaction on the part of Santa Claus.

As another example, consider this proposition (representing a belief that is inculcated by the parental family in some cultures):

"If one is dishonest, he will be rejected by his associates. ($p=1$)" Given the definition of influence used here, the individual who accepts this premise is being influenced not by his associates but by his parental family. If the attitude is subject to decay in the absence of reinforcement and to reinforcement by associates, the associates may exercise influence. But such influence is exercised through reinforcing the attitude, not simply by virtue of their being the manifest agents of the predicted event, and is measured by the difference between what the attitude is and what it would have been in the absence of reinforcement.

If this general reasoning is applied to the example of Congressman Brown and Mr. Jones, the Brown-Jones influence relationship becomes obscure only when the action of Brown in response to his anticipation of Jones' reaction serves to reinforce Jones' anticipation of Brown's action and vice-versa. This is the major empirical assumption underlying the complications foreseen. Since it is frequently a reasonable assumption, the complications remain; but it is important to distinguish the simple occurrence of an anticipated event from the contribution of the event to the reinforcement of the anticipation.

More generally, it is necessary consistently to separate the content of the learned relationship from the mechanisms by which it is learned. To be sure, there frequently is an important amount of interaction between content and learning; and, to be sure, there often is a second-level influence process between an agent of the predicted event and an agent of the symbolic communication so that the superficially perceived relationship actually does exist (though in a two-step rather than in a one-step chain). But when the distinction is maintained, the power of influence analysis is considerably augmented. This becomes particularly obvious, for example, when one considers the function and importance of the technical expert in an area of limited general knowledge.

## VI. THE MEASUREMENT OF INFLUENCE: SOME APPROACHES

Having explicated the concept of influence and the related concept of the 'state of the organism,' and having indicated at least some of the ways in which such concepts facilitate analysis, it remains to consider—within the same framework—the major problems of measurement. Previously, some of the difficulties of influence measurement were discussed in more or less general terms. In this section, the specific advantages, disadvantages, and difficulties of the chief methods of measurement currently in use are briefly considered. Three general types of measures are distinguishable in the literature: measures of attributed influence, measures of opinion change, and measures of direct interaction.

(1) *Measures of attributed influence.* It is possible to ask the members of the group under examination to rank each other according to influence, either over the individual respondent or over the group as a whole (*re* a particular situation).[31] Such a procedure has certain obvious advantages that should not be overlooked. In the first place, it is simple. The simplicity from the point of view of the observer is clear. The simplicity from the point of view of the respondent is less obvious, and strong reasons for anticipating considerable response difficulty can be found. However, so long as the response categories are relatively broad, no serious difficulty has been reported on this score by observers who have used this technique. In the second place, it taps unexpressed feelings and the implications of unobserved events. When overt behavior is observed over a time interval, there appear to be aspects of the influence pattern that are elusive. It is difficult to determine, for example, whether it is simply fortuitous that individual $X$ changes his opinion in the direction of individual $Y$, or whether the fact that individual $Z$ talks so much is indicative of his influence position or rather of a personal attraction to the tonal qualities of his own voice. By focusing on attributed power, it may be possible to distinguish real influence from pseudo-influence.

While the introspective nature of this approach provides, at least potentially, a major source of its attractiveness, it also results in a major disadvantage. One has a certain hesitancy in accepting an individual's self-evaluation of personal motivation in view of the distortions, conscious and unconscious, that may be ordinarily anticipated. In addition, this technique provides no ready means for comparing a relationship within a given ranking system on the one hand and a second relationship in a completely different ranking system on the other. Finally, in terms of the present model of the organism and the attendant specification of influence processes, this type of approach provides no clue to the form of influence involved—that is, to what sort of change in the organism has taken place (or habitually does take place).

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[31] For example, Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill, 1953); J. I. Hurwitz *et al.*, "Some Effects of Power on the Relations among Group Members," in *Group Dynamics*, ed. Cartwright and Zander (Evanston, 1953), pp. 483–92; Ronald Lippitt *et al.*, "The Dynamics of Power," *ibid.*, pp. 462–82.

(2) *Measures of opinion change.* Gauging opinion change is the approach to measuring influence that is probably most frequently used. Ordinarily, this involves defining an attitude, permitting interaction, and subsequently locating a post-interaction position on the attitude.[32] Alternatively, samples matched according to some *a priori* important characteristics can be used.[33] In such a case, pre-experiment attitudes are not obtained, but the groups are exposed to different experimental treatments and then checked as to attitude. The assumption is made that the matched samples are originally substantially identical as to attitude. Such a procedure has the obvious disadvantages associated with the assumption necessarily made. On the other hand, where the situation is such that it is reasonable to presume that a pre-experimental determination of attitudes will have serious effects on the reliability of the experiment, the matched sample method has considerable merit.

As contrasted with the attributed-influence technique, these methods have the advantage of being at least somewhat external to the individual under observation. That is, although the individual is asked to indicate his own attitude, the experimenter does the measurement himself.

The method frequently requires, however, that the attitude in question be subject only to responses amenable to being located on a continuum.[34] The problem of multi-dimensionality is, in principle, controlled by introducing an additional continuum for each dimension. Of course, insofar as there is a desire to combine results on several trials, such a method introduces a unit problem. Ordinarily, equal distance between two points arbitrarily defined as adjacent on the continuum is assumed as well as (occasionally) equal distance between any two such points on any continuum considered. There may be circumstances under which one should be prepared to make assumptions of these types in order to facilitate the execution of a measurement program, but the transformation of 'equal-appearing intervals' into 'equal intervals' should be made consciously and with an awareness of the somewhat dubious foundation for the transformation.

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[32] For example, James Bieri, "Changes in Interpersonal Perceptions Following Social Interaction," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* Vol. 48, pp. 61–66 (Jan., 1953); Harvey Cromwell and Richard Kunkel, "An Experimental Study of the Effect on the Attitude of Listeners of Repeating the Same Oral Propaganda," *Journal of Social Psychology,* Vol. 35, pp. 175–84 (May, 1952); James C. Davies, "Some Relations between Events and Attitudes," this REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 777–89 (Sept., 1952); Leon Festinger, *et al.* "The Influence Process in the Presence of Extreme Deviates," *Human Relations,* Vol. 5, pp. 327–46 (Nov., 1952).

[33] For example, Harold H. Kelley, "The Warm-Cold Variable in First Impressions of Persons," *Journal of Personality,* Vol. 18, pp. 431–39 (June, 1950); Malcolm Moos and B. Koslin, "Prestige Suggestion and Political Leadership," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Vol. 16, pp. 77–93 (Spring, 1952); Jack A. Parrish and Donald T. Campbell, "Measuring Propaganda Effects with Direct and Indirect Attitude Tests," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* Vol. 48, pp. 3–9 (Jan., 1953); Stanley Schachter and Robert Hall, "Group-Derived Restraints and Audience Persuasion," *Human Relations,* Vol. 5, pp. 397–406 (Nov., 1952).

[34] One variation of the more standard opinion-change techniques warrants specific mention. Where the influence relationship studied involves a simple dyad, it is possible to use the revealed-differences method. Two respondents are presented with problems, each of which admits of only two possible responses. They are then asked to reconcile any differences that arise and arrive at a joint position for each question. The proportion of decisions "won" by the most-winning person forms an index of the influence differential. To the extent that it is possible to assume the equal weighting of decisions, such a method

Quite aside from the difficulties in using substantial numbers of dimensions in the absence of a common metric, one of the major tasks in attitude measurement is that of identifying the dimensions of an opinion area. In this regard, recent developments in scaling procedures (e.g., the development of latent structure analysis)[35] offer hope that this is not an impossible task, albeit it is manifestly not a simple one.

As a consequence, when one deals with opinions, whether measured by means of a Likert-type scale or by more complex scales, rankings, or perceptual judgments, the difficulties in analysis are substantial. One indication is the variety of forms that such analysis has assumed: the utilization of mean values,[36] degrees of change,[37] simple combined indices,[38] standard deviation of estimates,[39] per cent of group,[40] relative rank correlation,[41] net direction of changes,[42] and 'change-no change'[43] measures for defining the existence or extent of attitude change.

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is feasible and provides a reasonably straightforward way of comparing different relationships. See Fred L. Strodtbeck, "Husband-Wife Interaction over Revealed Differences,' *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 16, pp. 468–73 (Aug., 1951). Recently, Strodtbeck has been experimenting with a similar technique in three-person groups.

[35] Samuel A. Stouffer *et al.*, *Measurement and Prediction* (Princeton, 1950).

[36] Herbert C. Kelman, "Attitude Change as a Function of Response Restriction," *Human Relations*, Vol. 6, pp. 185–214 (Aug., 1953).

[37] Raymond L. Gorden, "Interaction between Attitude and the Definition of the Situation in the Expression of Opinion," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 17, pp. 50–58 (Feb., 1952).

[38] Rheem F. Jarrett and Alex C. Sheriffs, "Propaganda, Debate, and Impartial Presentation as Determiners of Attitude Change," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 48, pp. 33–41 (Jan., 1953).

[39] Everett W. Bovard, "Group Structure and Perception," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 46, pp. 398–405 (July, 1951).

[40] Irving L. Janis *et al.* "Effects of Preparatory Communications on Reactions to a Subsequent News Event," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 15, pp. 487–518 (Fall, 1951).

[41] Malcolm G. Preston and Roy K. Heintz, "Effects of Participatory vs. Supervisory Leadership on Group Judgment," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 44, pp. 345–55 (July, 1949).

[42] Carl I. Hovland and Walter Weiss, "The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 15, pp. 635–50 (Winter, 1951–52).

[43] Solomon E. Asch, "Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments," in *Groups, Leadership, and Men* ed. Guetzkow (Pittsburgh, 1951) pp. 177–90.

Finally, two somewhat different complications introduced by the application of procedures for measuring opinion change should be mentioned. First, where such measurement is used in a group larger than two, the 'satellite' individual is awkwardly handled, since any two individuals whose opinions always coincided would have equal influence. This gives a 'yes-man' an influence rating equal to that of his boss, a result with which most students of decision-making would probably feel uncomfortable.[44] Second, the usual opinion-change technique and its several variations all leave unanswered a key question that is also unanswered by the attributed-power technique: what form of influence is involved? To return to an earlier example, no distinction is made between the private who salutes out of conviction and the private who salutes out of fear of conviction.

(3) *Measures of influence attempts.* Where the opinion change technique concentrates on observing behavior (or attitude) at two different points in time and recording manifest change (resulting presumably from interaction pressures during the interval between observations), the attempted-influence technique focuses directly upon the interaction pressures themselves.[45] Influence is measured either by influence attempts alone or by some index of influence attempts accepted by the other individuals.[46]

The unit utilized varies somewhat from one observer to another. In the Bales system, the basic unit is a simple declarative sentence, with some allowance for scoring non-verbal actions (e.g., laugh, extended pause). It is possible to use other units such as a single 'utterance,'[47] 'message,'[48] or 'influence attempt.'[49] Serious objections can be raised to any of these units, the major objection being directed at the assumption that each unit is equal to every other unit. It seems reasonable to believe that there are three types of unit inequality that are ignored in such an assumption. In the first place, the impact of a given unit from a given source will vary according to the target individual. In the second place, the impact of a given unit upon a given target will vary according to the source. In the third place, the impact per unit upon a given target from a given source will vary according to the communication content.

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[44] One method of avoiding this difficulty is to prohibit communication between respondents and present them with problems completely alien to their experience. Such procedures pose considerable problems of interpretation, but they do provide interesting and important data on the mechanisms of personal adjustment used by the satellite individual in a situation of uncertainty.

[45] The recording of interactive events has been used by several observers in one form or another, probably the best known schemes being those developed by Bales and Carter. See Robert F. Bales, *Interaction Process Analysis* (Cambridge, 1950); Launor Carter *et al.*, "A Note on a New Technique of Interaction Recording," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 46, pp. 258–60 (April, 1951). In essence, the observation of influence in this case is made by attempting to observe the in-process interaction.

[46] Theodore M. Mills, "Power Relations in Three-Person Groups," *American Sociology Review*, Vol. 18, pp. 351–57 (Aug., 1953); Norman Polansky *et al.*, "An Investigation of Behavioral Contagion in Groups," *Human Relations*, Vol. 3, pp. 319–48 (Nov., 1950).

[47] Kurt W. Back, "Influence through Social Communication," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 46, pp. 9–23 (Jan., 1951).

[48] Festinger *et al.*, "Influence Process" (cited in note 32).

[49] Lippitt *et al.*, "Dynamics of Power" (cited in note 31).

Since this unit inequality seems fairly clear, the real assumption behind the observation of attempts to influence appears to be that given an interaction period of sufficient length, the unequal units will tend to show a mean value of 1 for each interacting individual. Of the reasonableness of this modified assumption one may have somewhat greater confidence, but in view of its importance, it deserves further investigation.

In addition, concentration upon the interaction process obscures the importance of unobserved events. For example, it is argued, one will over-estimate the significance of a spokesman or a person in an authority role, where influence is based upon previous decisive changes in the organism. In this respect, it should be noted that if influence is defined as 'un-predicted' change in a specific organism over a given time interval, one is on safe theoretical ground; but this should not be taken as an invitation to ignore the interesting questions raised in a hierarchical influence structure or to spare caution in interpretation of observations in ongoing organizations.

Like the previous two techniques, the measures of influence attempts do not make clear what types of changes in the organism are involved. In some respects and under some conditions it is possible to make limited inferences in this direction from interaction data, but the possibilities for exploitation along these lines are not as great as along others.

Finally, the techniques outlined here have fewer non-experimental uses than either the attributed-influence or opinion-change techniques. This is not to say that these methods are applicable only in a laboratory situation, but simply to record the obvious fact that the restraints placed upon the utilization of such methods are, in this respect, more severe than the similar restraints imposed on the other major techniques.

Although the methods indicated here have considerable actual and potential utility, their somewhat questionable integration with the model outlined earlier in the present paper (or with any other model) indicates a need for some change both in the recording procedures utilized and in the forms of analysis undertaken. Supplementation by introspective recall methods and by attempts to make explicit the decisional premises held at the time of a decision seems indicated, as does the development of techniques (possibly physiological) for localizing more precisely the points in time at which significant changes in the organism occur.

There still remains the major problem of determining comparison values. It has been indicated that one could define the difference between predicted and observed behavior as a measure of influence. No attempt has been made to indicate in what terms a value could be assigned to that difference. Changing the formulation from "behavior change" to "premise reconstruction" does not greatly improve the position *vis-à-vis* this complication. Consider an organism that undergoes change at two different points in time. Is there any way of determining at which point greater influence occurs?

Two possible ways of approaching the problem suggest themselves (although others might be developed). First, one can evaluate the relative influence over a terminal act. Make the following estimates:

(a) Given the influence at $t_1$, in how many different ways could the organism have arrived at the act?
(b) Given the influence at $t_2$, in how many different ways could the organism have arrived at the act?

If these "different ways" are weighted according to some probability estimation and those that have sufficiently small probabilities are excluded, the change that had the greatest positive effect upon the probability of the event's occurring may be called the 'more influential.'

As an alternative, one can evaluate the relative influence upon the organism in general by estimating the proportion of acts the organism might perform which were changed by the influence at $t_1$ as compared with the influence at $t_2$. (Again, probability weightings would be necessary.) Obviously, the interaction between premises of action makes any estimation of the sorts outlined here a tricky one, but it is a direction that warrants exploration.

## CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made to sketch an explication of the influence concept that is both logically consistent and operationally feasible. A formal model of a decision-making organism has been outlined and used to deduce the major forms of interpersonal influence. On the basis of this formalization of the concept, some major complications—operational and theoretical—have been explored with reference both to the conception of influence here proposed and to the procedures currently in use in empirical research. The object has been to suggest answers to some important questions and to raise questions about some answers implicit in previous research into influence processes. Although no attempt has been made to review the entire history of the study of influence, at least one proposition can be made with some assurance: the measurement of influence and the formalization of the concept have proceeded in an unfortunately *ad hoc* fashion, with little communication either between the 'theorists' and the 'empiricists' or between the several practitioners within each class of that dichotomy. For example, it is extraordinary—but true—that despite the fact that there are currently in use a significant number of distinctly different methods of measuring 'influence,' it is not at all clear under what conditions they provide comparable answers. It is, of course, possible, though rarely useful, to define a concept by a measurement technique; but in the absence of some knowledge of the inter-correlations involved, one cannot define the same concept by several different measurement procedures. Yet this is the current state of influence measurement. Similarly, one can find few serious attempts in the literature to relate formal definitions of influence either to measurement methods or to the main body of social science theory.

These considerations and the others introduced above imply some of the directions in which influence theory and research might fruitfully proceed. Without attempting to be exhaustive, the present writer feels constrained to indicate some of the specific questions of considerable importance as he projects the development of the theory of influence.

a. *Questions with respect to the formal theory:* What is the relationship between action theory, as formulated by Parsons and his associates, and the theory of influence? Is it possible to define a conception of the structure of the individual personality that will fit systematically into a general theory of influence? Can deductions about influence be made from the theory of information? If not, what modifications or additions would make such deductions possible? What is the extent of congruence between the present formulation of the influence concept and the formulation implicit in Lewinian field theory? What connections can be established between learning theory and the theory of influence? What is the relationship between influence theory and the formal theory of probability?

b. *Questions with respect to measurement methods:* What is the extent of intercorrelation among the standard measures of interpersonal influence? Can the differential conditions of high and low correlation be specified? What measures from the explicit process of interpersonal interaction can be used effectively as indicators of change in the state of the organism? What is the meaningful metric for comparing opinion changes? To what extent is it possible to identify the physiological manifestations of the receipt of influence?

c. *Questions with respect to the relation between formal theory and measurement techniques:* To what extent can the measurement implications of the present model of decision-making be translated into operational measurement procedures? In particular, is it possible to devise a method for discerning the decisional premises of the individual actor? What are the mechanisms involved in relating measured interactions with hypothesized organism changes? Under what conditions will measurement necessarily result in a non-unique specification of the state of the organism? What are the predictive consequences of such non-uniqueness?

Once answers are provided to questions such as these, it will be possible to proceed to the major task of influence theory and research: the formulation of a structure of propositions, defining the mechanisms of influence in an empirically-testable form.

# THE SENATE AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM

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At Philadelphia in 1787 the authors of the Constitution invented a new kind of federalism. In previous federal governments, the participating states were no more intimate than permanent allies, and citizens retained a primary loyalty to local governments. The federalism of 1787 achieved a converse effect, however, for it subordinated the member governments and created a nation. Likewise, while the earlier federalisms were notoriously prone to muddles in policy and stalemates in action, the American form turned out to give reasonably effective government, even in the short run. For both its nationalism and its effectiveness, therefore, it found favor with constitution makers elsewhere: in the larger Latin American states, in most of the new nations of the British Commonwealth, in the Germany of Weimar and Bonn, even, on paper at least, in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Probably the clearest demonstration of the prestige and utility of the American invention was the revision (in 1848) of the Swiss Confederation into a federalism patterned after the United States. The cantons thereby abandoned the one remaining survivor of the alliance type of federalism, represented in the middle ages by the Swabian, Rhenish, and Lombard leagues, as well as by the Swiss. And so it happens that about half the earth is presently ruled by federal governments—all of them reminiscent in one way or another of the Philadelphia invention.

What was the secret of this new federalism? Why was it so effective, so nationalizing that half the world has seen fit to borrow it? If the inventors themselves had understood exactly what they had invented, we could hope to answer these questions more easily. Unfortunately, however, the inventors were not quite certain what they had done and their confusion has been transmitted to scholars and jurists even in our generation. Many of the delegates were, of course, fully conscious that they had created a new political form. In the thirty-ninth *Federalist*, for example, Madison demonstrated that in the proposed Constitution the alliance type of federalism was systematically infused with devices borrowed from unitary governments. What resulted from this infusion was, he observed, something unique, so unique indeed that he had no word to name it. But although he and other delegates were proud of their invention, they could not state with adequate generality how their federalism improved on others. Even Hamilton, whose utterances usually displayed the systematic coherence of the doctrinaire, left diverse rationales unreconciled. In the fifteenth *Federalist* paper, for example, he implied that the essential merit of the new Constitution was its provision that the central government should rule persons as well as states. In the seventieth *Federalist* paper, on the other hand, he suggested that the essential merit was a single executive, as against the collegiate form hitherto usually characteristic of federations.

Looking at the Philadelphia invention with the historian's advantage of hindsight, it is now possible to perceive the advantageous feature of the new federalism. After 165 years, it is clear that the Constitution was effective and successful because, in contrast to all previous federalisms, it made the central government formally independent of the states, leaving the states no effective constitutional means to control national decisions. By this standard we can distinguish two major types of federalism: one in which federal decisions are made exclusively through the machinery of the central government (this type we can describe as centrally-directed or centralized), and the other in which federal decisions are made, partially at least, through the machinery of local governments (this type we can describe as peripherally-directed or peripheralized). Centralized federalisms are, it turns out, just about as capable of effective action as most unitary governments and certainly as capable of creating a citizen loyalty. But in peripheralized federalisms, like the old Swiss Confederation or contemporary international organizations, where local governments by constitutional right take part in central decisions, direct the voting of their delegates to the center, form suballiances to control its policy, confirm federal decisions, and influence federal policy as much as does the federal government itself, there these local governments usually retain the primary loyalty of the citizen.

To say that the federalism of 1787 was centralized subsumes the statement of the fifteenth *Federalist* paper that the national government was to rule persons as well as states; one of the reasons the state governments could not, under the new form of federalism, control the federal government was that the states did not control the relation of citizens to the nation. Some peripheralized federalisms have permitted the federal government occasional direct contact with citizens (e.g., in military affairs and, rarely, in judicial affairs); but the American federalism allowed the central government to do almost all its business directly with persons—its taxing, its recruiting, its policing, its judging, etc. Hence the state governments were deprived of that middleman position which in peripheralized federalisms permits them to control the policy of the center. Similarly, to say the federalism of 1787 was centralized subsumes also the assertion of the seventieth *Federalist* paper concerning a single executive, for the collegiate executive in peripheralized federalisms has always been one major device by which the federated governments have controlled the federal.

In a variety of other ways, too, the new Constitution centralized federalism. For example, by the provision (Article I, Section 10) that "No State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into any agreement or compact with another State . . .", it isolated state governments from each other. Thereby it forestalled formal factions among states, one of the most frequent occasions in earlier federalisms for devolution of authority to local governments. (Such factions were, incidentally, the characteristic defect of the Swiss Confederation.) Again, by the provision (also Article I, Section 10) that "No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation . . . ," it forestalled formal intrigue with foreigners, intrigue which might force the whole federation into an undesired position. (Incidentally also, such intrigues were the characteristic defect of the Dutch Republic.) Both these provisions were copied, almost verbatim, from the Articles of Confederation (Article VI), but in a centralized federalism they had a special force. They did not, it is true, prevent the Civil War, which involved a formal faction of states, or the Hartford Convention, which contained the threat of intrigue with foreigners; but they did enable the United States to surmount those difficulties in a way that centralized its federalism even more.

Altogether, therefore, the Constitution provided for a national government largely independent of the federated governments. It contemplated, of course, that the people of the states would control the national government. But it contemplated also that the control would be direct, not through the agency of state governments. Naturally, it did not forestall sectionalism; no constitution, federal or unitary, could do that. But it did arrange things in such a way that state officials had to use the political party, not state governments, to make their influence felt in Washington. Thus, although the constitutional system was undeniably federal, although the state governments continued to pretend to a vague sort of "sovereignty," still it was federalism with a difference: state governments, as state governments, could not hope to control national policy.

While we, with our longer experience and larger vocabulary, can thus identify the achievement of 1787 as a centralization rather than a peripheralization of federalism, the authors of the Constitution themselves were not aware that they had really shut off all circuits for states to direct the nation. Indeed, they thought that the Senate, at least, retained the peripheralized character of the Articles of Confederation. With two members from each state, members chosen indeed, by state governments, it embodied half of the so-called Great Compromise. It was the most important national institution so constructed,[1] and the founding fathers evidently believed that it was sufficient to maintain the principle. The delegates from the small states signed the Constitution as eagerly as did the delegates from the large and then went home to urge its adoption. Hamilton, much as he yearned for a unitary state, reconciled himself to the form of the Senate and rationalized it concisely and drearily in these words:

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[1] The electoral college should probably be interpreted as another peripheralizing institution, inasmuch as its authors probably expected that state legislatures would choose the electors. But it was largely accidental that the electoral college had this peripheralizing form; indeed the framers adopted it only because they thought there were worse disadvantages in all the other forms suggested. Although the state legislatures did usually choose the electors in the early years of the Republic, still the Constitution did not formally invest them with the duty. It merely said: "Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors . . . " (Art. II, Sec. 1). Hence, because the form was accidental and the wording imprecise, the electoral college was quickly deprived of whatever peripheralizing character may have been intended. Another part of the Constitution that might have turned out to be peripheralizing was the ambivalent provision on state courts in the supremacy clause. But the series of decisions, beginning with *Martin* v. *Hunter's Lessee*, 1 *Wheat.* 304 (1816), which deprived state courts of any authoritative role in interpreting national law, eliminated that danger. The Second, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Amendments were also quite clearly intended to peripheralize. They were not, of course, the framers' work and are not, indeed, in harmony with the original Constitution. By reason of the disharmony, perhaps, they (especially the Tenth and Second) have been more effective for peripheralizing than provisions of the original Constitution itself.

> . . . the equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residual sovereignty.[2]

The Senate did not, however, have quite the anticipated effect. Except for the few occasions when sectionalism has been organized by state governments, the Senate has not been a peripheralizing institution. This failure of the Senate to represent state governments is a crucial constitutional development, for thus was achieved the centralizing purpose of the Convention of 1787 in spite of the miscalculation of the delegates. Indeed, this failure of the Senate is of equal and similar significance to the failure of dissident factions to carry through such states' rights programs as the Virginia and Kentucky Resolves, the Hartford Convention, or the Civil War—any one of which, if successful, might have peripheralized or entirely destroyed American federalism. But, although constitutional practice so significantly diverges here from constitutional form, the divergence has never been systematically examined. And so this paper is devoted to an examination of the development of the role of the Senate from the representation of state governments, which was the role initially intended, to the representation of the people of the states, which was the role finally played.

This change of role has two chronological phases. The earlier phase—and for that reason probably the more important—is the gradual failure of state legislatures to enforce their instructions to senators. The second phase is the gradual transfer of the power to elect senators from legislatures to the people, a transfer that starts with the public canvass and culminates in the Seventeenth Amendment. By the completion of these two changes, the Senate was divorced wholly from state governments and could not possibly have the effect that the founding fathers expected.

## I

The Senate seemed in 1787 to be a peripheralizing institution because it was to be elected by state legislatures. Election by state legislatures implied accountability to them. And if that accountability had in fact come to exist, then the governments at Boston and Albany, Philadelphia and Trenton, Richmond and Charleston might very easily have forced the national government to refer its problems to them. State legislatures and the parties that preferred them to the national legislature did indeed try to enforce accountability by means of the doctrine of instructions. Hence that doctrine was, next to the method of election itself, the main avenue through which state legislatures pushed themselves into national affairs.

The idea that senators ought always to obey their immediate constituents is now almost forgotten. Only scholars still know that it was ever acted upon and few of them have studied the action systematically enough to recognize its significance.[3] State legislatures did indeed continue until 1913 to instruct their senators according to the traditional formula ("Be it resolved that our Senators in Congress are hereby instructed, and our Representatives are requested, to vote for . . ."). But by 1860 few senators felt bound by instructions; and, under the Republican centralism thereafter, they regarded them as mere expressions of opinion. Hence by long disregard the doctrine of instructions passed into obscurity, and in so passing freed the national government from the peripheralizing influence of the Senate.

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[2] *The Federalist,* paper no. 62.

The doctrine of instructions followed naturally from political institutions prior to the Constitution. Town meetings in colonial New England regularly instructed state representatives and continued to do so until the disappearance of the Federalist party in New England.[4] Elsewhere, voters occasionally instructed by petition; and as late as 1835 Thomas Ritchie, one of the great Jacksonian editors, attempted to revive the practice in Virginia.[5] Delegates to the Continental Congress were often instructed; and since the Articles of Confederation (Article V) explicitly provided for the recall of delegates at any time, the instructions were easily enforced.

We have no clear indication as to the attitude of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention toward the practice of instructing, for the subject is not mentioned in any of the records. On the one hand, many delegates seemed to expect that the Senate would resist the democratic folly of more popular bodies; and this expectation implies that they did not anticipate that the popular bodies would regularly instruct and thus control the Senate. On the other hand, nearly all of them anticipated that the Senate would protect state rights; and it is hard to visualize any practical system of protection that did not include the doctrine of instructions. Regardless of the attitude of the founding fathers, however, state legislatures, accustomed to both giving and receiving instructions, continued to instruct senators after 1789.

But from then on instructions were less effective—and that is the reason why the Senate did not peripheralize American federalism. State legislatures lost the sanction of recall and the first Congress definitely approved the loss. The House refused by a large majority to add "the right to instruct" to the First Amendment, apparently because it seemed too "democratic" for the representative system and smacked too much of the localism of the Articles.[6] Similarly, when senators of the first Congress had occasion to discuss some of their many instructions, several Federalists argued that instructions "amounted to no more than a wish" and that legislatures were "only the machines to choose" senators, possessing no more right to instruct them "than the electors had . . . to instruct the President." On the other hand, William McClay, a proto-Republican, who had already tried to control the vote of his fellow Senator from Pennsylvania by getting the state legislature to instruct them, argued that responsible representation required obedience to instructions.[7] The Federalists, in the majority, clearly won the debate and thereby not only discouraged instructions then but also aligned themselves and their descendant parties against the principle of instructions forever.

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[3] Almost the only general discussions are: George H. Haynes, *The Senate of the United States: Its History and Practice,* 2 vols. (Boston, 1938), Vol. 2, pp. 1024–34; and William E. Dodd, "The Principle of Instructing United States Senators," *South Atlantic Quarterly,* Vol. 1, pp. 326–32 (1902). The latter is largely theoretical; the former gives a few examples.

[4] Kenneth Colegrove, "New England Town Mandates," *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts,* Vol. 12, pp. 411–49 (1920); Colegrove notes that even in 1851 Fall River broke a senatorial election deadlock by instructing its representative to vote for Charles Sumner (p. 449).

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 443; Charles Henry Ambler, *Thomas Ritchie: A Study in Virginia Politics* (Richmond, 1913), pp. 163–64.

[6] *Annals of Congress,* Vol. 1, pp. 733–47, 1st Cong., 1st sess. (August 15, 1789). Seventeen state constitutions, mostly in New England and the Midwest, did eventually come to guarantee the right to instruct (Colegrove, p. 443); but, of course, this guarantee meant nothing if the national government refused to recognize it.

State legislatures and the Jeffersonian Republicans, however, held tenaciously to the doctrine of instructions. The North Carolina legislature, for example, intending to rebuke Samuel Johnston's disobedience, invited him to render an account of the first Congress. He refused to attend and report to them and they refused to re-elect him.[8] With a strong sense of particularism, legislatures continued to expect that senators would obey frequent and detailed instructions. It was altogether appropriate, therefore, that the Kentucky Resolves of 1798, the great pronouncement of Jefferson's party, should take the form of instructions to senators.

Republicans were eager to make the doctrine of instructions work, for they believed that without it "the power of electing would be . . . incomplete, and the Senator, instead of being a servant, would be the uncontrollable sovereign."[9] But instructions were freely violated even then and needed a new sanction to substitute for the sanction of recall, which had so effectively peripheralized the federalism of the Articles of Confederation. So compelling was the need for a substitute that the whole subsequent history of instructions can be written in terms of the search for, the discovery and application of, and the ultimate disillusionment with, a substitute for recall.

In the absence of recall the most obvious sanction was refusal to re-elect, as in the case of Samuel Johnston. But it was weak: new majorities in state legislatures could not threaten a senator who, chosen by the old majority, knew he would not be re-elected anyway, or who, with a longer term than theirs, might hope for re-election and vindication from their successors. So, sporadically and in floundering fashion, Republicans and state legislatures alike searched for a better substitute. When several senators violated instructions in voting "not guilty" on the impeachment of Justice Chase, a constitutional amendment was introduced to rebuke them:

> That the legislature of any State may, whenever the said legislature shall think proper,

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[7] *The Journal of William McClay*, ed. Edgar S. McClay (New York, 1927), pp. 387–89 (entry of Feb. 24, 1791); see also p. 188 (entries of Feb. 6 and 7, 1790).

[8] H. M. Wagstaff, "Federalism in North Carolina," *James Sprunt Historical Publications*, Vol. 9, p. 24 (1910).

[9] John Tyler, writing in 1812, quoted in *The Letters and Times of the Tylers*, ed. Lyon G. Tyler, 3 vols. (Richmond, 1884–85, and Williamsburg, 1896), Vol. 1, p. 274.

> recall, at any period whatever, any Senator of the United States, who may have been elected by them. . . .[10]

"Whenever . . . at any period whatever"—the redundance testifies to the passion, but the motion was tabled. Several years later the Massachusetts legislature (ironically Federalist) invented a better sanction. John Quincy Adams provided the occasion: though elected as a Federalist, he voted for the Embargo Act, whereupon Timothy Pickering, Adams' colleague and the leading Federalist senator, roused Massachusetts Federalism to win the spring elections in 1808.[11] The new Federalist legislature promptly censured Adams and, adding indignity to the rebuke, elected his successor six months ahead of time. Sensitive to the "accumulated personal malignity borne me . . . by those who rule the State," Adams felt compelled to resign.[12]

This was, so far as I can discover, the first instance of a forced resignation, the only substitute sanction ever used with any success. But it too was not nearly so effective as recall, for it worked only against men with a quick sense of personal honor and, even then, only when there seemed to be mitigating circumstances of party advantage. Explaining to Senator Anderson of Tennessee that he indulged his sense of honor only because Jeffersonians were five-sixths of the Senate, Adams wrote:

> If then I did abandon you, it was from the perfect conviction that you were too strong to need any assistance of mine. For be assured, if the odds had not been so unequivocally decisive, . . . highly as I reverenced the authority of my constituents, and bitter as would have been the cup of resistance to their declared will, I would not have yielded up my trust until the moment when it was taken from my hands. . . .[13]

The next instances of censures and forced resignations, involving David Stone of North Carolina and William Branch Giles of Virginia, occurred at the end of the War of 1812. These resignations signified little in the politics of the period, for neither was submitted until after the people ratified the censures by reelecting Madisonian majorities to the state legislatures.[14] But they counted much for developing the sanction, and Giles especially, publicly disavowing instructions even as he obeyed them, placed the subject in the forefront of party controversy. In the South, where forced resignation was most important, these two cases formed the tradition, thereby aligning conservatives against instructions entirely and setting a precedent on which radical Jacksonians could rely.

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[10] *Annals of Congress*, Vol. 14, p. 1214, 8th Cong., 1st sess. (March 1, 1905).

[11] Henry Adams, *History of the United States during the Second Administration of Thomas Jefferson*, 2 vols. (New York, 1902), Vol. 2, p. 240.

[12] *The Diary of John Quincy Adams*, ed. Allan Nevins (New York, 1928), p. 57 (entry of July 11, 1808).

[13] *The Writings of John Quincy Adams*, ed. Worthington C. Ford, 12 vols. (New York, 1914 ff.), Vol. 3, pp. 269–70 (letter to Joseph Anderson, Dec. 15, 1808). Adams also wrote in this vein to Senator Giles of Virginia.

[14] Details of the resignations and the arguments for and against instructions are set forth in Dice Robbins Anderson, *William Branch Giles: A Study in the Politics of Virginia and the Nation from 1790 to 1830* (Menasha, Wisconsin, 1914), pp. 166 ff.; *The Letters and Times of the Tylers*, Vol. 1, pp. 273–75; and William Henry Hoyt, *The Papers of Archibald D. Murphey*, 2 vols. (Publications of the North Carolina Historical Commission, Raleigh, 1914), Vol. 2, pp. 1–6.

In the interim of incoherent issues and disorganized parties between 1815 and 1832 there were, so far as I can discover, no forced resignations. But they occurred often in the 1830's, when politics polarized around such events as Clay's motion of censure for the removal of deposits from the United States Bank, Jackson's extraordinary message in reply, and Benton's motion to expunge the motion of censure. As Jackson pointed out in his reply to the motion of censure, it would have failed if four Whig senators had obeyed instructions to oppose the restoration of deposits.[15] He might have added that it would have failed by one vote more had not Rives of Virginia resigned rather than obey instructions to support restoration. Jackson's emphasis on disobedience, however much he disclaimed any design "to interfere with the responsibility due from members of the Senate to their consciences, their constituents, and their country," was in fact intended to encourage state legislatures to instruct or instruct out of office every doubtful senator.[16] A Whig in Tennessee described the local agitation over Benton's motion thus, and his words concretely reveal the importance of the doctrine of instructions in a time and place of great Jacksonian influence:

> The "expunging resolutions" had been suffered to sleep in quiet in the legislature for the space of near a five-month. Meanwhile . . . no means were left untried to gain friends indoors and without. The people were invoked, and Gen. Jackson's reputation, like Caesar's pierced and bloody mantle, was held up before them. Public meetings were called and private memorials circulated. They sought to seduce the ignorant by misrepresentation, and to allure others by promises and flatteries. Gen. Jackson . . . did not think it out of the way to address himself personally, and by strong appeals, to many members of the legislature, and among them to some who must have been designated by some shrewd friend at Washington (the Speaker of the House [Polk], we suppose here), for they had never had the honor to see or be seen by the President, and were surprised—not flattered off by the distinction.[17]

Although the Democrats failed there, Tyler and Leigh of Virginia and Mangum of North Carolina resigned rather than obey instructions to vote to expunge, and were replaced by Jackson men. Since Benton's resolution passed by a vote of only 24 to 19, the three forced resignations provided the margin of success. This vote has often been derided as a "tinsel victory," but in fact it finished shaping the disciplined Democratic party which Jackson bequeathed to Van Buren and Polk. That instructions and forced resignations were crucial for the shaping testifies to the significant role they played in that era of American politics.[18]

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[15] Peleg Sprague of Maine, Theodore Frelinghuysen and Samuel Southard of New Jersey, and Thomas Ewing of Ohio.

[16] *Congressional Globe*, Vol. 1, p. 316 (April 16, 1834).

[17] E. H. Foster to Hugh L. White, Feb. 26, 1836, quoted in Nancy L. Scott, *Memoir of Hugh Lawson White* (Philadelphia, 1856), pp. 337–38.

[18] As the vote on the resolution to expunge indicates, the substitute for recall did sometimes work. Aside from the forced resignations already mentioned (Adams, 1808; Stone, 1814; Giles, 1815; Rives, 1834; Tyler, 1836; Leigh, 1836; Mangum, 1836), these resignations were also forced: Tazewell of Virginia, 1832; King of Georgia, 1837; Foster of Tennes-

But it testifies also, at the highpoint of instructions, to the inadequacy of their sanction. Although forced resignations, along with other Democratic victories, helped to expunge, they still were only half effective. The New Jersey legislature, for example, having instructed their senators to expunge, then requested them "to resign their seats . . . in case they should not think it proper to vote as above directed."[19] The Democrat of course obediently voted to expunge; the Whig disobeyed and refused to resign; yet two years later he was re-elected by the expanded Whiggery at Trenton. So it seems that resignations were not easily forced when senators sat for six years, state legislators for one or two. Nevertheless, in the South—where the people generally and even some Whig leaders thought that instructions were vital to popular rule—the substitute sanction worked fairly well. Consider what lies back of this advice given by J. H. Pleasants, editor of the Richmond *Whig*, to John Tyler when he and Leigh were instructed to vote for expunging:

> If you obey, dishonorable motives, the love of office . . . will at once be ascribed. A great clamor will be got up, with design to influence the elections in April, and they will be most perniciously influenced by it. If you *disobey*, and retain your seats, I do not hesitate . . . to say, that our hopes of carrying the State, spring and fall, will be annihilated at once. The cry of violated instructions is raised; false issues will again be made, and the true issues merged in them.
>
> You correctly say that, before that cry, false or fair, no man has been able to stand, let his popularity have been what it may. It overthrew us last spring, and will do it the next; . . . if you relinquish your seat, you give us the argument of obedience . . . always influential. . . . You disarm the enemy and inspirit our friends . . . [with] . . . a sentiment of indignation.
>
> . . . Success in Virginia is the first thing to be considered. Success is secured by your resignation—defeat is entailed by your retaining your places. I am very sensible that, by resigning, you countenance dangerous heresies . . . but you are powerless to sustain . . . [our] . . . principles by holding on. You but strengthen the hand of the enemy. . . .[20]

Only in the South, however, did instructions thus influence elections and hence only there was forced resignation really effective.

Jackson's use of instructions was both the high point of their life as a custom and the beginning of their obsolescence. Always fertile in the generation of political devices, always convinced that custom was not a rope that bound him but the raw material for a whip that would fit his hands, Jackson transformed instructions into a device by which he, as a national leader, could control both state and nation. Instructions and forced resignations were too fragile to endure for very long after the transformation. The purpose that had formed them and encouraged their development was thoroughly peripheralizing. When Jackson

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see, 1839; White of Tennessee, 1840; Brown of North Carolina, 1840; Strange of North Carolina, 1840; Preston of South Carolina, 1842; Haywood of North Carolina, 1846. Several other resignations, submitted in similar circumstances, should be classed as "almost forced": Sprague of Maine, 1835; Porter of Louisiana, 1837; Black of Mississippi, 1838; Rhett of South Carolina, 1852; Berrien of Georgia, 1852; and Everett of Massachusetts, 1854.

[19] *Congressional Globe*, Vol. 3, p. 159 (Feb. 1, 1836).

[20] John Hampden Pleasants to John Tyler, Jan. 13, 1836; quoted in *The Letters and Times of the Tylers*, Vol. 1, pp. 524–25.

made them serve a national, centralizing purpose, the political circles that had previously fashioned the theory and practice of instructions lost interest in them. Thus Jackson—who usually stood in theory for localism in government, but who in practice almost always centralized—here, typically, occasioned the decline of the one major instrument for state control of national policy.

Hence, after the flowering of forced resignations in the climate of the expunging resolution, the sanction was less used, perhaps because Jackson's successors lacked his prestige to manipulate state legislatures. Even in retirement, however, Jackson himself still made it work. Outraged by Tennessee's defection to the Whigs in 1836, he schemed to redeem it for the Democracy. He induced Polk to run for governor and after Polk's victory wrote exultingly to Van Buren:

> . . . of course Mr. Foster [the Junior Senator] and his gagg law will not any more trouble the United States Senate—Judge White must resign, or he will feel the weight of instructions and a Senator elected over his head—the precedent set by our last Legislature [which instructed Grundy, a Democrat, to vote against the sub-treasury] will justify this procedure. My own opinion is, White will resign—Bell being disappointed in going into the Senate to fill White's vacancy, which was the price of his apostasy, if he is disappointed in getting into the Speaker's chair will resign or *cut his throat* in despair and disappointment; and this catastrophy will end the existence of bluelight federalism in Tennessee.[21]

Bell's throat remained intact, but White and Foster were indeed instructed out, by being required to support the entire Van Buren program.

Still the Jacksonian device of humiliating instructions did not catch on. It was never again successful in Tennessee and was used elsewhere only reluctantly. Thus the North Carolina Whigs, theoretically opposed to instructions, tried to force out Bedford Brown and Robert Strange with a resolution asking them to "represent the wishes of a large majority of the people of this State."[22] Although Brown and Strange refused to treat this as an instruction, they did resign in 1840 to seek re-endorsement from the people—and did not get it.[23]

This was the last important case of forced resignation. Hence also it began the end of the doctrine of instructions, although some Southern senators did continue to regard even unpalatable instructions as binding. Senator Jarnagin of Tennessee, for example, voted under instructions for the tariff of 1846, but only after great pressure from President Polk himself and several of his emissaries.[24] Polk recorded his worries in his Diary:

> . . . My Private Secretary . . . informed me that the Bill . . . to reduce the tariff had been [re-] committed to the committee on Finance . . . by a majority of one vote, Mr. Jarnegan [sic] having disregarded his instructions and voted with his Whig friends. Jarnegan holds the fate of the bill in his hands and there [is] no reliance to be placed upon him. He de-

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[21] Jackson to Van Buren, August 12, 1839, Van Buren Papers, Library of Congress; quoted in Eugene Irving McCormac, *James K. Polk: A Political Biography* (Berkeley, California, 1922), p. 152. See also pp. 165–69.

[22] J. G. DeRoulhac Hamilton, "Party Politics in North Carolina, 1835–1860," *James Sprunt Historical Publications*, Vol. 15, p. 51 (1916).

[23] *Congressional Globe*, Vol. 7, pp. 110–11 (Jan. 14, 1839); Hamilton, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–70.

[24] *The Diary of James K. Polk*, ed. Quaife, 4 vols. (Chicago, 1910), Vol 2, p. 24 (entry for July 13, 1846); Vol. 2, p. 49 (entry for July 25, 1846).

> clared on Saturday last in the presence of the Cabinet . . . that he would vote for the Bill, and yet today he voted to embarrass and defeat it.[25]

Still, Jarnagin's reluctant "yes" on final passage carried the bill.

Even this obedience—in letter if not in spirit—could not last if the sanction disappeared; and that is just what happened. There were no clear cases of forced resignations after 1846. In 1849 Thomas Benton, Jackson's aide in organizing forced resignations, received and ignored unpalatable instructions. In the same year Lewis Cass, then the titular chief of the Democracy, was instructed to support the Wilmot Proviso; he not only disobeyed without resigning, but even persuaded the legislature to rescind its resolutions. Not surprisingly, therefore, John Bell of Tennessee remarked in justification of his disobedience on the Kansas question in 1858 that he found even "Democratic Senators obeying or disobeying instructions at their discretion."[26] In 1878, L. Q. C. Lamar of Mississippi disobediently voted against the Bland silver bill. A great outcry was raised about the violation; Jefferson Davis even broke the silence of his retirement to denounce Lamar and defend instructions as a principle of the old Democracy. Lamar stumped his state in 1879 and again in 1881 defending his course and was triumphantly re-elected.[27] Thereafter instructions were obeyed if palatable and unconcernedly ignored if they were not.

Instructions failed, I believe, through lack of a dependable substitute for recall. Forced resignations, the only available sanction, required that elections turn on the issue of obedience and that senators love honor more than office. By mid-century, neither requirement could be met. Voters quite reasonably refused to consider form more than substance; and the Democratic party that asked them to do so had for a time lost those states in which the technique was most popular. By mid-century, also, the Senate's prestige had risen so high that no man could lightly resign from it. From 1792, when Charles Carroll resigned, preferring to sit in the Maryland Senate, even from 1842 when Franklin Pierce resigned an office without a future in a city his wife disliked, the Senate's prestige rose steadily, as the statistics on resignation[28] show: from 1790 to 1819, 89 senators resigned; from 1820 to 1849, 91; from 1850 to 1879, however, only 34, exclusive of the seceders, who were also expelled; from 1880 to 1909, only 23; from 1910 to 1939, only 21. Also, a change had come about in the motives underlying resignations. The prestige of the Senate had at first been little greater than that of high state office, but this was no longer the case from about 1850: from 1790 to 1849, 48 senators resigned to take state office; from 1850 to 1949, only eight. From 1850 to 1949, 50 out of 90 senators resigning took high office in the national government, while 20 more resigned for ill health or financial reasons. How could instructions be enforced when neither political principles nor personal honor could compel men to resign a valuable property?

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[25] *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 51–52.

[26] Benton's instructions: *Congressional Globe*, Vol. 21, p. 98 (Jan. 3, 1850); Cass' instructions: *Congressional Globe*, Vol. 20, p. 432 (Feb. 2, 1849); rescinded, *Congressional Globe*, Vol. 21, pp. 702–3 (April 11, 1850); Bell's instructions: *Congressional Globe*, Vol. 27, p. 805 (Feb. 23, 1858). Bell's speech and Andrew Johnson's reply well summarize the arguments for and against instructions.

[27] Edward Mayes, *Lucius Q. C. Lamar: His Life, Times, and Speeches*, 2nd ed. (Nashville, Tenn., 1896), pp. 330–48, 362–64, 395–411, and 441–42.

[28] *Biographical Directory of the American Congress*, 1774–1949, H. Doc. 607, 81st Cong., 2nd sess. (1950), p. 952; Roy Franklin Nichols, *Franklin Pierce* (Philadelphia, 1931), pp. 106–8.

Localistic sentiments were extraordinarily strong in the first half of the nineteenth century. Had they had adequate institutions, they might have succeeded in peripheralizing American federalism. It is, therefore, crucial good fortune that no effective sanction for instructions was ever developed. In the absence of a sanction, the device of instructions gradually ceased to operate; and only the constitutional method of electing senators remained as a method by which the Senate might peripheralize federalism. To the gradual obsolescence of that method also, we now turn our attention.

## II

At the same time as instructions lapsed into obscurity, a new device began to appear for further separating national and state legislatures. This was the public canvass for seats in the Senate, a canvass, that is, of voters rather than of state legislators, a canvass in which candidates for the Senate helped elect those state legislators who were more or less formally pledged to vote for them. Prior to the 1830's, candidates for the Senate did not usually campaign until after the state legislature was elected, at which time they canvassed not the voters but the legislators. A master-servant relationship was thus established, except when, as rarely happened, the majority of the legislature chose a senator not of their own party. The senator, the servant, necessarily owed the legislators gratitude; but they owed him nothing—perhaps this explains why they felt free to instruct him so peremptorily. The rise of the public canvass for the Senate subtly changed this relationship. When a candidate for the Senate stumped the state in a campaign for the state legislators, he urged voters to vote for those candidates who were in turn pledged to vote for him for senator. Gradually, voters came to choose between rivals for the state legislature, not on the basis of their capabilities as lawmakers, but rather on the basis of the vote they would cast in senatorial elections. When this happened, each state legislator then owed his office less to his own merit and more to the merit of the candidate for the Senate with whom he was aligned. As a result, senators earned gratitude as much as they owed it. And, when gratitude flowed in both directions, senators depended less on state legislatures and in turn national government depended less on local government.

The system of public canvass for the Senate, both the product and the cause of popular excitement in campaigns, probably originated in the party turbulence of the 1830's. It received a fillip from the free-soil agitation of the 1850's, and matured with the development of rigid parties after the Civil War. Although possibly some candidates canvassed publicly earlier, the first instance I can find is the Walker-Poindexter campaign in Mississippi in 1834. Friends of Senator Poindexter, a Republican turned Whig, arranged for him to castigate Jackson at a series of outdoor banquets. At the first one, Robert J. Walker replied so effectively that the assembled crowd passed a resolution asking him to run for Poindexter's seat. Both candidates then canvassed the state, and, in striking anticipation of the Lincoln-Douglas campaign, met occasionally in debate.[29] The struggle between Democracy and Whiggery intensified the public canvass for the Senate, as well as all other sorts of campaigning. By 1841 the public canvass was so well established that Polk, as governor of Tennessee, refused to call a special session of the legislature to fill a Senate vacancy because "the members elected to the legislature in 1839 had not been chosen with the selection of Senators in view."[30] Doubtless this was merely a polite and politic way of saying that the Democrats were in the minority; but it is still significant that Polk could rationalize his interest with a reference to the public canvass.

It was the Lincoln-Douglas campaign, occasioned like earlier ones by a new minority and a split in the majority, that popularized the public canvass over the whole nation. In order to quell the Buchanan Democrats in Illinois, Douglas arranged for the state convention to endorse his re-election. Similarly, the Republicans endorsed Lincoln lest some of their legislators vote for Douglas in order to embarrass Buchanan.[31] Each candidate had, therefore, a pledged slate of electors. This was entirely new, for even the public canvass had not heretofore turned legislatures into mere electoral colleges. The correspondent of the New York *Evening Post* said it was "without a parallel" because:

> another instance can [not] be shown where two individuals have entered into a personal contest before the people for a seat in the United States Senate—an office not directly in the gift of the people, but their representatives.[32]

Inaccurate history, perhaps—but good evidence of the impression the campaign made. Some journals, like the Boston *Daily Advertiser*, were disturbed:

> It would be unfortunate for the social and industrial interests of the States, if this mode of electing legislators, solely and chiefly from regard to their votes for U. S. Senator, were to become general.[33]

And the Cincinnati *Commercial:*

> It is difficult to conceive of anything more illegitimate . . . the Senator . . . is the representative . . . of the state, as an independent polity, and not . . . of its individual citizens; and any attempt to forestall the action of the Legislature, either by party action or personal appeal to the people . . . is . . . an offense against the sovereignty whose freedom of action they thereby seek to fetter and control.[34]

Conservative disturbance did not, however, prevent the spread of the canvass, especially in states where the parties were in balance. The mechanics of re-election also encouraged it. Regularly, from 1790 to 1913, about 40 per cent of the senators won re-election and an even larger proportion sought it. Hence, gradually, most sitting senators came to be considered candidates for re-election. Once the public canvass operated, the parties solidified behind and against these presumptive candidates: thus John Sherman, for example, said that near the end of his fifth term in 1892, "I considered myself a candidate, without any announcement, and entered into the canvass as such."[35]

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[29] Henry S. Foote, *A Casket of Reminiscences* (Washington, 1874), pp. 217–19.

[30] Quoted from the Nashville *Union,* April 1, 1841, in McCormac, p. 183.

[31] Edwin Erle Sparks, "The Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858," *Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library,* Vol. 3, pp. 19–28.

[32] Quoted by Sparks from the New York *Evening Post,* Oct. 21, 1858, on p. 540.

[33] Quoted by Sparks from the Boston *Daily Advertiser,* Nov. 6, 1858, on p. 536.

[34] Quoted by Sparks from the Cincinnati *Commercial,* Sept. 23, 1858, on p. 540.

The combined effect of popular excitement and presumptive candidates is indicated by the history of elections in Indiana, one of the states really marginal in party attachment at the turn of the century. In the two decades, 1891–1910, there were seven regular elections. In every case the public clearly understood that the incumbent senator was a candidate. In three other cases—in 1896 when the Republican, Fairbanks, beat the venerable Voorhees, in 1908 when the Democrat, Shively, beat Hemenway, and in 1910 when the Democrat, Kern, beat Beveridge—the party out of power had clearly (if not always officially) nominated a candidate long before November. Thus in five-sevenths of the opportunities a candidate was in effect nominated before the state legislature was elected.

The endorsement of candidates in convention, the other new aspect of the Lincoln-Douglas campaign, was not, however, so readily accepted elsewhere. The Massachusetts Republican convention, fearing that conservative legislators would not vote for Sumner, did indeed copy the Illinois technique in 1862 and 1868.[36] But not until the mid-eighties, when the public canvass was quite frequent, did formal pledging again become popular. Then it spread widely and soon seemed an extra-constitutional means for popular election of senators.[37] In the election of William E. Borah in 1906–1907, both Republican candidates organized campaigns in every county of Idaho to elect a slate of county convention delegates.[38]

These devices, the public canvass and pledged legislators, were at their height soon after 1900. How well they worked is shown by the idiom: people spoke of the "election" of senators in November, when in fact only state legislators were then elected. Sometimes, of course, even candidates who had not campaigned tried to get elected by combining the minority with malcontents of the majority. Sometimes, as in Turpie's election in Indiana in 1887, the coalition succeeded; more often, as in Hanna's election in Ohio in 1898, it did not. And prolonged deadlocks—G. H. Haynes[39] counted 45 between 1891 and 1905—could often be broken only by ignoring the voice of the people. But despite these aberrations, the public canvass did work to free the senators from deep dependence on legislatures in at least half the elections in the turn of the century era.

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[35] John Sherman, *Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate, and Cabinet,* 2 vols. (Chicago, 1895), Vol. 2, p. 1118.

[36] Moorfield Storey, *Charles Sumner* (Boston, 1900), pp. 233, 356.

[37] John Haynes, "Popular Election of United States Senators," *Johns Hopkins Studies in Historical and Political Science,* Vol. 11, pp. 547–60, at p. 560. Haynes mentions especially the Democratic convention in Illinois in 1890 and the Republican convention in Minnesota in 1892, to which should be added as another outstanding example the Republican convention in Indiana in 1886. In the 1890's, these precedents were widely followed, and county conventions frequently pledged candidates for state legislator to a particular senatorial candidate. See Sherman, Vol. 2, p. 1118, and Mayes, pp. 433–34 and 446. In 1911, Senator Brown of Nebraska could say: " . . . it has been the frequent custom in States without primary election laws, as well as in States with them, to nominate candidates for the legislature, and in the nominating conventions pass resolutions instructing the nominee when elected to vote for some man for Senator." *Congressional Record,* Vol. 46, p. 2493 (Feb. 14, 1911).

[38] Claudius O. Johnson, *Borah of Idaho* (New York, 1936), pp. 63–68. Borah did not introduce the device of pledged delegates into Idaho. He had in fact opposed it in 1894, when stalwarts first used it successfully.

The public canvass occurred, however, only when there was a sufficiently high degree of political excitement. If the excitement was lacking, as for example in Massachusetts, where the overwhelmingly dominant Republicans were wholly blind to any defect in the characters of Senators Hoar and Lodge, then senatorial elections reverted wholly to the legislature. The direct primary, however, formalized and generalized the public canvass. This device, which originated in South Carolina in 1888 and which spread rapidly through the Populist and Democratic South, was widely copied after 1903 (when Lafollette instituted it in Wisconsin) in the Midwestern and Northwestern states most deeply touched with progressivism. By 1910, 44 out of the 46 states had primary election laws and 28 of these provided in one way or another for the nomination of party candidates for the Senate at the party primary.[40] More than half of the senators could assert proudly, with Cummins of Iowa: "I was selected by a primary vote in *my* state."[41] The constitutional method of election could hardly serve a peripheralizing purpose when many senators believed they owed their seats, not to the state legislatures, but to the people.

Legislatures were not, however, formally bound by the primary results. The dominant party could, and occasionally did, ignore the primary in choosing the senator. But even this gap in popular control was closed by the invention of the Oregon system. It provided not only for senatorial nomination in primaries but also for a test of popular sentiment between the nominees at the November general election. Candidates for the state legislature could, if they chose, subscribe to a promise to vote for the candidate who won the test vote in November. In 1909 the Oregon legislature, a majority of which had subscribed to the promise, actually elected a Democrat, George Chamberlain, because he had won in November, 1908, even though the legislature was overwhelmingly Republican. (Eastern Republicans were inclined to regard this as the best possible argument against direct election.) Finally, fearing that even this method of "solemn promise" would not work—the fear indicates the extent of bribery in state legislatures during senatorial elections—Oregon amended its Constitution to require the legislature to elect the people's choice.[42] Thus, the Oregon system instituted a rigid pattern of popular election and excluded the state legislature from the selection of senators as far as could be done under the Constitution.

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[39] George H. Haynes, *The Election of Senators* (New York, 1906), pp. 180–81.

[40] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 45, pp. 7113–20 (May 31, 1910).

[41] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 47, pp. 1742 (June 7, 1911). Emphasis is added because it is clearly implied in the original context.

[42] Details of the Oregon system are set forth in *The Code of the People's Rule*, S. Doc. 603, 61st Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 33 ff. Details on its operation are readily available in *Congressional Record*, Vol. 45, p. 5827 (May 5, 1910), in a speech by Senator Jonathan Bourne, which is reprinted under the title "Popular Government in Oregon," *Outlook*, Vol. 96, pp. 321–30 (Oct. 8, 1910).

It was copied in Nebraska and Nevada and would probably have been more widely copied had not the Seventeenth Amendment made imitation unnecessary.

## III

The Seventeenth Amendment completed the centralizing process that the public canvass began. The canvass had started to make the decision of the people a guide for the legislature. The system of pledging legislators, the direct primary, and finally the Oregon system, had each formalized the role of the voters a little more, until finally it seemed likely that the legislatures would select senators as mechanically as the electoral college selected the President. Thus these earlier reforms both occasioned the Seventeenth Amendment and anticipated its effects.

From the time that the public canvass became a fairly regular feature of senatorial elections (i.e., from the 1880's), there had been widespread agitation to amend Article I, Section 3. In the Forty-eighth Congress (1883–1885) there began a flood of proposals for popular election, in the form of memorials from state legislatures, petitions from private groups, and resolutions from congressmen. The agitation reached its high-point in the first session of the Fifty-second Congress (1891–1892), which received seven memorials, 54 petitions, and 25 resolutions on the subject. On January 16, 1893, the House actually passed a resolution to submit an amendment to the states—but the resolution never got out of committee in the Senate. The agitation levelled off thereafter, but persisted until the Amendment was finally and formally proposed in 1911. The House indeed resolved to submit an amendment in 1894, 1898, 1900, 1902 (unanimously), and 1911. On the last occasion, the Senate concurred.

It concurred because there was little point in holding out any longer. Thirty-seven state legislatures (more than the three-fourths necessary to adopt an amendment) had, by memorial to Congress or by institution of senatorial primaries, indicated that they no longer wanted to elect senators. Observe this colloquy, which occurred not long before the Senate gave in, between Senators Cummins of Iowa, a Republican progressive, and Heyburn of Idaho, also a Republican and by far the most dogged opponent of direct election:

> Mr. CUMMINS. . . . the Senator from Idaho is insisting . . . that if the voters of the United States be permitted to say who shall be their Senators, then this body will be overrun by a crowd of incompetent and unfit and rash and socialistic and radical men who have no proper views of government. I am simply recalling to his attention the fact that the people of this country, in despair of amending the Constitution, have accomplished this reform for themselves.
>
> Mr. HEYBURN. Like a burglar.
>
> Mr. CUMMINS. In an irregular way, I agree, but they have accomplished it.
>
> Mr. HEYBURN. Like a burglar.
>
> Mr. CUMMINS. And they have accomplished it so effectively that, whether the Constitution is amended or not, the people in many or most of the States will choose their own Senators.[43]

The accomplishment was a fact; hence Heyburn could not argue, he could only sneer. Like the Nineteenth Amendment—and possibly also the Eighteenth—the Seventeenth simply universalized a situation which a majority of state legislatures had already created.

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[43] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 47, p. 1743 (June 7, 1911).

Since the Seventeenth Amendment thus simply acknowledged an already existing situation, scholars and citizens alike have been unaware of its exact significance. Senatorial resistance to the doctrine of instructions was deliberately nationalistic. The opponents of instructions wanted to expand the role of the national government and to curtail the role of the states. The advocates of instructions were the states' rights parties. The failure of instructions was, therefore, a planned victory for centralized federalism—although not a conscious victory, for it came too slowly to be recognized by the participants. On the other hand, the Seventeenth Amendment, another very real victory for centralization, was hardly a deliberate one. Throughout all the agitation for the Seventeenth Amendment and its preceding reforms, no one—so far as I can discover—ever advocated them as a way to centralize federalism. The public canvass for the Senate was so natural a development out of other and earlier public campaigning that no one thought it needed justification. But if anyone had ever felt called upon to justify it, he would, I am sure, have described it as a democratic or popular device, which, intrinsically, it was. The same remarks hold for the extensions of the public canvass: presumptive candidates and pledged legislators. They were not justified; they were merely used, first because they were a new and effective way to win elections, later because they were simply a part of the procedure of campaigning. The direct primary for Senate seats and the Seventeenth Amendment were, however, elaborately justified. These were the dearest inventions of progressives to bring about a democratic utopia; these were the devices on which progressives in practical politics and progressives in universities thoroughly agreed. In consequence, they produced mountains of words in exhaustive and usually naive justification. But none of these justifications interpret them as devices to centralize federalism. It was, on the contrary, frequently asserted that the direct election of senators would peripheralize federalism, strengthening state legislatures by forcing them to concentrate on state business. It is difficult to understand how even the progressive propagandists imagined that depriving legislatures of their only control over national affairs would strengthen houses that were already decadent for want of a significant agenda. Instead, the reforms were justified simply but voluminously as extensions of democracy and as methods of avoiding deadlocks and bribery in senatorial elections.

Only the opponents of the Seventeenth Amendment understood its effect on federalism. In quite graphic terms Elihu Root, for example, described the control that state legislatures would lose. In 1911 the New York legislature still retained more power than most over the election of senators. Doubtless, therefore, the intimacy Root suggested was typical of other states only in an earlier era:

> Mr. President, this change [the popular election of Senators] would take the direct responsibility of Senators for their actions from the States [sic] legislatures to the people at

> the polls. The members of the State legislature . . . are familiar with the incidents and difficulties of legislation. They know how necessary it is that in order to accomplish beneficent results mutual concession shall be made. They know how impossible it is that any one man, or any one locality, or any one State can have all of its own way. When members of this body have to explain to the State legislature the reasons for their action, they meet minds that are competent and trained for the appreciation of their explanation. The people at large have far less understanding upon the subject that I am now speaking of than their legislature. . . . This will cease to be a deliberative body if every Senator has to convince, to explain to the great body of the people of his State every act he performs and every concession he makes.[44]

And he drew from his remarks a warning to the states' rights Democrats of the South, who provided the bulk of the votes for the Amendment:

> Let me tell the gentlemen who are solicitous for the preservation of the sovereignty of their States that there is but one way in which they can preserve that sovereignty, and that is by repudiating absolutely and forever the fundamental doctrine on which this resolution [to amend the Constitution] proceeds.[45]

But Root's understanding is not typical. Most opponents did no more than quote with pseudo-scholarship what the founding fathers had said about the Senate. Hence for all of its supporters and for most of its opponents, the centralizing effects of the Seventeenth Amendment went entirely unnoticed.

They were unnoticed because, by 1911, the state legislatures had lost all touch with national policy. By reason of the failure of the practice of instructions and by reason of the gradual mechanization of their part in the electoral process, the legislatures had been increasingly confined to the particular problems of their states. Hence the Seventeenth Amendment only formally excluded them from participation in national government. The actual exclusion, which the Amendment recognized and ratified, was the result of a constitutional evolution in process for the preceding 120 years.

## IV

By reason of the development described in this essay, the main peripheralizing feature of American federalism was excised from the Constitution. And that very excision had a centralizing effect, for it allowed other centralizing forces to operate with a minimum of restraint. The state governments of course remain to peripheralize federalism by means of their influence in political parties; but at least these governments cannot by constitutional right interfere with national policy. And considering that, compared with the national government, they have on the whole turned out to be far less efficient in action, far less competent in decision, and far less democratic in spirit, this change in the role of the Senate was surely good fortune for us all. Although we received it unconsciously, it seems important now to comprehend it rationally. Not only may we then defend our centralized federalism against the contemporary resurgence of peripheralizing measures, but also we may more wisely advise our imitators, especially in international organizations.

[44] *Congressional Record,* Vol. 46, p. 2244 (Feb. 10, 1911).

[45] *Congressional Record,* Vol. 46, p. 2243 (Feb. 10, 1911).

# THE EFFECT OF TELEVISION UPON VOTING BEHAVIOR IN IOWA IN THE 1952 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION*

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The presidential election of 1952 offered a unique opportunity for the study of the effect of television upon voting behavior. By happy accident—the FCC freeze on the construction of new television stations—it was possible to find areas of the United States where there were counties within television reception range and also counties otherwise similar to these with respect to their past voting behavior, but outside the reception area. In these areas the presence or absence of television can be regarded, with reasonable safety, as a genuine independent variable; and if television influenced voting behavior, there is some hope of detecting its effects.

The uniqueness of the situation and its utility for testing hypotheses about the effects of television deserve some comment. Ordinarily, one is confronted in ecological studies with an insurmountable confusion of cause and effect. For example, had there not been an "artificial" restriction on the extension of the television network in 1952, we would not be safe in regarding a county without television as comparable with a county having television. For in that case, absence of television would imply remoteness from centers of population of any size, and we could not assume that influences upon voting behavior in such remote counties would be the same as in counties closer to population centers.

Under the special circumstances that prevailed in Iowa in 1952, an ecological study of television and voting behavior holds more promise of isolating the causal influence of television than do studies that correlate individual voting behavior with television viewing habits. Any observed correlation between the latter two variables could well be spurious, since both voting behavior and television viewing are correlated with income and other social variables, and with personal variables as well. Even if we try to hold other variables constant by partial correlation techniques, we cannot be sure that we have identified the relevant variables; and if we introduce too many cross-classifications into our data, we run into problems of sample size.[1]

*The Setting in Iowa.* The freeze on new television stations, from March, 1950

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* We are grateful to the Ford Foundation for the financial assistance that made this study possible.

[1] In one of the few articles published on the relation of individual voting and television viewing behavior, "Television and the Election," *Scientific American*, Vol. 188, pp. 46–48 (May, 1953), Campbell, Gurin, and Miller state that they have no clear-cut evidence concerning how television affected the voting. Their findings, coming from a survey of 1,714 people representative of the citizens of voting age throughout the country, pertain mainly to a comparison of television with newspapers, radios, and magazines as a source of information in the campaign.

through 1952, took place at a time when most states north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi were already served by a relatively complete television network. Iowa, however, was served by only three television stations—located at Ames and Davenport within the state, and at Omaha, Nebraska. The station at Ames served some of the central counties of Iowa; that at Davenport, a number of southeastern counties; and that at Omaha, a number of southwestern counties. These stations are so located that only about one-third of the counties in Iowa received in 1952 a strong television signal. There was only a low television density (number of television sets per 1,000 population) in the numerous regions outside the reception areas of the three stations; in counties near these stations, the television density was, by comparison, quite high.

*Method and Findings.* The method employed was, quite simply, to compare voting behavior in counties of high television density (HTD) and counties of low television density (LTD). It was considered safe to assume that television density would be highly correlated with television watching, and hence with exposure to televised campaign broadcasts.

In all cases the null hypothesis was tested: that differences in television density had no effect upon (a) total participation in the election, or (b) division of the vote between Eisenhower and Stevenson. To provide further safeguards against uncontrolled differences among counties, the effects were measured in terms of shifts in voting behavior from 1948 to 1952 and from 1944 to 1952.

The findings of the study may be summarized quite briefly. *The data do not reveal any reliable difference either in the voting turnout or in the percentage of the vote cast for the Republican candidate between HTD and other areas.* Certain differences between the areas covered by television and the remainder of the state did reach statistical significance (although the magnitudes of the differences were small even in these instances), but the deviations of the three television areas from the remaining counties were not all in the same direction. Hence, even for the significant differences, it is more reasonable to conclude that these were due to other uncontrolled, non-random differences among the counties than that they were due to television. We would conclude that, at least in Iowa, the presence of television had a minor net effect, if any, upon the 1952 election.

The basic data—the election results in Iowa by county and by party for the 1944, 1948, and 1952 presidential elections—were obtained from the 1952 and 1953 issues of *The World Almanac.* In order to investigate the effects of television on *total participation* the following ratios were calculated for each county:

*1.* $$\frac{\text{total vote cast in county in 1952}}{\text{total vote cast in county in 1948}} = \frac{52V}{48V}$$

*2.* $$\frac{\text{total vote cast in county in 1952}}{\text{total vote cast in county in 1944}} = \frac{52V}{44V}$$

*3.* average of ratios *1* and *2*

*4.* $$\frac{\text{total vote cast in county in 1948}}{\text{total vote cast in county in 1944}} = \frac{48V}{44V}$$

TABLE I. HTD COUNTIES COMPARED WITH ALL* OTHER COUNTIES IN IOWA

| Ratio | Set of Counties Considered | Mean for Set of Counties [Per cent] | Relation of Mean to Mean of Non-HTD Counties | t† | p‡ [Per cent] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) $\frac{52V}{48V}$ | Other, non-HTD, counties (n=68) | 118.5 | | | |
| | Ames-HTD counties (n=14) | 126.4 | higher | 3.0 | <1 |
| | Davenport-HTD counties (n=7) | 129.4 | higher | 3.0 | <1 |
| | Omaha-HTD counties (n=9) | 115.0 | lower | −1.2 | >20 |
| (2) $\frac{52V}{44V}$ | Other, non-HTD, counties | 115.3 | | | |
| | Ames-HTD counties | 120.5 | higher | 1.8 | >5, <10 |
| | Davenport-HTD counties | 120.5 | higher | 1.3 | >10, <20 |
| | Omaha-HTD counties | 112.7 | lower | −0.8 | >20 |
| (3) $\frac{2\times 52V}{44V+48V}$ | Other, non-HTD, counties | 116.8 | | | |
| | Ames-HTD counties | 123.3 | higher | 2.4 | >1, <2 |
| | Davenport-HTD counties | 124.8 | higher | 2.2 | >2, <5 |
| | Omaha-HTD counties | 113.9 | lower | −1.0 | >20 |
| (4) $\frac{48V}{44V}$ | Other, non-HTD, counties | 97.5 | | | |
| | Ames-HTD counties | 94.1 | lower | −2.7 | <1 |
| | Davenport-HTD counties | 93.3 | lower | −2.5 | >1, <2 |
| | Omaha-HTD counties | 98.5 | higher | 0.6 | >50 |
| (5) $\frac{\%R52}{\%R48}$ | Other, non-HTD, counties | 134.6 | | | |
| | Ames-HTD counties | 136.4 | higher | 0.6 | >50 |
| | Davenport-HTD counties | 124.8 | lower | −2.4 | >2, <5 |
| | Omaha-HTD counties | 127.4 | lower | −1.9 | >5, <10 |
| (6) $\frac{\%R52}{\%R44}$ | Other, non-HTD, counties | 123.8 | | | |
| | Ames-HTD counties | 130.4 | higher | 2.1 | >2, <5 |
| | Davenport-HTD counties | 112.4 | lower | −2.9 | <1 |
| | Omaha-HTD counties | 115.4 | lower | −2.4 | >1, <2 |
| (7) $\frac{2\times\%R52}{\%R44+\%R48}$ | Other, non-HTD, counties | 129.0 | | | |
| | Ames-HTD counties | 133.3 | higher | 1.5 | >10, <20 |
| | Davenport-HTD counties | 118.3 | lower | −3.0 | <1 |
| | Omaha-HTD counties | 121.0 | lower | −2.5 | >1, <2 |
| (8) $\frac{\%R48}{\%R44}$ | Other, non-HTD, counties | 92.2 | | | |
| | Ames-HTD counties | 95.7 | higher | 1.7 | >5, <10 |
| | Davenport-HTD counties | 90.5 | lower | −0.6 | >50 |
| | Omaha-HTD counties | 90.8 | lower | −0.5 | >50 |

* Of the 99 counties in Iowa, 69 may be classified as not HTD. However, data for only 68 counties were used, since the data supplied for the other county in this set appeared to the authors to be incorrect.

To determine the effect that television had on the *party division* of votes, four additional ratios were calculated for each county:

*5.* $\dfrac{\text{percentage of voters in county voting Republican in 1952}}{\text{percentage of voters in county voting Republican in 1948}} = \dfrac{\%\text{R52}}{\%\text{R48}}$

*6.* $\dfrac{\text{percentage of voters in county voting Republican in 1952}}{\text{percentage of voters in county voting Republican in 1944}} = \dfrac{\%\text{R52}}{\%\text{R44}}$

*7.* Average of ratios *5* and *6*

*8.* $\dfrac{\text{percentage of voters in county voting Republican in 1948}}{\text{percentage of voters in county voting Republican in 1944}} = \dfrac{\%\text{R48}}{\%\text{R44}}$

Ratios *1*, *2*, *3*, *5*, *6*, and *7* were used to test the effects of television, ratios *4* and *8* as an additional check on the comparability of the HTD and other counties, since none of the television stations was in operation in 1944 or 1948. Another method for eliminating county differences will be discussed later in this paper.

*Counties with Television Compared with the State as a Whole.* Under the null hypothesis that television had no effect on the voting behavior of its viewers, we assume that the distribution of each of the above sets of ratios is normal in the counties with and without television, and we test the significance of the differences, between these two groups of counties, of the means of the ratios, using the *t* test.

A survey[2] is available showing the percentage of families in each county owning a television set. Any county in which 50 per cent or more of the families owned a television set was designated a HTD county. According to this rule 14 counties in the Ames area, seven counties in the Davenport area, and nine counties (in Iowa) in the region around Omaha were HTD counties. Voting behavior in the three groups of HDT counties was compared first with voting behavior in the remaining counties of the state. The results of the analysis are shown in Table I.

*Total Participation.* Considering the first ratio, the average voting participa-

[2] A survey by CBS Television Research (figures projected to May 1, 1953), as published in the *Telecasting Yearbook-Marketbook* for 1953–54. The data are applicable to a period approximately one year following the time with which we are concerned. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that over the course of this year the relative television densities remained about constant. Hence for our purposes the May 1, 1953 data are fairly acceptable.

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† To facilitate calculations, the *t*-test was performed in terms of the reciprocals of ratios *1*, *2*, *3*, *5*, *6*, and *7*, e.g., in terms of 48V/52V rather than 52V/48V. Consequently the value of *t* does not follow precisely from data for the six variables. Employing the reciprocals will not affect the conclusions drawn from the calculations.

‡ $\rho$ = probability that the difference between the mean of the particular set of HTD counties and the mean of the other, non-HTD, counties could arise by chance (two-tailed *t*-test).

tion in two of the three HTD groups of counties was significantly different from the average of the other counties. But we note, first, that the differences are moderate (three to nine percentage points); and second, that while the vote increased from 1948 to 1952 in the Ames and Davenport areas by an amount *greater* than the average increase for the non-television counties, the increase in the Omaha area was smaller than the average for the non-television counties. The results are the same for the shift from 1944 to 1952 (ratio *2*), but the differences are smaller and only one is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.[3]

Moreover, we notice that there are shifts between 1944 and 1948—(ratio *4*)—of which two reach statistical significance. These shifts could have had nothing to do with television. In the Ames and Davenport areas the vote dropped by a greater amount from 1944 to 1948 than in the non-television counties, but increased by a still greater amount from 1948 to 1952. In Omaha the reverse was true—the vote was more stable than in the non-television counties.

The most plausible conclusion is that all the differences in ratios *1* through *4* are explained as differences between those counties with a relatively wide fluctuation in voting turnout and those with a relatively small fluctuation, and that these differences are unrelated to television. Since in many respects voting behavior in 1952 is more closely comparable with 1944 than with 1948 (in terms of which groups supported the Republican party), the absence of significant differences for ratio *2* tends further to confirm this conclusion.

*Party Division of the Vote.* Ratios *5* through *8* measure the shift in the percentage of the total vote cast for the Republican candidate from 1948 to 1952, 1944 to 1952, and 1944 to 1948. In the Davenport and Omaha HTD areas, there was a smaller shift to the Republican candidate in 1952 than there was in the rest of the state, but in the Ames area the reverse was true. Only the difference in shift involving the Davenport area from 1948 to 1952 is significant at the five per cent level. There are differences in the same directions, respectively, (but generally insignificant) for all three areas for the shift from 1944 to 1948 (ratio *8*). That is to say, in the Ames area there was a smaller shift to the Democratic candidate in 1948, and a greater shift to the Republican candidate in 1952 than in the rest of the state; in the other two HTD areas the opposite was the case. As before, the most plausible conclusion is that factors other than television produced these results.

*Comparison of Paired HTD and LTD[4] Counties.* The data of Table I give little evidence of a measurable effect of television in the 1952 election, but they also suggest that we have not entirely succeeded in holding all other variables constant. Hence we also made a comparison of samples of paired HTD and

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[3] The Ames television station was an educational station, and it may be supposed that it did not play the same role in the campaign as the other stations. However, since it carried sixteen television broadcasts for each of the major parties, this objection can hardly be sustained.

[4] LTD counties are those in which less than 20 per cent of the families owned a television set.

LTD counties, the members of each pair being selected on the basis of similarity of voting behavior in 1944 and 1948.

In order to find comparable HTD and LTD counties, a graph was constructed of percentage Republican vote (in total vote) in 1948 versus percentage Republican vote in 1944. Each of the 30 HTD counties and each of the 36 LTD counties was plotted on the graph, and 16 pairs of counties were chosen on the basis of their similarity in voting behavior. The pairs selected are listed, together with the 1944 and 1948 Republican percentages, in Table II.

The means of ratios *1* through *8* were computed for the samples of 16 HTD counties and 16 LTD counties, and the differences in the means tested by the *t* test. The results are shown in Table III. None of the differences is significant at even the 10 per cent level, except the difference between the 1944-1948 change in total participation. The total participation showed a slightly greater drop from 1944 to 1948 in the HTD counties than in the LTD counties, and a slightly greater (but statistically insignificant) rise from 1948 to 1952. The Republican percentage of the total vote had a slightly (but insignificantly) larger drop from 1944 to 1948 in the LTD counties, and a slightly (but insignificantly) larger rise from 1948 to 1952 in these same counties.

We conclude that the comparison of paired counties is entirely consistent with the data presented in the previous section. Neither analysis gives us any basis for asserting that television had a significant effect upon voting participation or upon the party division of the vote.

TABLE II. COMPARABLE PAIRS OF HTD AND LTD COUNTIES

| | HTD Counties | | | LTD Counties | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pair | | $\frac{48R}{48V}$ [Per cent] | $\frac{44R}{44V}$ [Per cent] | | $\frac{48R}{48V}$ [Per cent] | $\frac{44R}{44V}$ [Per cent] |
| 1 | Cedar | 57.2 | 64.2 | Allamakee | 58.5 | 63.4 |
| 2 | Dallas | 45.9 | 50.4 | Wayne | 45.2 | 50.6 |
| 3 | Des Moines | 46.4 | 55.7 | Osceola | 45.5 | 55.4 |
| 4 | Greene | 50.9 | 55.1 | Mitchell | 51.2 | 55.8 |
| 5 | Guthrie | 50.0 | 58.2 | Clarke | 51.1 | 57.2 |
| 6 | Hamilton | 49.4 | 47.1 | Dickenson | 49.8 | 46.3 |
| 7 | Harrison | 48.5 | 54.6 | Sac | 48.6 | 53.9 |
| 8 | Jackson | 52.4 | 55.1 | O'Brien | 51.9 | 56.2 |
| 9 | Jasper | 46.1 | 47.9 | Emmet | 47.2 | 50.9 |
| 10 | Louisa | 55.4 | 59.2 | Floyd | 55.7 | 60.4 |
| 11 | Marion | 40.6 | 40.7 | Palo Alto | 40.2 | 42.6 |
| 12 | Marshall | 54.4 | 56.7 | Fayette | 54.3 | 56.7 |
| 13 | Monona | 43.7 | 48.8 | Howard | 43.8 | 48.6 |
| 14 | Scott | 50.3 | 48.7 | Linn | 49.9 | 50.2 |
| 15 | Shelby | 48.5 | 56.5 | Ida | 48.9 | 57.6 |
| 16 | Webster | 42.2 | 42.2 | Wapello | 42.1 | 45.2 |

TABLE III. TEST FOR SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MEANS OF THE SELECTED SAMPLES OF HTD AND LTD COUNTIES (SELECTION ON THE BASIS OF 1944 AND 1948 VOTING BEHAVIOR)

| | Ratios | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *(1)* | *(2)* | *(3)* | *(4)* | *(5)* | *(6)* | *(7)* | *(8)* |
| HTD Counties' Means | 127.8 | 116.7 | 119.8 | 95.0 | 133.3 | 122.7 | 127.9 | 93.1 |
| LTD Counties' Means | 119.2 | 117.6 | 118.6 | 98.8 | 137.0 | 125.5 | 130.9 | 92.4 |
| $\rho$* | .20+ | .50+ | .50+ | .01− | .20+ | .20+ | .20+ | .50+ |

* $\rho$ = probability of the two means coming from the same population, using the two-tailed test of the *t*-distribution.

As a final check upon our conclusions, and upon the possibility that other variables are concealing the effects of television, we have examined the degree of urbanism, and the relative rates of population growth in our various samples of counties.

Averaging the per cent urban population (1950 Census) for the counties of each group, we find some differences: an average of 34 per cent urban for the HTD counties, 29.1 per cent urban for the LTD counties in the sample, and 30.8 per cent urban for all counties in the state. These differences are relatively small, and they are also consistent with the greater fluctuation of the Republican vote, and the smaller fluctuation in total vote, in the LTD than in the HTD counties. It is well known that, in the country as a whole, the urban vote dropped more sharply from 1944 to 1948 than the rural, and rose more sharply in 1952; and that the shift away from and back to the Republican party over this same period was greater in rural than in urban areas.

Table IV presents the pertinent data on population changes. The changes are small over the whole period. The differences between HTD and LTD counties, and between the former and the state as a whole are too small to affect the analysis. The data do not, of course, reveal changes in the composition of

TABLE IV. CHANGES IN POPULATION, HTD AND LTD COUNTIES

[Per cent]

| Area | Increase from 1944–1948 | Increase from 1948–1952 | Increase from 1944–1952 |
|---|---|---|---|
| HTD Counties | 0.5 | 3.9 | 4.4 |
| LTD Counties | 1.9 | 3.0 | 5.0 |
| State | 1.2 | 1.9 | 3.1 |

Source: *Statistical Report of the Division of Vital Statistics*, Iowa State Department of Health, 1943–1944 and 1948. *Vital Statistics, 1952*, Iowa State Department of Health.

the population, but we have no reason to believe that these would require us to alter our conclusions.

*A Concluding Comment.* We undertook this analysis with certain hypotheses about the effect of television upon total participation and upon the party division of the vote. Since no effect was discernible, there is no need to state the hypotheses in detail. However, the negative finding is not entirely inconsistent with the model from which the hypotheses were derived, and it may be of some interest to comment briefly on the model.

The model assumed that the addition of a new mass medium like television to the other campaign media would have as its main effect the "intensification" of the campaign—that is, the focussing of more public attention upon it. This might be expected to have two effects (1) an increase in voting turnout, and (2) an increase in awareness of the "party" issues involved in the campaign—that is, an increased probability that voters would perceive the campaign in terms of their underlying attitudes toward the parties and their policies. The latter mechanism would tend to shift votes from the Republican to the Democratic candidate, since the former had a greater appeal when the choice was viewed as one of personal qualities than when it was viewed as a preference for Republican as against Democratic policies. (All analyses of the campaign appear to confirm this interpretation—both the shift to the Democratic candidate during the campaign, and the available data on how voters perceived the candidates.)

Why did the predictions fail? The postulated mechanisms would operate only if the campaign were not already "saturated" by the other mass media. That is, if other media had failed to evoke a high interest in the campaign, the presence of television might make a substantial difference in the areas where it was available. But if interest was already intense—and the turnout in all areas suggests that it was—there might be little room for further increases in participation or shifts in choice. We have, of course, no direct evidence for the correctness of this hypothesis.[5] It would have to be tested in campaigns that normally bring a small voting turnout. We advance it here not as a tested conclusion but as a warning against generalizing to other types of campaigns the negative findings we obtained.

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[5] An alternative hypothesis, suggested to us by James G. March, is that television served as a *substitute for,* rather than an *addition to,* the other mass media in areas where it was available. The evidence is, of course, as consistent with this hypothesis as with the one proposed here. Some data supporting Mr. March's hypothesis are available in the Michigan poll.

# THE NEW STRATEGY OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM*

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Communist international organizations and Communist parties the world over tend to follow a single strategy, which is always determined primarily by the needs of Soviet foreign policy paramount at the time. Corresponding to the requirements of the Soviet Union's "cold war" against the United States, a new strategy has gradually been adopted by international communism since 1947. Often non-Communist observers and sometimes even the Communists themselves seem unaware of the novelty of this strategy and they frequently obscure it by the use of terms more descriptive of older strategies, such as "united front" and "popular front." It is the purpose of this essay to distinguish sharply between the various Communist strategies with a view to clarifying the characteristic features of the new strategy. It would, of course, be both easy and tempting to document and enliven such an attempt with innumerable examples from history and quotations from Communist literature. However, it would go beyond the intended scope of this brief analysis to do more than draw the broadest generalizations from the record of thirty-five years of international communism.[1]

The central problem of Communist strategy has always been to determine who is, at any time, to be considered the principal enemy and consequently what classes should be accepted as allies of communism and what type of alliance should be entered into with them. These three factors, and especially the latter two, furnish the crucial distinctions between different Communist strategies. Two alternative solutions of this problem formed the bases of the two strategies followed by international communism during its first thirty years as an organized movement. In the Communists' own terminology,[2] we may refer to them here simply as the "left" and the "right" strategies.

The "left" strategy, which can perhaps be called the classical strategy of communism and is often erroneously thought to be still in effect, considered capitalism as its main enemy. Even in underdeveloped areas, the native bourgeoisie was looked upon as an enemy on a par with foreign imperialism and native feudalism, i.e., the landlords and the nobility. This strategy envisaged the socialist revolution as its immediate goal. Even in societies which, according to the Marxian schema of historical stages, had not yet traversed the capitalist stage, the next revolution was presumed to lay the basis for socialism and to merge with or even skip some of the phases of the so-called bourgeois-democratic revolution.

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* This article had its immediate origin in research done by the author at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is thus indebted to the Center, which bears, of course, no responsibility for the substance of the article. The same is true of his former colleagues, Morris Watnick and Bernard Morris, to whom he wishes to express his appreciation for contributing greatly to the development of many of the ideas presented here.

[1] It may also be noted that to a large extent Communist terminology is used in the following discussion of the distinguishing characteristics of the various Communist strategies, since it is both derived from and intended to be applied to the analysis of Communist writings. It must be remembered that, though quotation marks will be omitted for the sake of simplicity, the meaning to be attached to such terms as imperialism, feudalism, bourgeoisie, socialism, or national liberation is that given to them by the Communists.

[2] Used particularly while one strategy was in effect to condemn as deviationists the followers of the other one.

This "left" strategy was an attempt to form a "united front from below." It was based on appeals to workers and also poor peasants and petty bourgeois elements, both as individuals and in local organizations affiliated with socialist or "bourgeois" parties, or in the underdeveloped countries, the so-called bourgeois-nationalist movements. The appeals were designed to induce the rank and file to leave these parties and to join the Communists, either directly or by cooperating with them in "united action." Such appeals were therefore always coupled with violent denunciations of the top leaders of the other parties as servants of the bourgeoisie and of imperialism and as traitors to the interests of their rank-and-file followers. Similar tactics were followed in the trade union field in pursuance of this "left" strategy.

The "right" strategy of communism, on the other hand, regarded as its main enemy not capitalism as such but fascism and similar movements and, in underdeveloped areas, feudalism and foreign imperialism. The professed immediate aim of this strategy was the establishment or defense of democracy or national liberation, to which social revolution had to be subordinated. It therefore looked forward to a revolution in two stages: first a bourgeois-democratic revolution directed against fascism or imperialism and feudalism, followed later by a proletarian-socialist revolution directed against the bourgeoisie and capitalism, with the Communists participating in the first as well as in the second.

Not being anti-capitalist, the "right" strategy called for an alliance of the Communist party with other parties, which were recognized as anti-fascist or anti-imperialist and anti-feudal and which might include both labor and bourgeois parties.[3] Its most important characteristic, which easily distinguished the "right" strategy from the other Communist strategies, was thus that it involved a united front "from above," a "top alliance" with other parties arrived at in agreement with their national party leadership. Similar alliances or even mergers of Communist trade unions with socialist and nationalist trade unions were also advocated as part of this policy.

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[3] The "popular front" was broad enough to embrace both of these, while the "united front from above," in the narrower sense of this term, was an alliance of the Communist party only with a labor or socialist party. In practice this distinction is not too important, for the really difficult decision for Communists was to ally themselves with any strong party and particularly with their most hated enemies, the democratic socialists. Since these latter are, in any case, regarded as lackeys of the bourgeoisie, once this decision was made, it was easy and usual to extend the alliance to at least some left-wing bourgeois parties. We may therefore overlook the distinction here and refer to both the popular front and the united front from above by the latter term.

It is clear then that the "left" and "right" strategies were designed for diametrically opposite objectives: the united front from below was intended to weaken and split the very groups with which the Communists sought to enter an alliance when they were committed to a united front from above. The unfortunate fact that the Communists referred to both of these strategies as "united front" policies has given rise to much confusion and can obscure shifts from one to the other. The fact is all too often overlooked that, in a sense, Communists always follow a united front policy. To state no more than this, as is frequently done, without distinguishing between the united fronts from above and below, is merely to inform us that they, like all political parties, seek to increase their strength.

Different as the two strategies were, it must be emphasized that under both of them the Communist party insisted that it was a proletarian party, representing the interests of the workers and of the poor peasantry and petty bourgeoisie, but not those of the capitalists. It remained basically anti-bourgeois even when it entered into alliances with certain bourgeois parties and groups in a united front from above.

Until after the Second World War, the "left" and the "right" strategies were essentially the only ones pursued by international Communism. Both found application during the early 1920's. Then the "left" strategy was followed throughout the late twenties and early thirties. It was replaced about 1935 by the "right" strategy, which remained in use until 1947, interrupted only by a return to the "left" strategy during the period between the conclusion of the Stalin-Hitler Pact in August, 1939 and the Nazi invasion of Russia in June, 1941. During the war, however, the Chinese Communists under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung developed a strategy which is fundamentally different from the two traditional ones, though it combines certain of their features.

As it has since come to be applied by international communism, this new strategy, like the "right" one, singles out foreign imperialism and, where applicable, feudalism, as its main enemy. Also like the "right" strategy, therefore, it expects the revolution to take place in two stages: first as an anti-imperialist struggle for national independence or an anti-feudal bourgeois-democratic revolution, and only later as a socialist revolution.[4] The range of forces to be united under Communist leadership, consequently, also corresponds to that grouped in the united front from above and particularly the popular front embracing the so-called "bloc of four classes," i.e., the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and the anti-imperialist sections of the bourgeoisie.[5] To some extent, this union is to be attained by the methods of the united front from above, i.e., by a "top" alliance with other parties, but these are generally parties weaker than the Communist party and frequently fronts set up by the Communists. Principally the new strategy follows the method of the united front from below of the "left" strategy. The large parties, which more or less actually represent the classes to be united and with which the Communists would be allied in a united front from above under the "right" strategy (e.g., the socialist, liberal, and Christian-Democratic parties in the West and the nationalist parties, like the Kuomintang and the Indian Congress, and the socialists in the underdeveloped areas) are denounced as traitors to the interests of these classes and as servants of foreign imperialism. The same policy is applied by the Communist trade unions.

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[4] Cf. particularly Mao Tse-tung, *On the New Democracy* (January 19, 1940), extracts in Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp. 263–75. This important pamphlet is reprinted in full as *China's New Democracy* in U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee No. 5, National and International Movements, *The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism*, Supplement III, Country Studies (House Doc. 154), C. China, Appendix, pp. 67 ff. The attempt, by *ex post facto* rationalizations, to fit the Eastern European "People's Democracies" and the Chinese "New Democracy" into the Marxian scheme of two revolutions has brought some confusion into this subject and resulted in the expectation of varying numbers of stages or sub-stages of the revolution, always, however, more than one stage, under the new strategy.

The Communist party (alone or in conjunction with its "united front" of subsidiary and front-parties) now claims to represent the interests of the entire peasantry and the anti-imperialist capitalists, as well as those of the proletariat, the poor peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie. Having confined their appeal under both traditional strategies to these latter three "exploited" groups, the Communists were able to attract sections of these groups only through the united front from below. However —and this is crucial— they could seek the support also of sections of the bourgeoisie and of the entire peasantry only through the united front from above. It is because of the radical innovation of appealing directly to the interests of all four classes that the new strategy can apply the method of the united front from below to a range of groups so wide that it could formerly be encompassed only in the united front from above.

We need not be concerned with the theoretics according to which the bourgeoisie is divided into a pro-imperialist and an anti-imperialist wing.[6] What matters is merely that the dividing line between the friends and enemies of the Communist party is now drawn not short of the bourgeoisie but bisecting it. In practice, of course, the division is made not so much along economic or sociological lines, as is implied by the terms used to describe the two sections, but along political lines. Those business men who, for whatever reasons, are willing or likely to be willing to follow the lead of the Communist party are considered anti-imperialist capitalists. Those who are and are likely to remain opposed to the Communists, even if they have no ties with foreign interests and have only small businesses, are condemned as allies and servants of imperialism. Just as the working class is frequently made synonymous with the Communist party, so here too the Marxist materialist conception of history is turned upside down; class affiliation is deduced from ideology rather than vice versa.

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[5] Sections of the bourgeoisie are first explicitly included and strikingly pro-capitalist statements appear in Mao Tse-tung, *On Coalition Government* (April 24, 1945), extracts in Brandt et al. *op. cit.*, pp. 295–318, especially pp. 303–6. For a useful summary of the Chinese Communists' attitude toward the bourgeoisie, with several long quotations from Mao, see Yu Huai, "On the Role of the National Bourgeoisie in the Chinese Revolution," *People's China*, Vol. 1, pp. 7–10 (Jan. 1, 1950).

[6] The terminology used in Communist literature to describe the various sections of the bourgeoisie is not always consistent. Those capitalists who are only slightly or not at all tied to imperialism and can thus help form the "bloc of four classes" are generally called the "national," "medium," "middle," or "liberal" capitalists or bourgeoisie (although the term "national" may also be used simply as a synonym for "native"), while that section of the bourgeoisie which is regarded as a firm ally of imperialism is referred to variously as "comprador," "bureaucratic," "big," or "monopolistic."

As the new strategy was developed in China by Mao Tse-tung and more recently in some countries of Southeast Asia, its most important characteristics appeared to be not the appeal "from below" to the bourgeoisie, but reliance on the peasantry rather than the industrial working class as a mass base in the struggle for power[7] and resort to guerrilla warfare. This has tended to obscure the fact that it is, fundamentally, the essentials of this new strategy that are being applied by international communism throughout the non-Communist world today. Actually, neither of the two specifically Chinese features is an essential characteristic of the new strategy. In China, the peasants were the Communist party's main target; elsewhere other groups can be substituted, as has been the case not only in the West, but also in Japan and to some extent even in India. On the other hand, some reliance on the peasantry is not a new Communist policy. In practically none of the underdeveloped countries have the Communists in any real sense of the word been a working-class party. Rather they have been largely intellectuals seeking a popular base where they could find it. In this search, even under the old "right" and "left" strategies, they have never looked exclusively to the industrial working class (which in its Marxian sense of an urban stratum cut off from its rural moorings has, at least until recently, been virtually non-existent in most underdeveloped countries). Instead, they have also sought out the petty bourgeoisie and at least some sections of the peasantry who can easily be characterized as exploited classes in underdeveloped countries. They have attempted to conceal this fact, just as Maoism has in China, by speaking of working-class hegemony, which always means their own hegemony. In other words, they substituted themselves for the working class by a process of mental transposition.

Similarly, the use of armed force is neither characteristic of the new strategy alone nor does it necessarily accompany that strategy. Obviously important as it is, the use or absence of violent methods does not constitute the basic distinction among Communist strategies, which is rather, as we have seen, to be found in the extent and type of alliances made by the Communists with non-Communist elements.[8] Attempts to identify one or the other of the three strategies with a "hard" or "soft" line, though frequently made, are therefore misleading. Thus it is often implied that the "right" strategy is necessarily coupled with a "soft" line. It is, of course, true that under many circumstances an alliance between the Communist party and labor and bourgeois parties is inconceivable where the Communist party engages in violent activities. But in other circumstances its allies too may be engaged in or approve of such activities as, for example, during the Spanish Civil War, the wartime resistance in Western Europe, or colonial revolts against the mother country. On the other hand, the "left" strategy, while easily adaptable to armed violence, need not necessarily employ that tactic. Thus it was, with certain exceptions, used peacefully in Western Europe before 1935. Finally the new strategy too, though developed in conjunction with guerrilla warfare, can also be combined with a "soft" line, as is illustrated by the present tactics of the Communists not only in Western Europe and Latin America but also in India and Indonesia. Each of the three strategies can be applied in a violent or a peaceful manner. The use of armed force is a matter not of strategy but of tactics, which can be changed according to conditions while the strategy remains unchanged; it can even be in effect in some parts of a country while peaceful methods are applied in others at the same time.

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[7] For an excellent discussion of this point, see Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), especially pp. 72–78 and 189–204.

[8] A simple and perhaps oversimplified test to determine which of the three strategies the Communists pursue at any one time consists of the following one or two questions: Are the Communists making a serious attempt to form an alliance with the top leadership

The essential characteristic of the new strategy, which distinguishes it from both its "left" and its "right" predecessors, is its direct appeal "from below" (i.e., not through bourgeois parties) to the bourgeoisie. This appeal is made quite openly; it is defended on theoretical grounds and is expressed in propaganda emphasizing the interests held in common by workers and capitalists as against the foreign imperialists. Unlike reliance on the peasantry or on armed force, it is startlingly new to Communists. The proposition that the Communist party, the party of the exploited toilers, represents also the interests of the capitalists, who are, by Marxian definition, the exploiters, that the two classes between which the class struggle is supposed to be raging can be united in the Communist party, is hardly traditional Communist doctrine. It can, however, be considered an extraordinary but logical extension of "proletarian internationalism," i.e., the identification of the interests of the proletariat everywhere with those of the Soviet Union: the party of the proletariat is to unite all classes, regardless of their class interests, provided they are opposed to imperialism, meaning the United States.[9] In short, the class struggle has been replaced by the cold war.

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of the socialist party? If the answer is yes, they are following the "right" strategy; if it is no, a second question must be asked: Are there any capitalists among the groups to whose interests the Communists are appealing? If the answer to this question is no, they are following the "left" strategy; if it is yes, they are adhering to the new strategy.

[9] The only conceivable further extension of this anti-imperialist alliance could be made by adding feudal elements to the bloc of four classes. Since the immediate goal is presumably an anti-feudal, though not an anti-capitalist revolution, this is an even more extraordinary step than the inclusion of capitalists. Yet even it has been taken: "The scale of this national front [of the Chinese people] embraces workers, peasants, intellectuals, the petty-bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and even the progressive gentry," Liu Shao-chi,

Indeed if the "left" strategy was the strategy of anti-capitalism and the "right" strategy that of anti-fascism, the new strategy is the strategy of anti-Americanism. Before 1947 the new strategy as it had been developed in China was of little interest to Moscow and probably was hardly known there. With the beginning of the cold war, however, the "right" strategy of cooperation with the principal bourgeois and labor parties and with the governments formed by them was given up, since these were generally pro-American. During the following years, which also saw the rise to prominence of the Chinese Communists and their strategy in the world of international communism, there was some difference of opinion in Moscow and in some Communist parties as to whether the "left" or the new strategy was to replace the discarded "right" one.[10] It soon became clear, however, that the "left" alternative, by regarding capitalism as an enemy, unduly limited the range of the Communists' potential supporters to the so-called exploited classes—the workers, the poor peasantry and some petty-bourgeois elements—while in Moscow's eyes there was no reason, except the negligible one of Marxist theory, why exploiters too should not be mobilized on its side against the United States. The "left" strategy, though traditionally "internationalist," even entailed the serious danger that each Communist party would concentrate on the bourgeoisie in its own country as its main enemy rather than on Moscow's chief opponent, the United States, thus, from the Soviet point of view, "fighting the wrong war against the wrong enemy at the wrong time."

The new strategy, on the other hand, is admirably suited to the needs of Soviet foreign policy. Under it the Communists frankly invite the cooperation of "all classes, parties, groups, organizations, and individuals,"[11] including

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*Internationalism and Nationalism* (Peking, 1948). "The motive forces of the Viet-Nam revolution at present are the people comprising primarily the workers, peasants, petty-bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie, followed by the patriotic and progressive personages and landlords." "Platform of the Viet-Nam Lao Dong Party," *People's China*, Vol. 3 (May 1, 1951), Supplement. "The right of patriotic landlords to collect land rent in accordance with law shall be guaranteed," "Manifesto of the Viet-Nam Lao Dong Party," *ibid.*

[10] This point is developed and documented in the author's research paper, shortly to be published as a book, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India: A Study in the Postwar Evolution of Communist Strategy*, Chs. 3 and 4. This work also contains numerous quotations to document the advocacy of the new strategy with its appeal to the bourgeoisie by Soviet, Chinese, and Indian Communists.

[11] "Speech by Liu Shao-chi at the Conference of Trade Unions of Asia and Oceania," *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, Dec. 30, 1949, p. 2, also translated from *Pravda* of Jan. 4, 1950, in *Soviet Press Translations*, Vol. 5, pp. 168–72 (March 15, 1950). The phrase has since come into frequent use in Communist literature on Asia. For a more recent corresponding Western expression of the new strategy, see the statement of the French Communist Party's Central Committee of October 22 and 23, 1953: "We Communists declare that we are ready, with all Frenchmen, whoever they may be,—we say advisedly, whoever they may be—who, like us, do not want a new Wehrmacht, to take part in all political activities which can and must be organized in a mighty campaign throughout the length and breadth of France." Jacques Duclos, "France Moves," *Labour Monthly*, Vol. 36, pp. 63–70, at p. 70. (Feb., 1954).

capitalists and even feudal elements, the sole test of their eligibility being friendliness to the Soviet Union and antagonism to the United States.[12] Thus this strategy, like the "left" and "right" ones in earlier periods, has gradually been adopted by international communism throughout the non-Communist world. It is obvious that this is true in Asia, where the Communist parties have been urged by both Peking and Moscow to take the "Chinese path," in some countries in its violent, in others in its peaceful form.[13] It is also the case in the other underdeveloped areas and particularly in Latin America, where the Communists openly employ the strategy of the bloc of four classes, including the "national bourgeoisie."[14] However, since the Communists depict even the countries of Western Europe as colonial spoil of "American imperialism,"[15] a strategy containing the essential elements of the new strategy has come to be applied in these countries too.[16] This is clear from the Communist parties' concentration on the United States rather than capitalism as their main enemy and their call "from below" for cooperation with all elements, regardless of class, coupled with attacks on the governments and leading parties who would be their allies in the united front "from above" of the "right" strategy. The so-called "peace" movement with its anti-American appeal to all classes, the emphasis in Communist propaganda on the injury done by "American imperialism" to the national economy and the interests of labor and capital alike, and the outright attempts to attract capitalists by vistas of East-West trade, notably expressed by the Moscow Economic Conference of 1952, are all manifestations of the new strategy in evidence as much in the West as in the underdeveloped areas.

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[12] While, as we mentioned, the approach of the new strategy to other parties is generally one "from below" (i.e., antagonistic), this can, in conformity with the dominant anti-American motive behind the strategy, be changed to one "from above," where a party becomes sufficiently anti-American and pro-Soviet, as has happened in Indonesia and under the Arbenz regime in Guatemala, thus constituting a return to the "right" strategy in relation to that party. The Communist party's direct appeal to the bourgeoisie, however, is likely to continue in any case.

[13] For discussion and documentation, see the author's study, cited above, Chs. 5 and 6, and also his article, "Indian Communist Party Strategy since 1947," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 28 (June, 1955).

[14] For some fairly recent statements, see articles by the leaders of the Communist parties of Brazil, Chile, and Argentina in the Cominform journal, *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, June 5, 1953, p. 3, Dec. 18, 1953, p. 3 and Jan. 15, 1954, pp. 3–4, respectively, and especially the "Draft Program of Communist Party of Brazil," *ibid.*, Feb. 26, 1954, p. 3. See also Daniel James, "Lessons of Guatemala," *The New Leader*, Vol. 37, p. 3 (July 12, 1954), who says: ". . . what we think we have been fighting is classic Leninist-Stalinist Communism, whereas what we really had to contend with in Guatemala, and must now face throughout the Hemisphere, is the more formidable doctrine of Maoism."

[15] "In view of the policy of expansion pursued by the American monopolies, the struggle for national independence and economic development has now become a necessity not only for the peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial countries but also for those in the developed capitalist countries." "Decisions of Third World Trade Union Congress," *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, Oct. 30, 1953, p. 2.

[16] For Western Communist statements explicitly including sections of the bourgeoisie among potential allies see Jacques Duclos, "Historic Example of October Revolution and Middle Strata," *ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1951, reprinted with a highly relevant and perceptive introductory note in the experimental issue of *Problems of Communism*, and the speeches by Duclos and Thorez at the more recent 13th Congress of the French Communist party in *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, June 11, 1954. Recent statements making the same point implicitly by the Italian Communist leaders Palmiro Togliatti and Luigi Longo, the Austrian Johann Koplenig, and the West German Max Reimann may be found *ibid.*, Dec. 18, 1953, p. 2; May 7, 1954, pp. 3–4, May 21, 1954, p. 3; and July 2, 1954, p. 3, respectively. Even in the United States, the Communist party is now appealing to some "groups of capital" to join its "popular coalition movement." "New U. S. Red Line Seeks 'Coalition'," *The New York Times*, March 7, 1954, p. 1.

That the new strategy of communism involves a radical departure from Marxism is obvious and has already been indicated. It is, however, only a logical development of Leninism. The doctrines of Mao Tse-tung, even better than Lenin's prototype, serve to elucidate the implications of Leninism. To Marx and Engels the working class itself was the revolutionary agent, as it was matured by the inevitable historical and social development. The party, along with the trade unions, was conceived to be only a tool of the class in its class struggle and it could not therefore, any more than the unions, rely on elements which, by Marxian definition, were the enemies of the workers. Lenin, however, took the crucial step of divorcing the party from the class, shifting the emphasis from the latter to the former as the agent of an essentially no longer inevitable historical development, and in effect making the working class the tool of the party. Once this step was taken, there was no longer any reason why some other class could not also become the tool of the party. This can be the peasantry, as it was in China and to some extent in Russia, but it can even be the capitalists, as is now possible under the new strategy.[17] From the Marxist emphasis on the working class we have, via Lenin's reliance on the party, now arrived at a party, independent of all classes and representing none, seeking a base for the realization of its own ambitions in any class where it can find support. The end of Marx's party—the class struggle—has been abandoned for the means—the party in its quest for power.

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[17] This point is well made by Morris Watnick, "Continuity and Innovation in Chinese Communism," *World Politics*, Vol. 6, pp. 84–105, particularly pp. 94–96 (Oct., 1953).

# TWO CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH POLITICAL THEORY*

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There is widespread discontent today with the state of English political theory. This does not seem to have been so a generation ago. In 1915, Ernest Barker certainly revealed uneasiness about some intellectual tendencies of the time, but his overriding belief was that the new psychology and the new awareness of the personality of groups within society would enrich thinking in the long run.[1] Ten years later, Lewis Rockow was distinctly optimistic at the end of his *Contemporary English Political Thought.* Having surveyed the first quarter of this century, he was impressed by "the richness of the contemporary mind" and the boldness of its political speculation.[2] How different is the self-judgment of our own day. "In the present generation," declared Professor Catlin in 1952, "England is in a poorer way as a fount of political ideas than she has been for centuries."[3] There were only a few men—Laski, Barker, Oakeshott, E. H. Carr—whom he would put in a high category, while apart from them he went on to say, "a drear darkness has fallen on British political theory which was so bright." A little later, and speaking of the world in general rather than of England alone, Professor Cobban lamented "a general tendency to cease thinking about society in terms of political theory."[4] He could find no original thought since the eighteenth century and concluded that the idea of democracy had become a mere shibboleth—and not even a serviceable one, since all camps used it. He felt that the study of politics had taken a wrong turn, being corrupted by a neglect of the moral element, by an indifference to the practical problems besetting men, and by a deep pessimism about the possibility of resolving the dilemma between "moral man and immoral society." Eric Voegelin seems at first to strike a more cheerful note when he speaks of "the revival, not to say the outburst, of political philosophy at Oxford in recent years," but his article[5] is critical of some of its tendencies and even goes so far at one point as to refer to its "distressing state."

It would perhaps be unfruitful to enter into a debate over the truth or falsity of the opinions just quoted, or to inquire how far they are shared by others than their authors. Such judgments are almost impossible to prove or to disprove. What does seem to be certain, however, is that intellectual trends have appeared in the past thirty or forty years which have lessened the impulse among British students to raise the great questions about the state—its nature, its place among other associations, the limits to its justifiable action, and the duties of the citizen—which have always been the substance of theoretical analysis. It is our intention to consider two of these trends and to give some examples of how they have expressed themselves in writings about politics.

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* This paper was first presented at the fiftieth annual meeting of The American Political Science Association at Chicago, Illinois, September 10, 1954.

[1] Ernest Barker, *Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day* (New York, 1915), pp. 248–50.

[2] Lewis Rockow, *Contemporary Political Thought in England* (London, 1925), p. 294.

[3] George Catlin, "Contemporary British Political Thought," this Review, Vol. 46, pp. 641–59, at p. 641 (Sept., 1952).

[4] Alfred Cobban, "The Decline of Political Theory," *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. 68, pp. 321–37, at p. 322 (Sept., 1953).

[5] Eric Voegelin, "The Oxford Political Philosophers," *The Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol. 3, pp. 97–114 (April, 1953).

The first is a change in temper, a weakening of social optimism and of faith in man's capacity by taking thought to transform his institutions. The early part of this century saw a great deal of exuberant social criticism and confident social reform. Rockow's book was concerned largely with thinkers who believed society could be made over in a new image. Both the exuberance and the confidence have now evaporated, in spite of all the talk about planning, and in spite of the progress towards the welfare state. The legislation of the Attlee Government was merely the realization of dreams and plans that came to birth long before 1945. There are few signs that the Left is now going through another period of creative thinking. The generation described by Rockow dreamed of realizing Utopia; this generation hopes to escape disaster, whether in the form of economic collapse or atomic destruction. It may be significant that of the three writers used by E. H. Carr to illustrate his contention that theories of a natural process of social improvement have given way to theories of a natural process of social decay, two (Toynbee and Butterfield) are English.[6] The English national consciousness today seems to be made up of pride in the heroic achievements of two world wars combined with a realization of declining powers and an uncertainty about the future of the country in a world that seems bent upon self-destruction.

This is not the mood in which adventurous speculation is embarked upon. It is conservatism that profits most in times like these. And there are clear signs on many levels of a conservative revival. It is marked in the writing of history. It is seen in the interpretation of the nature of the political system, where Bagehot's Whig views have been challenged by Amery and others. It is one reason why the role of the monarchy in the working of government both past and present is stressed so strongly in contemporary writings. In the realm of practical politics the Conservative party has modernized its organization, widened its research activities, and expounded its ideology and policies with increased effectiveness.

The leading academic exponent of the new conservatism is Michael Oakeshott. Formerly lecturer in history at Cambridge, Mr. Oakeshott is now the Professor of Political Science in the University of London. Thus he occupies a position of central importance in the study and teaching of politics. In this position, dwelling in what was once the temple of Radicalism, surrounded by the protesting shades of Sidney Webb, Graham Wallas, and Harold Laski, and not far from the dry bones of Jeremy Bentham, he preaches a new form of traditionalism. He has given his views to the outside public in articles in the *Cambridge Journal* and in his inaugural lecture. The articles in question range from essays on politics and morals to reviews of current books on politics, history, and sociology. They may be said, however, to have a central theme or purpose, which is to change men's ways of thinking about political behavior, political knowledge, and political education.

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[6] Edward H. Carr, *The New Society* (London, 1951), pp. 1–18.

For Mr. Oakeshott believes that it is our misfortune to live in "an intellectually corrupt age."[7] This corruption can be traced back to Bacon and Descartes, but it has grown worse in recent times. In the moral sciences it shows itself most conspicuously in misconceptions regarding the nature of rational conduct. By the prevailing view, we are told, rational conduct exists only when a purpose is first formulated, then appropriate means are selected for its fulfillment and, finally, action is taken in harmony with the purpose and means previously selected. The rationality in conduct springs from something we do before we act. It requires a high degree of detachment and considerable reflective ability on the part of the actor. It cannot inhere in conduct based upon the unexamined authority of tradition, custom, or habit.

All this, says Professor Oakeshott, rests on misunderstanding. There cannot be a process of reasoning antecedent to conduct and from which conduct springs. For mind and knowledge, purposes and rules and standards, are all born of activity and are a part of it. Every activity, whether it is cooking or science or politics, is based upon a tradition. You must possess the tradition, the knowledge of what to do and how to do it, before you can engage in the activity either by devising projects or executing them. You must be a scientist before you can formulate a scientific hypothesis. And it is not enough to have a knowledge of rules and principles. That is merely technical knowledge, the kind that can be given precise verbal statement. More important is practical or traditional knowledge. This is not the outcome of reflection, nor can it be expressed in principles. Therefore, it can be neither learned nor taught in the ordinary meanings of these words. Its normal expression is in a customary way of doing things and its acquisition requires a period of apprenticeship, that is, of continuous contact with someone who has the tradition and is applying it in the appropriate activity. You learn to be a cook by cooking along with someone who knows how. The cookbook will help, but only after you already know how to cook.

Professor Oakeshott applies the term "Rationalist" to those who hold the prevailing misconceptions about the nature of human activity. And the trouble with modern politics is that they are dominated by Rationalism. New men and new classes have come to power. Lacking real knowledge of how to govern, they have had to resort to clumsy expedients. One was to apply to government the practical knowledge acquired in other spheres, such as business and trade union life. This was at least real knowledge, although imperfectly applicable to the art of ruling men. A worse procedure was to try to govern by techniques such as those laid down by Machiavelli.[8]

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[7] *Cambridge Journal*, Vol. 1, p. 766 (Sept., 1948), review of K. B. Smellie, *Why We Read History* (London, 1947).

The most common expedient is the attempt to rule by means of ideologies such as the "Principles of 1789" and the teaching of John Locke. It is just as impossible to do this as to govern by mere technique. For ideologies are merely incomplete and somewhat inaccurate summations of traditions of behavior. They are very imperfect guides to conduct. But men do not realize this; they think of ideologies as tremendous achievements of the purely speculative intellect. They think of them as penetrating deeply into the hidden realities of society, drawing therefrom abstract principles whose application will enable us to progress far beyond our ancestors towards perfection. In modern politics "traditions of behaviour have given place to ideologies."[9] Even Conservatives follow after these vagaries of thought, and opponents of planning like Professor Hayek give us "a plan to resist all planning."[10] As for the Labour party, led astray by the "intellectual dandies" of the Fabian Society, it wanders pitifully in a slough of error.[11]

In these intellectual errors, we are told lies the source of many modern disasters, although it is not always easy to demonstrate the fact. "If you start being merely 'intelligent' about a boiler or an electrical generator you are likely to be pulled up short by an explosion; but in politics all that happens is war and chaos, which you do not immediately connect with your error."[12]

And so we are brought to the only correct, indeed, in a sense the only possible way of conducting politics. It is "the amendment of existing arrangements by exploring and pursuing what is intimated in them."[13] Note that this is not a politics of passivity, of stubborn refusal to make changes. On the contrary, the politician is put under a positive obligation to seek out maladjustments and to correct them. He will not succeed in his efforts, however, unless the changes he makes are really required by the situation and are made in the way in which his society has been accustomed to "attending" to its "general arrangements." In making them, too, the politician should remember that there is a sense in which "the passage of time [is] the only healer of social complaints worth considering."[14]

When he succeeded Mr. Laski, Professor Oakeshott took the occasion to apply his views to political education. He had already shown what he did not like in some of his essays and reviews, such as that of Harold Lasswell's *Analysis*

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[8] Michael Oakeshott, "Rationalism in Politics," *Cambridge Journal*, Vol. 1, pp. 145–57, at p. 147 (Dec., 1947).

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

[11] Michael Oakeshott, "The Political Economy of Freedom," *Cambridge Journal*, Vol. 2, p. 213 (Jan., 1949).

[12] Michael Oakeshott, "Rational Conduct," *Cambridge Journal*, Vol. 4, pp. 3–27, at p. 14 (Oct., 1950).

[13] Michael Oakeshott, *Political Education; An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at the London School of Economics and Political Science on March 6, 1951* (Cambridge, 1951), p. 25.

[14] "Rationalism in Politics," p. 153.

*of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach.* Perhaps you will enjoy one sentence from this review: "If you want to be frightened, read this book; as a portent of the end of civilized life, it is far more unnerving than the atomic bomb."[15] Correct political education consists in a profound, practical knowledge of the traditions of behavior of one's own society. This cannot be acquired in a short time or from books alone. We must grow into it as we grow into a knowledge of our native language.

If pursued at the academic level, however, political education should include three branches of study: one's own society, other contemporary societies, and political philosophy. All are to be studied historically. Of them, the first is the most important. It is to be conducted in a respectful spirit, one that examines the national legend "not to explode its errors but to understand its prejudices."[16] The study of foreign societies is useful as an aid to comprehending our own; while political philosophy will give help in straightening out our logic and in freeing us from Rationalist illusions.

Three points seem especially noteworthy about this "understanding of politics."

1. The first is its low estimation of the place of speculation. This does not mean that Professor Oakeshott is an irrationalist or that M. Postan is right in saying that he draws upon the resources of reason to prove that reason has no resources.[17] On the contrary, Oakeshott states specifically that there is no area of human behavior which is "inherently impervious to rational analysis."[18] It is only when he comes to explain and assess the place of ideologies that exception can be taken to his views. There is certainly a sense in which the "Principles of 1789" were a distillation of tradition, but most students would hold they were more than that. They were a distillation in which the raw deposits of tradition were transmuted by reason into a fiery revolutionary liquor, which then sometimes stimulated and sometimes maddened the nineteenth century. The case of Jeremy Bentham lends some support to the Oakeshott views, but cannot be explained wholly by them. Everyone will acknowledge that Bentham was one of the most ideological thinkers who ever lived. He was indifferent to history and despised tradition. And so he failed in his effort to legislate for all times and places on the basis of a few simple principles of universal application. But we still must explain how it was that this ratiocinator had so great an impact on nineteenth-century English reform. It seems a little difficult to do so by saying that he was merely pursuing the "intimations" of a tradition of behavior. It is still more difficult to see how the pursuit of these intimations can be an adequate guide to policy in an age such as ours, which is constantly faced by new and "untraditional" situations and must be constantly adjusting itself to radical discontinuities.

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[15] *Cambridge Journal,* Vol. 1, p. 326 (Feb., 1948).

[16] *Political Education,* p. 25.

[17] Michael M. Postan, "The Revulsion from Thought," *Cambridge Journal,* Vol. 1, pp. 395–408 (April, 1948).

[18] Michael Oakeshott, "Scientific Politics," *Cambridge Journal,* Vol. 1, p. 354 (March, 1948).

2. The second is its parochialism in spirit and standard. Its parochialism in spirit is revealed by occasional asides about "foreign clap-trap" and "ignorant foreigners" (meaning apparently men like Karl Mannheim). It is parochial in standard because its ultimate measure for values appears to be the national tradition. It may be that this generation should place a higher value on tradition; but let us not make it infallible and let us choose a more ecumenical tradition than that of the nation. Burke was somewhat more generous than his twentieth-century successor, for he saw Europe as a Christian Commonwealth or Great Republic. Under Burke's view the unfortunate Russians would not be condemned to choose between Tsarist absolutism and Communist tyranny as the only political ideals worth clinging to.

3. The third is its deep scepticism about the possibilities inherent in political action, no matter how correctly taken. This is not the same point as the first. You may have absolutely no faith in reason and still believe that man's healthy intuition will ultimately produce perfection or that if we would only return to tradition and stand once again in the ancient ways, the world's great age would begin anew. How far removed from all this is the sentiment of the following paragraph:

> In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel; the sea is both friend and enemy; and the seamanship consists in using the resources of a traditional manner of behaviour in order to make a friend of every inimical occasion.[19]

The same note is struck again in the concluding words of the lecture, where we are warned against "the illusion that in politics there is anywhere a safe harbour, a destination to be reached, or even a detectable strand of progress. The world is the best of all possible worlds, and *everything* in it is a necessary evil."[20] When they hear words like these, the students of the London School will know that they are no longer listening to Professor Laski. What could be more calculated to narrow the range of political thinking than academic teaching with this particular combination of scepticism and worship of tradition?

But the change in intellectual temper, of which Professor Oakeshott is a reflection, is only the first of two changes of great consequence in the study of politics. There has also been a change in interests and approach. The analysis of institutions was always a keen interest, as can be seen from a succession of writers starting with Bagehot and continuing through Low, Bryce, Courtney, Muir, Laski, Jennings, the Webbs, and others. On the academic level, it was pursued long ago at the London School, where the tradition of Bentham and the influence of the Fabians were strongest. But it has spread more widely in the last decade or so. The new journal, *Political Studies*, established in 1953, is apparently the first English academic journal set up especially for the investigation of the working of political institutions. The growing interest in machinery is shown also by the splitting of the chair held by G. D. H. Cole into two professorships, one of theory and one of institutions. An analogous trend is the spread of research into political behavior, of which the electoral studies made by McCallum and Readman, Nicholas, and D. E. Butler are conspicuous examples. The English have a long distance to go before they reach the heights or the depths attained by political science in the United States, but they seem to be on the way.

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[19] *Political Education*, p. 22.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

They are given a powerful push along the road by some trends in general philosophy. These are especially important in Britain, where political theory has always been largely in the hands of philosophers, especially of philosophers trained in the classical tradition. It was this fact that lay back of the great reign of idealism at Oxford. It is well known that the spread of logical positivism has produced a reaction against traditional philosophy in any form and caused many philosophers to devote themselves to linguistic and logical analysis. What this means for political theory appears clearly in the writings of T. D. Weldon, especially in his second work, *The Vocabulary of Politics*. Since this was published in the Pelican Philosophy Series, it will presumably be read by thousands of people. The subtitle describes it as "an enquiry into the use and abuse of language in the making of political theories." The enquiry falls into three parts, which may be briefly noted. The first is a criticism of classical modes of political thinking in which the Greeks (with the partial exception of Aristotle) are found to have suffered from illusions in their beliefs in real essences, in absolute standards, and in the conduct of political discussion in the manner of a geometrical demonstration. They sought to arrive at unassailable conclusions of universal application by a process of careful definition and precise, logical deduction. This procedure has confused political theory ever since. It has led men to ask the wrong questions, such as "What is the best form of the State?" and "What is Justice?"; and it has caused them to seek proofs of the superiority of the systems of their preference instead of merely rational grounds for that preference. He thinks that the main outcome has been a set of useless or even vacuous formulations, such as "Men are always to be treated as ends and never as means" or "All men are born free and equal." They are useless because they concern ideal, not real, politics. "We can derive no actual law from them and appraise no actual law by means of them."[21]

It is the second part of Mr. Weldon's task to show that we can do better by using other methods of discussion. The vocabulary of politics, he argues, need not be as precise and unbending as that of mathematics. Indeed, it had better not be, since the phenomena we are attempting to describe do not have the sharpness and unchanging character of Euclidean concepts. The content we put into the words changes with the changes in men's institutions, conditions, problems, and aspirations. This does not mean that we are reduced to anarchy, since, as Mr. Weldon puts it, "verbal usage at any given time and for any given society is fairly stable and is not subject to the arbitrary whims of individuals."[22] He thinks that it is a worthwhile activity for political students to trace the developments in meaning that do occur. Those who are frightened by the absence of absolute standards in politics are invited by Mr. Weldon to look at science. In that area the assumption of absolute standards was abandoned in practice as long ago as Galileo, he says, and has since been overthrown in principle by Einstein and others.

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[21] T. D. Weldon, *The Vocabulary of Politics* (Penguin Books, 1953), p. 97.

The third aspect of Mr. Weldon's enquiry is its claim to provide a satisfactory basis upon which to rest political appraisals. Thereby we can avoid the dangers of mere positivism, scepticism, and subjectivism. An analogy is drawn between the task of making political appraisals, and that which confronts a selection board in making appointments. There are no absolute or completely "objective" standards, but a good board will set up criteria for its decisions. It can explain its criteria and show how they were applied in making any given appointment. By discussion with critics it may improve its criteria over a period time. So an individual can base his political appraisals on rational grounds which he can defend and amend in the light of criticism. Nor do all appraisals stand on a plane of equality. There are experts in politics to whom people will defer just as there are experts in art. They cannot answer meaningless questions such as: "Is Proportional Representation a good system?" They can, however, give expert advice as to whether it is a "good" system at a given time in a given place. This is relativism, but it is not anarchy.

Mr. Weldon would greatly narrow the scope of theoretical analysis. He sees politics as concerned with empirical difficulties and the ways to cope with them. All the questions of traditional political philosophy, he contends, are "confused formulations of purely empirical difficulties."[23] Philosophers failed to answer these questions very well because they insisted on treating them in the wrong way. They formulated them improperly because they were bemused by the belief in real essences. They did not answer them very profitably because they insisted on erecting a facade of irrefutable demonstration instead of being content with the construction of empirical hypotheses. The proper people to cope with the difficulties of politics, he thinks, are not philosophers, but statesmen and students of political institutions. The philosophers, it is true, can be of some help. They can try to clarify the language in which discussion is conducted and trace its changing meaning. They can also study competing philosophies so as to set them in their proper perspective, that is, against the background of the factual situations with which they attempted to deal in such a confused way. But Mr. Weldon is not sure that we should retain the term "political philosophy" for these operations. His doubts will be shared by others. He was really more generous to the theorists in his first book, when he said that "abstract enquiries about the State"[24] could produce practical results of great importance.

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[22] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

[24] T. D. Weldon, *States and Morals* (New York, 1947), pp. 6–7.

We have taken Oakeshott and Weldon as examples—somewhat extreme examples perhaps—of present-day English political thought. They do not represent the whole of it, but there is justification for their selection in the fact that the first was called to one of the most important chairs in political science in Britain and the other invited to contribute the volume on politics to a widely-read series of books. Their ways of viewing politics and its study may be said to be the ways, or at least among the ways, that are now popular. They differ a good deal in spirit and atmosphere. Weldon conveys a sympathy with men's strivings, an encouragement of their efforts to formulate purposes and then seek to realize them, that are alien to Oakeshott. Yet they are alike in their turning away from universal to national values and in the limits they place upon the possibilities of reason—in possessing a distrust of purely rational analysis in politics. In the long run they are moving in the same direction. On the one hand, the conservative traditionalist takes experience for his guide and, on the other hand, the liberal empiricist cannot be a very dangerous enemy of the status quo, since he provides no certain standard of values by which men may be stirred to embark on great feats of social criticism or social reform. The political science which they represent may produce splendid analyses of the English political tradition and perhaps of its rivals. It is not likely to result in great original thought about the state. It will hardly provide the inspiration that a generation of thinkers and public men found in John Stuart Mill or Thomas Hill Green. In this shortcoming may be found the justification for the unflattering comments on the present state of English political thought that were quoted at the beginning of this paper.

# METAPHYSICAL PATHOS AND THE THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY

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The conduct of a polemic focusses attention on the differences between two points of view to the neglect of their continuity and convergences. No modern polemic better exemplifies this than the controversy between the proponents of capitalism and of socialism. Each tends to define itself as the antithesis of the other; even the uncommitted bystander, rare though he be, is likely to think of the two as if they were utterly alien systems.

There have always been some, however, who have taken exception to this sharp contrast between socialism and capitalism and who have insisted that there are significant similarities between the two. One of these, the French sociologist Emile Durkheim, maintained that socialism like capitalism involved an overbearing preoccupation with economic interests. In both socialist and capitalist societies, Durkheim argued, economic concerns were at the center of attention. In Durkheim's view, neither capitalism nor socialism deemed it necessary to bridle materialistic ends; neither society subordinated pecuniary interests to some higher, governing, moral norms. Therefore, "from Durkheim's point of view," writes Talcott Parsons, "socialism and laissez-faire individualism are of the same piece."[1]

Bertand Russell came to similar conclusions on the basis of a trip to the then newly-established Soviet Republic: " . . . the practical difference between socialism and capitalism is not so great as politicians on both sides suppose. Certain features will appear in the early stages of industrialism under either system; and under either system certain other features will appear in its later stages."[2]

Without doubt, though, the most sophisticated formulation of this view was that conceived by the German sociologist, Max Weber. To Weber, the distinguishing characteristic of modern capitalism was the "rational organization of free labor." The pursuit of private gain, noted Weber, was well known in many earlier societies; what distinguishes present-day capitalism, he held, is the peculiar organization of the production unit, an organization that is essentially bureaucratic. This conception of capitalism, writes Parsons, "has one important concrete result; in contradistinction to Marx and most 'liberal' theories, it strongly minimizes the differences between capitalism and socialism, emphasizing rather their continuity. Not only would socialistic organization leave the central fact of bureaucracy untouched, it would greatly accentuate its importance."[3]

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[1] Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York, 1937), p. 341. For Durkheim's own statement, see his *Le Socialisme* (Paris, 1908), especially Ch. 2. The present writer is preparing an English translation of this volume.

[2] Bertrand and Dora Russell, *Prospects of Industrial Civilization* (New York, 1923), p. 14. Compare this with the discussion of Stalinist Communism by a postwar Russian refugee, G. F. Achminow, *Die Macht im Hintergrund: Totengraber des Kommunismus* (Ulm, 1950), which is discussed in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Character and Social Structure* (New York, 1953), p. 477.

While Marx had dwelt largely on the interrelations *among* production units, that is, their market ties, Weber focussed on the social relations *within* the industrial unit. If social relations inside of socialist and capitalist factories are fundamentally alike, in that they are both bureaucratic, then, asked Weber, does a socialist revolution yield very much of an improvement for the capitalist proletarian?

If Marx argued that the workers of the world had nothing to *lose* by revolting, Weber contended that they really had nothing to *gain*. "For the time being," he declared, "the dictatorship of the official and not that of the worker is on the march." Capitalism and socialism are thus placed under the same conceptual umbrella—bureaucracy—with the important practical result that the problem of choosing between them loses much of its point.

It is for this reason that the discussions of bureaucratic organization which are heir to the Weberian analysis must be understood as being, in part, a displacement of the controversy over socialism. Weber made it clear that questions of economic choice could no longer be treated in isolation from questions of administration. From Weber's time forward, administrative and economic choices were seen to be but two facets of the same hard problem. This has been recognized even by socialists, at least when they have been unencumbered by Communist party orthodoxy. For example, Oskar Lange once remarked, with a frankness that we hope he will never be compelled to regret, ". . . the real danger of socialism is that of bureaucratic organization of economic life. . . . "[4]

It is sometimes assumed today that the Weberian outlook is at bottom anti-socialist. In effect, the argument runs, Weber's viewpoint devitalizes the myth-like appeal of socialism, draining off its ability to muster immense enthusiasms. Weber's theses are therefore held to be an "ideology" serviceable for the survival of capitalism, while Weber himself is characterized as the "Marx of the bourgeoisie."

Now all this may be true, but it is only a partial truth; for, in actuality, Weber's theories cut two ways, not one. If it is correct that his theory of bureaucracy saps the fervor of the socialist offensive, it also undermines the stamina of the capitalist bastions. If socialism and capitalism are similar in being bureaucratic, then not only is there little *profit* in substituting one for the other, but there is also little *loss*.

Considered only from the standpoint of its political consequences then, the Weberian outlook is not anti-socialist alone, nor anti-capitalist alone, it is both. In the final analysis its political slogan becomes "a plague on both your houses." If Weber is to be regarded as an "ideologist," he is an ideologist not of counter-revolution but of quiescence and neutralism. For many intellectuals who have erected a theory of group organization on Weberian foundations, the world has been emptied of choice, leaving them disoriented and despairing.

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[3] Parsons, p. 509. See also the provocative fuller development of this argument as it applies to industrial organization: George C. Homans, "Industrial Harmony as a Goal," in *Industrial Conflict*, eds. Kornhauser, Dubin, and Ross (New York, 1954).

[4] Oskar Lange and Fred M. Taylor, *On the Economic Theory of Socialism*, ed. Lippincott (Minneapolis, 1948), p. 109.

That gifted historian of ideas, Arthur O. Lovejoy, astutely observed that every theory is associated with, or generates, a set of sentiments which those subscribing to the theory could only dimly sense. Lovejoy called this the "metaphysical pathos" of ideas, a pathos which is "exemplified in any description of the nature of things, any characterization of the world to which one belongs, in terms which, like the words of a poem, evoke through their associations and through a sort of empathy which they engender, a congenial mood or tone of feelings."[5]

As a result, a commitment to a theory often occurs by a process other than the one which its proponents believe and it is usually more consequential than they realize. A commitment to a theory may be made because the theory is congruent with the mood or deep-lying sentiments of its adherents, rather than merely because it has been cerebrally inspected and found valid. This is as true for the rigorous prose of social science as it is for the more lucid metaphor of creative literature, for each has its own silent appeal and its own metaphysical pathos.

Furthermore, those who have committed themselves to a theory always get more than they have bargained for. We do not make a commercial contract with a theory in which we agree to accept only the consignment of intellectual goods which has been expressly ordered; usually we take also the metaphysical pathos in which the theory comes packaged. In the end, the theory reinforces or induces in the adherent a subtle alteration in the structure of sentiments through which he views the world.

So too is it with the theory of organization. Paradoxically enough, some of the very theories which promise to make man's own work more intelligible to himself and more amenable to his intelligence are infused with an intangible metaphysical pathos which insinuates, in the very midst of new discoveries, that all is lost. For the metaphysical pathos of much of the modern theory of group organization is that of pessimism and fatalism.

## I. EXPLANATIONS OF BUREAUCRACY

Nowhere does the fatalism of the theory of organization become more articulate than in its efforts to account for the development of bureaucratic behavior. One of the less challenging explanations, for example, premises a supposedly invariant human nature. Thus in an otherwise illuminating analysis, one political scientist remarks: "Civil servants are ordinary mortals; they have the defects and weaknesses typical of human nature. Each loves, as Shakespeare said, 'his brief moment of authority'."[6]

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[5] Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), p. 11.

[6] John A. Vieg, "Bureaucracy—Fact and Fiction," in *Elements of Public Administration*, ed. Fritz Morstein Marx (New York, 1946), p. 52.

This, however, is difficult to reconcile with recurrent complaints, from civic leaders or business mangers, that it is often hard to persuade people either to run for political office or to accept positions as foremen. Apparently there are some people who do not hanker after their brief moment of authority.

In any event, it does not seem possible to account for bureaucracy in any of its forms as an outgrowth of "human nature." This explanation cannot cope with the rudimentary fact that in some times and in some places there is much bureaucracy, but in other times and places there is little. Leaving aside the question of the validity of the argument, its practical results are again all too evident. For if bureaucracy is rooted in human nature then all hope for a remedy must be abandoned.

Much more serious as goads to pessimism are theories explaining bureaucracy as the end-product of increased size and complexity in organizations. This is by far the most popular of the interpretations. Marshall Dimock and Howard Hyde, for example, in their report to the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC), state: "The broadest structural cause of bureaucracy, whether in business or in government, is the tremendous size of the organization. Thus with capital or appropriations measured in hundreds of millions and in billions of dollars and personnel in tens and hundreds of thousands, it is difficult to avoid the obtrusion of the objectionable features of bureaucracy."[7]

While suggesting varied causes for the development of bureaucracy, Max Weber also interpreted it as a consequence of large size. For example, in discussing the ubiquity of bureaucratic forms Weber adds: "The same [bureaucratic] phenomena are found in the large-scale capitalistic enterprise; and the larger it is, the greater their role."[8] He underscores the role of size by emphasizing that "only by reversion in every field—political, religious, economic, etc.—to small-scale organization would it be possible to escape its influence."[9] Despite his consideration of other possible sources of bureaucracy, these comments suggest that Weber regarded organizational size as the controlling factor in the development of bureaucracy.

Weber's emphasis on size as the crucial determinant of bureaucratic development is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, there are historic examples of human efforts carried out on an enormous scale which were not bureaucratic in any serious sense of the term.[10] The building of the Egyptian pyramids is an obvious example. Second, Weber never considers the possibility that it is not "large size" as such that disposes to bureaucracy; large size may be important only because it generates other social forces which, in their turn, generate bureaucratic patterns.

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[7] Monograph #11, Temporary National Economic Committee, *Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations* (Washington, D. C., 1940), p. 36.

[8] *Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, translated and edited by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York, 1947), p. 334.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 338.

[10] See Reinhard Bendix, "Bureaucracy: The Problem and Its Setting," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 12, pp. 502–7 (Oct., 1947). On the other hand, there are theoretically significant cases of small organizations which are highly bureaucratized, for example, the Boulton and Watt factory in 1775–1805. This "case illustrates the fact that the bureaucratization of industry is not synonymous with the recent growth in the size of business enterprises." Reinhard Bendix, "Bureaucratization in Industry," in *Industrial Conflict*, p. 166.

Of course, in every analysis there are always intervening variables— the unknown "x"—which stand between any cause and effect. Scientific progress depends, in part, on moving away from the gross causes and coming closer to those which are more invariably connected with the object of interest. The point is that when a social scientist accepts "size" as an explanatory factor, instead of going on to ask what there is *about size* that makes for bureaucracy, he is making an analytic *decision*. It is not a formulation unavoidably dictated by the nature of the data itself.

Significantly, though, it is a decision that leads once again to bleak pessimism. For to inform members of our society that the only way out of the bureaucratic impasse is to return to the historical past and to trade in large for small-scale organizations is, in effect, to announce the practical impossibility of coping with bureaucracy. Moreover, many people in our society believe that "bigness" symbolizes progress; to tell them that it also creates bureaucracy is to place them on the horns of a dilemma which gores no matter which way they turn. In such a position the most painless response is inaction.

Underlying this conception of the matter there is a Hegelian dialectic in which "good" and "bad" are viewed as inseparably connected opposites; bureaucracy, "the bad thing," is represented as the inescapable price that has to be paid for the good things, the efficiency and abundance of modern life. One social scientist clearly puts it this way: "Assembly line techniques offer marked advantages over those of custom craftsmanship. They also have their price. They entail the imposition of an order of progression, the fixing of a rate or rhythm of operation, and the discipline of a regular routine. Set order, fixed pace, and adherence to routine—these are the very stuff of which red tape is made. Yet they are of the essence of system, too."[11] However true or false, there can be little doubt that this is an outlook which is convenient and comfortable for bureaucrats—if not for many others.

## II. THE STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONALISTS

The fuller ramifications of this approach to bureaucracy can best be explained by turning to the analyses of industrial organization made by some of the "structural-functionalists." This is a comparatively new and vigorous school of American sociologists, which has grown directly out of the theories of Durkheim, Weber, and others, and whose most elaborate expression is to be found in the work of Talcott Parsons.

Parsons' recent analyses of industrial bureaucracy are of sufficient importance to be quoted in full. "Though with many individual exceptions [which he does not examine], *technological advance* almost always leads to increasingly

[11] Vieg, pp. 5–6.

*elaborate division of labor* and the concomitant requirement of increasingly elaborate organization." He continues:

> The fundamental reason for this is, of course, that with elaborate differentiation of functions the need for *minute coordination* of the different functions develops at the same time. . . . There must be a *complex organization of supervision* to make quite sure that exactly the right thing is done. . . . Feeding the various parts into the process, in such a way that a modern assembly line can operate smoothly, requires very *complex organization* to see that they are available in just the right quantities at the right times and places. . . . One of the most important phases of this process of change is concerned with the necessity for *formalization* when certain points of complexity are reached. . . .
>
> *Smaller* and simpler organizations are typically managed with a high degree of particularism (i.e., personal consideration) in the relations of persons in authority to their own subordinates. But when the "distance" between points of decision and of operation increases, and the number of operating units affected by decisions with it, uniformity and coordination can be attained *only* by a high degree of formalization. . . . [12]

Surprisingly enough, this is an atavistic recurrence of technological determinism in which characteristic bureaucratic traits—such as an elaborate division of labor, complex organization, and formalization—are held to stem directly from technological advance. This is a form of *technological* determinism because bureaucracy is seen as the result of technological change, without inquiring into the motives and meanings which these changes have for the people involved, and without wondering whether technological change would have a different impact on the formal organization of a group that had a high motivation to produce and therefore did not require close supervision. This is a form of technological *determinism,* because no alternative solutions are appraised or deemed possible and coordination is seen as attainable "*only* by a high degree of formalization. . . . "

Here once again we are invited to draw the conclusion that those who want modern technology must be prepared to pay for it with a minute and even stultifying division of labor.

All this, though, is a theoretical tapestry devoid of even the plainest empirical trimmings. Even on logical grounds, however, it is tenuous indeed. For it is evident that organizational patterns, such as a high division of labor, are found in spheres where modern technology has made comparatively little headway. This, in fact, is a point that Weber was at pains to insist upon. And if, as he maintained, bureaucratic forms are also found in charitable, political, or religious organizations—and not solely in industry—then they certainly cannot be explained as a consequence of modern machine technology.

Beyond these logical considerations, there are also some *empirical* grounds for questioning the adequacy of Parsons' analysis. Peter Drucker, for example, became extremely doubtful about the necessity of a minute division of labor while observing large-scale American industry during World War II. (This is crucial for Parsons' argument, because he holds that it is through increased specialization that technology evokes the other elements of bureaucratic organization.) Drucker comments that "we have learned that it is neither necessary nor always efficient to organize all mass production in such a manner as to have the majority of workers confine themselves to doing one and only one of the elementary manipulations. . . . It was impossible [because of wartime shortages of skilled labor] to 'lay out' the job in the usual assembly-line fashion in which one unskilled operation done by one unskilled man is followed by the next unskilled man. The operation was broken down into its unskilled components like any assembly-line job. *But then the unskilled components were put together again with the result that an unskilled worker actually performed the job of a highly skilled mechanic*—and did it as reliably and efficiently as had been done by skilled men."[13]

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[12] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1951), pp. 507–8. Italics added.

In short, lower degrees of specialization than those normally found in large-scale industry are not necessarily forbidden by modern technology. Drucker's observations must, at the very least, raise the question as to how much of the minute division of labor is attributable to technological causes. Parsons, though, gives no consideration to other factors contributing to an extreme division of labor. However, Carl Dreyfuss, a German industrial sociologist, has advanced an array of keen observations and hypotheses which meet this question directly. He writes: "the artificial complication of the rank order . . . permits numerous employees to feel that they hold high positions and are to a certain extent independent." Moreover, he notes that a complicated division of labor is "with its unwarranted differentiations, telescoped positions, and ramifications, diametrically opposed to efforts of rationalization."[14] In other words, Dreyfuss suggests that much of the complex division of labor today is not to be explained by technological requirements, but rather in terms of the prestige satisfactions, the "psychic income," that it presumably provides workers.

In Dreyfuss' view, the "minute division of labor" also stems from management's needs to *control* workers and to make themselves independent of any specific individual or group of workers. A high division of labor, said Dreyfuss, means that "individual workers and employees can be exchanged and replaced at any time.[15] Through its use, "dependence of the employee upon the employer is greatly increased. It is much more difficult for today's employee, trained in only one particular function, to find reemployment than it was for his predecessor, a many-sided, well-instructed business man, able and fitted to fill a variety of positions."[16]

A similar view is advanced in the more recent studies of industrial organization in Yankee City, which were made by W. L. Warner and J. O. Low. "While machine processes were adopted by shoe factories primarily to reduce costs and to speed the processing, the machine has other great advantages over the human worker from the managerial point of view," comment Warner and Low.

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[13] Peter Drucker, *Concept of the Corporation* (New York, 1946), pp. 183–84.

[14] Carl Dreyfuss, *Occupation and Ideology of the Salaried Employee*, trans. Eva Abramovitch (New York, 1938), p. 17.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

> Control problems are simplified . . . on two counts through mechanization: (1) machines are easier to control than human beings, and (2) mechanization tends to disrupt the social solidarity of the workers, who thereby become easier to control than they would if they were able to maintain close social relations during working hours . . . these factors tend to increase the subordination of the individual worker to management; from the management's viewpoint they are valuable means of social control over workers. . . . The routinization of jobs also simplifies control of workers in another way. The individual operative today does not have the feeling of security that the oldtime craftsman derived from his special technical abilities. In most cases, today's operative is aware that only a comparatively brief training period protects him in his job from a large number of untrained individuals. The members of the supervisory hierarchy are also well aware of this fact. The psychological effect of this result of the division of labor is to intensify the subordinate position of the individual operative and to make him submit the more readily to the limitations on his behavior required by the supervisory group.[17]

It is unnecessary for our purpose here to resolve this disparity between Warner and Dreyfuss, on the one hand, and Parsons, on the other. What may be suggested, however, is that there is considerable reason for holding Parsons' position to be both logically and empirically inadequate and to recognize that it has, without compelling scientific warrant, accommodated itself to the metaphysical pathos of organizational theory, which sees no escape from bureaucracy.

## III. THE TRADITION OF MICHELS

There is another offshoot among the structural-functionalists which is distinguished by its concern for the problems bequeathed by Robert Michels and, as such, it is even more morosely pessimistic than others in the school. Michels, it will be remembered, focussed his empirical studies on the Social Democratic parties of pre-World War I Europe. He chose these, quite deliberately, because he wanted to see whether groups which stood for greater freedom and democracy, and were hostile to authoritarianism, were not themselves afflicted by the very organizational deformity to which they were opposed.

Michel's conclusions were, of course, formulated in his "iron law of oligarchy," in which he maintained that always and everywhere a "system of leadership is incompatible with the most essential postulates of democracy."[18] Oligarchy, said Michels, "derives from the tactical and technical necessities which result from the consolidation of every disciplined political aggregate. . . .[19] It is the outcome of organic necessity, and consequently affects every organization, be it socialist or even anarchist."[20]

In concluding his study, Michels remarks with a flourish of defensive pathos, " . . . it seemed necessary to lay considerable stress upon the pessimist aspect of democracy which is forced upon us by historical study. . . ."[21] "The democratic currents of history resemble successive waves. They break ever on the same shoals. . . . It is probable that this cruel game will continue without end."[22]

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[17] W. Lloyd Warner and J. O. Low, *The Social System of the Modern Factory* (New Haven, 1947), pp. 78, 80, 174.

[18] Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (Glencoe, Ill., 1949), p. 400. Michel's work was first published in 1915.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 401.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 402.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 405.

Focussing, as Michels did, on an apparently democratic group, Philip Selznick examined the TVA, which many Americans had long believed to be an advanced expression of democratic values. Like Michels, Selznick assumes that "wherever there is organization, whether formally democratic or not, there is a split between the leader and the led, between the agent and the initiator. The phenomenon of abdication to bureaucratic directives in corporations, in trade unions, in parties, and in cooperatives is so widespread that it indicates a fundamental weakness of democracy."[23]

Selznick's study concludes that the TVA's emphasis on "decentralization" is to be best understood as a result of that agency's needs to adapt to suspicious local communities and to survive in competition with older governmental agencies based in Washington. "Decentralization" is viewed as a "halo that becomes especially useful in countries which prize the symbols of democracy."[24] In its turn, the TVA's emphasis on "participation" is explained as a catchword, satisfying the agency's needs to transform "an unorganized citizenry into a reliable instrument for the achievement of administrative goals. . . . "[25]

Selznick, like Michels, is impressed with the similarity in the organizational devices employed by different groups, whether they are democratic or authoritarian in ideology. He asserts " . . . there seems to be a continuum between the voluntary associations set up by the democratic (mass) state—such as committees of farmers to boost or control agricultural production—and the citizens' associations of the totalitarian (mass) state. Indeed the devices of corporatism emerge as relatively effective responses to the need to deal with the mass, and in time of war the administrative techniques of avowedly democratic countries and avowedly totalitarian countries tend to converge."[26]

In Selznick's analysis human action involves a commitment to two sets of interests: first to the *goals* intended, and second to the organizational *instruments* through which these goals are pursued. These tools are, however, recalcitrant; they generate "needs" which cannot be neglected. Hence if men persist in their ends, they are forced to satisfy the needs of their organizational instruments. They are, therefore, as much committed to their tools as to their ends, and "these commitments may lead to unanticipated consequences resulting in a deflection of original ends."[27]

For these reasons, organizational behavior must be interpreted not so much in terms of the *ends* that administrators deliberately seek, as in terms of the organizational "needs" which their pursuit engenders. "The needs in question are organizational, not individual, and include: the security of the organization as a whole in relation to social forces in its environment; the stability of the lines of authority and communication; the stability of informal relations within the organization; the continuity of policy and of the sources of its determination; a homogeneity of outlook with respect to the means and role of the organization."[28]

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[22] *Ibid.*, p. 408.

[23] Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949), p. 9.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 220.

[25] *Loc. cit.*

[26] *Loc. cit.*

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 259.

"In general," writes Selznick, "we have been concerned to formulate some of the underlying tendencies which are likely to inhibit the democratic process. Like all conservative or pessimistic criticism, such a statement of inherent problems seems to cast doubt upon the possibility of complete democratic achievment. It does cast such a doubt. The alternative, however, is the transformation of democracy into a utopian notion which, unaware of its internal dangers, is unarmed to meet them."[29] This, however, is an argument that rests upon assumptions which are not transparently self-evident and are acceptable without dispute only by those who are susceptible to its metaphysical pathos. Despite demagogic appeals to democratic symbols, there seem to be few places in either the Eastern or Western worlds in which there is a real and present danger of the "transformation of democracy into a utopian notion." Surely this is not to be expected among the class conscious working classes of Europe, the laborite masses of England, the untutored peasants of China, or among the confused and often apathetic American electorate to whom politics is something of a dirty game, to be periodically enlivened with scandals and investigations. And if this appraisal is correct, then just who is there to be "armed" with this knowledge of the internal dangers of democracy?

For some reason Selznick has chosen—and this was not forced upon him by the data—to focus on the things which harry and impede democratic aspirations, rather than on those which strengthen and energize it. It is for this reason perhaps that he is led to reiterate Michel's apologia: "Attention being focussed on the structural conditions which influence behavior, we are directed to emphasize constraints, the limitation of alternatives imposed by the system upon its participants. This will tend to give pessimistic overtones to the analysis, since such factors as good will and intelligence will be de-emphasized."[30]

Selznick chose to focus on those social constraints that *thwart* democratic aspirations, but neglected to consider the constraints that enable them to be *realized*, and that foster and encourage "good will" and "intelligence." Are these, however, random occurrences, mere historic butterflies which flit through events with only ephemeral beauty? Or are they, as much as anything else, often the unanticipated products of our "commitments"? Why is it that "unanticipated consequences" are always tacitly assumed to be destructive of democratic values and "bad"; why can't they sometimes be "good"? Are there no constraints which *force* men to adhere valorously to their democratic beliefs, which *compel* them to be intelligent rather than blind, which leave them *no choice* but to be men of good will rather than predators? The neglect of these possibilities suggests the presence of a distorting pathos.

It is the pathos of pessimism, rather than the compulsions of rigorous analysis, that lead to the assumption that organizational constraints have stacked the deck against democracy. For on the face of it there is every reason to assume that "the underlying tendencies which are likely to inhibit the democratic process" are just as likely to impair authoritarian rule. It is only in the light of such a pessimistic pathos that the defeat of democratic values can be assumed to be probable, while their victory is seen as a slender thing, delicately constituted and precariously balanced.

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[28] *Ibid.*, p. 252.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 265.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 252.

When, for example, Michels spoke of the "iron law of oligarchy," he attended solely to the ways in which organizational needs inhibit democratic possibilities. But the very same evidence to which he called attention could enable us to formulate the very opposite theorem—the "iron law of democracy." Even as Michels himself saw, if oligarchical waves repeatedly wash away the bridges of democracy, this eternal recurrence can happen only because men doggedly rebuild them after each inundation. Michels chose to dwell on only one aspect of this process, neglecting to consider this other side. There cannot be an iron law of oligarchy, however, unless there is an iron law of democracy.

Much the same may be said for Selznick. He posits certain organizational needs: a need for the *security* of the organization, for *stable* lines of authority and communication, for *stable* informal relationships. But for each of the organizational needs which Selznick postulates, a set of contrary needs can also be posited, and the satisfaction of these would seem to be just as necessary for the survival of an organization. If, as Selznick says, an organization must have security in its environment, then certainly Toynbee's observations that too much security can be stultifying and corrosive is at least as well taken. To Selznick's security need, a Toynbee might counterpose a need for a moderate *challenge* or *threat.*

A similar analysis might also be made of Selznick's postulated need for homogeneity of outlook concerning the means and role of the organization. For unless there is some *heterogeneity* of outlook, then where is an organization to find the tools and flexibility to cope with changes in its environment? Underlying Selznick's need for homogeneity in outlook, is there not another "need," *a need that consent of the governed be given—at least in some measure—to their governors?* Indeed, this would seem to be at the very core of Selznick's empirical analysis, though it is obscured in his high-level theoretical statement of the needs of organizations. And if all organizations must adjust to such a need for consent, is there not built into the very marrow of organization a large element of what we mean by democracy? This would appear to be an organizational constraint that makes oligarchies, and all separation of leaders from those led, no less inherently unstable than democratic organization.[31]

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[31] See Arthur Schweitzer, "Ideological Groups," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 9, pp. 415–27 (Aug., 1944), particularly his discussion of factors inhibiting oligarchy. For example, "A leadership concentrating all power in its hands creates indifference among the functionaries and sympathizers as well as decline in membership of the organization. This process of shrinkage, endangering the position of the leaders, is the best protection against the supposedly inevitable iron law of oligarchy" (p. 419). Much of the research deriving from the Lewinian tradition would seem to lend credence to this inference.

These contrary needs are just as real and just as consequential for organizational behavior as those proposed by Selznick. But they point in a different direction. They are oriented to problems of change, of growth, of challenging contingencies, of provoking and unsettling encounters. Selznick's analysis seems almost to imply that survival is possible only in an icy stasis, in which "security," "continuity," and "stability" are the key terms. If anything, the opposite seems more likely to be true, and organizational survival is impossible in such a state.

Wrapping themselves in the shrouds of nineteenth-century political economy, some social scientists appear to be bent on resurrecting a dismal science. For the iron law of wages, which maintained that workers could never improve their material standards of life, some sociologists have substituted the iron law of oligarchy, which declares that men cannot improve their political standards of life. Woven to a great extent out of theoretical whole cloth, much of the discussion of bureaucracy and of organizational needs seems to have provided a screen onto which some intellectuals have projected their own despair and pessimism, reinforcing the despair of others.

Perhaps the situation can be illuminated with an analogy. For many years now, infantile paralysis has killed and maimed scores of people. For many years also doctors, biologists, and chemists have been searching for the causes and cure of this disease. Consider the public reaction if, instead of reporting on their newest vaccines, these scientists had issued the following announcement: "We have not reached any conclusions concerning the causes of the disease, nor has our research investigated defenses against it. The public seems to have perfectionist aspirations of flawless health, they have 'utopian' illusions concerning the possibilities of immortality and it is this—not the disease—that is the danger against which the public needs to be armed. We must remember that the human animal is not immortal and that for definite reasons his lifespan is finite." It is likely, of course, that such scientists would be castigated for having usurped the prerogatives and functions of clergymen.

This, however, seems to parallel the way in which some social scientists have approached the study of organizational pathology. Instead of telling men how bureaucracy might be mitigated, they insist that it is inevitable. Instead of explaining how democratic patterns may, to some extent, be fortified and extended, they warn us that democracy cannot be perfect. Instead of controlling the disease, they suggest that we are deluded, or more politely, incurably romantic, for hoping to control it. Instead of assuming responsibilities as realistic clinicians, striving to further democratic potentialities wherever they can, many social scientists have become morticians, all too eager to bury men's hopes.[32]

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[32] We have sought to develop the positive implications of this approach to bureaucratic organization in *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Ill., 1954).

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# BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ARTICLE

## THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF NEO-LIBERALISM

Out of the maelstrom of totalitarian ideologies there has arisen in Europe, and more particularly in Germany, a movement and a political and economic ideology which calls itself liberalism. Though similar to traditional liberalism in a number of basic positions, this body of thought contains a sufficient number of novel elements to entitle it to evaluation on its own merits. It should not be disregarded simply because liberalism in its older forms is rather obsolete.[1] For this new form of liberalism has taken into account the criticisms leveled at its forebear by socialism and communism, as well as by conservatism and reactionary types of thinking. This continental liberalism "beyond Communism and Fascism" bears some striking resemblances to what is being expounded in this country and in England as the new conservatism; indeed, one of the movement's leaders has characterized his position as "liberal conservatism." However, this conservative note is linked with a certain social radicalism familiar to the student of English conservatism and liberalism—although, to be sure, all the lines of division are rather fluid. The fact that the notion of *ordo* is central in the neo-liberals' approach, and that they give conscious recognition to the role of the *ordo* concept in Thomist scholasticism, is highly significant.[2]

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[1] See Wilhelm Röpke, *Maas und Mitte* (Erlenbach-Zürich, E. Rentsch, 1950), p. 141; and Walter Eucken, *Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik* (Bern, A. Francke, 1952), p. 374.

[2] The journal of the movement is called *Ordo: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft.* Published at Düsseldorf, it has issued six volumes since 1948.

It was Wilhelm Röpke who called himself a Liberal Conservative, in the preface to his *Civitas Humana; Grundfragen der Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsreform* (Erlenbach-Zürich, E. Rentsch, 1944; English tr. by Cyril S. Fox, London, 1948), p. xvii. *Ordo*'s *Herausgeber* were Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm; its *Schriftleiter*, Fritz W. Meyer and Hans Otto Lenel; the editorial board has included Karl Brandt, Constantin von Dietze, Friedrich A. Hayek, Friedrich A. Lutz, Wilhelm Röpke, and Alexander Rüstow. A number of books have further clarified the neo-liberal position, notably *Wirtschaft ohne Wunder* (Erlenbach-Zürich, E. Rentsch, 1953), with contributions from Röpke, Rüstow, Luigi Einaudi, Ludwig Erhard, and others; and *Vollbeschäftigung, Inflation, Planwirtschaft* (Erlenbach-Zürich, E. Rentsch, 1951), with contributions from Eucken, Hayek, Röpke, Jacob Viner, and others; the approach in both is predominantly economic. The movement's main positions are described and, to a limited extent, analyzed in Ernst-Wolfram Dürr's *Wesen und Ziele des Ordoliberalismus* (Winterthur, Keller, 1954); it is a balanced portrait, but the emphasis is on economics, with primary attention to Eucken and Röpke. Dürr gives an extensive bibliography—which, however, neglects the relevant literature from English and American political science.

Another significant organization is the "Mount Pelerin Society," at Chicago, presided over by Hayek, with Frank Knight as secretary. Hayek and some of its other leaders contrast in many ways with the liberalism of the *Ordo* group. It undertakes a specific defense of capitalism in its *Capitalism and the Historians* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954), edited by Hayek, with contributions from T. S. Ashton, Louis Hacker, Hayek, W. H. Hutt, and Bertrand de Jouvenel—whereas the *Ordo* liberals, especially Röpke and Rüstow, are distinctly critical of capitalism. *Cf.* Röpke's *Civitas Humana*, p. 27: "We hope it is not necessary to say that we are not intending to hoist the much-tattered flag of 'Capitalism'. . . . Let us remember that 'capitalism' is the distorted and soiled form which mar-

As political scientists, we may be excused for starting with the concrete political manifestation of this new liberalism, which is basically conceived as an answer to the totalitarian challenge, whether Communist or Fascist. Although it antedates somewhat the rise of Hitler to power, its flowering has occurred only during and since the Second World War. Only recently there has come into existence an international liberal organization calling itself "The Liberal International." Based upon British initiative, it has issued a "liberal manifesto," and publishes a quarterly called *World Liberalism.*[3] The movement has a following in Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and in France and Italy;[4] but its particular strength, from an intellectual and political point of view, is to be found in Germany. Both Communist and Fascist movements have been strong in that country and have clashed in dramatic fashion, although both movements are today moribund, if not actually dead.

This strength of liberalism in Germany is rather paradoxical, considering the weakness of German liberalism in the past. The paradox can be at least partially explained by the fact that this past weakness lends to liberalism a certain aura of novelty.[5] Although its intellectual strength is not paralleled by political strength, it has considerable appeal. This appeal is personified in the figure of the Federal Republic's dynamic minister of economics, Ludwig Erhard. A jovial Bavarian and ex-professor of business economics, Erhard has become the spokesman of the creed of the neo-liberals in German and European politics.[6]

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ket economy assumed. . . . " *Capitalism and the Historians* tries to show that economic historians have spread a myth about capitalism's being responsible for an alleged deterioration of the position of the working classes—a view which is untenable in light of the more recent work in the field. Rüstow's pointed critique of laissez-faire economics is given in *Das Versagen des Wirtschaftsliberalismus als religionsgeschichtliches Problem* (New York, Europa Verlag, 1945).

[3] *World Liberalism* has published four volumes so far. It is edited by J. H. MacCallum-Scott, the International's general secretary.

[4] Mention should be made of the present President of Italy, Professor Luigi Einaudi; for an introduction to his ideas, see "Economia di concorrenza e capitalismo storico lo terza via fra i secoli XVIII e XIX," in *Rivista di Storia Economica,* Vol. 7, p. 49, 1942). See also his *Lezioni di politica sociale* (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1949), *Lezioni di politica economica* (Torino, G. Einaudi, 1944), and his vigorous espousal of European unity, *La Guerra e l'Unità Europea* (Milano, Comunità, 1948). Other neo-liberals in Italy are Carlo Antoni and Bresciani-Turoni. Among Swiss writers, beside Röpke, W. E. Rappard and Max Silberschmitt are important for political thought and history; among French writers are Raymond Aron, Louis Baudin, Bertrand de Jouvenel, Louis Rougier, and Jacques Rueff. Walter Lippmann's *The Good Society* (Boston, Little Brown, 1937) is very highly regarded by the whole neo-liberal movement, while De Tocqueville is a kind of patron saint.

[5] Note, however, the German concern for *Rechtsstaat,* which Hayek deals with in "Entstehung und Verfall des Rechtsstaatsideals," *Wirtschaft ohne Wunder,* p. 33—an able general analysis, although based on rather inadequate acquaintance with the literature in the field.

[6] A fairly sound and detailed assessment of Erhard and his policy appeared in *Fortune* for April–May, 1954. His views are mostly contained in his speeches, but see "Die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik im Blickfeld Europäischer Politik," *Wirtschaft ohne Wunder,* p. 128. The term "soziale Marktwirtschaft," however, was coined by Professor Alfred Müller-

The key slogan is the "social market economy" (*soziale Marktwirtschaft*), an economy which is definitely "free," as compared with a directed and planned economy, but which is subjected to controls, preferably in strictly legal form, designed to prevent the concentration of economic power, whether through cartels, trusts, or giant enterprise. Opposed to all and every kind of subvention, such as those which characterize American agricultural policy, the proponents of the "social market economy" call for governmental intervention only for the purpose of hastening impending changes by facilitating them. Thus agricultural producers who were engaged in an obsolete endeavor would be encouraged to abandon this line of work by being granted transitional support while changing over to another field, instead of being permitted to continue in their present line. In any case, the government must at all times maintain a free competitive market. *Leistungswettbewerb* ("achievement competition") is stressed; only such competition as results in superior production is considered genuine. Hence the movement not only is opposed to cartels and other manipulations, but vigorously supports fair trade practices legislation as well.[7]

Even this brief review shows that the neo-liberal movement is strongly economic in orientation. The neo-liberals see economics as "embedded" in politics, and are convinced that economic and political systems are strictly interrelated. In a very striking study concerning this relationship, Franz Böhm, one of the leading thinkers of the neo-liberal movement, comes to the conclusion that a market economy is the economic form of a political democracy:

> The experiences of the most recent past have shown us that the way to reform must be sought . . . in the direction of an intensification of competition, of a strengthening of the indirect institutions which are characteristic for systems of freedom, and of a decisive fight against both private and public power over the market, and of a reduction of planless interventions and authoritarian planning tendencies.[8]
>
> The competitive order possesses the quality of nearly ideal social substructure for a democratic political order [*Staatsordnung*], for it is based upon the idea of coordinating free human beings as much as possible by intelligently taking into account psychic reactions, social rules of the game, and the order of civil law, while at the same time employing the method of subordinating men to human command and the power of planning only to the extent necessary for the protection of the order of freedom and for the prevention of

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Armack, the imaginative author of *Genealogie der Wirtschaftsstile*, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1944) and other works.

[7] See Walter Eucken, *Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie*, 6th ed. (Berlin, Springer, 1939), pp. 196 ff., where the problem of economic power is analyzed; also his "Die Wettbewerbsordnung und ihre Verwirklichung," *Ordo*, Vol. 2, p. 1; Röpke, *Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart* (Erlenbach-Zürich, E. Rentsch, 1942; translated by the Jacobsohns as *The Social Crisis of Our Time*, London, 1950), Part 1, Ch. 3, and elsewhere; Franz Böhm, *Die Aufgaben der freien Marktwirtschaft* (München, Isar Verlag, 1951).

[8] Franz Böhm, *Wirtschaftsordnung und Staatsverfassung* (Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr. 1950), p. 69. See also Röpke, *Civitas Humana*, p. 85. This thought was clearly developed by Rudolf Stammler, especially in his *Wirtschaft und Recht*, (Leipzig, Veit, 1896), pp. 34f., and in his *Die Lehre von dem Richtigen Recht* (Berlin, J. Guttentag, 1902), tr. by Isaac Husik as *The Theory of Justice* (New York, Macmillan, 1925), pp. 184ff. But the Neo-liberals do not refer to him often and his works are not mentioned in their bibliographies.

> typical social injustices. . . . A purified competitive order will have to go much further in admitting coercion and governmental control than was done in the past. . . . [9]

It is obvious that the outlook of these men has distinct points of contact with the thought of liberal progressives in the United States as they have shaped anti-trust legislation and social security programs, as well as with the viewpoint of such liberal social thinkers as John Stuart Mill and L. T. Hobhouse.[10]

Though the economic aspects of neo-liberal thought are significant and interesting, their more specifically political thought is the focal concern of this analysis.[11] In the tradition of Aristotle, these neo-liberals see the political as primary—in itself a striking departure from certain dominant strands of traditional liberalism. To maintain this primacy of the political they want the state to be strong so that it can assert its authority vis-à-vis the interest groups that press upon the government and clamor for recognition of their particular needs and wants. The idea of the state as a strong and neutral guardian of the public interest, as contrasted with the private interests rampant in the market place, is familiar to the student of the history of political thought, especially that of Hegel and the Neo-Hegelians.[12] It was made central to the neo-liberal creed as set forth by its ablest exponent, Alexander Rüstow, more than twenty years ago in a programmatic declaration characteristically entitled, "Free Economy—Strong State."[13] Against all pluralistic interpretations, the state is seen as a central source of authority; yet at the same time, the state must not interfere in all kinds of activities, for this is not the sign of a strong state, but "a sign of lamentable weakness." The state can no longer withstand the attack of all the interest groups; it has become their "prey." This idea was also expressed by Hegel, who strongly objected to the state's interfering with everything. Referring obviously to the excesses of the French Revolution, Hegel wrote:

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[9] Böhm, p. 49. The same point is made very effectively by Rüstow, "Wirtschaftsform und Staatsform," in *Magna Charta der Sozialen Marktschaft* (Heidelberg-Ziegehausen, Vita Verlag, 1951). *Cf.* also Röpke, *Civitas Humana*, p. 85.

[10] See Leonard T. Hobhouse, *Liberalism* (New York, Holt, 1911), and John Stuart Mill's classics *On Liberty* and *Utilitarianism* as well as *Representative Government;* an interesting recent re-evaluation of these writers is that of John Plamenatz, *The English Utilitarians* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1949), Ch. 8; Plamenatz manages to distill the essence of Mill's liberalism—which is there in spite of all the contradictions and inconsistencies. Against Nietzsche's mocking remark that Mill appeared as such a mountain because he stood in such a complete plain, it suggests the elevation of the liberal foundation which Nietzsche could not see.

[11] It should be noted that writers such as Hayek and Ludwig von Mises, while obviously sharing a substantial number of the negative positions of this group—for example, the rejection of all forms of socialism and planning—take a more traditional view, and are therefore referred to by the neo-liberals as "palaeo-liberals"—old timers who do not recognize the lessons of Communism and Fascism. Likewise the thought of Joseph Schumpeter, especially as expressed in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York, Harper, 1942), must not be confused with this neo-liberalism; his defeatism in the face of the socialist movement issued politically in a sort of tired Austrian despair that opens the door to reactionary political movements.

[12] See Hegel's *Philosophy of Law and Right,* pars. 257 ff., and the comment by Erich Weil, *Hegel et l'État* (Paris, Vrin, 1950), p. 43.

[13] "Freie Wirtschaft—Starker Staat—Die Staatspolitischen Voraussetzungen des wirtschaftlichen Liberalismus," *Schriften des Vereins fur Sozialpolitik,* Vol. 187 (1932). See also Röpke's remarks against a pluralistic conception; *Civitas Humana,* especially p. 27.

> In the new, partly-developed theories it is the central prejudice that the state is a machine with a single spring which gives motion to the infinite remaining wheels. . . . The pedantic passion to determine everything in detail. . . . In the whole state, every bite should [according to these writers] be taken from the soil which produced it to the mouth in a straight line which state and law and government have investigated, calculated, corrected, and commanded. . . . The center of political authority, the government, should leave to the freedom of the citizens all that is not essential to its purpose. . . . Nothing should be more sacred [to a government] than to leave to the free action of its citizens all these matters. . . . For this freedom is sacred in itself.[14]

The neo-liberals, harking back to one of the earlier liberals, are fond of quoting Benjamin Constant: "Le gouvernement en dehors de sa sphère ne doit avoir aucun pouvoir; dans sa sphère il ne saurait en avoir trop" ("The government beyond its proper sphere ought not to have any power; within its sphere, it cannot have enough of it.").[15] To which remark Hegel would of course have said "Amen!"; like the neo-liberals, he would stress the role of the government and state as above the interest groups, setting the framework for their operation—in particular, formulating the law (*ordo* as general interest). It will be readily recognized by Americans that this is the generally accepted doctrine of American constitutional government. We may note in passing that these ideas were in turn important in shaping the thought of Comte and his sociological followers, especially in France.

But whereas for Hegel the state was given an absolute value rooted in its ethical purpose, the neo-liberals see the state merely as an instrumentality suited for the effective ordering of the community. For their stress is on community as contrasted with society. In buttressing this position, Rüstow has coined the interesting term, *Vitalpolitik* ("vital policy"), in contrast to *Sozialpolitik* ("social policy"), to designate an outlook which takes into account the "entire vital situation of man in all its essential components" and not merely the "few coarse external aspects which can be measured, as does traditional social policy."[16] This "vital situation of man" is the central value in terms of which the thought of the neo-liberals is oriented. It places them clearly in the tradition of secular humanism; but since they recognize the role of religion, it also puts them close to the more Aristotelian and humanistic strands of Catholicism. It makes them sympathetic to the thought of Anglicanism as contrasted with Puritanism, and with Catholicism as contrasted with Protestantism.[17] "The vital situation of man, which determines whether he is happy or unhappy, whether he feels well or ill, extends from the tangible facts of his income, of his profession, of his dwelling, of his family, to the intangibles of his subconscious, of his *Weltanschauung*, of his religion."[18] After having thus defined his conception, Rüstow notes that the present situation is unsatisfactory and in need of change. He believes that worthwhile change can and should be attempted: "Everywhere it must be our goal to create conditions and attitudes which make it possible for man to feel well."[19]

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[14] "Constitution of Germany," in my edition of *The Philosophy of Hegel* (New York, Modern Library, 1953), pp. 535–36; see also my introduction, p. xxiii.

[15] The quotation from Benjamin Constant is given by Röpke in his *Civitas Humana,* p. 28. Incidentally, Hegel's political philosophy owes much to Constant; in the view of Georg Lasson, Hegel began the reading of Constant as a youth in Bern, gave attention to him to the end of his life, and owes to him a good part of his monarchical liberalism. See Lasson's "Einleitung" to Hegel's *Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie* (Leipzig, F. Meiner, 1913), p. xi. The propensity toward constitutional monarchy of the older sort is strikingly illustrated in Röpke's *Die Deutsche Frage* (Erlenbach-Zürich, E. Rentsch, 1945), in which he recommends this form as a solution for the problem of how to reconstitute the *Rechtstaat.*

[16] "Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart," a radio lecture given by Rüstow on Oct. 26, 1952, which was printed in the *Berner Bund* for Jan. 23, 1953. See also his lecture, "Der Mensch in der Wirtschaft: Umrisse einer Vitalpolitik," which he gave on June 24, 1952, before the Wirtschaftsverband der deutschen Kautschukindustrie.

It is clear that such an outlook is far removed from any quietistic conservatism. The worldly, non-transcendental attitude of these neo-liberals is beyond doubt. But it is equally evident that their conception of happiness is broadly conceived and transcends material well-being, even though it definitely includes it.[20]

If this (with due elaboration) were all that could be said about the world of thought of the European neo-liberals, it would not seem sufficiently different from certain familiar patterns of Anglo-American liberalism to merit detailed theoretical analysis. But this general outlook has been given an exhaustive theoretical and historical underpinning by Alexander Rüstow in his major work, *Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart*.[21] A literal translation of the title would be "Determination of the Present's Location," which reveals at once the curious interlarding of spatial and temporal ideas involved in this extraordinary book. In a way it belongs in the same category as the work of Spengler and Toynbee, for it unfolds a vast canvas of universal history. But instead of being preoccupied as these were with the historical process as such, with the rise and fall of civilizations, Rüstow's *Ortsbestimmung* is a "critique of culture" (*Kulturkritik*); it has a distinctly pragmatic and activist flavor, as contrasted with the despondent pessimism that pervades Spengler, or the quietism and resignation that predominates in Toynbee. Its three volumes reveal this in their titles: the first is called *Ursprung der Herrschaft* ("Origin of Government or

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[17] Substantial elements of the Christian Democratic Union, for whom Ludwig Erhard is the spokesman, belong to this trend of Catholic thought.

[18] Rüstow, in the first lecture listed in note 16.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] We might recall in this connection Aristotle's description of happiness in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 8, which stresses that beside virtue and an activity of the soul, there is required for genuine well-being a complete life, including external goods of every description.

[21] Alexander Rüstow, *Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart*, Vols. 1 and 2 (Erlenbach-Zürich, E. Rentsch, 1952). The third volume is to be published in 1955. Reference to Rüstow's major work will be made in parentheses in the text—Roman numerals giving the volume, Arabic ones the page.

Rule"), the second *Weg der Freiheit* ("March of Freedom"), and the third *Herrschaft oder Freiheit* ("Rule or Freedom"). The titles suggest a serious difficulty for the English reader on account of their use of *Herrschaft.* This term has been employed in German writings to designate those more informal aspects of government—whether political or associational—which are suggested by the word "rule,"[22] but it is also employed to refer to the governing function and the government as such. Other terms which imply at times what *Herrschaft* refers to are "dominance" and "control."[23] The former of these clearly is equivalent to the Latin *dominus,* which in turn gave rise to the term *dominium.* "Dominance" has the further advantage of suggesting the contrast to freedom which Rüstow's titles clearly call for. On the other hand, in his historical analysis, Rüstow rather stresses the contrast between *Herrschaft* and *Genossenschaft,* a dichotomy familiar to students of political and legal theory and history from Otto von Gierke's monumental work, *Das Deutsche Genossenschaftrecht* (published in 1868–1913, in four volumes), which is built entirely on this antithesis. Gierke, in good romantic fashion, surmised that *Herrschaft* was the heritage of Rome and Roman law, while *Genossenschaft* was the principle of the Germanic folk community. Rüstow, on the other hand, asserts that these principles are of universal significance and application, and that they recur in the history of many peoples—obviously the sounder view.[24] *Genossenschaft* has also occasioned difficulties in interpretation;[25] in modern parlance it corresponds to "cooperative association," which might be contrasted with "imperative association."[26]

In line with his traditional liberalism, Rüstow takes a generally deprecatory attitude toward rule, government, and power. But these intrinsically undesirable forms of human association do acquire for him a relative and limited value as means toward an end. Just as the "free" market, in the thinking of the neo-liberal group, is actually "ordered" and "regulated" by human beings who devise the legal institutions for its successful operation and the maintenance of the competition prevailing therein,[27] so in the broader sphere of human endeavor, *Herrschaft* is seen as a vital factor in the evolution of civilization.

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[22] Note, for example, the title, *The Ruling Class,* used for an English translation (New York, 1939) for Gaetano Mosca's *Elementi di Scienza Politica,* which might just as well have been translated "The Governing Elite."

[23] Talcott Parsons, in rendering *Herrschaft* in the introduction to his translation of Max Weber's *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,* employs the expression "imperative control": see *Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,* translated by A. M. Henderson and Parsons (London, Oxford, 1947), esp. p. 152. Max Weber is important in Rüstow's thought.

[24] Nonetheless, the complete lack of reference to Von Gierke's thought is rather startling, since he developed the concepts and gave them their significant content. The indebtedness of Max Weber to Von Gierke has never been properly appreciated—part of a general failure to recognize Weber's juristic background, so strikingly seen in his insistence upon abstract definitions.

[25] Maitland suggested that "fellowship" would be the most appropriate English rendering for *Genossenschaft*—for which the natural antithesis would be "lordship." Johannes Althusius, upon whose thought Gierke built his own, coined the phrase *consociatio symbiotica* to describe the organic and interdependent relationship. The terminological problem is highly complex. See Pollock and Maitland, *History of English Law,* 2 vols. (Cambridge, University Press, 1895); also Maitland, *Political Theories of the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, University Press, 1900).

[26] Parsons, p. 153, speaks of an "imperatively coordinated group," in rendering Max Weber's *Herrschaftsverband.*

In seeking to establish the "point at which we have arrived at the present time" (the literal transcription of his main title), Rüstow insists that we must return to the beginnings of human civilization. In so doing, he makes extensive use of the work of ethnologists and anthropologists, in particular the Vienna School of Father Wilhelm Schmidt.[28] Rüstow asks how it could happen that about 10,000 years ago there set in a process of rapid and radical change leading to the production of the great cultures of man, when for long ages preceding no such phenomena can be observed. He answers that this development is the result of *Ueberlagerung*, the "super-imposition" of one culture over another, resulting from conquest. In the isolation of the last ice age, those men who had learned to herd horses and other animals attacked and overwhelmed the settled farmers and established themselves as rulers. Rüstow sees this process as repeating itself again and again, with the conquerors achieving their supremacy not as a result of higher culture but by means of their superiority in military technique. There then sets in a slow process of amalgamation of the two layers. For long periods the layers may stay separate, a state of affairs which Rüstow calls *Ueberschichtung* ("over-laying"). The resulting dualistic social structure he proposes to call broadly "medieval," employing this term, along with "feudalism," as applicable to any sort of situation that can satisfy the indicated criteria.[29] The typically "feudal" social structure is characterized by rigid division into a layer of *Ueberlagerer*, conquerors who have successfully superimposed themselves, and a broader layer of *Ueberlagerte*, the conquered who have come to accept their masters. The idea of *Ueberlagerung* is of course not entirely novel, nor does Rüstow pretend that it is: in an appendix (I, 84–92), he gives a sketch of this notion from Ibn Khaldoun to Karl Mannheim. He expresses approval of Mannheim's attempt to transcend the Marxist overemphasis on economic factors, and quotes his statement that "in the last analysis the *ultima ratio*, both in our external political relations and in our final decisions in internal politics, is force." This unhappy notion is at variance with Rüstow's own idea of the *Genossenschaftsstaat*, which obviously does not rest on force. The key expounders of the conquest theory of the state are Gumplowicz and Oppenheimer—but surely power is generated by consent as well as by constraint.[30] We encounter here, clearly, a Marxist heritage that is related to Rousseau and anarchism.

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[27] There is no indication that the thought of these neo-liberals has profited from the path-finding work of John R. Commons, especially his *Legal Foundations of Capitalism* (New York, Macmillan, 1932), in which the legal institutions of the market are fully explored.

[28] This school is radically diffusionist in outlook and insists upon the interpenetration of all cultural processes and phenomena. See Wilhelm Schmidt and W. Koppers, *Völker und Kulturen* (Regensburg, Habbel, 1924), Vol. 1, and Schmidt's *Rassen und Völker in Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des Abendlandes*, 3 vols. (Lucerne, Stocker, 1946–49). See also Wilhelm Schmidt, *The Culture Historical Method of Ethnology*, tr. Sieber (New York, Fortuny's, 1939), a translation of his *Handbuch der Methode des Kulturhistorischen Ethnologie*, with an introduction by Clyde Kluckhohn, who acknowledges his debt to Schmidt. Rüstow wrote (I, 286) that when he first encountered Schmidt's ideas they acted as a "revelation concerning universal history."

[29] Rüstow employs Max Weber's expression *Idealtypus*—though like Weber he leaves it unclear as to what is to be understood by it, or why his particular design should be considered "ideal." A searching critique of the methodological problems raised by the "ideal type" still remains to be written. Wilhelm Eucken, *Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie*, pp. 41, 162, and 268, develops a suggestive distinction between *Ideal-* and *Realtypen*, according to which "capitalism" would be a "real type," while ideal types are not images of reality: they are constructs which are used as measuring rods. Eucken points out that the concept of an "ideal type" was derived by Weber from Georg Jellinek's *Allgemeine Staatslehre*. The concept has a long history; it is discussed, for example, by John Stuart Mill in his *Logic*, Book 6, Ch. 9, par. 3. *Cf.* Alexander von Schelting's discussion in

If one asks just why a higher culture results from *Ueberlagerung*, that is, from conquest and dominance relations and the resultant rule, Rüstow answers that this *Herrschaft* makes possible the effective organization of large numbers of human beings over large areas. He enunciates (I, 39) a "law of the culture pyramid" which results from the need for an elaborate division of labor, without which any higher culture is impossible. This law states that there is a relation between the breadth of the base and the height which the culture can achieve. Primitive groups of small extent are incapable of reaching a high cultural level.[31] Rüstow advances a wide range of ideas concerning the origin of great cultures, building upon the research of many specialists who have dealt with pre-history and who have, in recent years, clarified such matters as the origin of nomads and peasants, the role of cattle and horse herders, and, finally, the role of the horseriding conquerors who emerged from Inner Asia at the beginning of historical times in successive waves (I, 42–83). For political theory, what is decisive is the stress Rüstow lays upon conquest as the origin of "the state"—which he defines very broadly in terms of sovereignty, i.e., of independence with respect to the outside, and final say with respect to the inside, of a given community. Such a state may be based either upon community or upon dominance; it may be either *Genossenschaftsstaat* or *Klassenstaat* (composed of

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*Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1934), p. 319, and Talcott Parsons' attempt to clarify the problem in *The Structure of Social Action* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1937), p. 601. The ill effects of Weber's use of the notion of ideal type are illustrated in his discussion of bureaucracy; see my paper in *Reader in Bureaucracy*, ed. Merton (Glencoe, Free Press, 1952.)

[30] Ludwig Gumplowicz, *Der Rassenkampf* (Innsbruck, Wagner'sche University (1909); Franz Oppenheimer, *Der Staat*, Vol. 2 of his *System der Soziologie* (Jena, Fischer, 1926); and the work of Lester F. Ward. *Cf.* also Alfred Vierkandt's *Gesellschaftslehre;* Fritz Kern, *Die Anfänge der Weltgeschichte* (Bern, Francke, 1953); and Alfred Weber, *Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie* 2nd ed. (München, Piper, 1935). But see my *Constitutional Government and Democracy*, 3rd ed. (Boston, Ginn, 1950), p. 22.

[31] Rüstow notes that this "law" was clearly stated by Adolphe Coste, a 19th century French sociologist, who described it in his *Principes d'une sociologie objective* (Paris, Alcan, 1899), pp. 154–56.

equal and cooperating members, or of classes, one ruling and the other ruled). In other words, the "state" may be either of one layer or of two (I, 118). Rüstow regards democracy, when defined as majority rule, as merely the inversion of the state based upon dominance—an *Ueberlagerung der Ueberlagerten.*

There is a good deal of elitist thinking among these neo-liberals, with little appreciation of the role of the common man.[32] Many of them—although not Rüstow—confuse the common man with the mass man, in the manner of Ortega y Gasset. Although their idea of the constitution as the creative act of instituting the free market economy requires an elaboration of their image of man along democratic lines, showing that he is capable of much "common sense," they do not see democracy in this perspective. There is a general tendency to confuse constitutional democracy with the anarchic majoritarian democracy that the Jacobins read into Rousseau, and to see totalitarian dictatorship as its inescapable fruit.

The importance of constitutionalism is not given adequate attention by Rüstow or any of the other members of the group, although Hayek has emphasized the importance of the rule of law, the *Rechtstaat.* But this rule of law surely implies certain notions associated with constitutionalism—that the constitutional order owes its being to the action of a constituent power which is the people's, that the people at large continue as the constitutional legislator in amending the constitution, that the constitution has to provide for the separation of powers and has to protect each citizen's private sphere by due process, and so on. These ideas are not traced in Rüstow's broad treatment of freedom's march through history, nor are they given adequate recognition in any of the group's other efforts. There is not a single thorough study of the *ordo constitutionalis,* its genesis, and its nature, in all the six volumes of *Ordo.*

When noting the advantages of democratization, Rüstow merely mentions in passing that the exercise of power is subject to fixed rules and procedures; the conflict between democratic power and restraining rules is not adequately spelled out, in spite of the large English and American literature on this subject. As a result, the notion of a state based upon community (*Gemeinschaftsstaat*) never becomes very distinct. The oft-repeated theme of Rüstow's *Ortsbestimmung* identifies the state of advanced culture with the *Ueberlagerungstaat:*

> The state of advanced cultures was created by superimposition. These advanced cultures, which could only develop by a division of labor within this state, are based upon *Ueberschichtung.* The feudal stigma of this principle of superimposition has remained intact at the most diverse points in state, society, and culture, and is easily recognizable. We are confronted with a catastrophic relapse into the most brutal superimposition (I, 104).

But this recognition of conquest and superimposition as culture-creating factors does not lead Rüstow to a pessimistic assessment: he retains a stout faith in the basic goodness of man. It is natural for man to live in a genuine community, and this desire to achieve community affects not only the conquered but also the conquerors. We have here a clear reassertion of the classical liberal and democratic belief in man as a sociable being with basically coopertive propensities.[33] The antinomy between what the conquest has done for man and what he is really after, is strongly reminiscent of Kant's philosophy of history. The process of history is seen as pushing man onward and upward—but only on the assumption that man faces up to his tasks and is prepared to be the master of his potentialities.

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[32] See, for example, Louis Baudin, *Die Theorie der Eliten* (Sonderdruck, Monatshefte, 1953).

Among the most stimulating portions of Rustow's great opus are those sections in which he traces the impact of the "feudal" principle upon society. Like a veritable detective, he uncovers this principle in family and education, in religion, and even (following psychoanalytic lines of inquiry) in the conscience of the self. Sadism and masochism are the individual-psychological reflections of the conquerors and the conquered (I, 118). The priests, developing elaborate theologies, are the willing instruments of rulers and provide the justification for the superimposition which is called for by the conquerors' desire to legitimize their rule—i.e., to make it "communal"—(I, 124). Rüstow traces, in a fashion reminiscent of Veblen, the retention of feudal habits in customs of daily living. He writes a bitter critique of what has come to be the *cauchemar* of progressive educators everywhere: the "authoritarian" approach to the young; for it Rüstow would substitute genuine authority (I, 140). It is characteristic of this "feudal" heritage that education is monopolized by the upper classes, that the relationships in the factory and on the farm are conceived in terms of command and obedience, of ordering and subordination (I, 165 and 183).

While Rüstow's analysis is couched in general terms and presumably has universal application, it is not difficult to see that it provides more specifically a critique of German culture. Many of the familiar issues Americans have been arguing over in connection with the problem of Germany in recent years are put in terms that will command widespread approval—even if occasionally interspersed with suggestions that imply that all is not well in the Anglo-Saxon world, that imperialism and colonialism, and the treatment of Negroes and Indians, fit into a pattern that is uncomfortably close to the German one. What all this adds up to is in a sense a theoretical analysis of the factors that went into the totalitarian tendencies of our time—the central concern, as we have already noted, of the entire neo-liberal group. This is strikingly illustrated by Rüstow's treatment of the "race myth" as derived from conquest and *Ueberlagerung:*

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[33] But this belief is not fortified by adequate consideration of the problems which mass society and mass man present. In *The New Belief in the Common Man* (Boston, Little Brown, 1942, later republished with a prologue and epilogue as *The New Image of the Common Man* (Boston, Beacon 1951), I tried to suggest the lines which such a restatement might take—by the projection of human potentialities as the image of a "communal man" (*Gemeinschaftsmensch*). The issue goes back to the problems of Greek politics: when Aristotle says that man is a being living in a *polis*, he is essentially asserting this need for community. The dangers of total absorption as exemplified in the political philosophy of Plato have recently been increasingly recognized, although the attack is overdone in such writings as Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (London, Routledge, 1945), Vol. 1. What is needed is a balanced concept of man's individual and communal needs and potentialities, and this the *Ordo* liberals are trying to achieve. See Röpke's two works cited in notes 1 and 2; also Clyde Kluckhohn, *The Mirror for Man* (New York, Whittlesey House, 1949).

> The race theory is a typical product of a dual social structure caused by *Ueberlagerung*. It is bound to get involved in insoluble inner contradictions when it is to be propagated together with the myth of the people's community (*Volksgemeinschaft*), for the latter denies—theoretically at least—all layers (*Mehrschichtigkeit*) (I, 158).

But if we are thus engulfed by the survivals of "feudalism" and of conquest, how can we hope to escape from all this disastrous heritage, especially in view of the "catastrophic relapse" which Rüstow and his friends fear? The answer to this question is to be found on the one hand in those natural cooperative and communal tendencies of man, and on the other in self-generated forces which the very process of *Ueberlagerung* and of rule and dominance has set on foot. We see once again the older English liberalism's faith in man, especially the common man, and also the faith of the older German liberalism, that of Kant and Hegel, in an inherent dialectic in historical processes. Rüstow treats these matters under the heading of "transfeudal forces in advanced cultures" and describes them essentially as "tendencies." He notes the tendency toward community already mentioned and the related tendency toward democratization, as well as toward expansion, monarchy, rule of law, plutocracy, bureaucratization, popular armies, division of labor and specialization, urbanization, rationalization, secularization, and the egalitarian and normative tendencies associated with these. It will be seen that these are the constitutive factors of modern society and of its government and politics.[34] These tendencies, where they do not derive from "human nature," are caused by the rulership which the superimposition had brought about, often in a complex historical dialectic which is only hinted at here and there.

Thus bureaucratization is rightly stressed as one of the major factors which enabled the monarchs of early modern Europe to combat and eventually to subdue the feudal aristocracies, but which in the process developed an *esprit de corps* of its own which tended to rationalize administration and thereby set limits to the arbitrary will of the monarch. The stress laid upon the bureaucracy and its objectivity,[35] as perhaps the most distinctive trend away from the state based upon superimposition, is reminiscent of Hegel, who in his assessment of the development of freedom had contrasted Germany (especially under its constitutional monarchies) favorably with Britain by stressing the role of the officialdom, which served to reinforce the objective and hence moral position of the monarch "above the estates."[36] This does not mean, of course, that Rüstow and the neo-liberals are unaware of the dangers of bureaucratic control—far from it:

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[34] The treatment of these "tendencies" is on the whole rather sketchy, based as it is largely upon the analysis offered by Max Weber. Very little attention is given to the recent extensive American literature on the subject of bureaucratization. For the topic of *Rechtstaat*, which is crucial for Rüstow's thesis, not a single reference is given; all the English and American writings on the rule of law and of constitutionalism seem to count for nothing. Of course they are not based upon the idea that conquest and dominance are so important for the development of the "state," nor would they agree with Rüstow's view of feudalism, which neglects the feudal origins of Western, and more particularly British, constitutionalism. On the *Rechtstaat*, see Hayek's article cited in note 5.

[35] Thus Rüstow would have the bureaucracy the main factor in the process of crystallizing a "public" and a "general" interest: "By way of the professional officialdom with its division of labor . . . there occurred for the first time an ever-clearer disentangling and separating of the two interests (the private and the public), with the general interest concentrated . . . in the hands of the professional civil service" (I, 244). In the light of English parliamentary history, this view is a difficult one for Englishmen and Americans to accept.

> The worst and nowadays most actual danger of corruption of the professional officialdom lies in the drifting away from conscientious and democratically responsible administration toward absolutistic rule (*Herrschaft*), a drift which turns the official into the master of the people rather than its servant—that is to say, into its *Ueberlagerer* (I, 245).

In all totalitarian states this change is officially brought about, and is one of their most striking characteristics, Rüstow thinks; but the same trend is appearing in democratic countries. This led to unqualified attacks upon bureaucracy, attacks which he regrets, because "a sound professional officialdom belongs among the most needed and most dependable components of a democratic state" (I, 246).[37]

From these tendencies, which the feudal order has partially generated but failed to suppress, Rüstow turns to the essential conditions for the life of advanced cultures. He notes five: a sufficient space within which to develop, the growth of cities as cradles of higher culture, defensive ability, something he calls *die Geschlossenheit des Lebenskreises,* and freedom. By the "closed circle of life," Rüstow means essentially the closely-knit community with its shared values, beliefs, feeling, and intimacies, which John Dewey explored in *The Public and Its Problems.*

In the worthy tradition of Romanticism and the German Youth Movement, Rüstow asserts that "it is fundamentally important to realize clearly that among the main human ways of life which have so far been developed, that of the peasant is the one genuinely appropriate to the natural essence of man" (I, 263). The life of the peasant and of the rural craftsman is meaningful and vitally independent.[38] These neo-liberal notions are familar to all students of American political thought as Jeffersonian, for Jefferson more than any other thinker stressed the importance of the small, self-reliant, and independent farmer for the health and well-being of a free society. Related to this position is the stress Rüstow lays upon the small community;[39] he recalls the thought of Plato, Aristotle, and Rousseau on this score, and cites Rousseau's famous advice on the government of Poland: "En un mot, appliquez-vous à étendre et perfectionner le système des governments fédératifs, le seul qui réunisse les avantages des grands et des petits états. . . . " Unfortunately, Rüstow does not explore further the problem of federalism.

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[36] The "estates" (*Stände*) occupy in Hegel's thought the place which in Rüstow is taken by the "interests" and the parties which pluralistically represent them and thus threaten "to devour the state." [For Hegel, see *Philosophy of Right and Law,* pars. 50–256, 301–315.] See my edition of *Hegel's Philosophy of History,* pp. 229, 308, and the comment in the introduction.

[37] Rüstow observes that it is therefore essential to explore the conditions and limits of such healthy bureaucracy, but seems to be unaware that a great deal of work has been done in England and America on precisely this problem. With Taylor Cole, I published *Responsible Bureaucracy: A Study of the Swiss Civil Service* (Cambridge, 1932), and followed this with a study entitled *Responsible Government Service* (New York, 1935), which dealt with the United States. See also the bibliography for Chapter 19 of my *Constitutional Government and Democracy* and the more recent study of Charles S. Hyneman, *Bureaucracy in a Democracy* (New York, 1950).

[38] Wilhelm Röpke also stressed the need for combating "proletarianization," "congestion," and the trend toward excessive size in general; see his *Civitas Humana,* Chs. 6–9, and *The Social Crisis of Our Time,* pp. 199–223. There are obvious links to the Ameri-

The key concept of Rüstow's philosophy is—as might be expected of a liberal—that of freedom. *Freiheit* provides the focus of his second volume, dealing with the road to freedom or rather the "way of freedom." His analysis is a broad panorama of the development of political thought and institutions. The great path-finders of freedom in our Western culture were the Greeks, but to the extent that freedom is presaged and made possible by the free spirit (*Geistesfreiheit*), a corresponding development took place in China and India. At the outset:

> The fateful step forward from the primitiveness of the natural peoples and archaic peasants to higher culture was achieved by superimposition and was paid for by rule and subjection. The decisive question posited by fate [is] whether, when, and how it would be possible to regain a freedom which is appropriate to human nature. . . .

This position is close to Hegel's, and yet at the same time opposed to it. Hegel too thought of history as the march of freedom; he gave his freedom a spiritual connotation. But whereas Hegel linked the march of freedom to a transcendental world spirit manifesting itself in successive folk spirits, Rüstow would argue that this march of freedom is the work of human beings motivated by an inherent love of freedom—which they originally possessed and have been struggling to recapture these many thousand years. This "humanizing" of the Hegelian position is of great importance: Rüstow's entire work may in a sense be seen as an effort to overcome Hegelianism.[40]

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can trend exemplified by Mr. Justice Brandeis' *The Curse of Bigness* (New York, 1934), and Thurman Arnold's *The Folklore of Capitalism* (New Haven, 1937). For a sharply contrasting view, see T. S. Ashton, "Treatment of Capitalism by Historians," in *Capitalism and the Historians*, p. 33.

[39] In the United States and elsewhere, the problem of the closely-knit neighborhood has received increasing attention. Modern architecture recognizes the need for planning community centers and the like. In Italy a keen appreciation of the issue has led to the organizing of the Community movement, with a journal, *Rivista del Movimento Comunità*, now in its 8th year, directed by A. Olivetti. The movement is European in scope; it finds expression in the *Conseil des Communs d'Europe*, composed of national associations in most of the members of the Council of Europe. It is rightly based upon the notion that only strong local communities can ensure the development of genuine democracy.

[40] Rüstow's judgment of Hegel is unduly harsh: he does not seem to be aware of the extent to which his own work is in the Hegelian tradition (the same is true of a number of other German writers of this general type, notably Alfred Weber). He has in common with Hegel the emphasis upon a constitutionally limited and legally defined freedom, and an enthusiasm for the Greeks, more especially the Athenians. They also share quite a few other general judgments—for example, the notion that conquest and all that goes with it are forces for a basically necessary and intrinsically desirable evolution.

In tracing the march of freedom, Rüstow concentrates upon Western culture. He sees the Greeks as the protagonists of the "break-through" of freedom:

> Within the confines of Western Culture, it was the Greeks who, as *Heros Archegetes*, achieved the break-through first and uniquely, as prototype and example, and classically—that is with an effect and validity for all later times down to today. This achievement lifts the Greeks and their history above the history of all the other peoples of our world. It makes their history our concern in the highest sense. It makes their history at least as important to us as our own history, which receives its highest task and its world-historical dignity and significance only through the assumption and administration of this heritage (II, 11).[41]

This emphasis upon the Greek cultural achievement is carried by Rüstow to the point where it overshadows the coming of Christianity as a way-station in the march of freedom. Hegel, on the other hand, had stressed the fact that Greeks called only themselves free, whereas the Christian challenge vindicated this freedom for all men. However, Hegel's moving treatment of the advent of Christianity as the decisive event in the history of freedom was never philosophically integrated with the other key idea of his philosophy of history, namely, that the world spirit moves toward its realization through the successive stages of consciousness which the spirit achieves in a sequence of world-historical peoples.

> The nature of God as pure spirit is revealed to man in the Christian religion. . . . It is not right to think of Christ only as a past historical person. . . . For if one considers Him only according to his talents, character, and morality—as a teacher and the like—one places Him on the same level with Socrates and others, even if one puts his morals higher. . . . If Christ is merely a splendid, even a sinless individual, . . . the notion of absolute truth is being denied.[42]

This merging of reason and religion led Hegel to assert that reason is the essence of the spirit, of the divine as well as the human. Religion is reason in mind and heart, it is a "temple of freedom in God," whereas the "temple of human freedom is the state." As we have already seen, this sort of deification of the state is as far from the view of present-day neo-liberals as it was from that of English liberalism. It may be questioned whether Hegel was not more nearly right in his insistence upon the unique importance of the coming of Christ for the history of freedom.[43]

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[41] These phrases are strongly reminiscent of Hegel's enthusiasm, indeed almost a vindication of Hegel's exclamation: "Greece, oh my Greece, you will yet be resurrected!" (See my introduction to *The Philosophy of Hegel*, p. xvii). Yet Rüstow, unlike Hegel, does not fully appreciate the significance of slavery as a limiting aspect of Greek notions of freedom; indeed he makes every effort to minimize its significance, likening it to domestic service in the West. See II, 41, where the problem is discussed in the context of a critique of Jakob Burckhardt's *Grieschische Kulturgeschichte*. Rüstow rejects Burckhardt's bitterly critical view of the *polis:* in my view, Burckhardt has the better of the argument.

[42] Cited in my edition of *The Philosophy of Hegel*, p. 87. Hegel's notion that absolute truth is revealed in the Christian message was and is so unacceptable to many of his intellectual followers that this crucial aspect of his philosophy of history is often overlooked, and his viewpoint is given an immanentist and secular turn.

[43] There is a related point of divergence between the neo-liberals and earlier thought on the subject of the Reformation. Rüstow and others see the Reformation as primarily

In the modern West, according to Rüstow, the decisive turning points are Humanism and the Renaissance. Closely paralled by the Enlightenment, they and their intellectual exponents mark the path of freedom,[44] while Reformation and Counter-Reformation, Baroque and Absolutism, Romanticism and Totalitarianism, belong together and mark the opposite trend. This surely is a great oversimplification, and does scant justice to the decisive importance of the role which Christianity, especially Protestantism, has played in the history of freedom. The point is so obvious to English and American readers as hardly to need laboring. Is Lincoln thinkable without Luther? Or Cromwell without Calvin? Luther may have been ready, in keeping with the New Testament, to urge compliance with established authority in matters of secular concern; but he was dramatically emphatic in his insistence upon the inner light of faith and the decisive role of conscience. And the Protestant doctrine of the calling, though building upon medieval precedents, surely enabled the representatives of the people—the estates' assemblies whom Calvin called *ephors*—to see their duty in a new light, as Wolzendorf has shown. Other criticisms of this sort might be raised against Rüstow's tendency to see all history as a millennial struggle between Blacks and Whites, and to resolve the slow evolution of constitutional democracy into a simple battle of the secular rationalists against all others.

It will have been noticed that dichotomies play a very important part in the thought of Rüstow and all of the neo-liberals. Starting from the distinction between the market economy and the planned economy, their thought makes use of such paired concepts as fellowship (*Genossenschaft*) and rule (*Herrschaft*), community (*Gemeinschaft*) and super-imposition (*Ueberlagerung*), competition (*Wettbewerb*) and monopoly (*Monopol*). Such pairs of contrasts are well suited to highlight an issue; it is more than doubtful that they have any close resemblance to what we find in the real world. They make for a two-party system in the intellectual arena, rather than a many-sided discussion among individual seekers after truth. The approach of an Aristotle, oriented as it is

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anti-liberal and anti-democratic: with Engels and his latter-day followers, he stresses Luther's turning against the peasants in 1525, without giving adequate weight to other aspects of Luther's writings, or to the peasants' own very dubious case. Regarding this problem see my *Inevitable Peace* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University, 1948), Ch. 4, entitled "Peace and Natural Law: The Christian Tradition"; see also Bishop Hanns Lilje's *Luther: Anbruch und Krise der Neuzeit* (Nurnberg, Laetare, 1952). For Rüstow's views see II, Ch. 20, especially p. 288. Rüstow feels that his view of Luther is "historical" and that his condemnation is an inevitable consequence of the value decisions upon which his work is based. One may question both propositions.

[44] It will be observed that this viewpoint is conventional in England and America, except for the stress on the French Revolution. The peculiar importance for the whole trend of the stress on law has been made the key to his analysis by Frederick M. Watkins —himself a conservative liberal—in *The Political Tradition of the West* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948). Watkins, of course, emphasizes the growth of constitutionalism as represented by British and American thought, which Rüstow recognizes without adequately stressing the central importance of the concept of the constitution. See my *Constitutional Government and Democracy*, Ch. 1.

toward observable regularities in the real world, is more bewildering, but also more likely to be adequate for scientific purposes.[45] But certainly neo-liberal political theory is an effective ideological weapon in the struggle to transcend totalitarianism; it derives its cohesion and drive to some extent from this effective polarization. By absorbing and at the same time transcending the Hegelian heritage of continental liberalism,[46] the neo-liberalism of the *Ordo* group bids fair to reinforce recuperative and renovating trends in Western European politics. Its pronounced anti-capitalism, when combined with its equally pronounced anti-socialism, provides the underpinnings for a critical approach to the governmental and organizational problems of industrial society. Its keen awareness of the power aspect of this kind of society—with its vast accumulations of capital through giant corporations, trusts, cartels, and other forms of economic power "in restraint of trade"—provides a significant competitor to the socialist criticism of these phenomena, since it recognizes the even more dangerous potentialities of the "state" in all those matters—the state being power *par excellence*. Rejecting vigorously the socialist quietism which would entrust all to "Father State,"[47] it is ready to undertake a fresh start in fulfilling the basic task of Western politics: that of defining ever more precisely and legally but firmly the "proper limits" between government and society. With all their shortcomings, the European neo-liberals are resuming the never-ending task of balancing social justice and freedom, communal man and individual man, reason and will.

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[45] Eucken's interesting effort at analysis in terms of both real types and ideal types (see note 29) has much to recommend it, but is not followed to any extent by Rüstow, Röpke, Böhm, or any other writers. Rüstow has criticized Eucken's position in a paper entitled "Der Idealtypus oder die Gestalt als Norm," in *Studium Generale*, Vol. 6 (1952).

[46] Guido de Ruggiero, *The History of European Liberalism* (London, 1927), wisely made Hegel a central focus of his analysis of the German liberal tradition, but failed to develop adequately its inherent dangers.

[47] See Rüstow's *Zwischen Kapitalismus und Kommunismus* (Godesberg, Küpper, 1949). Likewise rejected by these liberals is the democratic quietism which accepts the pluralism of competing interests and pressure groups as somehow issuing in a parallelogram of forces from which the public interest emerges in adequate doses. In lieu of the many familiar political items cited in my *Constitutional Government and Democracy*, I may mention only Kenneth Galbraith's imaginative *American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1952). Precisely this notion of the counterweight is found in Röpke.

# BOOK REVIEWS

*In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations.* By Trygve Lie. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1954. Pp. xv, 473.)

In this interesting book, Trygve Lie narrates his seven years' experience as Secretary General of the United Nations. With engaging candor he admits the reader to the details of his activities, his motivations, his feelings, his estimates of others. No one has had a better opportunity to appraise the inner workings of international relations from an objective point of view during the exciting period since World War II when the general optimism following victory and commitments to harmony in the United Nations Charter degenerated into cold war, frustrations, and unenthusiastic coexistence of hostile ideologies in an H-bomb stalemate. Trygve Lie went through many trials and admits that the boycott against him by the Soviet Union, after extension of his term of office by action of the General Assembly in 1950, was a major factor in his resignation two years later. This boycott, ostensibly based on the incompetence of the General Assembly to extend the term of the Secretary General without Security Council recommendation, was in fact an effort of the Communist states to punish Mr. Lie for supporting United Nations principles by rallying United Nations forces against aggression in Korea. In 1950, Mr. Lie thought that withdrawal of his name for reappointment, which he had contemplated, would constitute a yielding to the pressure of the aggressors, but in 1952 the situation had changed and he thought there "was a larger consideration. I want the office of Secretary General to be in a position to wield its constitutional powers with the greatest possible degree of influence and prestige. When the Secretary General speaks or acts for peace and freedom in some future crisis, he should have behind him not only the weight of his constitutional authority, but the weight of political influence conferred upon him by the fact that he is in office by the affirmative votes of all five permanent members of the Security Council and is recognized as Secretary General by all member states" (p. 411). Since he did not occupy this position at the time, he thought his resignation would be in the interest of the United Nations.

After his resignation speech was made in the General Assembly on November 10, 1952, and the search was proceeding for his successor, he suffered his greatest trials. The negotiations for the Korean armistice dragged on, the insulting attitude of the Soviet Union was manifested in even more vigorous terms, and the United States, under what he describes as an incomprehensible hysteria of public opinion, continued to attack the Secretariat. Amidst these trials, Abe Feller, the General Counsel of the United Nations, committed suicide. "Shock and grief engulfed me," writes Trygve Lie. "Abe Feller had been nearer to me than anyone else outside the circle of my immediate family. . . . No doubt he was a victim of the witch hunt, of the awful pressure of the hysterical assault upon the United Nations that reactionaries were promoting and using for their own ends. He was a liberal in politics and a conservative in his lawyer-like respect for due process. He knew that no American in the Secretariat had ever been indicted for espionage or any other subversive activity against his country. Although he felt as strongly as I that the United Nations officials who had pleaded the Fifth Amendment had betrayed their obligation and should be removed, he had a genuine sympathy for the victims of the headline hunting investigations and resented deeply the 'smear' against the whole of the Secretariat which was so assiduously advanced. Day after day, he followed the Senate hearings and saw the tragedy unfold. He saw the hysteria invade high places and sweep this country in violation of fundamental principles of fair play and orderly justice by which he had lived all his life. The strain finally grew too strong and he broke" (p. 399).

Trygve Lie believed that Article 99 of the Charter authorizing "The Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security" required him to assume a leadership beyond that open to the corresponding officer of the League of Nations. He acted on this opinion and as a result was often in hot water. In the Iranian dispute of 1946 he irritated the United States by presenting a legal opinion that, after withdrawal of this dispute by both the Soviet Union and Iran, the Security Council was no longer seized of it. He irritated the British by holding that since Palestine was an internationalized territory placed under the auspices of the United Nations by the Mandatory, the Assembly was competent to *decide*, not merely to *recommend*, on a division of that territory and that Arab violation of this decision constituted aggression. He irritated the United States and the Chinese Nationalists by his memorandum holding that the government of a member state in a position to carry out the responsibility of United Nations membership should be admitted to represent that state in United Nations organs and that, therefore, in 1950, before it was involved in the Korean aggression, the Communist government should have been admitted to represent China. He irritated the Soviet Union by his firm stand for action against the aggressors in Korea. Only in the last case, however, did the irritated power denounce his action as unconstitutional. In addition to these instances, Lie assumed a positive initiative in visiting the governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union to win their support for his twenty-years' peace program at a time when, with the Soviet boycott of United Nations organs on the Chinese representation issue, he feared the United Nations was dissolving. He also took a positive but not public initiative in the Berlin blockade crisis of 1948. His initiative in obtaining the opinion of an impartial commission of jurists on the Secretariat crisis precipitated by American investigations was clearly within his administrative competence, though the Administrative Tribunal found that some of his dismissals of staff members on the basis of this opinion were contrary to staff regulations approved by the General Assembly.

Some will doubtless contend that a less vigorous exercise of his political powers would have increased his effectiveness. There are still some who believe that with the present limitations of international organization the Secretary General should be the inconspicuous servant of the political organs and should not attempt to be a leader or even a stimulator of action. Few will question, however, after reading this autobiography, that Trygve Lie emerges as an attractive, vigorous, even noble figure. He kept the purposes set forth in the Charter alive during a period unusually inauspicious for international organization. He demonstrated that his office could assert a leadership which advanced those objectives and which, on the whole, strengthened the United Nations even though at the sacrifice of his personal life.

In extraordinary degree he maintained a world point of view permitting him to appraise the actions of all governments according to the standards of the Charter. While increasingly, as his term of office went on, the intransigence of the Soviet Union convinced him that force must be organized among the democracies to stop its violation of the Charter, there were occasions during the earlier part of his term when he thought the Soviet Union behaved better than the United States or the United Kingdom, notably in the proposal for collective admission of certain states to membership in 1949 (p. 102) and the proposals for implementation of the Palestine decision in 1948 (p. 169).

He recognized the need for collective security against aggression, he wanted to bring all states into the United Nations, he was ready to adopt a liberal interpretation of the Charter permitting procedures through the General Assembly to circumvent the veto in the Security Council, he favored a Review Conference after ten years in accord with Charter provisions although he recognized the risks of such a conference, but his heart was primarily in the welfare work of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. Shaken by direct contact with the poverty of Latin America and of the Orient in his travels as Secretary General, he believed that technical assistance, aid to children, and other programs to improve human well-being were at the heart of the United Nations. International peace and security were to him not the goal but rather essential conditions for the realization of higher standards of human life.

This is a very human book. Trygve Lie tells not only how he appraised but how he felt about the crises with which he was repeatedly confronted. He saw the inherent difficulties of the United Nations and advised his successor that "the task of the Secretary General is the most impossible job on earth" (p. 417). "My position," he writes later, "was not made more comfortable by my regarding myself as 'part' of the United Nations. I felt morally and legally compelled to take what I saw as the 'United Nations view' particularly when I felt that the member states were not living up to their Charter obligations. I did everything in my power to keep the United Nations from sinking or running aground. Had this occurred, I am certain that we should have been far closer to a world war today. There were many times when I believed the United Nations was the last barrier between peace and war; and for that reason—here in the peaceful mountains of Norway—I am grateful that it was possible for us to keep the peace, even though the cold war raged through all my years in the United Nations. This thought dominates my recollections, brushing all other factors aside" (p. 421).

As for the United Nations, he thinks it "inconceivable that societies so diverse as those living under the Western democratic tradition on the one hand and under Communist dictatorship on the other, would agree in present circumstances to give up any significant segment of their national independence to a supranational authority. This also holds true when we consider the vast differences between the societies of the West and those of the greater part of Asia." Consequently the effectiveness of the United Nations depends upon the continuing recognition by the nations of their national interest in observance of its principles and on "the wisdom and skill with which the governments applied this principle of higher national interest to each of the questions with which they deal in the United Nations." He endorses President Eisenhower's statement in 1953 that "the United Nations has become a sheer necessity" and also Sir Winston Churchill's endorsement of Napoleon's opinion that "a Constitution should be short and obscure." He construes this to mean that "it is not only the words in a Constitution that count, but the popular will to accept the Constitution's spirit." This attitude, he adds, "has done a great deal through constructive interpretation of the Charter. . . . Thus progress depends by no means alone upon textual revision of the Charter. A continuing liberal construction of the Charter we now have holds out great promise, and perhaps is a more practical way to strengthen the bonds of the world community" (pp. 423–24).

The book is indispensable reading for students of international organization and is important for students of any other aspect of international relations. It illustrates in very human terms the problem, perhaps the tragedy, of a world seeking to raise itself by its own bootstraps. Because he believes that the human spirit can transcend material difficulties, Trygve Lie does not believe the task impossible.

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*Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign.* BY BERNARD R. BERELSON, PAUL F. LAZARSFELD, AND WILLIAM N. MCPHEE. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1954. Pp. ix, 395. $7.50.)

Rarely has the contribution of one social science to another been so impressively demonstrated as in this study of *Voting* based upon a panel survey of Elmira, N. Y., in the 1948 presidential campaign. To the understanding of a central political problem the team of Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee have brought a battery of analytical devices developed in psychological research and tested not only in the earlier study of Erie County (*The People's Choice*) but also in marketing and radio research throughout the country. The panel technique (several "waves" of interviews of a single panel of respondents) permits the authors to probe the *process* of electoral decision, using concepts which integrate social and psychological factors in a common theory. Going beyond *The People's Choice* (in which two of the three authors participated) they have effectively cleared away more of the rubble that stands where disciplinary walls once erected barriers to social research.

The work is so rich in ideas and hypotheses that only a few of the more significant findings can be mentioned. In analyzing changes in voter decisions, the authors find that the conversion from one party to another is only part of a series of molecular changes from "strong Democrat" to "moderate Democrat," from "moderate Democrat" to neutral, from neutral to "moderate Republican," and so forth, and that the intraparty changes are linked to the same causal sequences as the interparty changes. The book develops the concept of the "breakage effect," that is, "When the voter's immediate personal environment is split in political preference, he is more likely to vote in line with the majority of the large community" (p. 116). One of the most important ideas in the book is the concept of the "pulsation effect." The evidence seemed to support the idea that the bonds of group membership (Catholic, union, occupational strata) are relaxed in the period between political campaigns so that defection is greater and group cohesiveness less strict. The effect of a political campaign, however, is to tighten group discipline and reinforce group loyalties, common perceptions, and political and ideological homogeneity.

In attacking the problem of father-child political inheritance, their methods permit the authors to say that the cause of the correlation is more social (the pressure of common group memberships) than personal (adoption by the child of a paternal political preference because it is paternal). The authors make a significant contribution to political thinking in their separation of "position issues," involving personal stakes of an economic or occupational character, from "style issues," where the individual tastes and personality of the individual are more determinative of his opinions. And, to cite only one more of the conceptual nougats in this rich fare, the authors are able to show how the "rally" to Truman was the product of a change in frame of reference or saliency on the part of the voters rather than a conversion to new positions. Finally, an appended list of 209 propositions on voting patterns, with indication of the surveys on which the propositions are based, will prove immensely useful for future research.

However impressive the contributions of these authors may be to the understanding of electoral decisions—and they are impressive—it is well to point out that some important matters have been omitted. From the study one learns nothing of the impact of registration provisions, of primary laws, of electoral administration in the electorate's decision-making process. There is no mention of the possibility that allegiance to the Republican party may be affected by a misrepresentative system in the state, by "loaded" systems of state grants to local areas for schools and roads, or by the heritage of railroad and canal politics of the past. Perhaps the effort to relate the survey findings to the law, the institutions, the history of Elmira (and New York) would have muddied the clarity of the presentation and forced the authors too far afield; the point is that *Voting* is more a special report—it is not yet the work which integrates past and more "orthodox" research with present psycho-social knowledge.

Only bold authors make significant contributions to political interpretation; but their boldness, in the absence of a saturation in the literature of politics, also leads them to make mistakes. One type of error is to fail to see the limitations of the data derived from this single survey. On the basis of information on one presidential election in one place the authors conclude that local party organizations in moderate-size towns have atrophied and lost much of their significance. Now there may be something in this, but at least it is relevant to point to the very different nature of party stakes in local elections and hence the revivification which local elections often effect in local party organizations. Equally important, it is very dangerous to generalize about the nature of party conflict in two-party areas on the basis of data in a predominantly one-party town.

The second type of error, or so it seems to me, lies in the exclusive attention on political parties as instruments of representation and the failure to consider their function as instruments of government. This viewpoint, quite natural in the perspective of this study, leads the authors to take satisfaction in the amorphous nature of political parties characterized by overlapping opinions and group memberships—satisfaction unalloyed by consideration of the problems of party government by parties with little internal agreement on a domestic program, unreliable constituencies, and no true discipline.

*Voting* is an extraordinarily good book—indeed a brilliant book. The political scientist likes to witness such a marriage, however late, of the social-psychological sciences and politics since, after all, he is the father of the bride.

ROBERT E. LANE.

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*The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1829–1861.* BY LEONARD D. WHITE. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1954. Pp. xii, 593. $8.00.)

In this stimulating volume, Professor White completes his trilogy on the administrative history of the American federal government from the Federalists to the Jacksonians. This volume describes and analyzes the conduct of the federal government in the 32 years from Jackson to Lincoln. These were the years of the beginning of the industrial revolution in the United States, the growth of large-scale industry, and the development of a nation-wide economy. They were also years of uninterrupted political tension and excitement, constitutional debate over the nature of the Union, sectional strife, and political party conflict. In White's view, the only effective presidential leaders throughout this period were Jackson and Polk; and Congress, according to White, did little to compensate for the lack of presidential leadership. Executive initiative in policy matters was widely accepted.

The book may be divided into six sections: (1) the President and the administrative system—four chapters, pp. 20–103; (2) Congress and administration—three chapters, pp. 104–62; (3) departmental management—seven chapters, pp. 163–299; (4) the personnel system and the theory and practice of rotation—seven chapters, pp. 300–436; (5) selected public activities—three chapters, pp. 437–505; and (6) the state of administration under the Jacksonians—four chapters, pp. 1–19, 506–67.

The federal government did little in 1860 that it had not undertaken before 1830, even though the number of government employees rose roughly from 20,000 to 50,000 and federal government expenditures rose from 15 to 63 million dollars between 1830 and 1860. The only large public service was the post office. Under the Jacksonians, the federal government withdrew substantially from internal improvements. Governmental expansion was primarily a phenomenon of state and local government, but the federal government could not escape the effects of industrialization, urbanization, and westward expansion. The states remained dominant in the federal relationship, but the scales were beginning to tilt toward Washington under the impact of the war and peace issue, the expansion of business, the development of a new party system, and the drain of manpower in public life to the federal government.

Despite the politicizing of the public service caused largely by profound changes in the nature of political parties, the period 1829–1861 was dominated by policies that discouraged the development and expansion of a national administrative system. The period exhibited remarkable stability in the form and structure of government on the one hand and marked change in the quality and standards of governance on the other. Administratively, the great change ushered in by the Jacksonians was the infusion of a democratic spirit in administration and in the concept of the public service. As White skillfully shows, the democratization of the public service was the result not of innovation or pioneering or the dominant influence of particular political leaders, but rather of changes in the magnitude and complexity of the federal government and the emergence of a new concept of the political party. The history of Jacksonian administration, as White points out, "is not a simple tale of rotation, spoils, confusion, and deterioration" (p. 16). Rather the great contribution of the Jacksonians to governmental administration was the introduction of "endless sources of vitality into the body administrative directly from the body politic, granting all the confusion and waste that were finally to be corrected by more orderly and systematic methods, themselves democratic in character. The relationship between the people and their administrative system was not again to suggest preference to the wellborn and the well-to-do" (p. 566).

The full impact of the Jacksonians on federal administration can be grasped only in light of the experience of the forty years from 1789 to 1829. As White says, "The conduct of government in a democracy requires a judicious combination of politics and administration, and the cooperation of men within the executive departments devoted to each branch of the public service. This cooperation had been relatively easy and effective under the Federalists and Jeffersonians, since both groups were drawn from the broad class of gentlemen, and could work in the relative freedom of a society in which organized mass parties and pressure groups were negligible" (p. 347). Up to 1829, a single type of career service had existed. Without any formal method of selection and with no guarantee of job security, young men began as clerks and continued as clerks in the office in which they entered; a few of them became principal clerks or chief clerks. After 1829, under the influence of the theory of rotation in office and limited tenure, this system was supplemented by a patronage system. "Oldtime clerks, remained at their desks; 'party' clerks came and went" (p. 362). As White shows, the patronage system commanded public attention, but it was the career system that enabled the government to continue operations with at least minimal effectiveness. If the patronage system was fatally defective because it was loyal to the political party, it at least had the unique asset of enabling many citizens to participate in the art of governance. As White suggests, the adjustment of the career service to the party system "remained even a century later an object of concern."

The Presidents retained their preeminent administrative position from Jackson to Lincoln. The President was mainly an operating executive who had to make an incredible number of decisions on petty matters. He was the chief personnel officer of the government and occasionally a chief budget officer as well. In this period the public service had hardly acquired a sense of corporate unity, and the President remained the only official with some responsibility for the whole service. His "official household," consisting of a handful of housekeeping assistants, was not established by Congress until 1857. Jackson described the presidency as "dignified slavery"; Polk called it "no bed of roses"; and to Van Buren, it was a "toilsome and anxious probation."

Nevertheless, the concept of executive power was advanced notably in four ways. The doctrine that the President was representative of the people challenged the exclusive claim of Congress to that designation. The extensive use of the veto brought the President more directly into conflict with Congress. The presidential power to remove government officials was used in unrestrained fashion. And perhaps most important of all, the President emerged as the active leader of his political party. These developments, however, were offset by strict construction of federal powers and guarded use of constitutional authority, by a reliance upon the states for carrying on most tasks of government, and by a widespread fear of uncontrolled executive power and an insistence that government should be minimal. Jackson, therefore, was an exponent of executive power in a government whose functions and prerogatives were strictly limited by constitutional interpretation and democratic ideology.

From 1829 to 1861, of the 76 men who served as Cabinet Secretaries only 10 were born in an urban environment, and only 12 were born in well-to-do families. Fifty-one, or five out of seven, had a college education (in a period when college education was available to very few persons). Sixty-eight were lawyers, and only one had come up through departmental ranks. While the general level of administrative competence had declined since 1829 and no administrative genius comparable to Hamilton or Gallatin served in the executive branch, several men did make excellent records. White explains that the Secretaries were chosen for their political weight rather than their executive experience, and that business life "may have drained executive talent out of the stream of public life" (p. 101). In the period studied, only six men held Cabinet posts for more than four years, and 45 held office for less than two years. Their previous political experience was gained mostly in legislatures and political campaigns.

White's discussion of Congress and administration has a thoroughly modern ring. When the power of the President was weak, Congress was also weak and divided, and stalemate and drift were the outcome. The troubles of Congress were traceable to poor organization, bad manners of congressmen, the handicap of the seniority system, the impairment of congressional unity by standing committees, and the excessive power of the Speaker of the House. Except for the last factor, these elements must still be included in any list of conditions that undermine the capacity of Congress to govern. While Congress undertook significant investigations of administration, individual members were too oppressed by errand-running for constituents to develop effective tools of executive accountability. The executive departments complained constantly of severe hardships. Congress refused to appropriate funds for adequate staffs, was reluctant to pay adequate salaries, and refused to authorize needed agencies and bureaus. On the whole, Congress' record in administration was "characterized by delay, indifference, partisanship, and reluctance to provide the resources for effective work" (p. 162).

Traditional standards of public morality declined throughout the period, and standards of official conduct in 1861 were below those fostered by Federalists and Jeffersonians. This deterioration of public morality was "parallel with and consequent upon a decline in business ethics that affected society generally" (p. 412). White traces the decline in morality to the decline of face-to-face business transactions between neighbors and associates and the rise of impersonal dealings with banks and corporations; to the growing impersonal and often anonymous life of city dwellers; and to the temptations to ruthless and unscrupulous operations in the business world of railroad construction, shipping, and manufacturing.

Perhaps the term "doctrine on administration" is somewhat exaggerated as applied by White to the complex of ideas about executive power, constitutional interpretation, federal-state relations, and public morality held in various ways by Federalists, Jeffersonians, and Jacksonians. White is accurate and perceptive in pinpointing the basic ideas of the periods covered by his trilogy on such matters as executive accountability to Congress, loose construction versus strict construction of the Constitution, the sources of administrative talent in the population, and the expansion and limitation of administrative discretion. But these issues were among the foremost political controversies of these periods. To classify them as aspects of a doctrine on administration may be somewhat artificial and synthetic.

Like its predecessor volumes, *The Jacksonians* is an absorbing account of a seminal period in American administrative development. It is thoroughly documented and written with simplicity. Although painstaking in detail, it never loses sight of the key issues and main trends. It is a fitting sequel to the earlier volumes in this great study.

MARVER H. BERNSTEIN.

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*Workmen's Compensation: Prevention, Insurance, and Rehabilitation of Occupational Disability.* By Herman Miles Somers and Anne Ramsay Somers. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd. 1954. Pp. xv, 341. $6.50.)

One of the oldest of America's social security programs and the only one which the states have continued to administer without federal financial assistance or pressure, workmen's compensation is again a controversial issue after more than forty years of experience in many states. That experience and the reasons for the political controversies in which the programs are now embroiled offer provocative data for political scientists. The Somers' book is an excellent and overdue exposition of the entire matter: careful, comprehensive, reflective of the economic and political interests involved, and keenly analytical of their interplay.

The authors discuss the details of workmen's compensation's origins, coverage and benefit patterns, insurance provisions, administrative and litigation problems, industrial safety and health programs, and rehabilitation. They also provide appendices which describe the chief alternatives to common American forms of workmen's compensation: the British industrial injuries insurance system; the Ontario workmen's compensation system, which is rather like the American but works more satisfactorily; the Federal Employers' Liability Acts for railway workers and seamen; and the Federal Employees' Compensation Act.

Many facets of the picture systematically traced in this volume cast useful light on some common theories of political science. It implicitly suggests, for example, that the states have been singularly unexperimental and ineffective laboratories for new ideas in a field in which the laboratory theory of federalism might have been expected to prove its worth especially well. Instead, similar inadequacies and lapses from the original ideals of workmen's compensation have appeared in all the states, and similar strivings for new solutions have been generally blocked.

Many of the objectives sought by the original workmen's compensation laws are not realized as well today as they were in 1915. Benefits are substantially lower in relation to wage levels and living costs. Litigation and legal fees have grown enormously. State safety and health programs have not been noticeably stimulated by workmen's compensation and are in most cases wholly inadequate. Costs and overhead ratios are probably higher than they are under the Federal Employers' Liability Acts. The one significant improvement since the early days has been the addition of medical service benefits, but even this great advance is overshadowed by the prevailing indifference to the potentialities of rehabilitation. In rehabilitation we have a remedy which would save thousands of injured workers from a life of dependence and suffering, reduce insurance costs to employers, relieve state treasuries of a major burden in relief appropriations, and expand America's productive capacity. Yet the provisions for rehabilitation are few and feeble, and there is a lack of coordination between rehabilitation agencies and workmen's compensation agencies which often becomes hostility and hinders rehabilitation. This experience strongly suggests that even the most predictably beneficial experimentation is unlikely unless some high-level agency of the state government is so constituted as to be more sensitive to widely held group interests than to the strongly organized, narrowly based ones that dominate state legislatures and compensation agencies alike.

Attacks on workmen's compensation currently take two forms. The low level of benefits in spite of rising living costs has given rise to a movement to supplement compensation with alternative remedies, such as tort suits in which the employer is deprived of the common law defenses. More broadly, medical advances are underlining the artificiality of the distinction between industrial injury and disease on the one hand and community health and safety problems generally. On the legal side this difficulty is exemplified in the increasing inability to define injuries arising "out of and in the course of employment" with any certainty and in the arbitrary restrictions on rehabilitation benefits, such as those which limit them to disabilities which have become static and to services necessary to render a patient fit to hold a job. Opposed to the groups which urge that public policy take account of these changes in economic conditions and medical knowledge are those who see some real or fancied advantage in the established practices. These include insurance companies, compensation officials, unions, employer groups, and reformers still dazzled by the bold experiment of the years 1910–1915. For the student of the political process this situation yields data that bear directly on the validity of significant hypotheses. One wishes the authors themselves had chosen to devote more space to the more general implications of their research for the theory of policy formation.

The present volume nevertheless offers many clues to the origins of particular institutions and policy changes, and it does so by systematic description of the problems and activities of affected groups. It thereby achieves a happy blend of concern for human problems and objective description of process and fact. Like the late Mr. Gladstone, the authors are able to keep their audience excited for hours about the social and political drama underlying elaborate compilations of statistics and legal provisions and procedures.

In the preface the authors declare that as this is a joint enterprise, any errors are to be attributed to the other author. Readers are more likely to bestow praise on both. This is one of the most important books to be published in the field of labor and government in a long time.

MURRAY EDELMAN.

*University of Illinois.*

*The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline.* BY ARTHUR P. WHITAKER. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1954. Pp. x, 194. $3.00.)

This is an important book. Many Latin Americanists will not like it, but it had to be written sooner or later. Its central thesis deserves serious debate. If Professor Whitaker wins that debate, the consequences will carry major significance for the place of the Western Hemisphere in the foreign policy of the United States.

The core of the Western Hemisphere idea, according to Whitaker, is "the proposition that the peoples of this Hemisphere stand in a special relationship to one another which sets them apart from the rest of the world" (p. 1). An historical study, the book traces the emergence, late in the eighteenth century, of the Western Hemisphere idea, its high place in the foreign policy of the United States in the early years of the nineteenth century, and the role of the idea in the subsequent Pan-American movement. The idea, Whitaker maintains, has declined during the twentieth century and, as of the middle 1950's, has lost its hold in the United States.

Explanation of the decline of the Western Hemisphere idea is sought in the proposition that, in its original form, the idea possessed a number of attributes—e.g., a concept of geography, an interpretation of political ideas and institutions, and an anti-European thesis—which are now in the process of rejection in "North American" thinking about international problems. The original argument of geography noted that the map of the globe, as conventionally drawn, had depicted the Americas as separated significantly from the rest of the world, and read fundamental implications into this division. The early proposition of political community emerged from emphasis on the points that independence movements in both North and South America (1) occurred at about the same time in the history of the West and (2) entertained a somewhat common category of political ideas associated with the Enlightenment and with the French Revolution. Further, an anti-European thesis was held in both Americas late in the eighteenth and early in the nineteenth centuries. "What, in short, is the whole system of Europe towards America but an atrocious and insulting tyranny?" Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1811. "In whatever governments they [the Latin Americans] end, they will be *American* governments, no longer to be involved in the never-ceasing broils of Europe" (pp. 28–29). Insofar as this line of thought is concerned, Jefferson spoke for a body of opinion not only in the United States but also in the Latin America of his time.

Whether or not these elements of the Western Hemisphere idea ever contributed, at any time, to valid analysis of the real world is a question largely irrelevant to Whitaker's task, and, quite properly, he does not endeavor to answer it in this book. Rather, his points are that there was a time when "North" and Latin Americans *believed* the idea, and that this belief is now being abandoned in the United States although much of Latin America apparently still clings to it.

In tracing the recent course of the Western Hemisphere idea in the United States, Whitaker chronicles changing patterns of "North American" thought about geography, the political oneness of the Americas, and about Europe. The proposition of geopolitics that water unites whereas land divides, and Makinder's celebrated statement—"the geographical perspective of the twentieth century differs . . . from that of all previous centuries" (p. 161)—are duly noted. Mercator's map had not made it clear that no European capital, including Moscow, is as far from the "North American" Middle West as is Buenos Aires, or that only one European capital, Athens, is as far away as Rio de Janeiro; but in the twentieth century, according to Whitaker, "North Americans" have at last come to discover this. Nicholas Spykman's characterization of the Western Hemisphere idea as a disguised isolationism, and his assertion that the relations of Latin America "to Washington can never be as important as those of the great powers of Europe and Asia" (p. 165) are presented as illustrative of the twentieth-century shape of "North American" thinking. As of the end of World War II, the concept of the geographic unity of the Americas was in apparent retreat in the United States.

The belief that the Americas were joined by a political commonality likewise was challenged in the United States during World War II. The Western Hemisphere had long been advertised as the home of free republican institutions, essentially similar in Latin America and the United States. It is to be doubted whether this was ever true, even in the nineteenth century. But, as World War II focused "North American" attention upon problems of dictatorship, the point that dictatorship likewise flourished in many Latin-American states became increasingly difficult to overlook. The celebrated "Argentine Question" dramatized this problem during the war and weakened in the United States this second element of the Western Hemisphere idea.

I believe that a fair summation of Whitaker's point on the anti-European thesis would run somewhat as follows. In "North American" thinking, this thesis lived and died with isolationism. The participation of the United States in World War I severely undermined the anti-European thesis in this country, as did the international crisis dating from the 1930's. It has been difficult for "North Americans" to maintain, on the one hand, that the Americas stand apart from the rest of the world and, on the other, that the United States should be deeply enmeshed in the problems of Europe and Asia. Active "North American" participation, in the years after the close of World War II, in the affairs of Western Europe is probably incompatible with the preservation of the anti-European thesis in the United States. In the current conflict between the Western Hemisphere idea and the "cold war," it is likely that the former will fall.

As I indicated at the outset of this review, I believe Whitaker's little volume —based on the eight Commonwealth Foundation Lectures he delivered at University College, London, early in 1953—to be an important book. Its message is that the Western Hemisphere idea is now as good as dead in the United States.

I cannot be certain if Whitaker is right about that, but this does not detract from the significance of his volume. It raises the whole question of what this country's interest in Latin America might be in the 1950's. The book suggests answers—disturbing to "North Americans"—to a number of embarrassing questions Latin Americans have been asking in recent years. How are the decline and fall of the Good Neighbor policy to be explained? Why is the United States of the 1950's turning its back on Latin America? Since the launching of the Marshall Plan in 1947, many Latin Americans have complained of a certain unfaithfulness to the Western Hemisphere idea on the part of the United States. Perhaps "North Americans" have lately discovered a truth that will later make its way south. Perhaps it will never go there. Or—this may be a Pandora's box—perhaps the "North American" rejection of the Western Hemisphere idea will lead to a compensatory reaction in the other American nations.

Whitaker's method is that of an historian employing documentary materials. I have no particular quarrel with that method, although I do doubt that it completes the case for the thesis of *The Western Hemisphere Idea.* We are shown to my satisfaction that at some times some people in the Americas believed that the Hemisphere stood apart from the rest of the world, and that at other times other Americans rejected that proposition. Whitaker himself is well aware that the Western Hemisphere idea was never universally accepted in either the United States or Latin America; but what is missing, it seems to me, is some measure, some gauge, of the influence of selected statesmen and writers in shaping the thinking of the Americas. I am prepared to believe that Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Halford J. Makinder, Eugene P. Staley, and Nicholas Spykman said what Whitaker tells us they said. But the influence of such people, particularly the geopoliticians among the later writers, upon the ideas of the Americas remains to be measured or estimated.

In short, I do not know if Whitaker is right. His book, however, is a significant one, and should be read by all concerned with the role of the Western Hemisphere in international affairs.

George I. Blanksten.

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*European Union and United States Foreign Policy: A Study in Sociological Jurisprudence.* By F. S. C. Northrop. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1954. Pp. x, 230. $4.75.)

Among the postulates which political scientists seem to accept as platitudes, none presumably is better or longer established than the proposition that law and legal institutions on the one hand are reciprocally related as cause and effect with popular thought, sentiments, and similar factors on the other. In his examination of existing and projected institutions of European union and of centripetal forces conceived to prevail in Europe, Professor Northrop makes much of this concept of a reciprocal institution-sentiment relationship. He repeats at frequent intervals, perhaps in somewhat less simple terms than usual or necessary, a formulation of the relationship. He apparently feels that the idea gains in impressiveness by being denominated a principle of sociological jurisprudence. Thus, for example, he asserts in one place: "Sociological jurisprudence informs us that the introduction of new positive law is unlikely to be effective unless the norms which it expresses are supported by common norms in the underlying living law of the peoples to whom it is applied." Manifestly, Professor Northrop boldly undertakes to apply the principle in the situation where most difficulty attends its application.

In two chapters, "The Positive Law of the Council of Europe" and "The Positive Law of Continental European Union," Professor Northrop offers a convenient summary account of the pertinent meetings, decisions, and documents relative to the Council of Europe and to the Coal and Steel Community, the European Defense Community, and the European Political Community. With a somewhat striking trust in written provisions and in statistics and with an at least equally regrettable failure to be concerned with meanings in the case of such basic concepts as law and sovereignty, he directs his attention primarily to emphasizing the degree to which sovereignty has in certain cases by positive law been surrendered.

Professor Northrop readily confesses that the founders of sociological jurisprudence "failed to specify the method by which the living law of any society is to be determined." Nothing daunted, he formulates a method of his own as applicable to peoples of Europe. This method, he suggests, "is to examine the quantitative statistics which specify how these people group themselves with respect to their personal, religious, political and economic beliefs." Having asserted by way of anticipation that in the religious context "the task is easy" and that it is "relatively easy" in respect of the economic and the political, he methodically examines the situations in these several respects as they exist first in "Greater Europe" and then more particularly in France, Italy, Western Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. His conclusion is that conditions are not sufficiently propitious for establishment of a supranational community consisting of the countries represented in the Council of Europe, but that such a community is "practicable" in the case of the six particular nations which are parties to the Coal and Steel Community and which were, in turn, to have constituted the European Defense Community and the European Political Community.

Professor Northrop's conviction of the practicability of a Western European supranational community is perhaps not altogether without ambiguity; but he seems to commit himself to the implication that the chances appear good of an early surrender of sovereignty in the military and political spheres, though his words might possibly be interpreted as being primarily a prophecy that once such surrender is made, the resulting institutions are likely to operate effectively. At the outset, Professor Northrop certainly gives the impression that he anticipated the establishment relatively soon of the European Defense Community and the European Political Community. He, with no little reason, considers this "a remarkable phenomenon." At the end, he appears to establish a hedge—hardly less useful today than in the spring of 1954, when Professor Northrop formulated his prophecy—in the form of an assertion that lack of success could not destroy the importance of the fact that proposals of union had been made. However, Professor Northrop suggests what is in some respects another hedge, which is of the greatest interest and importance. He argues forcefully that failure of European union would be largely the fault of the

United States. In the course of this argument, he makes a strong case, which would not be easy to controvert successfully, for the view that the foreign policy of the Eisenhower Administration has been a "tragic failure."

Professor Northrop's eminently readable and manifestly sincere little book is highly provocative in the favorable sense that it raises more problems than it settles. Balanced discussion of these controversial problems would naturally itself require at least another volume. The necessary alternative here is to recommend Professor Northop's book to serious readers as a basis for their thinking through the issues for themselves.

R. K. GOOCH.

*University of Virginia.*

*Government and Parliament: A Survey from the Inside.* BY HERBERT MORRISON. (London, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1954. Pp. xiii, 363. $3.40.)

The complete adjustment of some of the older and more conservative members of the Labour party to a parliamentary system which that party used to complain of is perfectly shown in The Right Honourable Herbert Morrison's *Government and Parliament.* A book of great and varied usefulness, it is a book of explanation and appreciation, not of criticism.

It is true that perhaps no one has had better luck than Mr. Morrison under the system which he describes. He was a minister six years after he entered the House of Commons. Ever since the Labour schism of 1931 he has been one of the recognized leaders of the Labour party. During the painful thirties when his colleagues were sometimes out of office and often out of Parliament, he was the successful leader of the London County Council. From 1940 to 1951 he held a succession of the highest offices under the Crown—offices which in the old days would have seemed worthy only of a Cecil or a Pitt. He is now second only to Mr. Attlee in his position in the parliamentary Labour party. The prime ministry alone is lacking, and there may still be time for that.

Mr. Morrison's experience and education have been practical. He became a member of the Labour party because of his original class and his early associations. He did not choose to be a Socialist as did Attlee. His socialism is pragmatic and quite unmixed with theory, just as his education for his career has been mostly self-education.

The self-educated man has not been taught to be critical. The successful self-made man has not learned to raise questions about the situations in which he has been a personal success. It is natural therefore that this book should seem much more lacking in criticism and in evaluation than if it had been written by a scholar or by an experienced politician who had had a longer formal education than its author. One respect, however, in which no one can surpass the author is in his extreme competence as a politician and his great success as an administrator.

This book is pedestrian. But for the serious student of English government it is almost invaluable. It records exactly only one period, that of the Labour government that ended in 1951, and the author has no great powers of generalization. But his elaborate and informative detail fits into the more general picture that other books give, or brings the other books up-to-date.

The detail in the book is very, very good, often because the author has been a participant or direct observer of what he discusses. Otherwise he is likely to state the views of the ordinary Englishman. On the questions of the monarchy, for instance, which has not always been without its importance in the inner conflicts of the Labour party, he makes acute observations on the King's part in the crisis of 1931, but for the rest says conventional things with the help of quotations from Bagehot and Nicolson.

The volume starts with a discussion of the cabinet, particularly notable as explaining the modern method by which most business is done in committees. But the author also discusses the duties of ministers; probably in this book for the first time one can learn what a parliamentary secretary does.

The section on Parliament is particularly good in explaining the relations between ministers, whips, back-benchers, and party machinery generally. Mr. Morrison's chapter on the House of Lords is very moderate. He discusses its obstructionism even after the Parliament Act of 1949, but seems to believe that it should be reformed in membership and allowed to act as a revisory chamber. The chapters on reform of House of Commons procedure and on the parliamentary program give a down-to-earth view of how business is actually conducted.

The last section of the book is entitled "Administration" and discusses problems of socialization of industry, economic planning, and relations between ministers and civil servants.

The book arose out of talks which Mr. Morrison gave as Visiting Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford. It is written from the point of view not of the lawyer and not of the theorist, but of the politician and administrator who has had intimate and long experience at the center of things.

EUGENE P. CHASE.

*Lafayette College.*

*La Fonction Publique*. BY ROGER GRÉGOIRE. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1954. Pp. 282. 1200 fr.)

This book concerns French administrative practices and problems rather than administrative law, an uncommon occurrence in a country that has produced many eminent jurists but few specialists in public administration. As the author remarks, Vivien's comment made more than 100 years ago is still applicable today: "Until now, administrative law has taken the first place. . . . It is easier to get information on the administration of New York than on that of our own municipalities, on the police of ancient Rome than on that of Paris."

M. Grégoire is uniquely qualified to fill this gap. Now a professor at the National School of Administration, he was one of the formulators of the administrative reform established by the provisional government, and he became the first director of the "Service de la Fonction Publique" created in October,

1945. His study is concise, well-documented, and highly intelligent; it will be more than a reference book for American political scientists.

Chapters 1 and 2 trace the evolution of the French concept of the "fonction publique" down to the present regime. Chapters 3 to 6 deal with the administrative structure and the problems of selection, promotion, and remuneration. The last chapter is a thoughtful re-examination of the concept of public service and of the relations between administration and politics.

The comparative method is used to point out the significant differences of administrative evolution and practice between the French system and those of the rest of Europe and the United States. Historical, sociological, psychological, and juridical references, and constant attention to human factors bring further depth to his realistic analysis.

The author contrasts the continental concept of public service with the American. The French administration has incarnated the state and for a long time was hardly separate from the government. The result is a solid bureaucratic tradition, jealous of its domain and prerogatives. Tocqueville had noticed that "what characterizes the French administration is its violent hatred of whomever, noble or bourgeois, wants to involve himself with public affairs. . . . It prefers sterility to competition." The Roman concept of the pre-eminence of the state prevented contractual relationships between the state and its servants on the American pattern. Throughout the nineteenth century unilateral decisions by the government gave public servants growing statutory guarantees against instability and arbitrariness. More recently those guarantees came to be rules imposed by the legislature on the executive, and under the pressure of collective interests these rules came to resemble ordinary social legislation. But not until 1946 did a law bring to an end the individualistic concept of the relationship between the state and its agents, when it recognized the "droit syndical"—though keeping a prudent silence concerning the right to strike. The myth of state supremacy and of its statutory rights had to yield to the reality of powerful unions of public servants.

M. Grégoire points out that French psychology may explain some of the drawbacks in the system of selection and promotion. In contrast to practice in Great Britian, only the intellectual qualities of a candidate are tested and no judgment is passed on the man himself, perhaps a reflection of a pathological fear of arbitrary selection. Similarly, until 1952, no system of promotion allowed for an effective appraisal of merit and aptitudes. Agents were judged on intellectual and moral qualifications rather than on their actual effectiveness in the service.

The author regrets the narrow corporative spirit that makes every service a closed preserve protected against all forms of outside competition, that multiplies sets of rules to protect civil servants not only against the arbitrary but also against the unforeseen, and that tends to bring about the "automatisme des carrières." "It is believed that there are no real guarantees if the least accidents of the career are not foreseen and the slightest initiative of the administration not limited by formal texts. The ideal, often expressed openly, would be a type of recruiting based on absolutely objective tests followed by careers of automatic development in which promotion would depend exclusively on seniority." His analysis of administrative reforms since 1945 is objective and cautious and leads to some wise suggestions for further improvement.

CHARLES A. MICAUD.

*University of Virginia.*

*The Soviet Regime: Communism in Practice.* BY W. W. KULSKI. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1954. Pp. xiv, 807. $8.00.)

Dr. Kulski's massive volume is a useful though unexciting contribution to the growing amount of literature on the Soviet system now being produced in American universities. He is not concerned with an explanation, or even an analysis, of the Soviet regime, but simply with presenting its operation in such a way as to destroy as far as possible the illusions which some people still hold about it. He has chosen for this purpose to confine himself rigidly to official Soviet publications and to Soviet textbooks on the relevant topics and has excluded all other forms of first-hand material, such as the accounts of refugees or former prisoners, as well as any expression of views about opinions held by other Western scholars. For this reason, much of the book reads more like an anthology of Soviet political and economic writing than anything else. Since however this selection of extracts has been done with great care, the work should be useful, though like other works which are written with a primarily political purpose, it occasionally irritates by departing from the language of scholarship in order to score a debating point.

The most interesting part in many ways is the first, where Dr. Kulski brings together a good deal of material on the precise nature of the cultural isolation and ideological conformity at present imposed upon the Soviet intelligentsia. This is particularly useful because Dr. Kulski does not share the illusion which some Polish historians have promulgated, and of which Professor Arnold Toynbee has made himself a spokesman in the West, namely that Russia has never been culturally a part of Europe. As Dr. Kulski points out, "The Party has implied its acknowledgement of the West by limiting the cultural isolation of the Soviet Union to contacts with the 20th century West, while pointing to the 19th century standards of the West as a guiding beacon for the present Russia."

The second part deals with political and social institutions and, incidentally, disposes of the view still advanced in some quarters that although Soviet elections are meaningless at the ballot stage, there is an element of democracy in the nominating process. Part III deals with the actual living conditions of the Soviet worker and peasant, with an emphasis on the regime's continued discrimination against the latter, and then considers the problem which is at the heart of any analysis of Soviet society—whether the regime is developing a new and rather rigid system of social stratification. The evidence produced, particularly on the educational side, would seem to support an affirmative answer. As Dr. Kulski says, the guiding element in the history of the regime has been the determination of its leaders to push the process of industrialization, and events which have taken place since the book was published certainly justify this view. In connection with this, he points out that in the shadow of the industrial pyramid there has been growing another, that of social stratification founded on the twin principles of inequality and hierarchy. Soviet society of today reminds one of a hierarchical pyramid: at the top are the professional politicians, leaders of the Party and the State, who could be removed from the top only by another revolution. Directly beneath them is the upper bureaucracy of the Party, of the State, and of various so-called public organizations; the lower stratum is represented by skilled workers and lower white-collar employees; while the base is formed by millions of unskilled workers and peasants, those forgotten men of the regime. Differences in education and professional knowledge serve as the main criteria for allocation of places within the hierarchical pyramid built on the foundation of strict obedience of the lower stratum to the higher.

In Part IV, Dr. Kulski returns to the theme of the peasantry with a sideglance at the regime's intentions about collectivization in the satellites. The bulk of the book is intended to be a description of the system as it existed at the time of Stalin's death. The events of the last year and a half are dealt with separately in two concluding chapters which go far to explain, in their appreciation of the sources of power in the system, why any idea of a genuine revolution or even of a "thaw" was so utterly out of touch with Soviet reality.

MAX BELOFF.

*Nuffield College, Oxford (England).*

*The International Law Standard in Treaties of the United States.* By ROBERT RENBERT WILSON. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1953. Pp. xii, 321. $4.50.)

International law is usually discussed in terms of two major categories, customary and treaty law, or general and particular law. However useful this analytical distinction may be, it is essential to recognize the interrelationships between the two basic types of international law.

One of the most explicit linkages, reference in a treaty to the "law of nations" or "international law," is the subject of Professor Wilson's study. He deals primarily with the approximately two hundred such references found in American treaties, reserving for an appendix a summary treatment of the treaty practice of other leading powers.

A major value of the book is its demonstration of the variety of purposes served by treaty reference to international law. It may be merely a kind of ceremonial bowing before a sacred table of laws, or a diplomatically convenient device for masking unresolved disagreements. The usage may be incidental to the acceptance by the parties of deviations from general international rules in their mutual relations, sometimes with the purpose of promoting universal agreement upon the stipulated innovations. It may constitute a formal indication that the treaty listing of rights and duties is not exhaustive or prejudicial to the continued validity of customary rules. Finally, and in ideal conception most significantly, reference to international law may serve as a shorthand technique for incorporating in treaties particular segments of a large body of generally accepted, well-established, and clearly understood customary legal rules.

Professor Wilson gives most of his attention to the last of these functional bases of reference to the international law standard, and his analysis leaves the reader in no doubt that the state of general international law minimizes the serviceability of such reference as a word-saving device. Detailed case studies indicate that, intentionally or not, treaty makers who invoke the name of international law more often postpone debate than express solid agreement about the rules for their future governance. As of now, agreement to follow international law cannot be much more, in most cases, than agreement to try to agree upon what international law permits and requires.

This book consists largely of careful analyses of the position of international law, and controversies concerning that position, with respect to such cases as early American assertions of the right to navigate the lower Mississippi, the *Alabama Case*, and nineteenth-century efforts by Britain to effectuate a prohibition of international slave traffic. Useful as many of these studies are, they do not seem to be related with sufficient purposefulness to such a main theme as the author might have adopted to give his book a real impact. It is difficult at times to shake off the suspicion that Professor Wilson simply seizes upon the lucky fact that a particular treaty includes the words "international law" as an excuse for launching into an elaborate and expert treatment of a topic which he has been itching to write about. This is not to say that the book is incoherent, but that the reader has to supply much of the coherence, and that the author does not fully exploit the opportunities for striking the punches of cogency that his materials afford him.

This study opens up the possibility of formulating some systematically elaborated questions and drawing some general conclusions about the actual and potential interaction and interdependence of international customary law and treaties. Professor Wilson is within his rights in refusing to relieve the reader of the tough intellectual task of deciding what to make of this body of material, but I regret that he has not chosen to present a more elaborate and theoretically oriented statement of its implications.

Aside from the more sophisticated thoughts which it may inspire among serious students of international law, this volume may serve an important purpose for other readers. The sheer fact that the United States habitually incorporates references to international law in its treaties is well worth emphasizing in a day when so many people, laymen and scholars, regard it as evidence of simple-mindedness if one does not assume without question that international law is meaningless or non-existent. We will be on the road to clearer thinking about the problem of world order when the scoffers recognize that the pragmatic evidence forces the burden of proof upon them, and the visionaries realize that world law is not an original dream to be pulled in its pristine purity from the sky; then, perhaps, both groups will join in studying the successes and failures of the old and very mundane system of international law, analyzing its inadequacies and its surges toward adequacy, and promoting its tendencies toward mature development. Professor Wilson's book, illustrating the point that international law is an imperfect reality to be examined and improved rather than a delusion to be glibly denied or a vision to be translated *de novo* into reality, may contribute to that result.

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.

*Harvard University.*

*People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character.* BY DAVID M. POTTER. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1954. Pp. xxvii, 219. $3.50.)

The kinship of history and her neighbors in the realm of social science is appropriately canvassed with emphasis on the American scene and character in this clear and compact work by a Yale historian. The volume is based on the lectures given by Professor Potter at the University of Chicago in 1950 under the auspices of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation for the Study of American Institutions. It distinctly qualifies as a study of institutions, including the strikingly American institution of advertising. It starts off with a broad introductory look entitled "History, the Behavioral Studies, and the Science of Man." It then looks, in the two chapters of Part I, at the subject of national character as treated by historians through the ages and by behavioral scientists in the modern age, with notable attention to those scientists concerned with anthropology, sociology, and psychology. With this ground covered, the other seven chapters or lectures set forth the author's body of ideas on the rise and development of American civilization under the title of "Abundance and the Shaping of American Character." The little book provides no intensive coverage of its large subject, but it opens up a valid inquiry that is highly stimulating, suggestive, and provocative. It aims pointed arrows at not a few stereotypes, such as those of nationalism and racism.

Professor Potter is concerned with man's environment and with man as part of his environment, in other words with the compound of primary and secondary environmental factors in history. He makes recurrent use of Ralph Linton's remark that "culture is the precipitate of history." In his quest for a common denominator to fit the analyses of Margaret Mead, David Reisman, and Karen Horney, he advances "as a determinant the factor of economic abundance." This abundance means more than physical or impersonal resources potentially available; it means a plentiful supply of usable goods produced from these resources, "which the people of the United States have possessed in far greater degree than any other national population." Taking up the Frederick J. Turner thesis that the dynamic frontier, with land for all, made America American and democratic, Potter insists that the frontier and the frontier lands constituted only a function or factor of abundance, which, once set going, continued to make America and American democracy distinctive in the world regardless of the disappearance of the frontier. He finds Turner's frontier agrarianism inadequate to explain the whole American story. He accepts Walter P. Webb's expansion of the Turner interpretation as formulated in Webb's *Great Frontier* and then goes on to qualify or expand the *Great Frontier* interpretation of modern capitalistic progress. He implies that Turner and Webb both overemphasized the physical environment as generator of American wealth and democracy.

Professor Potter gives solid treatment to advertising as "The Institution of Abundance." That institution is concerned with the disposition of plenty, not with the problem of scarcity. Hence, it is predominantly American and, in this country, is commensurate in terms of dollars and institutional influence with school or church. Like other institutions, American advertising casts its shadows afar but without the customary concern or conscious responsibility for advancing the social order. Not only does this multibillion-dollar enterprise sustain wide services of communication; it tends to set the tone and taste of news, thought, and comment. Much of the noncommercial content of publications, broadcasts, and telecasts is, in reality, advertising to attract advertising, and there is something to a British critic's complaint that American magazine writing "fixes the attention but does not engage the mind." The steady advertising of standard brands even becomes linked with social status and prestige for middle-class Americans. This institution is a phase or index of American democracy which is clearly more commercial or practical than ideological or theoretical and cannot be exported to peoples unacquainted with the dynamics of abundance. When we try to preach a democratic ideology to others we merely kid ourselves, not the others. Perhaps the bell rang before this unique lecture could appraise our media of communication in comparision with those in other countries which lack the sustenance of lush advertising.

The Potter thesis of economic abundance, with its modification and expansion of the Turner frontier doctrine, makes much of the American spirit and practice of equality of opportunity. We are a mobile people, not only in the wide-ranging geographic movement of individuals but in the vertical movement of individuals on the ladder of material, professional, and social achievement. A son is not merely expected to hold the station attained by his father; he feels impelled to rise above this station and to see his son move to still higher station. A by-product of this pattern is tension of the inner man over the outer circumstances. There is tension over struggle and success, and there is tension over failure and the fear of failure, with frustated souls seeking relief in the psychiatrist or in idealistic crusading for reform, social change, or even communism.

The last chapter of this study gets around to conditions and influences of American abundance in the formation of character in childhood. The author here makes an original hook-up between historical interpretation and the teachings of behavioral science. The bedroom, the nursery, the bathroom, and the methods of feeding make American children different from those of most of the rest of the world and from those of earlier days in our own country. American children of the present day have younger and healthier parents but have less intimate contact with them. Economic comforts stimulate the physical and emotional maturity of our children but paradoxically with a postponement of a sense of responsibility. Historiography must take account of these private matters in interpreting American character. Political scientists cannot live without Freud.

H. C. Nixon.

*Vanderbilt University.*

*Politics and Opinion in the Nineteenth Century: An Historical Introduction.* By John Bowle. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1954. Pp. 512. $4.50.)

This volume is the sequel to the author's *Western Political Thought,* which appeared in 1947. The earlier volume treated the history of political ideas "from the origin to Rousseau." The present volume is devoted to the nineteenth century, which the author divides, quite properly, into two eras: the "Romantic Age," and the "Age of Darwin." Altogether he considers thirty-six thinkers, certainly including all the major and representative European thinkers of the period between the French Revolution and World War I.

This study is written, presumably, from a point of view, that of "modern humanism." Apparently the humanist's concern is with "the moralization of power," to promote the goal of enhancing human life. The ideal of the modern humanist takes the form of "world peace through world commonwealth," imperative for realization to ensure the survival of Western civilization. Accordingly, for Mr. Bowle political thought must be seen in terms of "environment and psychology," and political "truth" is that which promotes "life."

For Mr. Bowle the grand theme of the nineteenth century is "the development of liberal constitutional commonwealth into social democracy to meet mass civilization." It is this development, along with the cross-currents it engendered, that the author proposed to examine. In these terms Mr. Bowle set as his task to "elucidate the constructive and destructive elements in nineteenth century political thought." He modestly describes his volume, written for the intelligent layman rather than the specialist, as an introduction, in broad outline, to a more general analysis. He less modestly expresses the hope that his study will "clarify and mobilize opinion upon [political] questions which will determine the life or death of modern society."

In Mr. Bowle's view the most valuable idea in Western political thought at the close of the eighteenth century was that of "liberal constitutional commonwealth." But this fine middle-class idea was circumscribed by the sovereign nation-state structure, with government, based on national popular will, the center of social affairs. And it was, too, "pre-industrial" in origin, alien to a modern context. So we find in the nineteenth century a three-fold attack launched against the idea of liberal constitutional commonwealth. In the attack, Central and Eastern European socialists, nationalists, and nihilists challenged the basic liberal assumptions. In this twentieth century, the threat of arbitary political power is made even more ominous though successful scientific conquest of the environment. Consequently, the hope of building a social democratic world commonwealth in this century depends upon a firm alliance between constitutional government and socio-psychological studies.

Despite the articulation of a point of view in the opening and closing pages, the body of the book is not animated by a thesis, and for a distressingly simple reason. This study is first of all a survey, and most of all historical. But what the author actually presents is a series of essays which are at best sketchy intellectual biographies, at worst, mere biographical profiles, of political writers.

Insofar as this study falls within a tradition of scholarship in political thought, it is within the "who said what" tradition. Scholars of this bent have performed a service, albeit a menial one, of identifying and ordering "ideas," as if they were neatly packaged inventory items. Yet what is missing in this, like so many other studies in the history of ideas, is, paradoxically, ideas. Perhaps an "idea" can be labeled for convenient handling by a catchy phrase, but it cannot be articulated, or probed, in such a fashion. Perhaps we can learn from such studies something about the authors of political tracts, but we can learn little about the political doctrines which so agitated the affairs of our forebears. To understand political doctrines and their vital roles in the thought of other days, searching analysis of their theoretical underpinnings is required. And to evaluate them, whatever the criterion of validity, careful inspection of propositions is likewise required.

But as a study in political thought, this book is deficient as well in the manner of treating ideas. The florid style of writing by itself is less exasperating than the fact that the treatment is that of a literary critic: impressionistic and superficial. The author of this artistically fashioned exercise appears content to dismiss a significant and complicated theoretical conception with a quotation, capped by an epigram.

The author's manner of treating doctrines is exemplified in his discussion of "Catholic Attitudes" (Book II, Chapter IX). In ostensibly reciting Catholic teachings, he writes: "The Catholic Church, alone, is the divinely ordained repository of revelation, and the representative of God on earth. As here expressed, this claim is theocratic . . . " (p. 389). As there expressed, the author is mistaken, as even a casual examination of Papal encyclicals concerning Catholic political teachings should reveal. After all, nineteenth-century Catholic theoreticians elaborated a doctrine of political authority, of which this study of politics and opinion exhibits no evidence.

Of course a historian of ideas is under no obligation to accept a body of doctrine he considers. However, a theorist is under an obligation to analyze a doctrine he proposes to evaluate, let alone expound. And if perchance he should be interested in the merits of a theoretical issue, he is under an obligation, too, to indicate the grounds for the positions he holds.

A theorist, in short, is obliged to theorize. Hence a guided tour through a museum of nineteenth-century political thinkers, no matter how entertaining, does not constitute a significant contribution to the study of the history of political thought.

CURRIN V. SHIELDS.

*University of California (Los Angeles).*

*Social Security in the British Commonwealth: Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand.* BY RONALD MENDELSOHN. (London: The Athlone Press. 1954. Pp. iv, 391. $7.00.)

Social security is one of the hallmarks of the modern state. Yet we have far too little fundamental analysis of its effect not only on individual behavior but also on national standards of living and the national economy. The motive for introducing social security has been to alleviate or prevent poverty arising out of specific causes like ill-health, old age, or the burden of children. It is common, therefore, to say that social security systems ensure a national minimum standard of living. Do they also help to create a more equalitarian, or a freer type of society? Can they even perhaps be used to develop national optimum standards of living?

Only occasionally does Dr. Mendelsohn's detailed and competent study of *Social Security in the British Commonwealth* approach such questions, though it is obvious that they are in the back of his mind while writing about the minutiae of benefits and administration. In places, indeed, his study suggests new lines of investigation. Its particular contribution, however, is that it provides a wide range of carefully presented comparative data from four countries—Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—which have as significant experience in this field as can be found anywhere in democratic states.

Of the four, Great Britain has gone by far the longest way towards providing complete coverage of persons and risks. Between insurance and assistance, it provides total cover for sickness, invalidity, maternity expenses, industrial injuries, funeral expenses, and for orphans, widows, the aged, and those in need of residual relief; it includes also the general health scheme. Interestingly enough, one of only two fields in which Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all provide total cover—family benefits—is one of the two in which Great Britain has only partial coverage. None of the four countries provides complete coverage for unemployment though all provide partial aid under these circumstances. Australia has partial aid in all fields but total cover only for family benefits, maternity expenses, and residual relief. Canada and New Zealand do not cover funeral expenses; the latter country covers all the other risks with complete cover of old age, family benefits, industrial injuries, residual relief, and the health service. Canada has numerous gaps in its services but provides complete cover for old age, family benefits, and residual relief.

No less important, however, is the level of benefits, their relation to each other and to the means of the recipient. Here again there are wide differences. The level of benefits in Great Britain is relatively low; in New Zealand it is adequate, perhaps even too high for the economy. In Canada, everyone over 70 receives old age pensions regardless of means and without prior contributions;

in Great Britain, most social services are related to insurance principles. In fact, there is infinite variety in the systems which the book describes.

Dr. Mendelsohn is an Australian, a member of the Commonwealth civil service who has had personal experience with the working of social security administration. Not surprisingly, those sections of his book which deal with his own country are the most vivid, standing in sharp contrast to the rather dry and lifeless picture he presents of Canadian conditions. One would wish also for more consideration of the dynamic drive towards social security provided by political parties and pressure groups. Admittedly the book is large already, but it would have greater meaning and interest if it had a more substantial background of this type.

What the book does, however, is important. It provides a broad view of how four countries, with widely different conditions and problems, but similar traditions and objectives, have responded in the social security field to the challenge of the welfare state. It is clear, comprehensive, and occasionally exciting. The book not only makes a worthwhile contribution of its own; at the same time it can serve as a sound basis for subsequent studies grappling with fundamental issues raised by the vast and widespread growth of social security.

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER.

*Smith College.*

*Behörde und Bürger: Das Verhältnis zwischen Verwaltung und Bevölkerung in einer deutschen Mittelstadt.* BY KLAUS A. LINDEMANN. (Darmstadt: Eduard Roether Verlag. 1952. Pp. xv, 214.)

This study, whose title may be loosely translated *Bureaucracy and Citizen, the Relationship between Administration and People in a Middlesize German City,* is one of ten monographs in which the results of a community study of the city of Darmstadt and its rural environs have been published. Its interest to political and other social scientists in America far transcends the significance of its findings or conclusions.

First of all, it is a product of one of the more sensible activities fostered by the United States as an occupying power in post-World War II Germany. The Social Science Research Institute in Darmstadt was the inspiration of an American sociologist, Nels Anderson, who conceived it, found the money for it, nursed it along, and finally saw its community study project brought to fruition. This genius in intercultural exchange at the level of scientific research showed up fortuitously in the Labor Relations Branch of the Manpower Division of OMGUS. That he appeared here, rather than in one of the agencies whose declared purpose was cultural exchange, and that he weathered the transition to HICOG and numerous RIFs long enough to complete at least this part of his work may be regarded as unusually reassuring manifestations of the "List der Vernunft."

The Darmstadt community study was designed primarily as a means of bringing German social science, which had been separated from the invigorating influence of international cultural exchange for the twelve years of Nazi domination, into contact with the research techniques that had been developed outside Germany and particularly in the United States during this period—in many instances, indeed, through the efforts of exiled German scholars. Although the actual reasearch and the writing of the monographs were done principally by the young German scholars directly engaged in the project, the specific contributions of several Americans, in addition to Anderson, should be recognized. Immediate guidance in the initial stages and throughout the middle distances came from Henry J. Meyer, a sociologist, and H. Ashley Weeks, a social statistician, both of New York University. S. Earl Grigsby, a specialist in rural sociology, worked with the project from beginning to end, assisting particularly with those aspects of the study which have to do with the relations of the city with its rural hinterland. For the present monograph he wrote the English extract.

The final methodological imprint was contributed by Professor Theodore W. Adorno, chief joint author of *The Authoritarian Personality.* As a representative of the Institute for Social Research, which he and Professor Horkheimer had reestablished in Frankfurt after their sojourn in the United States, Professor Adorno became scientific advisor and editorial consultant for the Darmstadt community study in 1951. He determined to no small extent the form and character of the ten studies in which the findings have been reported.

The monograph here under review, *Behörde und Bürger,* is principally valuable as a case study in the application of research methods and techniques. Professor Adorno points out in his introduction that it was selected to serve as a model for the treatment of the focal problem that emerged in the community study as a whole. This problem he defined as the interaction between the objective social situations in the city and the life of the human beings therein ("die Beziehung zwischen den objektiven gesellschaftlichen Gegebenheiten der Stadt und dem in solchen Gegebenheiten sich abspielenden Leben der Menschen"). Through this focus the interaction between objective factors and subjective factors, those belonging both to the sphere of rational judgment and to psychologically determined reactions, could be examined.

In pursuance of this design, the monograph is divided into two parts. The first presents a "structural analysis," i.e., a systematic description of the governmental agencies in the city and of the contacts between these agencies and the people. It is concerned with "objective" relations, whereas the second part deals with the "subjective" reactions of the people to the administrative authorities ("Wie hat sich . . . die Darmstädter Bevölkerung zur Verwaltung verhalten?").

Particularly in the second part, Dr. Klaus Lindeman, the author, presents his material with self-conscious attention to methodological mechanics that makes his work unusually valuable as a laboratory demonstration. This value is enhanced by the inclusion of numerous charts and tables and by the appendices, which contain a careful exposition of the techniques used, a table showing the personality types of all respondents in the interviews arranged according to the scale developed in *The Authoritarian Personality,* and résumés of the questionnaires of four respondents of different personality types.

For those interested in substance rather than method the first part of the study has most interest. In this "structural analysis," the physical aspects of the administrative agencies—i.e., housing, location, convenience or inconvenience of office and waiting room arrangements, etc.—are set forth against the historical and social background of the city. The several agencies are systematically classified from the point of view of function and frequency of contact with citizens. The institutional features, such as organizational structure and procedures, are analyzed. Exceptionally striking are the detailed analyses of the procedures of five specific agencies, in each case illustrated by a description of the processing of a typical case from the initiation of the request by a petitioner to the final disposition, complete with charts indicating the nature and duration of the action at each stage. In all of this analysis and description and in the generalizations which state the conclusions of the author, considerable indebtedness to the methods and insights of the sociological administrative science of Max Weber is apparent.

In the second part of the study, which deals with the subjective reactions of the people to the administrative authorities, the author was handicapped by a paucity of data. This was in part due to the fact that the questionnaire used for sampling public opinion had been drawn up and the interviews taken before the focal problem as defined above was clearly perceived and the attack upon it designed. Fortunately, however, the two questions which related to administrative authorities suited the design well. One concerned the general evaluation of the city administrations by the respondents; the other dealt with the particular experiences of the respondents with an administrative authority in specific instances. Fortunately also, from the first the investigation was concerned with evidence on the alteration of stereotyped attitudes as a result of new experiences produced by substantially altered environmental conditions. Furthermore, the interviews had been so constructed as to produce many data useful in identifying the type of personality represented by each of the various respondents as measured by the personality scale developed in *The Authoritarian Personality.* These data were especially useful because the design adopted for handling the focal problem involved testing the Adorno hypothesis about the reduced capacity of an "authority-bound" personality to respond rationally to specific experiences. Some additional data, useful chiefly for purposes of comparison, were obtained from interviews taken by the Reactions Analysis Branch of HICOG and some supplementary interviewing was done in the final stages of the study, but this was limited by considerations of time and expense.

This reviewer feels that the author, with the aid of his advisors and assistants, extracted the maximum possible of generalizations and conclusions from the data at hand. It is to the credit of all concerned that these are cautiously presented and that the assertion of their significance is modest. The value of the work is in its high quality demonstration of the application of recently developed research methods and techniques under peculiarly interesting as well as difficult circumstances. To summarize its findings or to judge its achievements in terms of the substance of it conclusions would be to miss the point of the whole enterprise. The appropriate concluding comment is that made by Professor Adorno in his introduction: "Die Monographie betrachtet sich selbst als Anfang, und das setzt gewiss ihren Wert nicht herab."

C. B. ROBSON.

*University of North Carolina.*

*Taxation in the United States.* BY RANDOLPH E. PAUL. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1954. Pp. xii, 830. $15.00.)

In this book an eminent legal scholar presents and interprets the historical background of our national government's tax system from colonial times to the present, indicates the executive, legislative, and judicial processes in formulating tax measures, and analyzes the system in relation to recent economic theory. Federal tax history is interpreted in the light of the changing political, economic, and social background. The tremendous influence of national finance on the economy, the importance of rational and equitable tax policies, and the great need for intelligent citizen interest in taxation in a democracy are emphasized.

Mr. Paul writes from the vantage point of one who was special Tax Consultant to President Roosevelt and the Treasury during the Second World War and who became General Counsel of the Treasury during this critical period. His book is rich in its references to the thinking and activities of leaders in Congress and in administration. The politics of taxation—frequently small, bitter, and selfish—are shown to be an influential force in tax developments. The raising of revenue has been regarded by many persons as more important than raising that revenue equitably and in a manner consistent with our economic and social goals. Too often political expediency has moulded our tax legislation.

The Constitution and taxation have developed with the country. The broad power of Congress to raise revenue through a diversified system of taxation and to regulate the economy has been upheld by the courts. Every tax has regulatory effects; and as taxes expand in scope and their rates increase, their regulatory effects grow. It is therefore important for us to "determine our social and economic objectives, and then decide which taxes will best lead us to the double goal of raising revenue and accomplishing these other objectives."

The national government's tax system, growing out of our imperfect governmental processes, is deficient in important respects. Yet it has evolved with the financial task to be performed and in recent years has been more directly related to the need for an expanding but reasonably stable economy.

Mr. Paul warns us that we must expect heavy taxation for many years. Both low and high income groups, as well as the great middle class, must be burdened. In spite of its weaknesses, we have a relatively good tax system. But it should be reformed to improve its equity, to lessen its ill effects upon the economy, and to promote social and economic progress.

Corporate taxation is open to much criticism. Our revenue needs are so great, however, that it is not now feasible to reduce corporate taxation to low levels, as some have proposed, or to sweep it away. Mr. Paul would also close important income tax loopholes. Overgenerous depletion allowances, which result in large revenue losses, would be cut down to a reasonable level. The loophole caused by the exemption of the interest on state and local government securities from federal taxation would be closed. The estate and gift taxes would be integrated with each other and at the same time correlated with the income tax.

Mr. Paul's large and meaty volume is not a treatise on federal taxation. It is rather an account of how we got where we are and an appraisal of the task ahead of us, if we are to make our tax system conducive to democracy and a modern enterprise economy. The reader will find in the study, however, many expressions of the author's tax philosophy and frequent analyses of important tax problems. For example, Mr. Paul provides an extended discussion of the theory, limitations, and validity of progressive taxation. While progression might be carried to excessive heights and be applied with objectionable discriminations, it is the product of modern ideas of ability to pay and the needs of our economy. The majority of the American people can be trusted, it is contended, not to abuse the power to impose high rate taxes upon the wealthy.

This thought-provoking book was written by Mr. Paul because of his conviction that taxation and fiscal policy have become a major issue in America. If our financial system and our economy are not to collapse under the weight of heavy spending and taxation for defense and international aid, as Soviet Russia has hoped, and if our democracy is not to default through bankruptcy to communism, we must rationally control our finances and taxation and employ the weapons in our fiscal arsenal in a manner which will strengthen, rather than weaken, our society. The author contends that Americans must fully understand the basic issues of taxation and fiscal policy if we are to win the war with communism on the financial and economic front. While fiscal policy alone will not guarantee a prosperous and growing economy and a democratic society, it is indispensable for the achievement of our economic and social goals. Therefore, tax experts—accountants, attorneys, economists, and other students of taxation—are urged to do everything possible to educate their fellow citizens concerning our huge federal tax problem and to help in the reform of our tax policies and legislation so that the tax system will be consistent with and foster American democracy and a modern enterprise economy.

ALFRED G. BUEHLER.

*University of Pennsylvania.*

# BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*Methods of State Constitutional Reform.* By Albert L. Sturm. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1954. Pp. xii, 175. $2.50.)

This monograph is a very timely one, on a very important subject—a subject that has not been adequately explored for several decades, since the publication of the studies by Dodd and Dealey in 1910 and 1915, respectively. The present study contains seven chapters which deal with the general characteristics of state constitutions, legal methods of constitutional change, legislative proposal of amendments, the constitutional initiative, constitutional conventions, constitutional commissions and other official groups, and summary and conclusions. In other words, after discussion of the historical background of our state constitutions and the urgent current need for their revision, there is a fairly comprehensive treatment of each of the four existing methods by which significant changes and/or complete revision of these basic laws may be accomplished. The study contains twelve tables in which is summarized a large portion of the data presented and interpreted in the text. The data were obtained from analysis of the amending provisions of the constitutions themselves, from the several secretaries of state, and with the aid of an elaborate questionnaire from well over 100 political scientists—one or more in each of the forty-eight states and the Territories of Hawaii and Puerto Rico.

The material has been well-organized and is well-presented throughout. Sometimes one wishes that particular topics had been treated more fully, but to have done so in any number of cases would have increased the size and scope of the work. Actually, this reviewer finds little to criticize. One might wonder why, in Chapter 2, no mention is made of change by constitutional commission, which is a legal method, or may be made so. This technique, however, is not authorized in any existing state constitution, and the study is limited primarily to an analysis of the provisions for constitutional change currently effective in state constitutions. In view of the number of barriers, legal and otherwise, to constitutional reform, one might wish that these had been discussed more fully in one place; all are covered, however, at appropriate points as the discussion proceeds.

The point of view upon which the study is based is fundamentally sound. The author stresses the fact that at least seven principal weaknesses of the state governments arise directly out of their outmoded constitutions. (One cannot help wondering why, when constitutions were so frequently and easily revised in the late nineteenth century, it has become almost indecent or irreverent even to suggest constitutional revision in the twentieth.) Efforts to refine and modernize the methods of state constitutional reform should be governed by a number of basic considerations: (1) the limitations and capabilities of the electorate; (2) reasonable balance between excessive rigidity and extreme flexibility; (3) conversely, means of permitting necessary adaptation to changed conditions without incurring the risk of instability; (4) means of securing an adequate measure of the popular will. "Articles on amendment and revision of state constitutions," the author concludes, "should afford appropriate methods of harmonizing the organic law with the changing needs and demands of our dynamic society."

With this sound conclusion, no informed person will take issue. The $64 question—which was not within the purview of this study—is this: in the present climate of opinion on constitutional questions, how can the people be brought to understand this premise, and to utilize the powers to revise the fundamental law which, in the majority of jurisdictions, they actually possess?—W. Brooke Graves, *Library of Congress.*

*Economic Policy in the Development of a Western State: Missouri, 1820–1860.* By James Neal Primm. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1954. Pp. viii, 174. $3.75.)

*Constructive Liberalism: The Role of the State in Economic Development in Georgia to 1860.* By Milton S. Heath. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1954. Pp. xiv, 448. $7.50.)

Publicists and politicians of all persuasions show a marked tendency to re-create the past in terms of their own dreams of what the present should be. Apparently this is a characteristic unaffected by time and circumstances; it is as conspicuous in Plato's vision of the halcyon days of the city-state as it is in a National Association of Manufacturer's interpretation of American colonial history and of the early days of the Republic.

Probably the most dogged myth, and one that seems destined to survive an infinite exposure to facts, is that the United States was founded as a working model of *laissez-faire.* In this view, the increasing role of government in the economy is a departure from the economic ideals of the fathers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The growth of the Welfare State, it is asserted, has meant the end of the "American Way," and history is invoked to prove that in our ancestors' time men stood on their own feet and, with pioneer verve, scorned collectivism.

True, there were some who have dissented from this picture: Professors Charles A. Beard, Richard Morris, and Carter Goodrich set off a few mines under the bastions, and others followed in their path. But the most detailed analysis has come only in recent years with the publication by the Harvard University Committee on Research in Economic History of a series of state case studies. The first two, one by Louis Hartz and the other by Oscar and Mary Handlin, dealt extensively with state intervention in the economic life of Pennsylvania and New York. The two under review are concerned with a Western state and a Southern state respectively, and carry on the high research standards of the earlier volumes.

Only one versed in the intimate affairs of Missouri and Georgia a century ago could attempt a textual criticism of these two books; so I will not undertake any footnote chopping. The books make their point and make it well, although one must comment in passing that neither is up to the literary standards set by their predecessors in the series. In each case the authors have painstakingly examined what the state did in the economic arena, and have demonstrated conclusively that while the early leaders of the nation were hardly socialists, they certainly demanded state protection and encouragement of their economic interests. Canals, railroads, plank-roads, factories, and particularly banks, were constantly subject to legislative and administrative supervision and regulation, and in Georgia the state government took an active part in land distribution. Furthermore, state intervention was taken for granted; all groups favored state activity, but a bitter squabble went on to determine whose welfare the state would underpin.

The central difficulty which has hindered many observers from gaining an adequate understanding of the pre-Civil War United States is the obsession—justifiable in the light of twentieth-century developments—with the activities of the national government. It is true that in relative terms the early national government intervened only slightly in economic life, but it is ignorance or perversity to attribute this nonintervention to a principled belief in *laissez-faire.* A more significant basis for opposition to national intervention was states' rights, although on occasions it was cloaked in the phrases of Adam Smith. A Missouri congressman could, for example, denounce federal intervention in the field of banking as contravening natural economic law, and then go home to Jefferson City and support a state bank. In short, in economics as in politics, Americans have traditionally been prepared to take the theory which suited their purpose. The search for principle generally ends with the highly pragmatic question: "Whose ox is gored?" JOHN P. ROCHE, *Haverford College.*

*The Negro and the Schools.* BY HARRY S. ASHMORE. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1954. Pp. xv, 228. $2.75.)

The United States Supreme Court on May 17, 1954, put an end to the old doctrine of "separate but equal" facilities in the public schools. Because of the long time these cases were before the Court, there was opportunity for a well-qualified group of scholars, mostly sociologists from the South, to study this topic. Harry S. Ashmore, editor of the *Arkansas Gazette*, has summarized these studies in a brief, objective, and readable volume. The more detailed studies are appearing as later volumes.

The scope of the Ashmore volume is comprehensive. The narrative chapters discuss the origins of bi-racial education in the United States. Even as late as the end of World War II many states outside the South maintained separate systems for the races, while all of the Southern states did so. Then, in a number of these Northern and Western states integration began according to individual state plans. Here one finds an analysis of such programs in New Jersey, Illinois, Indiana, and other states. The second part of the volume presents a statistical analysis of the current situation in the Southern schools. Comparative data are presented on financial support for the schools, teacher training, teacher salaries, and other matters. Finally there is a population analysis of the various sections and counties within each Southern state.

For all who wish to be informed of the nature of the problem of segregation, the book is of impelling interest. Those citizens and officials in the South who hope to ignore or circumvent the decree of the Supreme Court will, of course, not find that they need to consider the data. But for those who wish to read and learn, here is much helpful information. The volume, of course, cannot attempt to present solutions for all of the problems that will arise. But as consideration is given in many states to the choice of immediate integration or some system of gradualism, there is much here that can be studied with profit. It is also to be hoped that there will be additional studies of this type, as the experience of such cities as Baltimore and Washington in changing to integration also becomes available. But as for this volume alone, seldom has a more timely and helpful analysis appeared at the same time a major issue in public affairs cried for solution.—Manning J. Dauer, *The University of Florida.*

*A Whig Embattled: The Presidency under John Tyler.* By Robert J. Morgan. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1954. $3.50.)

Students of politics have for a number of years insisted that one of the essential characteristics of constitutional democracy is, paradoxically enough, strong executive leadership tempered by effective legislative control. In the United States recent studies of the presidency have emphasized the necessity under our system for "vigorous executive leadership." This, broadly speaking, is the theme of Robert J. Morgan's first-rate study, *A Whig Embattled: The Presidency under John Tyler.* The author is not interested in elaborating a chronological narrative, but rather in evaluating Tyler's contributions to the office, considering that office in its various chiefships, namely, Chief of State, Chief Executive, Chief of Legislation, Chief of Foreign Relations, and Chief of Party. This is not an attempt to rewrite history, though it is Mr. Morgan's belief that the picture of John Tyler as a stubborn ineffective President is something less than accurate.

At the very outset Tyler after the death of Harrison was forced to determine whether he was merely Acting President or President in the full sense of the constitutional office. Over Whig objections he insisted that he was President of the United States, took the oath as President, and informed Congress that the presidential office had devolved upon him. This, Mr. Morgan rightly insists, was a fundamental decision and one in which Tyler showed "good judgment and courage." Such strong and forthright action did not look like the kind of constitutional President the Whig legislators had in mind, and indeed once in office Tyler came much closer to the hated Jacksonian view of the presidency than to the Whig view. Tyler exercised the veto power often, even going so far as to veto a national banking bill twice. Consequently, "By the summer of 1842 John Tyler apparently had learned the very necessary lesson that a President must lead, not follow, Congress."

On only one occasion does Mr. Morgan indulge in fulsome praise concerning Tyler's actions, and that is in the matter of Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island. Here the author holds that "Tyler demonstrated . . . a skillful capacity for blending his legal authority as the nation's chief executive with the moral influence of the Presidential office. He acted with restraint and firmness. He refused either to shy away from his plain duty or to act with precipitate haste." Even Daniel Webster, no great admirer of Tyler's, was moved to praise the handling by the President of this "insurrection." Evidence today suggests that these evaluations are fair. In his last chapter, entitled, "A Jacksonian Whig," the author concludes: "At the very least, he [Tyler] determined for the future the tradition that a President by accident may use his official powers with a vigor and purpose undiminished by his peculiar position. Like Jackson alone before him, Tyler stood adamant in defending his office against the Whig dogma of legislative guardianship of the executive."

This is a valuable study not only in pointing up accurately some constitutional issues of the presidency under Tyler, but also in demonstrating some of the necessary elements of constitutional government in the United States today. Like Walter Lippmann, Mr. Morgan holds that there is a function of "governing" and a function of "representation," that is, of executive leadership and of legislative control, and that imbalance between the two may lead to difficulties if not disaster.—George A. Peek, Jr., *University of Michigan.*

*Law Writers and the Courts: The Influence of Thomas M. Cooley, Christopher G. Tiedeman, and John F. Dillon upon American Constitutional Law.* BY CLYDE E. JACOBS. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1954. Pp. 223. $3.50.)

From time to time American history is preoccupied with a struggle between business and government, or more accurately between business on one side and the legislative and executive branches of government on the other. Generally, it may be said, a growing faith in democracy has insured victory for "government," unless the judiciary intervenes. On occasion that intervention has been so drastic that President Hadley of Yale could say (in (1908): "The fundamental division of powers . . . is between voters on one hand and property owners on the other. The forces of democracy on one side, divided between the executive and the legislature, are set over against the forces of property on the other side, with the judiciary as arbiter between them. . . ." The present book examines one facet of that now expired judicial revolution in which our courts, by adopting *laissez faire* as the law of the land, loaded the dice against popular self-government. Mr. Jacobs undertakes to show the influence of Cooley, Tiedeman, and Dillon in the rise of those legal doctrines which gave economic *laissez faire* its constitutional sanction. Examining a large number of cases in which these publicists were approvingly referred to, Mr. Jacobs concludes they were "great law givers" in a creative sense. Perhaps they were, but one may be sceptical as to whether such evidence—frequent citation in court opinions—supports the conclusion. If the judges cited the publicists, the publicists cited the judges. It is well known, moreover, that Cooley was often used on both sides of a case: lawyers supporting governmental regulation looked to his pages on the "police power," their opponents to his pages on "due process." *A priori* one position seems as sound, and as "creative," as the other. The really contriving law giver, one submits, was that force in the community which vindicated the one and undermined the other. He who can explain and measure such a force has one secret of law in his grasp. When we call it the bias or perversity of judges do we do any more than name (and thus hide) what we do not understand? Because judges did take one position does it follow they were free to have taken another?—WALLACE MENDELSON, *The University of Tennessee.*

*Military Law under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.* BY WILLIAM B. AYCOCK AND SEYMOUR W. WURFEL. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1955. Pp. xviii, 430.)

General dissatisfaction with the administration of military justice became evident at the conclusion of World War II. As a result the Uniform Code of Military Justice was enacted by Congress and became effective on May 31, 1951. While leaving the basic organization of military courts at the service level unchanged, the code did introduce certain procedural changes and in addition made the decisions of the lower tribunals reviewable by a civilian Court of Military Appeals. The creation of this new court led to the accumulation of decisions interpretative of the code. The chief value of the present book lies in its analysis and discussions of these holdings through August 13, 1954. It thus presents the fascinating history of a new court feeling its way in a new field and establishing precedents governing the administration of military justice. Although outside of the author's scope, which he states to be that of affording a practical reference for the military lawyer or civilian practitioner, it is, nonetheless, regrettable that he offers no over-all evaluation of the success of the new system. The reader would like to know how far the new code has been accepted by the military forces in the field, how successful the attempt to incorporate traditional civilian legal procedures has been in practice, and what defects in administration have been evidenced since the adoption of the code. These questions are of special significance in view of the movement to introduce amendments to the code in the current session of Congress. This criticism aside, the work constitutes an important and much needed contribution and the author merits the thanks of all whose interests involve them in litigation before our military courts.—H.M.M.

*Le Système Constitutionnel des États-Unis d'Amérique: Le Système Constitutionnel Actuel.* BY ANDRÉ TUNC AND SUZANNE TUNC. (Paris: Montchrestien. 1954. Pp. 542.)

In this second of three volumes on the constitutional system of the United States, the authors analyze the present organization and functioning of the national and state governments, devoting nearly half of their pages to the judiciary. The volume furnishes French scholars with an encyclopedic description and analysis of current American government; its extensive footnotes are a comprehensive guide to scholarly literature on the subject, with special emphasis being placed on Supreme Court cases and law review articles.

*Economic Controls and Defense.* By Donald Wallace. With a Chapter by John Maurice Clark. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund. 1953. Pp. xii, 260. $2.00.)

*Defense and the Dollar: Federal Credit and Monetary Policies.* By Albert G. Hart. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 1953. Pp. xii, 203. $2.00.)

Two useful studies for those interested in the economic problems created by large-scale expenditures for defense. Dr. Hart's study describes and evaluates the monetary defenses against inflation and makes recommendations concerning their use. Dr. Wallace's study, ending his long period of rich experience and scholarly writing on problems of economic mobilization and stabilization, deals "principally with fundamental problems raised by use of direct controls in a long defense effort," including those of inflation, production programming, use of materials, and manpower. Dr. Clark adds a final chapter dealing primarily with the necessity for and place of direct controls.

*State of Louisiana Official Publications, 1935–1953.* (Baton Rouge, La.: Wade O. Martin, Jr., Secretary of State. 1954. 2 vols.)

The two volumes issued late in 1954 are called a "sesquicentennial publication." Vol. 1 (pp. 398) is a *Bibliography of the Official Publications of Louisiana, 1935–1948,* compiled by Lucy B. Foote, Librarian, Louisiana Room, Louisiana State University Library, and supplements her *Bibliography of the Official Publications of Louisiana, 1803–1934,* which was issued by the University Library in 1942. Vol. 2 (pp. 235) is a *List of the Public Documents of Louisiana, 1948–1953,* compiled by Mrs. Margaret T. Lane, recorder of documents in the office of the Secretary of State, cumulating the semi-annual lists from August 1, 1948, through December, 1953, and containing a supplement, 1948–1953, to Miss Foote's *Author Headings for the Official Publications of the State of Louisiana.* Beginning in 1948, the listing of Louisiana state documents had been required by law through the Recorder of Documents in the Secretary of State's office, and a series of depository libraries for state documents has been established in Louisiana. The two volumes will do much to facilitate the access to Louisiana state documents, and show what can be done with a will to work in the difficult but important field of state documents.—J.B.C.

*Official Publications of the Colony and State of North Carolina, 1749–1939: A Bibliography.* Compiled by Mary Lindsay Thornton. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1954. Pp. xii, 347. $6.00.)

Miss Thornton, librarian of the North Carolina Room at the University of North Carolina Library, has prepared a union catalog of North Carolina documents for the period covered in the more important North Carolina Libraries, together with a few references from other sources. Separate entries are given for all the individual items bound in the volumes of the North Carolina *Public Documents.* The arrangement of the more than four thousand titles is alphabetical by agency, and there is a substantial topical index at the end. The contribution of James Sprunt Hill in making possible the publication of the volume should do much to encourage the collection and use of North Carolina documents and to focus attention on doing some similar work in many other states.—J.B.C.

*Official Publications of the State of New York, 1947–1952. A Cumulation of the Checklist of Official Publications of the State of New York, Volumes 1–5.* Compiled by Mrs. Ethel Lansing. (Albany: New York State Library. 1954. Pp. iii, 139.)

About 4,000 items are included in the volume issued by the State of New York for the period October, 1947 to June, 1952. The arrangement is alphabetical by issuing agency. There is no index. In addition to the monthly *Checklist,* of which this is a cumulation, there have also been annual cumulations for the 1st–3rd, 6th, and 7th years. At the beginning, there is a list of earlier guides and indexes to New York State publications. The appearance of this welcome cumulative volume may well be the means of arousing some interest in seeing what can be done to cover the period from 1904, the latest date included in Hasse's *Index,* to September, 1947.—J.B.C.

*Checklist of New Mexico Publications, 1850–1953.* By Wilma Loy Shelton. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1954. Pp. 240.)

Miss Shelton, formerly librarian of the University of New Mexico, has over many years attempted to assemble as complete a record as possible of the territorial and state publications, including those of which an edition has been purchased by the New Mexico government for distribution. There is a brief introduction with a statement of the printing and distribution laws and a chart of the administrative organizations as of July, 1952. The official publications of New Mexico are grouped under the executive agencies in alphabetical order, followed by separate sections for the Governor, Judiciary, Legislature, Associations, and Institutions. The work, first printed in the *New Mexico Historical Review*, 1949–1954, constitutes a much needed tool for those having to deal with state documents.—J.B.C.

*Admiral Kimmel's Story.* By HUSBAND E. KIMMEL. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. 1955. Pp. xvi, 201. $3.75.)

The Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in 1941 tells his side of the Pearl Harbor disaster; the Fleet was clearly unready for war but the reasons—as presented here—were delay and procrastination in Washington, failure to pass on vital intelligence information to those directly responsible for defense in the Pacific, and—it is suggested—the use by those engaged in "power politics" of the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor as a "lure" for a Japanese attack.

*Essays in Public Finance and Fiscal Policy.* By GERARD COLM. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1955. Pp. xvii, 375. $4.74.)

A reprint of 18 essays, all except the concluding one heretofore printed, though three have not been previously printed in English. There is much perceptive comment on such matters as budgeting, state-local and federal coordination, legislative control and executive discretion, and democracy in relation to fiscal policy as a tool of economic redress and advance.

*Probing Our Past.* By MERLE CURTI. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1955. Pp. xii, 294. $4.00.)

A reprint of eleven essays written between 1926 and 1953 including several which will be of special interest to political scientists, such as those on the influence of Locke on American thought from 1783–1861, Francis Leiber and nationalism, human nature in American thought, and the democratic theme in American historical literature.

*American Constitutional Law.* By ALPHEUS T. MASON AND WILLIAM B. BEANEY. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1954. Pp. 642+Appendix.)

Authored by political scientists, this volume constitutes a happy compromise between the verbose scholarly dissertations on constitutional law and the severely stripped down opinion casebook offered by law school professors. Incisive topical essays, and effectively edited opinions, each accompanied by a succinct statement of facts, facilitate the developmental approach with stress on the recent and current. Court performance appears as a potent instrument in public policy.

*Industrial Relations and the Government.* By WAYNE L. MCNAUGHTON AND JOSEPH LAZAR. (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc. 1954. Pp. vii, 531. $6.00.)

This text provides an exceptionally detailed analysis of English and American background and of American statutes and administrative and court decisions; it includes also chapters on the organization and activities of associations representing employer and employee interests.

*The Structure and Government of Labor Unions.* By PHILIP TAFT. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1954. Pp. xix, 312. $6.00.)

An illuminating analysis of the internal affairs of unions, including dues, salaries, discipline, appeals, and elections for union office. It includes a chapter on radicalism in unions and case studies of the automobile workers', steel workers', and teamsters' unions.

*Hugh Roy Cullen, A Story of American Opportunity.* By ED KILMAN AND THEON WRIGHT. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1954. Pp. viii, 376. $4.00.)

A journalistic and idealized story of the amassing of a fortune, followed by philanthropy and an active fight in politics—to prevent "one-worldism," "socialism," and "to save our form of government."

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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## FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

*Essai sur la Politique des Subventions Administratives.* By Jean Boulouis. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1951. Pp. ix, 334.)

M. Boulouis, professor at Poitiers, won the Paul Deschanel Prize for this thesis on the policies of central grants to local governments, commended in the foreword by Professor Rolland as the first comprehensive treatise in France on grants viewed constitutionally, administratively, and fiscally. Before entering his detailed study of France, a unitary state, Professor Boulouis examines the policy in Great Britain, with its tradition of local self-government, and in Switzerland, a federal state. He finds small comfort in either. In all three countries, the growth of the welfare state has forced the national government to rely on sources of revenue not available to local units and to channel some of these revenues back to local units. In the process, conditions are imposed that undermine local responsibility. The historic local community becomes in effect an administrative sub-district.

M. Boulouis' most detailed study is of France. Here the first grants (as in Britain and Switzerland) were earmarked for certain mandatory expenditures (in France, school buildings, highways, public assistance, police and fire), then for optional expenditures (rural electrification, supply of drinking water, local transportation, and unemployment relief). There was at no time (except perhaps for the postwar Monnet Plan) a systematic inventory of needs and resources behind the series of special grants. The grants have led to fiscal and administrative uniformity, central control and sanctions.

France then experimented with block grants. Here M. Boulouis thinks that the British avoided the worst faults of the French system of control because of their tradition of local self-government, which was in France a delicate flower of nineteenth-century liberalism. He shows how block grants leave local government fiscally at the mercy of central government.

Finally, M. Boulouis recounts the evolution of equalization grants (*péréquation*), which began as aid to depressed areas to maintain minimum services. As the system of grants stands today, he sees it as a transitional step toward integrating local budgets and the national budget. He believes that it has done more harm than good in France by weakening local responsibility and flexibility of response to local needs.

Those in this country studying intergovernmental relations will find this lucidly written essay of value and of interest. One wishes that M. Boulouis had been in a position to compare France with the United States (rather than Switzerland) as a federal state: would he then have been as pessimistic globally?—Charles S. Ascher, *Brooklyn College.*

*The Communist Party of India: A Short History.* By Minoo R. Masani. (New York: Macmillan. 1954. Pp. 302. $3.50.)

Unlike the pre-revolutionary Chinese Communist party, the Communist party of India has received but slight journalistic or scholarly attention. Now, however, Minoo R. Masani, a former Congress Socialist leader and reluctant participant in Communist-sponsored United Fronts during the 1930's, has supplied a short yet comprehensive history of the party. Masani knows modern Indian history, makes good use of his first-hand experience, and writes with a refreshing sense of proportion with respect to his own role.

The volume traces the principal doctrinal shifts inside the party and the varying relationship of the party with the Indian National Congress and the government. A major theme is the dependence of the Indian party upon foreign support. Founded in 1924 with the technical assistance of British Communists and the Comintern, the party's following was insignificant until the 1930's when it won some sympathy among student and trade union movements as a result of its United Front tactics. During World War II, however, the party dissipated its hard-won backing; after Hitler's attack on Russia, the "imperialist war" became for the Communist party a "people's war" and the party was placed firmly in opposition to the Indian National Congress and as firmly in alliance with the British imperialist *raj*. The greater part of the volume records the emergence of the party from its isolated and discredited position at the end of the war and brings to print a number of documents and reports which until now have not been generally available. A detailed account is given of the origins of the policy of violence and insurrection which the Party embarked upon in 1948 and pursued up to 1950 when the foundations of the current United Front approach were laid.

Masani concludes that, in purely domestic terms, the party has only a nuisance value; the sources of the party's growth and success, he believes, are primarily external and dependent on what happens in the rest of the world and what others do beyond Indian frontiers. Contrasting contemporary Indian government with government in China by the Kuomintang, Masani points to the unchallenged position of Indian administration throughout the country, the loyalty and discipline of the armed forces, and the failure of Communist attempts to create "Yenans."

This book's documented historical account is of value to anybody concerned with Indian political prospects. The general reader who wishes only to add to his understanding of Asian affairs will find a readable, unusually objective review of the Communist party of India's strategy and policy.—MERRILL R. GOODALL, *Cornell University*.

GRENZEN DER VERFASSUNGSAENDERUNG. BY HORST EHMKE. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 1935. Pp. 144.)

The traditionally easy amendability of German constitutions in conjunction with a more recently felt necessity to place their *basic* contents beyond constitutionally permitted change has reawakened the interest of German students of public law in the problem of "barriers to constitutional change." The present volume, taking matters up where Nazism left them through imposed silence, contains a discerning critique not only of previous treatments of this specific problem but, more generally, of the theoretical foundations of "systems" such as Kelsen's "pure theory of law," Carl Schmitt's "decisionism," and the author's own teacher's (Smend's) "integration theory." Its chief merit lies in its criticisms. It is more difficult to follow the author where he tries to create his own theory of "inherent" and "material" barriers to constitutional amendment. The problem is of considerable practical import, as witness recent discussions of amendments to the Bonn Constitution in connection with the European defense agreements. More or less "positivistic," or more or less "natural law" inclinations of the West-German Constitutional Court may prove decisive in this respect. This book, despite its shortcomings, merits attention as one of the so far somewhat sporadic postwar studies in Germany which reestablish the high standard set by pre-Hitler *Staatslehre*.—JOHN H. HERZ, *The City College of New York*.

*Mau Mau and the Kikuyu*. BY L. S. B. LEAKEY. (New York: The John Day Company. 1954. Pp. 115. $2.50.)

The effect of cultural change on the nature of political authority has perhaps no more dramatic manifestation than among the Kikuyu of East Africa. Seventy years ago the Kikuyu were an isolated people, living behind their forest barrier on the rich slopes of Mt. Kenya; but the introduction of commerce, trade, modern agriculture, and a territorial government has brought the Kikuyu into direct and continuous contact with a new and drastically different kind of social and political organization. The Kikuyu, unlike some of the other tribes, have had sharp and obvious reactions to this new environment. On the one hand, the Kikuyu have shown singular aptitude for assimilating Western ideas and for promoting their own political and educational development, and some of the brilliant sons of this remarkable tribe are now students in American universities. On the other hand, the Kikuyu tribe has spawned the obscene and cruel Mau Mau movement, which has perverted the sacred *githathi* oath to coerce obedience and whose members have slaughtered hundreds of their own Kikuyu brethren.

It is not possible in one short volume to answer all of the tantalizing questions one could raise about the Kikuyu tribe, but Mr. Leakey has contributed useful background material for better understanding of what has happened up to now. The first part of the book describes the political and social structure of the Kikuyu before the arrival of the European; the second part, the gradual deterioration of authority within the tribe. The original Kikuyu political system was highly localized, with the tribe having no central authority, but the system was too frail to meet the burdens imposed upon it and proved inadequate for modern administrative needs.

Mr. Leakey, an archeologist of note, has manifest talents for writing a book of this nature, for he was born in Kikuyuland as the child of missionary parents and was reared with Kikuyu children. He speaks the language fluently and is a member of one of the Kikuyu age groups. One could not suggest a better introduction to the problems besetting the Kikuyu—and these problems are shared in various degrees by other peoples, in Africa and elsewhere—than this fine, lucid book, which presents the case for the Kikuyu with understanding and tolerance. Mr. Leakey's reasonable proposals for reform provide some hope for the future, once the terrible fratricidal war is brought to an end.—ROLAND YOUNG, *Northwestern University.*

*The Economic Development of Japan: Growth and Structural Change, 1868–1938.* BY WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Pp. xv, 603. $10.00.)

A curious gap in scholarship concerning Japan has been the study of her economic development. In this erudite and comprehensive work, the author, an economist on the faculty of Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, has substantially closed the gap. The appearance of the book is particularly timely because, as Lockwood points out, the experience of Japan is more relevant to the problem of industrializing other Asian nations than is the experience of any Western nation.

The analysis begins with a careful study of the Meiji Era (1867–1912) and ends with a long chapter on the relationship between government and the economy in 1938. Nearly fifty tables and charts and extensive documentation make the volume of considerable use as a reference work.

Political scientists will be particularly interested in the final chapter on government control. Lockwood's conclusion is that the state was not necessarily the chief direct influence in economic development. He gives support to T. S. Ashton's thesis that the factors of economic development were many and complex but were most closely related to " 'those spontaneous forces of growth in society that arise from ordinary men and women and find expression in voluntary association, as well as in the State'." The real influence of the state in this regard was in the creation of a milieu which provided release for the creative capacities of the Japanese people. This is a provocative hypothesis and is worthy of attention by those interested in the economic growth of other nations.—R.B.

*The Clerical Organization of the House of Commons, 1661–1850.* BY ORLO CYPRIAN WILLIAMS. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1954. Pp. xv, 335. $5.60.)

This valuable work is the product of a labor of love and dedication by a former clerk of the House; it is in the highest tradition of English historical scholarship. In it is traced the development up to modern times of the several clerkships of the Commons—the Clerks at the Table, Committee Clerks, Treasury Clerks, etc. The period covered extends from the reestablishment of the clerical offices on the basis of royal appointment at the time of the Restoration to the far-reaching reforms in the middle of the nineteenth century that established the principles of the present system.

*Consilium Principis: Imperial Councils and Counsellors from Augustus to Diocletian.* BY JOHN CROOK. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1955. Pp. x, 198. $5.00.)

In this book Mr. Crook analyzes and evaluates the role played in the formation of policy by the *amici principis* who surrounded the imperial throne from Augustus to Diocletian. From a scholarly re-examination of the sources he reaches conclusions different from those of Mommesen and Cuq and sees the *consilium principis* not so much as a constitutional organ, but as a shifting group of influential and prominent persons whose conservative and often unimaginative approach often inhibited the Roman administration in dealing with the problems of Empire.

*The Government of Canada.* BY ROBERT MACGREGOR DAWSON. (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press. 1954. 2nd ed. Pp. x, 667. $7.25.)

A new edition of this standard textbook. The revision is thorough but the changes are, for the most part, minor; many passages have been rewritten and the whole has been sufficiently altered to take account of developments since the original issue in 1947.

*Edmund J. James Lectures on Government.* (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press. 1954. Pp. 88.)

The sixth issue of a lecture series in honor of the late president of the University of Illinois, this volume contains three essays: Quincy Wright on constitutionalism and world politics, George G. Galloway on congressional reform, and Roy Blough on the economist's role in federal policy making.

*Studies in the Social Services.* By Sheila Ferguson and Hilde Fitzgerald. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office and Longmans, Green and Co. 1954. Pp. x, 367. $5.25.)

A new volume in the official United Kingdom history of the civil government during the war, carrying forward an earlier study by R.M. Titmuss entitled *Problems of Social Policy.* The present volume is concerned with the war's impact on the family; it seeks to explore the problems thus created and to analyze and evaluate the governmental policies designed to meet them.

*Nouvelles Études de Sociologie Électorale.* Edited by François Goguel. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1954. Pp. xiv, 214.)

This is one of a growing series of studies of parties and elections sponsored by the *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.* It is an uneven but useful and interesting collection of articles on varied topics in the field of elections and electoral systems. Included, among others, are studies of particular constituencies in France, women's voting habits, the British "floating" vote, and an analytical method for the study of Belgian elections.

*Comment la France est Devenue Républicaine: Les élections générales et partielles à l'Assemblé Nationale, 1870–1875.* By Jacques Gouault. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1954. Pp. 241. 1200 francs.)

A new study from the *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques,* this volume is based on a systematic examination of the general election of February 8, 1871 and of the by-elections that followed during the years 1871 to 1875. More than a mere analysis of statistics, the study relates events to shifts in electoral opinion and the general political struggle for the establishment of the republic.

*The Gwydir By-Election. 1953: A Study in Political Conflict.* By Henry Mayer and Joan Rydon. (Canberra: Australian National University. 1954. Pp. 202.)

An analysis of a 1953 by-election in rural New South Wales, chosen because of its complexity and its special importance. It represents one of the first efforts to apply to Australian elections the techniques of electoral analysis developed in Britain and America and makes a substantial contribution to the study of Australian politics.

The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. *Fifth General Index to the Papers Presented to Parliament. Sessions 1937–38–39–40, 1940, 1940–41–42–43, 1943–44, 1944–45, 1945–46, 1946–47–48 and 1948–49. 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th Parliaments.* (Canberra: Government Printing Office. 1954. Twenty-first Parliament, 1954, Paper No. 15. Pp. LXXIV. 4s.)

The present index, continuing the series from 1901 at approximately ten-year intervals, immensely facilitates the search for the multitude of papers included in the sessional paper volumes and thus obviates the need of using indexes for each session. The paper number and the volume where bound are indicated for each paper printed. A consolidated index for the period 1901–1949 is in preparation, and probably will be available in 1955 or 1956.—J.B.C.

*Stortinget, 1954–1957.* By Vilhelm Haffner. (Oslo: J. G. Tanum. 1954. Pp. 118.)

The current Norwegian parliamentary directory, composed to a great extent of illustrated biographical sketches, continues a series begun with a volume for 1900–03.—J.B.C.

*Diario de sesiones de la Comisión de los quince encargada de elaborar el proyecto de la Constitución de la República.* (Guatemala, C. A.: Tipografía Nacional. 1953. Pp. 272.)

The stenographic report of the proceedings of the Committee of Fifteen of Asamblea Constituyente to draft the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala was not printed until the end of June, 1953, and covered the 26 meetings from Jan. 11 to Feb. 22, 1945. The debates of the Asamblea Constituyente had been printed in February, 1951. A new Asamblea Constituyente was convened on October 29, 1954.—J.B.C.

*Soviet Industrial Production, 1928–1951.* By Donald R. Hodgman. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. Pp. xi, 241. $5.00.)

Using Soviet data on wage payrolls in various branches of the Soviet industries, the author develops an independent index of Soviet industrial production for the years 1928–1951. He thus finds that (during the first four five-year plans) the Soviet industrial output increased about five-and-a-half times, the productivity of industrial labor about doubled, and the output of consumers' goods per capita gained by 88 per cent. In all three instances the gains are much less than the official Soviet claims.

*Russia's Danubian Empire.* By Gordon Shepherd. (New York: Praeger. 1954. Pp. xi, 262. $4.50.)

Leaning heavily on his personal experience as newspaper correspondent Mr. Shepherd gives an interesting report on developments in the Danubian basin from the Communist seizure of power to 1954. While he deprecates both the methods by which the Communists conquered the area and by which they maintain themselves in power, he thinks that in the social and economic fields they "have done a little good from the right motives and perhaps a great deal more from the wrong motives."

*Ukraine under the Soviets.* By Clarence A. Manning. (New York: Bookman Associates. 1953. Pp. 223. $3.50.)

Using primarily materials prepared by a group of displaced Ukrainian professors, the author describes in a series of twenty-five short chapters the developments in the Ukraine under Soviet rule, dealing not only with political and economic matters but also with such matters as literature, culture, and religion. He concludes the book with an ardent appeal for a free Ukraine.

*The Mind of Modern Russia: Historical and Political Thought of Russia's Great Age.* Edited by Hans Kohn. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 1955. Pp. xii, 281. $5.50.)

"The debate [in Russia] about Russia and the West which went on throughout the nineteenth century forms the background against which Russia in the middle of the twentieth century and her relationship to the West can be understood." Pursuing this line of thought, the editor has selected representative excerpts from writings by a number of Russian authors of "Russia's Great Age" and by one Pole and one Czech. Ably integrated by Professor Kohn's introductory and interpretative remarks, they will be found most helpful in promoting a better understanding of the Russian mind.

*The Red Carpet: 10,000 Miles through Russia on a Visa from Krhushchev.* By Marshall MacDuffie. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc. 1955. Pp. xiv, 319. $4.50.)

A personal account of on-the-spot observations made during a two-month tour through eight Soviet Republics in 1953, including several areas which foreigners are seldom allowed to visit. There are several pages of photographs.

*La Guerre des Papillons: Quatre Ans de Politique Communiste (1940–1944).* By A. Rossi. (Paris: Les Iles D'Or. Pp. 332.)

A study of the policies of the French Communist party in the years of German occupation of France as reflected in the Party's propaganda leaflets.

*Bedeutung, Arbeitsweise und Aufgabenstellung der Ständigen Kommissionen der Bezirks- und Kreistäge, der Stadtverordneten- und Stadtbezirksversammlungen.* By Hauptabteilung Örtliche Organe des Staates beim Ministerpräsidenten der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Zentralverlag. 1954. Schriftenreihe Demokratischer Aufbau, Heft 12. Pp. 40.)

The official brochure on the importance and plan of work of the standing committees of the regional and local government councils in the Democratic Republic of Germany is signed by Inge Kerreit. A specific statement of duties is given for each type of standing committee. These committees assume a peculiar importance in drawing into active participation in the government an increasing number of citizens, especially after the dissolving of the state governments in the Democratic Republic.—J.B.C.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
# FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

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# INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

*The Wilhelmstrasse: A Study of German Diplomats under the Nazi Regime.* By Paul Seabury. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1954. Pp. xiii, 217. $3.00.)

Problems of power in international relations can be resolved only by bargaining or by violence. The former process is the province of diplomacy. What happens to diplomats in a regime whose policy makers are pathologically dedicated to violence? The answer, for Hitler's Reich, has hitherto been obscure. It is now crystal-clear, thanks to the fascinating labors of Professor Seabury of Berkeley in the rich vineyards of diplomatic memoirs, captured documents, and war crimes testimony, supplemented by interviews and by a rare gift for psychological insight and political analysis of the highest quality. He somewhat neglects, it seems to me, a decisive circumstance—i.e., the extent to which German diplomats under Hitler were kept in ignorance of crucial resolves by the party leaders and the elite of the Wehrmacht, including the time of the decision to attack Poland in 1939 and to invade Russia in 1941. But in all other respects this work is admirable in content, style, and perspective.

Seabury's theme, amply documented, is the debasement and moral corruption of the diplomatic bureaucracy in its effort to carry on as a group of professional technicians by adapting itself to the imperatives of an oligarchy of fanatic demagogues and adventurers who had no use for diplomats save as tools of deception. His judgments are charitable but inexorable. Here is the full story of "Brownshirts vs. Striped Trousers"; the opportunism of Neurath; the follies of Ribbentrop; the uneasy relations among party, army and the Foreign Office; and the final reduction of German diplomacy to the ignoble role of an abettor of national suicide. Seabury gives us a grim and gripping tale, replete with implications about the functions of diplomats in many other contexts. His findings deserve the most earnest pondering not only by political scientists but by all citizens concerned with self-preservation in a new time when violence spells co-annihilation and only diplomacy offers hope of survival.—Frederick L. Schuman, *Williams College.*

*The Legal Community of Mankind.* By Walter Schiffer. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1954. Pp. x, 367. $5.50.)

This is the posthumous work of a well-known student of the League of Nations who, at the time of his death, was carrying on his studies at the Institute of Advanced Study with the aid of a Guggenheim Foundation grant. It has a brief preface by Max Radin. The foreword by Mrs. Schiffer explains that this book carries to fruition "the idea of a systematic analysis of concepts and doctrines of international organization and which as such may be regarded as a completion and sum of his life's work."

World organization, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations represent, was based on the idea (says the author) that universal law and order can be preserved through an association of independent states which, though not a state, should function as if it were a state. A state cannot exist without a legal order; so it was presumed that the world is or should be governed by a global legal order. The author's purpose is to analyze this historical pattern of thought, and he does this with a somewhat forced objectivity. The study is exclusively theoretical and was not intended to arrive at positive conclusions or recommendations.

Part I searches in the field of natural law primarily for concepts of international organization: Grotius, and his idea of a legal community without a central organ; Pufendorf; Wolff and the fictitious world state; and the later development of positivism (Oppenheim) which asserts that law is created by sovereign states. Part II considers the concept of a community of mankind based on natural interests, on which the author refers to Kant, Mill, Lecky, and others, and takes up Laurent's argument that a universal state is undesirable. Part III deals with the League of Nations concept of "quasi-government," depending upon the good will of the sovereign states which compose it—which, according to the author, is self-contradictory. He relies heavily upon Georges Scelle for legal monism. Kelsen is not mentioned in the book. The United Nations is mentioned only among the conclusions in the final chapter, where it is regarded as a slightly strengthened League of Nations.

The analysis of earlier theories is interesting and helpful; it comes out at about the same place that common sense would bring the informed person today. At the beginning of the book, the author tells us that the analysis "is in agreement with those who reject the United Nations idea and suggest the creation of a world state"; he immediately warns, however, that he does not enter into the political question of how this world state is to be established. Nevertheless, toward the end of the book (p. 295) he thinks that its establishment "will require the use of some kind of political power, which may be that of one of the strongest states, or that of a world-wide political group capable of influencing the policy of various states, or which may be derived from a combination of these factors."

The reviewer thinks that Dr. Schiffer places too much of a boundary between law and politics. The making of a legal order is necessarily a political process; those who believe in the United Nations do not necessarily feel that it is unworkable until politics are excluded and it is able to stand on the goodness and reasonableness of man. It is not a matter of choosing between the alternatives of an association of states and a world state, but rather of gradual development from one to the other, and through political processes.

Nevertheless, the concluding sentence of the book is worth quoting: "the idea that everything could be obtained for nothing was an important element of the pattern of thought which shaped the League of Nations and the United Nations ideas."—Clyde Eagleton, *New York University.*

*The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951–1952.* By Alan W. Ford. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1954. Pp. xii, 348. $4.00.)

This book is a study of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute as a problem in international law. As stated by the author, the central legal issue of the dispute is the right of a state to appropriate or nationalize property within its borders. The international norm requires that appropriations of the property of aliens be accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. He concludes that Iran committed an internationally illegal act in appropriating the property of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company when the government was patently incapable of paying prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. The government of the United Kingdom was justified in exercising its right of diplomatic protection, he continues, and the International Court of Justice erred in dismissing the UK's application on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The author contends that the Court did have jurisdiction in the case, and he feels strongly that it should have accepted this opportunity of reformulating the antiquated norm of international law that was violated with impunity in this and other recent instances. The Court's denial of jurisdiction leads to the obscuring of the obvious fact, he suggests, that nationalism of the Mossadegh type is incompatible with a society in which respect for the obligations of international law can be maintained.

The subtitle of the book is "A Study of the Role of Law in the Relations of States." It is noted that both parties constantly appealed to legal arguments to justify their actions. Given the nature of international law, the *status quo* power could obviously do this with greater facility than could the power that sought a sudden change in the established order. The author concludes, however, that this study confirms the a priori judgment of many scholars (probably including the author) that international law has an existence and plays a real, though limited, role in the conduct of the relations of states.

At the time of the writing of this book all efforts at settlement of the dispute had failed. Mr. Ford attributes this failure to the fact that the basic assumptions of the two protagonists—the British assumption that the Iranians had to sell oil and the Iranian assumption that the Western world had to have their oil—were erroneous. The various attempts at settlement are described clearly, and the entire controversy is placed in perspective by a concise treatment of the historical background. The inclusion in the appendices of the texts of the 1933 agreement between the government of Persia and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the 1951 laws nationalizing the oil industry, and the Persian declaration accepting as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, as well as a twelve-page time table of events covering the period from July, 1949 to August, 1952, increases the usefulness of the book.

While the agreement reached in October, 1954 makes this account of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute an incomplete one, it does not affect the value of the lucid if somewhat summary explication of such problems in international law as the right of a court to indicate interim measures, the right of a state to expropriate the private property of aliens, and the circumstances under which domestic interposition is permissible.—Charles D. Hounshell, *Emory University.*

*Taiheiyō Sensō Gen'in Ron* [*Essays on the Causes of the Pacific War*]. COMPILED BY THE NIHON GAIKŌ GAKKAI [JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ASSOCIATION] SUPPORTED BY THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. (Tokyo: Shimbun Gekkan-sha. 1953. Pp. iv, xii, 766, xxii. Appended chronological table. 1,100 yen.)

Western lawyers and political leaders who have been confident that the judgment of the War Crimes Trial in Tokyo, 1946–1948, was so legally just and so historically sound that it would command the support of the Japanese people, should read this book. Here are the considered views of fourteen Japanese scholars—political scientists, diplomatic historians, economists, and international lawyers—who, under the leadership of Professor Toshio Ueda of Tokyo University and with the financial assistance of the Japanese Ministry of Education, have recently completed a three-year study of the Trial records and other relevant materials. Each presents his own conclusions, but all agree: insofar as the Military Tribunal blamed the War on certain specific individuals of Japanese nationality, its judgment needs revision.

Their method is to analyze the historical situation in which these leaders acted. The four political scientists of the group, for example, contend that some measure of responsibility for the War must be assigned to Japan's prewar political structure and domestic political activity. Professor Inada Masatsugu of Tokyo Teachers' College points to the inconsistency in having had a constitution which provided for little coordination between the cabinet and the supreme command except in the person of the Emperor and then having failed to train the Emperor to play an active coordinating role. Professor Tsuji Kiyoshi of Tokyo University feels that another basic defect in the prewar political system was the extraordinary authority wielded by the administrative officials of the government in contrast to those representing the people. Professor Yabe Sadaji of Waseda emphasizes the decline of the political parties in the 1930's and the establishment of the fascist IRAA in 1941; while Professor Mukoyama Hiro'o of Aichi condemns the prewar suppression of social reform movements, which, he contends, might have checked the course toward military expansion.

A certain degree of responsibility is also assigned to Japan's prewar domestic economic structure; but most American readers will be disappointed with these chapters, for the authors' chief concern seems to be to prove or to disprove the applicability of orthodox Marxist-Leninist theory. Professor Takahashi Yūji of Tokyo University claims that the basic cause of the War was that the impersonal forces of capitalism had reached a crisis stage in Japan, forcing it to compete for the spoils of empire; he seems to have been unable to persuade his colleagues to accept this view. Indeed, the well-known specialist in Oriental economic history, Professor Muramatsu Yūji of Hitotsubashi, vigorously attacks the theory, contending that Japanese capitalists, unlike those in more "advanced" countries, were too weak and "backward" to bend the military, the bureaucrats, or even the politicians to their will. Two other economists revive the argument that the War was caused in part by the economic policies of countries other than Japan. Professor Uchida Naosaku of Seijo points to the effects on Japan of the Chinese boycott; and Professor Itagaki Yoichi of Hitotsubashi analyzes the threat to Japan's oil supply posed by American, British, and Dutch policies in Southeast Asia.

Following able treatments of Japan's foreign relations from 1928 to 1937 by Professor Hanabusa Nagamichi of Keio, from 1937 to 1940 by Professor Ueda, and in 1941 by Professor Kumakiri Nobuo of Musashi Technical College, the international lawyers offer their revisions. Professor Ohiro Zengo of Hitotsubashi agrees that Japan was guilty of aggression against China, but he refuses to concede that the attack on Pearl Harbor constituted an aggressive act against the United States. His argument is that, to be aggressive, an act must be performed with territorial designs. Since Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor was motivated, not by a desire for American territory, but solely by the desire to dissuade the United States from further intervention in China, Japanese leaders were not, he contends, guilty of aggression against America. Not only that, says Professor Ichimata Masao of Waseda, but in a certain sense America itself may be said to share the responsibility for Japan's actions. Taking up the legal doctrine of the right of self-defense, to which many of Japan's leaders appealed to justify their acts, he suggests that America's stressing of this doctrine may have led Japan's leaders to interpret it too broadly. The book is concluded with an essay by Professor Irie Keishiro of Aichi, in which he reminds his readers that Japan's wartime partner, Nazi Germany, was also partly responsible for the outbreak of war in the Pacific.

These are essays then which suggest that there were many extenuating circumstances which in large part conditioned the responsibility of Japan's wartime leaders. While readers will disagree about the merits of each of these essays, most will accept this basic contention. Indeed, were not the reforms of the Occupation based on this fundamental premise? The question raised here is, to what extent does the existence of such circumstances mitigate the responsibility of individuals? Speaking from a long Western tradition of individualism, the Military Tribunal gave one answer; judging from their own ancient habit of group responsibility and feeling the increasing drive in Japan in post-Occupation years to close the national ranks and to recover some continuity with the national past, these scholars disagree. The causes of the War, they insist, were too broad and too deep to attribute exclusive responsibility for it to any particular individuals or to any one nation.—JAMES WILLIAM MORLEY, *Union College.*

*The International Labor Movement: History, Policies, Outlook.* BY LEWIS L. LORWIN. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1953. Pp. xviii, 366. $5.00.)

For the reader seeking a general survey of international labor movements, this volume is strongly recommended. Long a student of labor problems, Mr. Lorwin handles with understanding and integrative perception the complex maze of personalities, organizational problems, strategies, policies, and ideological conflicts that have characterized organized labor's extra-national activities. Out of the wealth of data presented by the author, one can derive some insights into the nature of the inter-personal and inter-organizational patterns that tend to emerge when national trade unions, representing diverse cultures, attempt to cooperate in the interest of vaguely defined and often subjectively interpreted "common goals." One can also trace here the disintegration of international labor unity, as the mutual suspicion of 1948 replaced the euphoria of 1945.

The most thought-provoking revelation of this volume is the unprecedented extent to which trade unions are currently involved in the "cold war." The international labor struggle unfolds in the factories of Italy and France, in the halls of the United Nations, and in the wilds of East Africa. Moreover, it is apparent that the unions are frequently not concerned with wages and hours, but with political and ideological questions of wide scope and implications. Mr. Lorwin handles this phenomenon with restraint, especially where the actions of American trade unions are concerned. It might have been worth while to examine the extent to which any government can permit private organizations such as unions to operate so independently in the realm of foreign relations. The possible unanticipated consequences of such activities run the gamut from diplomatic embarrassment to political suicide.

In the concluding section, Mr. Lorwin engages in a bit of speculation regarding the future of international trade unionism. He suggests a number of obstacles that lie in the path of an expanded proletarian internationalism (e.g., union emphasis on national problems, uneven national economic development, conflicting national goals and values, etc.), but concludes that the international role of organized labor will be continuously important. The conclusion is far from convincing, however, and it is at this point that the reader will wish that Mr. Lorwin, after his long period of careful research, had given his audience less description and more analysis.—JOSEPH G. LAPALOMBARA, *Michigan State College.*

*Secretary Stimson: A Study in Statecraft.* BY RICHARD N. CURRENT. (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press. 1954. Pp. x, 272. $4.50.)

Writing in a strikingly clever and incisive style, Professor Richard Current presents a provocative assessment of Henry L. Stimson from a "revisionist" viewpoint.

This is certainly not a mere biographical chronicle; it aims to be a "study in statecraft." But the author does include an introductory disclaimer that his book "is intended more to raise questions than to give final answers." Insofar as he does sharply point up problems which will continue to merit thoughtful re-examination by students of American diplomacy, Mr. Current has done useful work. His biting criticisms of successive major phases of Secretary Stimson's public career are based on extensive research in both primary and secondary sources. And some readers may welcome the fact that he has avoided the tone of a "revisionist" bill of indictment, usually preferring to dispose of his subject with thrusts of sarcasm or more subtle irony.

This technique, however, enables Mr. Current to avoid taking any clearly defined, consistent position of his own from which to make his appraisal of Stimson's statesmanship. For an avowed "study in statecraft," this one is curiously lacking in precise standards of judgment to be applied to the late Secretary. Plainly Mr. Current is generally against interventionism; an isolationist and even a pacifist position is implied in many of his criticisms of Stimson. But this viewpoint is nowhere spelled out directly and in sufficient detail (even at the end where some effort is made) so that the reader can be sure just what integrated criteria of policy and administrative practice underlie many of Mr. Current's apparently inconsistent criticisms of Stimson's conduct at successive stages of his career. Thus, "the Stimsonian principle of imposing law and morality and peace upon the rest of the world" is continually under implied attack—but so also is Stimson himself for the inconsistency of every expediential retreat he ever made from that principle—while yet he is further censured for insubordination (especially to President Hoover) in promoting the principle too relentlessly. Mr. Current is even less clear about his notion of the proper relationship between a department head and his official advisers. Episode by episode, the author shifts his line of attack to wherever Colonel Stimson looks to him most vulnerable.

It is useful to have such a compendium of brilliantly phrased criticisms of the career of one of the most influential Americans of our time. But before the great weight of Stimson's reputation can be moved very far, the man who wields the lever will at least have to adopt a fixed and well-grounded stance.—H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD, *Harvard University.*

*La Teoría y la Práctica del Reconocimiento de Gobiernos.* By CÉSAR SEPÚLVEDA. (Mexico: Publications of the Faculty of Law of the National University. 1954. Pp. xxii, 111.)

The author, one of the most capable of the younger generation of Mexican scholars, states his purpose to have been to write a treatise that can serve as a text in the law schools of his country. He has accomplished much more. This delightful little volume gives a well-balanced and realistic summary of the various theories of recognition. In the opinion of the reviewer his stated effort to avoid the pitfalls of "diplomatic subterfuge and legal fiction" has been successful. Since a generation of Mexican students may be raised on it, its importance to the American scholar is obvious and will increase with time.

Professor Sepúlveda, I believe, would classify himself as a Jeffersonian of the pre-Seward school. He has no sympathy with the concept of *de facto* recognition, agreeing with Baty that it is a "bastard institution" that should be abandoned. This is not surprising, since one of its principal uses has been to enable the United States to interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico and other Latin-American republics. He joins a long list of Latin-American authors who reject the doctrines advanced by Carlos Tobar of Ecuador and the Conventions of 1907 and 1923 that were erected upon them, as well as those advanced by Woodrow Wilson. The Estrada doctrine, although propounded by his fellow countryman, fares no better. He considers it in essence to have been only a protest against "the vicious practice of using recognition as a means of securing certain unilateral advantages or as an act of intervention in the internal affairs of another country"; and although he believes that it served to influence the United States in its policies, the doctrine had scarcely been enunciated before Mexico itself was guilty of the very type of practices against which it was a protest.

Chapter 3 gives an excellent discussion of the legal effects of recognition, thoroughly documented with judicial decisions, a large percentage of them chosen from our own courts. He champions the view that nonrecognition should disturb the normal application of the rules of private international law as little as possible, insisting that the private rights of individuals should not depend upon the political recognition of a government. He believes that recognition can serve a valuable political purpose only when used collectively, preferably by a world organization such as the U. N. Absent such collective action, he feels that recognition should be almost automatic, since to permit it to be used as a political weapon by a single power is out of keeping with the spirit that should permeate international law.

The final 31 pages are devoted to an appendix giving extracts from documents and opinions of various national tribunals. The American scholar will regret that some of the cases are so cited as to fail to reveal the court involved and at times even the date, but of course the serious student using the book will turn to the sources cited for a fuller report.—J. A. C. Grant, *University of California (Los Angeles).*

*Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland, 1914–1920: A Study in the Influence on American Policy of Minority Groups of Foreign Origin.* By Louis L. Gerson. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1953. Pp. xi, 166. $4.00.)

The author of this revised doctoral dissertation endeavors to show how the Americans of Polish origin influenced Woodrow Wilson's policy toward Poland—the study itself being a demonstration of "the susceptibility of minority groups among our citizenry to propaganda and purposes of the land of their origin, often contradicting the national interest of the United States." By implicitly assuming an incompatibility between America's national interest and the cause of Polish independence, Mr. Gerson makes himself, from the very outset, vulnerable to reproach that his study lacks objectivity. This initial impression is confirmed by: (a) his steady preference for quotations from sources which purport to prove that an independent Polish state has no place in the European community; (b) his omission of a number of facts which do not fit into his general thesis; (c) his over-reliance on certain obviously partisan secondary sources. Actually, the author fails to show to what extent Americans of Polish ancestry were responsible for Wilson's friendly policies toward Poland. The one thing that emerges with relative clarity is the influence which Ignace Jan Paderewski exerted on Colonel House and, hence, indirectly, on Wilson himself. However, Paderewski was not an American of Polish ancestry, but a foreigner.

The book contains sweeping generalizations, statements unsupported by evidence, contradictions, and factual errors. On p. 2, the author asserts that "a great majority [of the Poles] seemed to welcome" the partitions of their country, but does not submit proofs of this statement. He seems to ignore the fact that between 1794 and 1918 the Poles rebelled and fought at least six times against the partitioning powers. In line with his argument that the partitions were not an "act of brigandage," but a "natural denouement of two centuries of lawlessness, anarchy," etc. (p. 3), the author omits any reference to the reform movement in Poland between 1772 and 1793, which, spurred by the writings and action of Staszyc, Konarski, Czartoryski, and others, resulted in the adoption of the Constitution on May 3, 1791, and marked a profound moral and political renaissance, only to be interrupted by the external factor of the second and third partitions. As to the peasant attitudes, Mr. Gerson passes under silence the fact that Kosciuszko's forces in 1794 were mainly composed of peasant battalions. Dmowski is repeatedly pictured as a man of aristocratic background and proclivities, while in reality he was a son of an artisan and, far from representing the interests of large landowners, was one of the prime movers in awakening the urban middle class. On p. 105, the author confuses a certain Dr. Paderewski of Warsaw, member of the National-Democratic party, with Ignace Jan Paderewski, pianist and statesman. This mix-up in personal identification produces a number of subsidiary errors scattered throughout the book. The author's historical geography is wobbly. On p. 31 he places the "Slovenes" in pre-partition Poland, and on p. 111 he states that Pilsudski ("a Socialist agitator") had embarked upon "forceful incorporation" of Estonia and Livonia—both rather fantastic statements. These are but a few examples of a lengthy list of regrettable shortcomings.—George Lenczowski, *University of California (Berkeley).*

*Poland: White Eagle on a Red Field.* By Samuel L. Sharp. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1953. Pp. vii, 338. $5.00.)

It has recently become fashionable among some students of international politics to use one and only one yardstick for the measurement of the world's problems, namely, that of power-political considerations, and to disregard the importance of ethical, cultural, and other non-material factors. Mr. Sharp belongs to that group. In discussing the question of Poland he uses solely what he calls "the language germane to politics," meaning thereby the exclusive jargon of power politics, devoid of such rubbish as ethical valuations and the like. Hence, the Polish problem is for him only "the issue of existence and survival of states unable to defend themselves by their own means in an essentially anarchistic international community" and the persistent underlying tone of his book is that the whole issue of Polish independence is a sort of nuisance and that the world would be far better off if the Poles would just give up and shut up.

Though written ably and interestingly, Mr. Sharp's book makes distressing reading. Should the problem of freedom against oppression for every nation be discussed in "terms divorced from extra-political considerations," Western civilization would be finished long before it would have been overrun by the armies of totalitarianism.—EDUARD TABORSKY, *University of Texas.*

*Strategy: The Indirect Approach.* BY B. H. LIDDELL HART. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1954. Pp. 420. $5.95.)

In this book Liddell Hart defines military strategy as the application of the indirect approach. His central thesis is that wars are not won by preponderance of military power until the enemy has previously been thrown off balance by the disintegration of his moral, psychological, and logistic supports. This can be achieved primarily by indirect methods, sometimes deliberately planned, in other cases fortuitously seized upon. In fact successful strategy envisages the breaking of the enemy's resistance without fighting, and entails on the part of the strategist an understanding of the thought processes of his opponent, the maintenance of flexibility and obliqueness of action, and a willingness to take advantage of the mistakes of one's antagonist. Captain Hart endeavors to substantiate his thesis by an analysis of military strategy from the time of the Greeks through World War II, and this historical analysis constitutes the bulk of the book. The author's conclusion is that those who rely upon the H-Bomb and massive retaliation have missed the essence of strategy. In their hope of finding in the threat of atomic destruction a solution to the problem of war, they have only increased the general sense of world insecurity. Indeed the sheer destructiveness of an H-Bomb compels a return to more conventional methods of military activity, and, indeed, in the author's opinion, makes the strategy of indirectness even more important than it has been in the past.

*International Politics: Foundations of International Relations.* BY NORMAN J. PADELFORD AND GEORGE A. LINCOLN. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1954. Pp. xii, 719. $6.50.)

A new text, restating simply and clearly the nature and basic problems of modern international relations. The text examines the basic factors affecting national policies, the policy-making process in the major powers, the projection of national policy into world politics, and the search for security through the international community.

*International Law: Cases and Materials.* BY WILLIAM W. BISHOP, JR. (New York: Prentice-Hall. 1953. Pp. xxvii, 735. $9.75.)

This newest textbook on international law includes excerpts from various treatises and digests of international law, full or partial quotations from judicial decisions, treaties, diplomatic documents and the like, and attempts to synthesize these materials with the aid of "introductory notes," "editorial notes" and just plain "notes." As the author says, "the point of view of the book is frankly American." Even so, he might have found room for more use of decisions of international judicial and arbitral bodies by omitting a number of old cases which have little relation to international law in our day.

*Theory and Practice of American Foreign Policy.* BY MORTON GORDON AND KENNETH N. VINES. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1955. Pp. x, 541. $2.95.)

An up-to-date collection of readings, with introductory commentary, ranging from a general section on the U.S. approach to international politics (presenting the idealist vs. realist arguments) to a specific section concerned with contemporary policy objectives.

*Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.* BY HANS J. MORGENTHAU. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1954. 2nd ed. Pp. xxi, 600, xxv. $5.75.)

Revised edition, somewhat lengthened and considerably rewritten, of a well-known text. National interest and power still remain the main tests of policy but with more qualification than in the first edition. A difficult but rewarding new first chapter presents "A Realist Theory of International Politics."

*Fifty Years of Technical Assistance: Some Administrative Experiences of U.S. Voluntary Agencies.* BY EDWIN A. BOCK. (Chicago: Public Administration Clearing House. 1954. Pp. x, 65. $1.50.)

A useful and interesting summary of the opinions of 55 experienced technical assistance administrators with a wide range of experiences in nongovernmental agencies. These opinions are collated into a cogently developed essay which discusses some of the most crucial problems in this important activity.

*Approaches to an Understanding of World Affairs.* EDITED BY HOWARD ANDERSON. (Washington: National Council for the

Social Studies. 1954. Pp. x, 473. Cloth, $4.00, paper $3.50.)

A source-book "on international understanding" that attempts an analysis of world tensions and methods of meeting such tensions, and describes the "ways of living" and social and cultural values in eleven different states or areas of the world. It concludes with 150 pages of suggestions for teaching understanding of world affairs at all educational levels from elementary through graduate.

*The Revolution in World Trade and American Economic Policy.* BY SAMUEL LUBELL. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1955. Pp. xvi, 138. $2.50.)

A brief and provocative tract which insists that the lengthy discussions of tariffs and free trade have disguised the long-term and fundamental shifts in the world's commercial relations, that the non-Communist world needs a unified economic policy as badly as it needs a unified political or military policy, and that the United States must think and plan in terms of a permanent foreign economic agency which can reconcile our economic interests when—as so often occurs—they conflict with our strategic interests.

*The Parchment Peace: The United States Senate and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922.* BY JOHN CHALMERS VINSON. (Athens: The University of Georgia Press. 1955. Pp. xi, 217. $4.50.)

Based on State Department archives, the *Congressional Record*, press materials, and the correspondence and papers of many persons concerned, this study traces the emergence of the four-power naval limitation treaty from the development of the disarmament movement in 1916, with special reference to the influence and role of the Senate throughout the process.

*The Western-Educated Man in India: A Study of His Social Roles and Influence.* BY JOHN USEEM AND RUTH HILL USEEM. (New York: Dryden Press. 1955. Pp. xiii, 237. $3.00.)

In light of the many exchange-of-persons programs, and the American faith in education, this is a valuable and revealing report of a field study in which the authors sought to analyze "the consequences of a foreign education for the individual, for his society, and for international understanding."

*Nationalism in Japan: An Introductory Historical Analysis.* BY DELMER M. BROWN. (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press. 1955. Pp. viii, 278. $5.00.)

A detailed study of the emergence of a Japanese national consciousness, the organization of that consciousness in support of political action, and the Japanese resistance and reaction to alien ways.

*Soviet Policies in China, 1917–1924.* BY ALLEN S. WHITING. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1954. Pp. 350. $5.50.)

A major work of scholarship, well-written and copiously documented with Russian language sources. The results of this study suggest the existence of a significant and complex pattern of relations between the Soviet Union and China.

*Institutes and Their Publics.* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1953. Pp. viii, 156. $1.50.)

Speeches, papers, and comment from the 1953 International Conference of Institutes of International Affairs. The three themes of the conference concern "The Evolution of the United Nations," "The Forces That Shape Foreign Policy in Democracies," and "The Purposes, Policies, Programs and Problems of Institutes."

*Popular Diplomacy and War.* BY SISLEY HUDDLESTON. FOREWORD BY HARRY ELMER BARNES. (Rindge: Richard R. Smith Publisher, Inc. 1954. Pp. 285. $3.50.)

Uneven but provocative commentary about international affairs since 1914, and primarily a bitter attack on the methods of "new diplomacy" which allow press, public opinion, legislatures, and amateurs—politicians, businessmen, and generals—to dominate the proceedings.

*Documents relatifs à la Conférence de Genève sur l'Indochine (21 Juillet 1954).* (Paris: La Documentation Française. 1954. Notes et études documentaires, no. 1,901, série internationale cccvi, textes diplomatiques cxxxiii. Pp. 12. 25 fr.)

The text of the final act of the Conference is presented with the declarations attached, and also the declarations noticed by the Conference in its final session but not included in the documents, the declarations of the chiefs of delegations, and the exchange of letters between Pham Van Dong for the "Democratic Republic" of Vietnam and M. Mendès-France. The cease-fire agreements were published separately under the date of August 18, 1954, as no. 1909 of the Notes et études documentaires.—J.B.C.

*The Year Book of World Affairs, 1954.* (London: Stevens & Sons Limited. Distributed by Frederick A. Praeger Inc., New York. 1954. Vol. 8. Pp. xii, 378, iv. £2 2s.)

The major part of this year's annual volume is devoted to a series of essays analyzing some of the more important activities of the United Nations, in anticipation of a Charter Review Conference. The problems of international government, the position of the major powers in the UN, the unsuccessful role of the Security Council, and the economic work of the Organization are among subjects discussed.

*Yearbook of International Organizations, 1954–1955.* (Brussels: Union of International Associations, Palais D'Egmont. Pp. 1087. $10.00.)

The second issue of a highly useful handbook giving the details of composition, functions, finance, and history of more than 1100 international organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental.

*Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1937. Volume IV. The Far East.* (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1954. Pp. iv, 911. $4.00.)

*Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1937. Volume V. The American Republics.* (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1954. Pp. v, 807. $3.75.)

The final volumes of correspondence in the 1937 series; the first recalls such concerns as the search for Amelia Earhart, the sinking of the *Panay,* the last efforts to make anything of the Nine-Power Treaty, the spreading undeclared war between Japan and China, and the growing power of the Japanese militarists; the second is chiefly concerned with reciprocal trade and commercial agreements, the Chaco dispute, and some tentative inquiries about mutual defense interests in the Western Hemisphere.

*Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1938. Volume III. The Far East.* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1954. Pp. 752. $3.50.)

*Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1938. Volume IV. The Far East.* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1955. Pp. 626. $3.25.)

These two volumes are devoted almost exclusively to the undeclared war between Japan and China and to the problems—within China and international—arising from that conflict; Export-Import Bank credits are arranged for China, and the first pressures upon Japan appear in efforts of the United States to dissuade American manufacturers from selling aviation materials to that country. The increasing trend toward totalitarianism within Japan is also noted.

*International Law Documents, 1952–53.* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1954. Pp. v, 340.)

The 48th in the series, this annual volume includes Japanese and West German treaties, conventions and documents, NATO and EDC materials, the Pacific Area security treaties, and the statutes and charters of the several West European organizations.

*Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939–1941.* By Gerhard L. Weinberg. (Leiden: E. J. Brill. 1954. Pp. 173.)

This is yet another contribution to the growing literature on the short-lived Nazi-Soviet "honeymoon" of 1939–1941, based on a wealth of documentary materials, published and unpublished, mainly from German sources. The overall picture the author derives from his study is one of "two great powers plodding fitfully along the path of expediency, one motivated by vast schemes of conquest, the other by the hope of protecting what it has and adding what can safely be picked up." A bibliography is appended.

*Still the Rice Grows Green: Asia in the Aftermath of Geneva and Panmunjom.* By John C. Caldwell. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1955. Pp. 308. $3.75.)

A sympathetic and sometimes sentimental report about the lives of ordinary men on the Chinese Nationalist-held islands, Formosa, and in South Korea, accompanied by a charge of inadequate and misleading American press coverage of these regions, and a strong anti-Communist, pro-Nationalist attack upon American foreign policy.

*Völkerrechtliche und Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen.* (Cologne and Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag. 1954. Pp. viii, 557.)

A collection of nineteen studies on various topics of international and constitutional law written by members and collaborators of the Max-Planck Institute for Foreign Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg. Prepared in honor of the German jurist and scholar Carl Bilfinger.

*Bahrein Islands: A Legal and Diplomatic Study of the British-Iranian Controversy.* By Fereydoun Adamiyat. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1955. Pp. x, 268.)

A study, based on thorough research, of the lengthy British-Iranian controversy over the control of these strategic and petroleum-rich islands in the Persian Gulf.

*The New Warfare.* By C. N. Barclay. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1954. Pp. x, 65. $2.75.)

The editor of the British *Army Quarterly* interestingly sorts out his thoughts about the tactics and prospects of the "cold war," and concludes that continued preparedness and a willingness to coexist may pave the way for some eventual agreements about specific danger points.

*The Dollar Dilemma: Perpetual Aid to Europe?* By Melchior Palyi. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1954. Pp. vii, 208. $2.75.)

A European-born economist argues that the American program of aid for Europe has perpetuated rigidities and inefficiencies, financed socialism, promoted bureaucratism, and destroyed incentive.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON

# INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

H. ARTHUR STEINER*

*University of California (Los Angeles)*

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## POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

*The Social Sciences in Historical Study.* By the Committee on Historiography. (New York: Social Science Research Council. 1954. Pp. x, 181. Paper, $1.75; cloth, $2.25.)

The purpose of this report is indeed praiseworthy, for the Committee on Historiography aims at giving historians some idea of the nature of research methods and problems and goals in the social sciences as an aid to the writing of history. The historian, presumably, will as a result become more aware of points of view and hypotheses offered by experts in anthropology, sociology, demography, social psychology, political science, and economics; his own working hypotheses, it is hoped, will be more varied and fruitful, his methods of research more up to date, and his interpretations more satisfying. There is much to be said for this; the historian of recent times in particular needs to understand more fully the newer "technology" of research in the social studies.

But why should history be a social *science*, except in the sense of a field of knowledge? As a field of knowledge, history has always been a social science as well as some other things. Above all, history is the written memory of mankind, and the study and interpretation of that memory or record. Of course there are many lacunae in the written record, and there are serious difficulties in interpreting what survives. Nonetheless, history is the study of all that can be learned, largely through written documents, of what mankind has experienced and achieved in the development of civilized communities, governments and law and order, economic and social interests, religions, learning, literature, and the arts—in the development of those ideas and ideals of civilization that distinguish man from the animals. Since most of this written memory is not subject to sampling and measurement, nor to statistical averaging, the historian needs to be educated more in the great literate tradition of mankind than in the technology of the social sciences. Not that this technology is without value to history; its value is simply stressed too much in this report. My attitude will seem old-fashioned. But I merely want to make the point that so far no one (not even Toynbee) has successfully described an average civilization, religion, government, constitution, legal system, or philosophy—or even an average great man or event or development. Anyhow, for most periods of history the sources are lacking for the methods described here. The best study of mankind is still the written memory, not the average man of statistical reports.—Gaines Post, *University of Wisconsin.*

*Politique et Philosophie chez Thomas Hobbes.* By Raymond Polin. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1953. Pp. xx, 266. 1000 fr.)

This monograph by Raymond Polin, Professor at the University of Lille, will be welcomed by political scientists and philosophers as a masterly exposition of Hobbesian problems. Politics was the center of Hobbes' philosophizing. And it could be the center, because the order of inquiry was for him determined, not by exigencies of philosophical problems, but by practical, utilitarian considerations. While Descartes composed a philosophy of the universe in which man found his place, Hobbes "wrote a philosophy of man, which he used as his model when he sketched a philosophy of the universe." That is the thesis used by Polin as his guide through the complexities of Hobbes' work from the *Elements of Law* to the *Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of Common Law.* The problems are presented in systematic sequence, beginning with chapters on human nature, rationalism, force, and history, and concluding with the theories of opinion and of the public person. Under each head the problem is traced through the Hobbesian *corpus*, with ample quotations and references, so that the monograph will prove a valuable index for future students. Of special interest are the chapters on "Le Bien et le Mal," from which Hobbes emerges as the great conservative, as well as on "Doctrine des Vertus," in which Polin takes issue with Leo Strauss' assumption that a development from aristocratic to bourgeois virtues can be discerned in Hobbes. The study is conducted with conscientious regard for philological methods —no anachronisms about Hobbes the "totalitarian" or "fascist" will be found in it.

In reading the book one wishes more than once that the author had restrained himself somewhat less in characterizing the historical place and effects of Hobbes. While occasionally he refers to the resumption of Hobbesian themes in Rousseau, Hegel, or Marx, he makes no concerted attempt, as he could well have done on the basis of his analysis, to validate the Marxian dictum that we all stem from Hobbes. He is clear and elaborate on the point that a rational science of politics is possible for Hobbes because for him the polity is a work of human reason, but he does not mention that Vico built his "Scienza Nuova" on the same principle, or that Marx used the same argument (directly, as well as *via* Vico) as the basis for his dialectical materialism. One also would have wished to see a reference to Locke's very Hobbesian introduction of "desire" as the principle that leads from the state of nature in the economic form of subsistence farming to the money economy. References of this type seem to have been omitted, because the author's own secularist position did not permit him to discern secularism as the historically influential determinant in the work of Hobbes and to characterize it appropriately by philosophical standards. Such criticisms, however, concern only the conclusions which Polin might have drawn from his own analysis; they do not touch the excellence of the study itself. The Hobbesian problems are presented so impeccably that the reader is almost forced to draw the conclusions himself.—ERIC VOEGELIN, *Louisiana State University.*

*Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society.* TRANSLATION BY EDWARD SHILS; EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND ANNOTATIONS BY MAX RHEINSTEIN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1954. Pp. lxxii, 363. $6.00.)

*Law and Morality: Leon Petrazycki.* TRANSLATED BY HUGH W. BABB WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY NICHOLAS S. TIMASHEFF. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1955. Pp. xlvi, 330. $7.50.)

These two works are the latest titles in the Twentieth Century Legal Philosophy Series published under the auspices of the Association of American Law Schools. Supplementing the previously published Modern Legal Philosophy Series the current venture seeks to bring to American scholars translations of the significant works of distinguished European jurists of the present century.

*Law in Economy and Society* (Volume VI in the series) is a translation of selected portions of Max Weber's *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (1922) and reproduces roughly about one-fourth of the original work. It presents in compact form, and in a really masterly translation of Weber's difficult prose, his conception of the nature of law and its relation to economics and sociology. Weber's thesis is that law evolves in stages from a charismatic formulation via empirical and utilitarian bureaucratization, to a system of legal rationality more or less characteristic of the present age. The material selected is also illustrative of Weber's sociological method and approach which links closely the development of law to changing economic, political, and social conditions. This methodology will be familiar to those who have read his *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus.* In more detailed sections students of politics and administration will find much to interest them in Weber's treatment of bureaucracy, monarchy, and the political community.

Although the vogue for Weber is presently somewhat on the wane in America, his great influence on sociological jurisprudence and sociology in general remains alive. Hence, this volume is a valuable addition to the translated literature.

The second work, *Law and Morality* (Volume VII of the series), is by a prerevolutionary Russian scholar who makes his contribution to sociological jurisprudence by a psychological analysis of the nature of law. For Professor Petrazycki, law is real only in a psychological sense and as part of the mental process. It finds expression by the will becoming conscious of the limiting imperative of duty but in a manner different from the moral imperative in that the recognition of the duty binding on the individual involves likewise the affirmation of a right in other individuals against the duty bearer. As Professor Timasheff puts it in his introduction: "morality is merely *imperative* while law is *attributive-imperative.*" This "intuitive" concept of law awakens man to his social and moral relationships to other men and leads ultimately to Petrazycki's contention that the end of law is the education of men "in the spirit of active love for their neighbors."

In reply to the idealistic critics of his early works, Petrazycki published in 1904 his *Nature of Human Conduct,* which develops his psychological assumptions. On this foundation he published in 1905: *Introduction to the Study of Law and Morals,* and in 1907: *Theory of Law and the State in Connection with a Theory of Morals.* These two works in abridged form are reproduced in the present translation. Petrazycki's influence has been greatest in Russia where certain of his concepts were temporarily taken over by the Soviet and significantly influenced the "revolutionary consciousness" school of Reisner. Although known to American legal theorists, his influence in this country has not been significant and this translation of certain of his works will, it is hoped, stimulate discussion of his position by English and American scholars.—H. M. MACDONALD, *University of Texas.*

*A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists.* BY V. O. KEY JR., (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell. 1954. Pp. x, 209. $2.50.)

*Political Statistics.* BY HAROLD T. DAVIS. (Evanston, Illinois: The Principia Press, Inc. 1954. Pp. xv, 364. $5.00.)

If one keeps the title word "primer" in mind, he should find V. O. Key's treatment useful and relatively painless. In a sense Key leaves the primer level after the first pages as he moves easily and skillfully through the basic statistical concepts; but there is a trap for the unwary here. Key makes it look too simple, for one thing. Further, the student who proposes to employ statistical tools in his research designs literally starts with the techniques for statistical inference. Key's purpose is to get his reader to that level with a proper introduction.

Davis has written a text (which Key has not) for an introductory class. His book does a thorough job with introductory skills but fails to treat many concepts which are becoming basic knowledge for social scientists. For example, he includes no discussion of inference or statistical significance. If his book is employed as a text for political science students, it should be supplemented with Key's book.

These books raise the question of whether a special statistics course should be developed for political scientists. Certainly that discipline has neglected this research tool far too long, but the current trend, which appears wise, is in the direction of the general statistics class for all social scientists. Possibly books with special applications should be employed in conjunction with such classes.—WILLIAM B. STORM, *University of Southern California.*

*Faith and Freedom.* BY BARBARA WARD. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1954. Pp. viii, 308. $3.75.)

With something of the grand sweep of a Toynbee, Barbara Ward "wrestles with the angel of history" for the answer to the problems of the present in terms of the history of the past. Her conclusion is that man's greatness is achieved through freedom and that freedom can be attained only on the basis of faith. The faith she has in mind is that of the Christian concept of God as the purposeful creator in the achievement of whose creation, men, by reason and conscience, may meaningfully participate. The realization of the creativeness of men subsumed under the creativeness of God breaks both the chains of the archaic determinism of early civilizations and the modern determinism of Feuerbach, Darwin, Marx, and the twentieth-century totalitarians. Faith, so conceived, opens up a vista of human betterment based on self-restraint and self-limitation arising from a proper recognition of the nature of man. In practice it serves to curb man's inclination towards domination as expressed in imperialism, nationalism, and totalitarianism. Specifically, the author advocates free international trade, greater cooperation between East and West, improved status for industrial workers, and above all the recognition by the United States of the need of sharing its great economic wealth and technical skill with the more backward areas. The book is typical of several which have recently appeared, underlining the necessity of the recovery of faith if democracy and free society are to survive.—H.M.M.

*The Judgment of History.* BY MARIE COLLINS SWABEY. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1954. Pp. x, 257. $3.75.)

It is difficult to judge any judgment of history. But the author of this book does not judge history, as the title indicates; instead, she judges the judgments of a few great historians like Gibbon, philosophers like Kant and Whitehead, and interpreters of the history of civilization like Spengler and Toynbee. In this she is stimulating, all the more so because she associates history with the humanities rather than with science (social or laboratory). But she has not, any more than any one else, offered a substitute for the study of the sources of historical knowledge. For all we can say in the end is that History is an interesting field of knowledge (incomplete and often subjective, of course), the knowledge of the written record or memory of mankind. It is as important, perhaps as futile, as the existence of literate, civilized man.—G.P.

*International Bibliography of Political Science.* EDITED BY JEAN MEYNAUD AND ASSOCIATE EDITOR JEAN MEYRIAT. (Paris: UNESCO. 1954. Vol. 1. Pp. 248. $3.00.)

This first issue of its kind includes references to materials published in 1952. Something over 4,000 items, including books, magazine articles, and national and international documents are listed. The editors, quite justifiably, comment on difficulties of selection and classification. These they have surmounted well enough to make this a useful volume. It is likely, of course, that many will find incompleteness in listings. Thus, three books published in 1952 and given reviews in this REVIEW in December, 1952 (McKinley's *Uncle Sam in the Pacific Northwest: Federal Management of Natural Resources in the Columbia River Valley;* Cahill's *Judicial Legislation: A Study in American Legal Theory;* and Jaffa's *Thomism and Aristotelianism: A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics*) are not listed. On the other hand, a second edition of a college text on the government of one state is included. But such citations of possible error in choice could be raised in regard to most bibliographies.

*Reason and Nature: An Essay on the Meaning of Scientific Method.* By Morris Raphael Cohen. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1953. Pp. xxiv, 470. $6.00.)

For many years Morris Cohen declined to allow a reprint of the first edition of this important work because of revisions he thought necessary. This new edition, which includes the changes made by Cohen over a period of 16 years, will be welcomed by all students of methodology.

*Dante: Monarchy and Three Political Letters.* Translated by Donald Nicholl and Colin Hardie. (New York: Noonday Press. Pp. xxi, 121. $2.75.)

Although there are numerous translations of Dante's *Divina Commedia*, it is over fifty years since an English edition of his *De Monarchia* has been published. This lack has now been met in the present work which again makes available to the student Dante's great polemic against papal absolutism and in favor of a secular world empire. In addition three of the thirteen political letters have been included and the entire book made of value to the student by the addition of a chronological table covering the years 1245 to the death of Dante in 1321.

*The "Isms": A History and Evaluation.* By Eugene O. Golob. (New York: Harper & Bros. 1954. Pp. vi, 681. $6.00.)

This work, by an economist now on the history and contemporary civilization staff at Columbia, presents a socio-economic study of capitalism, mercantilism, socialism (including communism), and corporatism. It is an historical analysis emphasizing the economic rather than the political aspect of the movements discussed. The most interesting section deals with an analysis and defense of corporatism. The author attempts to disassociate it from its reactionary and totalitarian manifestation and to present it in the more favorable guise of the Christian corporatist movement. The book concludes with a plea for a *via media* approach to current problems founded on the Christian concept of man.

*German Protestants Face the Social Question. Vol. 1: The Conservative Phase, 1815–1871.* By William O. Shanahan. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. 1954. Pp. xii, 434. $6.75.)

This is a scholarly and well-documented account of the attempts of German Protestantism to deal with the social and economic problems arising in Germany during the period 1815–1871. Careful treatment is given the three main streams of German Protestant thought, namely, idealism, pietism, and the established orthodoxy. The influence of Lutheran Erastianism as an ever-present factor in German theological thinking likewise comes in for its share of analysis and evaluation. Since German Protestantism is essentially individualistic, much of the book is concerned with theologians and writers and their reactions to the historic events culminating in the establishment of the Empire. A second volume bringing the story up to the present is promised by the author.

*Contemporary Social Issues.* By Raymond L. Lee, James A. Burkhart, and Van B. Shaw. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Publishing Company. 1955. Pp. xv, 864. $3.95.)

A book of readings designed to show social, personal, economic, and political problems and both the dynamics behind these problems and the theoretical material related to them. It includes, among others, sections on democracy and rival ideals, politics and administration of American government, and the United States in world affairs.

## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
## POLITICAL THEORY

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## SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
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## NOTE ON POLITICAL SCIENCE FILMS

This is a list of audio-visual sources which could be used as tools for college instruction. It includes only films released in 1954 which the writer had the opportunity to preview or otherwise inspect. Essential data on the films and the conditions of sale or rental are given. If not otherwise indicated, the films are 16 mm, sound, black and white.

### AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*Do We Need Wiretapping Laws?* (American Film Forum. February, 1954. 15 minutes. $60.00. Rental $15.00.)

Marquis Childs moderates a discussion between Senator Wayne Morse, Oregon (Ind.) and Rep. Kenneth B. Keating, New York (R.).

*Is Fighting Communism Periling Civil Rights?* (American Film Forum. April, 1954. 15 minutes. $60.00. Rental $15.00.)

Marquis Childs moderates a discussion between Rep. Richard Bolling, Missouri (D) and Rep. Pat Hillings, California (R).

*Is It Treason?* (American Film Forum. September, 1954. 15 minutes. $60.00. Rental $15.00.)

Marquis Childs moderates a discussion between Rep. Richard Bolling, Missouri (D) and Rep. Kit Clardy, Michigan (R). The question of security risks among federal employees is aired from the standpoint of the two political parties.

*The Legislative Process.* Educational collaborators: Frank E. Horack, Louis E. Lambert, Pressly S. Sikes, Kenneth B. Thurston. (Indiana University. 1954. 28 minutes. Black & white or color. $135 or $250.00 [color]. Rental $5.00; $8.00 [color].)

The process of lawmaking in the General Assembly of Indiana is shown by using actual scenes of the deliberations and carefully explaining the sequence of steps through which a bill must pass to become a law.

*Portrait of a County.* (Pennsylvania State University. 1954. 20½ minutes. Black & white or color. Applications for use to producer.)

Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, is pictured not only as a unit of government, but also as an area with historical and geographical features, and as a business performing services for the people.

*Should Taft-Hartley Be Repealed?* (American Film Forum. May, 1954. 15 minutes. $60.00. Rental $15.00.)

Marquis Childs moderates a discussion between former Rep. Fred Hartley and Gerhard von Arkel, former General Counsel of N.L.R.B.

*The Supreme Court.* Educational collaborator: Alpheus T. Mason. (Encyclopaedia Britannica Films. 1954. 18 minutes. $100.00. Rental $4.50.)

The film pictures the origin of the judicial review, highlighting the development of the

Supreme Court's powers since Marbury v. Madison. The N.R.A. case is used as the basis for a description of the Court's procedures and of the working of judicial review.

*Who Should Control Our Natural Resources?* (American Film Forum. January, 1954. 15 minutes. $60.00. Rental $15.00.)

Marquis Childs moderates a discussion between Senator Mike Mansfield, Montana (D) and Fred G. Andahl, Assistant Secretary of the Interior. The question is whether the federal government or private concerns should own the natural resources of the country.

## FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

*Australia in New Guinea.* (Australian National Film Board. Distributed by Australian News & Information Bureau. 1954. 20 minutes. $60.00. Rental $3.00.)

Different aspects of the Australian administration of the Territory of Papua-New Guinea are shown, combined with a wealth of anthropological information.

## INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

*The Berlin Air Lift.* (Teaching Film Custodians. 1954. 19 minutes. License fee: $30.00 for a one-year period.)

Excerpts from the 20th Century-Fox movie, *The Big Lift.* The political implications of the 1948 Berlin blockade can be seen only by inference. Emphasis is placed on the technical difficulties of the air supply flights to Berlin.

*Operation Goodwill.* (United Nations Department of Public Information. 1954. 10 minutes. $32.50. Rental $2.50.)

The town meeting of Wolfeboro, NewHampshire, changes its character into a town meeting of the World as delegates from six foreign countries come to the community, which is engaged in "Operation Goodwill" to help some communities abroad.

*Should Red China Be Admitted to the UN?* (American Film Forum. December, 1954. 15 minutes. $60.00. Rental $15.00.)

Marquis Childs moderates a discussion between Richard H. Crossman, a Labor Party member of the British Parliament and Dr. Chih-Mai Chen, of the Chinese Embassy in Washington.

*Workshop for Peace.* (United Nations Department of Public Information. 1954. 29 minutes. $65.00. Rental $7.50.)

A guided tour through the UN Headquarters at New York is used to present details of the working of the UN. Original scenes of the Eighth General Assembly and sessions of the other UN organs are utilized.

## POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

*Defining Democracy.* Educational collaborator: Harold D. Lasswell. (Encyclopaedia Britannica Films. 1954. 18 minutes. $50.00; $100.00 color. Rental $3.50.)

Democracy is not merely a form of government. Each community can be rated on a scale between democracy and despotism. The goal variables of a community can be expressed by the degree power and respect are shared. Instrumental variables are economic distribution and enlightenment.

## ADDRESSES OF FILM PRODUCERS

1. *American Film Forum, Inc.*, 516 Fifth Avenue, New York 36, New York.
2. *Australian News & Information Bureau*, 636 Fifth Avenue, New York 20, New York.
3. *Encyclopedia Britannica Films*, Wilmette, Illinois.
4. *Indiana University*, Audio-Visual Center, Bloomington, Indiana.
5. *Pennsylvania State University*, Motion Picture and Recording Studio, 112 West College Avenue, State College, Pennsylvania.
6. *Teaching Film Custodians, Inc.*, 25 West 43rd Street, New York 36, New York.
7. *United Nations Department of Public Information*, United Nations, New York, New York.

## NOTES

1. The American Film Forum movies are released monthly from September through May. Cost for a yearly subscription is $135.00, including discussion guides.
2. Encyclopaedia Britannica released four other films which the writer did not have the opportunity to preview. The Titles are: *The Congress*; *Iran: Between Two Worlds*; *Planning Our Foreign Policy*; and *The President*.

JERZY HAUPTMANN.

*Park College.*

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HAROLD, ROY E. *The Dollar: Sir George Watson Lectures, 1953.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1954. Pp. vi, 156. $3.50.

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LAUTERBACH, ALBERT. *Man, Motives, and Money: Psychological Frontiers of Economics.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1954. Pp. xiv, 366. $5.00.

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New York and London: Harper & Brothers. 1954. Pp. x, 159. $2.00.

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Ver Steeg, Clarence L. *Robert Morris: Revolutionary Financier; With an Analysis of His Earlier Career.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1954. Pp. 276. $5.00.

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Windmuller, John P. *American Labor and the International Labor Movement, 1940 to 1953.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1954. Pp. xvi, 232. $3.00.

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# NEWS AND NOTES

## PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

### 1955 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION

The 1955 Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association will be held September 7–9, 1955, at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado. The chairman of the Program Committee is Professor Weldon Cooper of the University of Virginia; the chairman of the Committee on Local Arrangements is Professor Dayton D. McKean of the University of Colorado.

The annual conference of the World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR) will be held at Konstanz, Germany, September 5–9, 1955. The conference will be held in conjunction with the annual meeting of ESOMAR—European Society for Opinion Surveys and Market Research. Suggestions for papers may be sent to either member of the WAPOR Program Committee: Baron K. G. von Stackelberg, EMNID, Bodelschwinghstrasse 23, Bielefeld, Germany, or Professor Morris Janowitz, Institut für Sozialforschung, Frankfurt Universität, Frankfurt/Main, Germany.

Some 300 practitioners, teachers, and researchers in the field of public opinion attended the Tenth Annual Conference of the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR), April 13–16, 1955, in Madison, Wisconsin. The conference was held under the general sponsorship of the University of Wisconsin. Among the participants were George Gallup, AAPOR president; Elmo Roper, of Elmo Roper and Associates; Bernard Berelson, the Ford Foundation; David Riesman, University of Chicago; Samuel Stouffer, Harvard University; and Paul Lazarsfeld, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

The 1955 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association will be held September 6, 1955, at the University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado. A cordial invitation is extended to the members of the American Political Science Association to come a day early for the national meeting and attend the sessions of the Western Association.

The Southern California Political Science Association held its spring meeting at Loyola University at Los Angeles on April 22. The general theme of the meeting was "Trends in the Commonwealth of Nations." Professor Charles R. Nixon of UCLA spoke on "Republicanism in the Union of South Africa," and Professor Dean E. McHenry of UCLA on "Regionalism in the South Pacific." Officers for 1955–56 are as follows: president, Robert L. Morlan, University of Redlands; secretary-treasurer, Tulley E. Warren, Los Angeles State College; additional members of the executive committee: Totten J. Anderson, University of Southern California; Don B. Leiffer, San Diego State College; Frank M. Stewart, University of California at Los Angeles; Arthur C. Turner, University of California at Riverside; John A. Vieg, Pomona College.

The Annual Student Conference of the Eastern Pennsylvania Citizenship Clearing House was held in Philadelphia, March 25–26, 1955. Senators Clifford Case and Richard Neuberger were the featured speakers. One hundred students from 33 eastern Pennsylvania colleges and universities attended, as well as 25 faculty members and 25 political leaders.

The Public Affairs Laboratory will be offered again at the American University during the 1955 summer session. The Laboratory is a workshop of government in action with extensive field trips, seminars, discussions, and lectures. It extends from June 20 to July 29 and is administered by the department of political science and public administration. Professors Charles M. Hersh and Palmer C. Pilcher are in charge of the Laboratory this summer.

The Florida Citizenship Clearing House held a three-day conference on state government on the campus of Florida State University in Tallahassee, April 25–27. Approximately 100 senior students from the University of Miami, the University of Florida, Stetson University, Florida Southern College, Rollins College, and Florida State University attended the conference. The program included a number of panel discussions in which the students participated with public officials and political leaders in across-the-board and off-the-record discussion. The meeting was scheduled during the legislative sessions so that the students could see the legislature in action and meet with their representatives in small groups. The executive director of the Florida Citizenship Clearing House is Dr. Frank Johnson of the political science department at Rollins College. Chairman on local arrangements in Tallahassee was Dr. Marian Irish of the political science department, Florida State University.

The Eighth Annual Conference on the Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace was held at the University of Idaho, March 16–17, 1955, under the sponsorship of the Borah Foundation for the Outlawry of War. The theme for this year's conference was "The United Nations—Is It the Road to Peace?" Faculty members from institutions in Montana, Idaho, Utah, Washington, and Oregon participated in a series of discussions with leaders representing economic interest, civic, and educational groups. Special emphasis was placed on problems of improving levels of information for community participation in foreign policy. Major addresses before plenary sessions were by: Quincy Wright, professor of political science, University of Chicago—"The United Nations and Charter Review"; Ronald B. Levinson, head of the department of philosophy, University of Maine—"Outlawry of War and the Nature of Man"; Carlos Davila, Secretary General, Organization of American States, Pan American Union—"Regional Organizations and the Roads to Peace"; Thomas Jefferson Hamilton, *New York Times* Press Section, United Nations—"Traditional Diplomacy v. Collective Security in the Contemporary World."

The department of human relations at the University of Miami is sponsoring a six-weeks' Workshop on Theory and Practice in Human Relations, June 14 to July 23, 1955. The first part of the Workshop will be concerned with the theoretical foundations of human relations; the second part, with practical applications in public and private agencies, business and industry, education, international relations, the home, and interracial and interfaith areas of tension. The Workshop will carry six semester credits on both the graduate and undergraduate levels. A limited number of scholarships will be available. Further information may be obtained from Dr. Dean George Epley, chairman of the department of human relations and director of the Workshop, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida.

As part of the activities of the second year of the Curriculum Development Project of the political science department at Northwestern University, a Conference on Political Philosophy and the Study of Politics was held February 24–26, 1955. Six papers were read at the conference: "The Unity of Political Theory," by Norman Jacobson, University of California (Berkeley); "The Place of Classic Political Theory in the Study of Politics," by Mulford Sibley, University of Minnesota; "Political Ideology as a Datum for the Study of Politics," by Frederick Watkins, Yale University; "American Political Theory and the Study of Politics," by Robert McCloskey, Harvard University; "Political Philosophy and the 'Science' of Politics," by Carl Friedrich, Harvard University; and "Political Philosophy in the 20th Century: An Appraisal of Its Contribution to the Study of Politics," by Lindsay Rogers, Columbia University. Other persons attending the Conference included: David Easton, University of Chicago; Cortez Ewing, University of Oklahoma; Frank Grace, University of Michigan; Pendleton Herring, Social Science Research Council; Thomas Jenkin, University of California (Los Angeles); Evron Kirkpatrick, American Political Science Association; Avery Leiserson, Vanderbilt University; Norton Long, Western Reserve University; Austin Ranney, University of Illinois; Wallace Sayre, Columbia University; David Smith, Swarthmore College; John Stewart, Rockefeller Foundation; and Sheldon Wolin, University of California (Berkeley). Harry Eckstein, Harvard University, served as rapporteur.

The Institute of World Affairs, sponsored by the University of Southern California, in cooperation with the colleges and universities of the Pacific area, held its thirty-first annual session at the Riverside, California, Mission Inn, December 12–15, 1954, under the direction of J. William Robinson, professor of government and international relations at Whittier College. The theme of the meeting was "The Achievement of Peace: Hope or Illusion?" Political scientists giving major addresses included Clyde Eagleton of New York University and Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago. Papers were presented by Kenneth C. Cole, University of Washington; G. Homer Durham, University of Utah; J. Eugene Harley and Rodger Swearingen of the University of Southern California. Panel chairmen included Raymond McKelvey, Occidental College; James S. Coleman, University of California (Los Angeles); Paul Beckett, State College of Washington; Stanley H. Chan, Loyola University of Los Angeles; Henry G. Dittmar, University of Redlands; Miguel Jorrín, University of New Mexico; William B. Ballis, University of Washington; William C. Olson, Claremont Graduate School; and Ross N. Berkes, University of Southern California. Other papers and discussions were given by 125 historians, economists, and sociologists representing 31 institutions and by representatives of government, business, and research organizations.

Director of the thirty-second session, December 11–14, 1955, will be James T. Watkins IV, executive head, department of political science, Stanford University. Other members of the executive committee include Charles E. Martin, University of Washington; Frank M. Russell, University of California; Graham H. Stuart, Stanford University; and Chancellor Rufus B. von KleinSmid of the University of Southern California. Dr. Watkins has selected "America Learns to Lead" as the theme.

A two-day clinic for community and regional planners was held in Austin, February 28–March 1, 1955, under the auspices of the Institute of Public Affairs, University of Texas. The theme of the clinic was "Teamwork for Community Advancement." Harold V. Miller, executive director of the Tennessee State Planning Commission, served as consultant. Mr. Miller conferred with Austin city officials, who had recently launched a master plan, and a faculty committee on community and regional planning heard him discuss the activities at other universities in the training of city planners. The leading feature of the conference was a public lecture at which more than 250 Austin citizens were warned by Mr. Miller of the pitfalls for cities resulting from rapid but unplanned growth.

A Conference of Teachers and Administrators Concerned with the U.S. Foreign Service was held at the University of Virginia, March 24–26, 1955, at the invitation of the Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs, with the cooperation of the Department of State. Approximately 25 college teachers and administrators of departments or special schools in international affairs and officers from the Department of State assembled for the principal purpose of discussing the needs of the Foreign Service. Included on the agenda were the following: (1) the need to restore prestige of the Foreign Service to a level that will appeal to the best college students; (2) the selection process for the Foreign Service as seen from the point of view of college teachers and students; (3) the possibility of curriculum changes or modifications in teaching techniques in the colleges that would be productive of better candidates for the Foreign Service; (4) exploration of ways of using Foreign Service Officers as visiting lecturers in colleges and universities and the possibility of academic service by retired F.S.O.'s; and (5) advice from experienced teachers and teacher-administrators to the officers of the Department of State responsible for the development of the Foreign Service Institute (and related training or intern programs) on the curriculum of the Institute and the use of established academic facilities for special training needs. A copy of the conference report is being sent to all departments of political science in the country.

A Conference on Responsible Leadership in a Democracy was held at Yale University during February and March, 1955. The core of the conference was the Lamont Lecture Series given over a six-weeks' period by members of the university's department of political science. These lectures were as follows: "Authority, Anarchy, and Democratic Leadership," by Frederick M. Watkins; "The American Executive," by James W. Fesler; "The Electorate's Image of Presidential Leadership," by Robert E. Lane; "External and Internal Restraints on the 'Responsible' Leader," by Robert A. Dahl; "Some Myths and Realities of Local Leadership," by Herbert Kaufman; and "American Democratic Leadership and Foreign Affairs," by Arnold Wolfers.

# OTHER ACTIVITIES

Progress toward cooperation among the five Central American countries (Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica) was notably advanced with the completion by 27 students in December, 1954, of the first general course at the Advanced School of Public Administration Central America, located in San José, Costa Rica. The school, known as ESAPAC (the initials of its name in Spanish—*Escuela Superior de Administración Pública América Central*), is jointly maintained by the governments of the five countries and by the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration. A group of international experts forms the professional staff, directed by Dr. Enrique Tejera-París of Venezuela. After an intensive five-months' training program, the high-level government officials who are the ESAPAC students return to their countries with a broadened base of understanding and desire to work together. The Central American Society of Public Administration, established in November, 1954, was formed by some of the school's first students.

The ESAPAC program is a combination of formal lectures, organized professional group discussions, field trips, and practical field work projects for improved municipal administration and overall community development. The spirit of teamwork and cooperation among the students and professors evident in ESAPAC's first general course is expected to strengthen relationships between the Central American countries on future projects.

Typical professional group studies and work projects have included a detailed comparative analysis of the budget process in each of the Central American countries; a study for the model organization of a national public works department; a study to determine statistics needed for sound analysis of the structure of Central American economies; and a study on the proper location of the planning function in national government structure. These group projects were in addition to the individual reports submitted by each of the students, which are expected to help in furthering various projects for improved public administration in Central America.

The Atlantik-Brücke, an information bureau, has been established in Germany for the purpose of providing assistance to visiting Americans in the field of the social sciences. The Atlantik-Brücke is a group of private citizens who desire to promote better understanding between Germany and the United States. It is financed exclusively by contributions of its members and is non-partisan. Services offered by this new organization include providing information on German research institutes, universities, and libraries, and arranging contacts with German management, labor, institutes, and government agencies. The address is: Information Bureau on German Social Sciences, Hamburg 13, Harvestehuderweg 9.

The Brookings Institution has announced the appointment of three research fellows in political science for the year 1955–56. The three appointees are as follows: Stanley Kelley, Jr., who is completing his work for the doctorate at the Johns Hopkins University in June; John H. Romani, who is completing his work for the doctorate in June at the University of Michigan; and Thomas S. Francis, a candidate for the doctorate at Columbia University. The fellowship awards were the result of a competition in which ten universities were requested to make nominations. With these awards, the Brookings Institution resumes the granting of fellowships for advanced training and research, an activity which it suspended in 1942. The stipend for the present series of fellowships has been set at $4,400.

The Gaspar G. Bacon Lectures on the Constitution of the United States were delivered at Boston University by Arthur T. Vanderbilt, February 15–17, 1955, on the general subject, "Judges and Jurors: Their Functions, Qualifications and Selection."

The elevation of Cornell University's School of Business and Public Administration to full graduate status, effective on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the school, July 1, 1955, was announced on January 30 by Deane W. Malott, president of the University. In his announcement, the president stated that "The designation of the school as the Graduate School of Business and Public Administration signifies our conviction, after a decade of experimentation, that our effort to combine business and public administration in an integrated program has been successful and that the objectives are sound." Dean Edward H. Litchfield announced that the school is raising its entrance requirements, offering an expanded course as well as research program, and enlarging its faculty and facilities to correspond with the change in title of the school. Up to this time the school had permitted qualified seniors from Cornell and other universities to enter the first year of its two-year program; but, commencing with the school year of 1955–56, this procedure will be modified to apply only to exceptional cases. Since its founding, the faculty of the school has more than tripled and will represent more than 20 full-time faculty members by 1955–56. Work toward the doctor of philosophy degree was authorized two years ago, and the growing doctoral program of the school will soon be supplemented by an expanding research program, the blueprint for which is now being developed by a special faculty research committee. The developmental program contemplates a maximum enrollment of not more than 350 graduate students by 1960, as compared with the approximately 200 now enrolled.

The members of the newly appointed Advisory Council to the Cornell University School of Business and Public Administration, who will assist the school in its experimental work in administrative science are: Chester I. Barnard, formerly president of the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company and of the Rockefeller Foundation; General Lucius D. Clay, chairman of the board, Continental Can Company; Clarence Francis, formerly chairman of the board, General Foods Corporation; Luther Gulick, administrator, City of New York; Pendleton Herring, president of the Social Science Research Council; Elmer L. Linseth, president of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company; and James A. McConnell, executive vice-president of the Cooperative Grange League Federation Exchange and administrator, Commodities Stabilization Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

The first of the 1954–55 series of "Lectures in Administration" at the Cornell University School of Business and Public Administration was given by Major General Otto Nelson, U.S.A., ret., vice president of the New York Life Insurance Company. His subject was "Organization and Administration—Military and Business." Other lectures were given by Lawrence A. Appley, president of the American Management Association; Arthur F. Burns, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; Luther Gulick, administrator, City of New York; Gordon Dean, formerly chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission; James P. Mitchell, Secretary of Labor; and P. M. Shoemaker, president of the Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Railroad Company.

The annual Edmund J. James Lecture in Government was given at the University of Illinois on February 24, 1955, by Lindsay Rogers of Columbia University. His subject was "Political Crystal Gazing." The James Lecture is endowed by the family in honor of former President Edmund J. James of the University of Illinois.

As an outgrowth of its annual summer Institute on World Affairs, the Pennsylvania State University is planning to introduce in the fall of 1955 an inter-disciplinary course in international understanding designed primarily, but not exclusively, for non-liberal arts students. Six or eight selected students from each of the nine different colleges at the university will be registered for the three sections of the course. An interdepartmental committee consisting of Neal Riemer, associate professor of political science, Kent Forster, professor of history, and William T. Butz, assistant professor of agricultural economics, has been appointed to prepare a syllabus of materials for the course. Elton Atwater, associate professor of political science and coordinator of the 1955 Institute on World Affairs, will also work closely with the committee in a consultative capacity. The course will cut across various fields, such as history, politics, economics, psychology, education, and science, in an effort to provide an integrated understanding of international affairs and the approaches of different peoples and cultures to international problems.

The establishment of a Foreign Policy Institute at the University of Pennsylvania has been made possible by a grant of $113,000 by the Richardson Foundation of Greensboro, North Carolina. Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and chairman of the university's graduate program in international relations, will serve as director. The Institute will be concerned with the study of major problems in international relations and their impact upon American foreign policy. Specialists will be employed from international relations, political science, economics, history, sociology, anthropology, and geography. The primary operational unit will be a staff conference consisting of professors from the University of Pennsylvania and from other American and foreign universities. Associated with the Institute as advisers will be: William Yandell Elliott, professor of government, Harvard University; William R. Kintner, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.; Hans Kohn, professor of history, City College of New York; Paul M. A. Linebarger, professor of Asiatic studies, the Johns Hopkins University; Norman D. Palmer, professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania; Stefan T. Possony, professor of international relations, Georgetown University; Froelich G. Rainey, professor of anthropology and director of the University Museum, University of Pennsylvania; and Arthur P. Whitaker, professor of Latin American history, University of Pennsylvania. Still unnamed are a number of post-doctoral and pre-doctoral assistants who will serve as the research staff of the Institute. Also still to be appointed is an assistant director of the Institute who will act as director of research. Findings of the Foreign Policy Research Institute will be made available in a series of occasional papers as well as in book-length studies initiated by individual members or by the Institute as a whole.

The political science department of the University of Pennsylvania sponsored a special faculty seminar on "Research in Political Behavior: Its Achievements, Problems, Prospects," which met on five occasions during the months of March and April. The seminar, a Ford Foundation project to promote inter-university communication, was conducted by Professor Richard C. Snyder of Princeton University. It was attended by some 30 faculty members representing ten different disciplines. The major purposes of the seminar were to provide an inter-disciplinary forum for the discussion of fundamental issues which arise when behavioral research is discussed and to identify, analyze, and evaluate the major types of behavioral research, both within and outside the field of political science.

The School of Public Administration of the University of Southern California observed its 25th anniversary with a two-day celebration, February 25–26, 1955. The school is the second oldest of its kind in the United States and now has the largest faculty and student body.

The department of government at the University of Texas has this year inaugurated a conference-seminar for its graduate students. These monthly meetings are designed to afford an opportunity for a more intimate social and intellectual acquaintance among the faculty and graduate students and to provide a forum for discussion of significant problems. Each meeting is devoted to a particular topic, and an effort has been made to bring to the university a series of outstanding scholars and teachers in the field of political science. Speakers during the second semester, 1954–55, were Merle Fainsod of Harvard University, who spoke on "The Struggle for Power since Stalin"; Charles Hyneman of Northwestern, on "Research Methodology in Political Science"; Robert M. MacIver of Columbia University, on "The Theory of Democracy"; and Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago, on "National Interest as a Guide for Foreign Policy Formation."

The Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, is conducting a special seminar in Mexico this summer. This program is supported by the Henry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable Foundation and will be directed by John Gange.

Henry L. Bretton, of the department of political science, University of Michigan, has been awarded a Rackham Summer Faculty Research Fellowship for 1955.

Herbert Emmerich, director of the Public Administration Clearing House and lecturer in the department of political science, University of Chicago, was awarded the honorary degree of Doctor of Civil Law by the University of Southern California on February 25, 1955, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the university's School of Public Administration.

Russell H. Fitzgibbon, of the University of California (Los Angeles), attended the Fourth Extraordinary Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council as an unofficial observer for the university. The conference was held from November 22 to December 2, 1954, at Rio de Janeiro.

John Gange, director of the Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, has been elected to the board of the University of Denver Social Science Foundation.

Willard N. Hogan, professor of political science at the State Teachers College, New Paltz, New York, served as educational director of the Annual National Collegiate Council for the United Nations Institute held June 12–19, 1955, at Finch College in New York City.

W. V. Holloway, professor of political science at the University of Tulsa, has been appointed to the Civil Service Board of the City of Tulsa.

Philip E. Jacob, of the University of Pennsylvania, addressed the annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science held in Philadelphia on April 1, 1955. The general topic of the meeting was "Internal Security and Civil Rights in America"; the subject of Professor Jacob's address was "Freedom of Religion: A Good Security Risk?"

Robert F. Karsch, professor of political science at the University of Missouri, was elected in the nonpartisan municipal election of April 5, 1955, to a two-year term on the Columbia City Council.

Walter H. C. Laves, chairman of the department of government at Indiana University, gave lectures at the London School of Economics and at the University of Hamburg on March 10 and 15, respectively, on the subject, "Some Organizational and Administrative Problems in Public Enterprises of South and Southeast Asia." While in Germany, Professor Laves attended the annual meeting of the governing board of the UNESCO Social Science Institute in Cologne. During the latter part of March and April, he served as a public administration consultant with the Foreign Operations Administration at Bangkok, Thailand, for the purpose of developing a program of public administration training to be established at Thammasat University in Bangkok.

Alpheus Thomas Mason, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton University, gave the Messenger Lectures at Cornell University during the two weeks of March 7 through March 17, 1955.

Frank A. Mesplé, instructor in government at San Francisco State College, and Carl F. Stover, acting instructor of political science at Stanford University, served as consultants with the National Science Foundation during February and March, 1955.

Hans J. Morgenthau, professor of political science and director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago, gave a series of lectures at the Graduate Institute for International Studies at the University of Geneva during the past spring.

Emery E. Olson, first dean of the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, was awarded the honorary degree of Doctor of Civil Law by that institution at the 25th anniversary celebration of the university's School of Public Administration, held on February 25, 1955.

Franz B. Schick, professor of political science at the University of Utah, will lecture on international law this summer at the Free University of Berlin. He will also participate in the meetings of the International Political Science Association at Stockholm.

Gerald Stourzh, research associate in the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago, has received for his book, *Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy*, the prize of the Institute of Early American History and Culture for the best book in the field of early American history published during 1954.

Philip B. Taylor, Jr., of the department of political science, University of Michigan, has been awarded a Rackham Summer Faculty Research Fellowship and will spend the summer of 1955 in Mexico working on the general subject, "Political Effects in Mexico of the Spanish Refugee Intellectuals after the Franco Revolution in Spain."

Paul W. van der Veur, instructor in the department of political science at Yale University, has been designated co-director of an Indonesian research project to be conducted at Yale during 1955–56.

### THE HOCHSCHULE FÜR VERWALTUNGSWISSENSCHAFTEN, SPEYER

In 1947 the Landtag of Rheinland-Pfalz established a new institution of higher education called the Hochschule für Verwaltungswissenschaften at the beautiful old cathedral town of Speyer in West Germany. Unlike the prewar Hochschule für Politik in Berlin and the similar schools which sprang up in other cities of the Western Zone after the war, this new school was entirely on a graduate level. Its function was to give advanced training in public administration to graduates of the several university law schools who had been employed in Rheinland-Pfalz by the state or local governments. Later, admission was extended to certain civil servants of other Länder, which were encouraged to contribute to the school's support.

The program of the Hochschule is designed to complete the preparation of Referendaren ("probationary" higher civil servants, who must ordinarily work for three years after graduation from the university—without salary, but with a small living allowance) by giving them in-service training in applied public administration. A few other junior permanent civil servants are also admitted. The total enrollment during the summer semester of 1954 was 170, of whom 159 were civil servants and the rest auditors.

Regular courses are divided into five groups: (1) political science and constitutional law, (2) administration, (3) private law, (4) economics, and (5) sociology and history. The workshops and colloquia are in such areas as public law, public finance, and the rights of citizens. Seminars include constitutional law, local government law, and the sociological problems of population. The two languages taught are French and English. The state library of Rheinland-Pfalz is located directly across the street from the school and is used by the school as its library. In addition, the school has three research institutes, each with its own library: (1) the Institute of Administrative Law, (2) the Institute of Economic Administration, and (3) the Institute for Sociology and History.

The Hochschule für Verwaltungswissenschaften has served its appenticeship as a part of the West German program for training higher civil servants and now has a secure position and an excellent record of performance. Its activities should be carefully observed and kept in mind by all students and teachers of comparative public administration.—HARVEY WALKER.

### A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITHIN THE NETHERLANDS KINGDOM

On December 15, 1954, Queen Juliana of The Netherlands proclaimed the new Statute for the Kingdom of The Netherlands at a ceremonial assembly of the two Houses of the Netherlands Parliament at The Hague. The Statute provides complete internal autonomy for the two former colonies of The Netherlands in the Western Hemisphere: Surinam (Dutch Guiana) and the Netherlands Antilles. The Statute was adopted on June 3, 1954, at the final meeting of the Round-Table Conference between the delegations of the prospective partners. Meanwhile, the three parliaments have ratified the Statute, and the Queen's Proclamation made it effective.

Discussions between the mother country and the two dependencies were first held in 1948, at which time no agreement was reached. In order to expedite the organization of autonomous government in Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, the Netherlands Government offered interim legislation whereby autonomy in the internal affairs of the two countries was granted, to Surinam in January, 1950, and to the Netherlands Antilles in February, 1951.

The preamble to the Statute reads as follows: "The Netherlands, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, considering that they have declared of their own free will a new rule of law in the Netherlands realm, in which they will look after their own interests independently and will, on the basis of equality, care for the common interests and give reciprocal aid, have decided in joint consultation to compile the statute for the realm as follows . . . ." Defense and foreign relations are the only specific "affairs of the realm." The Council of Ministers of the realm, comprising ministers appointed by the Crown (Queen) and ministers plenipotentiary appointed by the governments of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, makes joint decisions regarding affairs of the realm. Should a representative of Surinam or the Netherlands Antilles declare that the country he represents will not be bound by proposed realm legislation, the provision cannot be made applicable in the country he represents. Before a final vote is taken on a realm bill in the Netherlands Parliament, the representative of either country will be given an opportunity to express his views on the bill. Should he oppose it, he may request Parliament to postpone the vote until the next meeting. If, under these circumstances, Parliament accepts the bill with a less than three-fifths majority, the measure will be suspended and further discussion must take place in the Council of Ministers. The Crown does not bind either Surinam or the Netherlands Antilles to economic and financial agreements if either party indicates that such agreements are contrary to its interests. The same applies to the annulment of such agreements. Should one of the partners wish to conclude an agreement separately, this may not be prevented unless it should be incompatible to that partner's realm ties. The defense of the realm is the responsibility of the three partners. The Surinam and Antilles contributions are to be determined through joint consultation.

The three countries, through the Statute, declare they will assist each other in the financial, economic, and cultural fields. Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles will thus be the beneficiaries of Netherlands technical and economic assistance. A Foundation for the Development of Mechanical Agriculture in Surinam has been set up for the purpose of transforming large areas of jungle into arable land. Through the intermediary of the Netherlands Government a few projects of the Foreign Operations Administration are now under way. Consultations are now being held between Surinam and The Netherlands on a ten-year development plan. Netherlands universities, the Netherlands Institute for Applied Scientific Research, and the Royal Tropical Institute are doing extensive research on Surinam timber to determine its possible industrial uses. Assistance is being rendered to the recently instituted Netherlands Antilles Technical Economic Council, which is investigating the economic possibilities of creating so-called "free port zones" in the Antilles. Netherlands specialists are being placed at the disposal of the Netherlands Antilles for the purpose of reorganization of the police force, for organization of child welfare, for improvement of port facilities, for the organization of social security, for revision of tax legislation, and for legislation concerning the building industry.

In the cultural field, the Foundation for Cultural Cooperation and the Foundation for Scientific Research in Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles are already in operation. The latter is especially devoted to the coordination of research between Netherlands institutions of higher learning for the benefit of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. Rapport has also been established between Netherlands, French, and British institutions for the purpose of exchanging scientific information relating to the West Indies.

In a recent Netherlands Government report to the Dutch Parliament, it was stated: "Cooperation between the partners in the realm in every possible and profitable way will be planned on the basis of long-term projects as soon as the new statute is in operation. The Government is convinced that the extent of the willingness of the partners to render assistance, where possible and justified, and the spirit with which this assistance is to be carried out will determine the strength of the ties between the partners."

In all three parts of the realm, elections are free and secret. In Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, there is universal suffrage for all residents who are citizens or Dutch subjects, provided they have reached the age of twenty-three.—Dr. H. J. Friedericy, *Netherlands Embassy.*

## APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

William Anderson, professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, was on leave from the university during the spring quarter. In addition to attending the final meetings of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, he prepared for publication one monograph in the Minnesota Intergovernmental Relations Series and edited for publication one or two other monographs for the same series.

Peter Bachrach has been promoted to associate professor of political science at Bryn Mawr College.

M. Margaret Ball, of Wellesley College, will offer courses in the field of international relations during the summer quarter, 1955, at Stanford University.

William E. Biggs has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science and public administration at the American University.

William W. Boyer, Jr., formerly administrative assistant to Governor Kohler of Wisconsin, has been appointed associate professor of political science and director of research in the Institute of Local Government at the University of Pittsburgh.

Donald W. Brandon has resigned his teaching post at the University of San Francisco to take a position with the federal government.

Gerard Braunthal, who was awarded the Ph.D. degree by Columbia University in June, 1953, has been appointed instructor in government at the University of Massachusetts.

David S. Brown has been named associate professor of public administration in the

George Washington University School of Government. Professor Brown was with the federal government for thirteen years, his last assignment being executive secretary of the Public Advisory Board for Mutual Security.

Philip W. Buck will be on sabbatical leave from Stanford University during the academic year 1955–56. With the aid of a research grant from the Ford Foundation, he will make a study of various aspects of careers in English politics.

James L. Busey, who has been acting assistant professor for the past three years at the University of Colorado, has been appointed to an assistant professorship at that institution, beginning next year.

John C. Campbell, who is presently a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State in Washington, will join the staff of the Council on Foreign Relations, September 1, 1955, as director of political studies.

James C. Charlesworth, of the University of Pennsylvania, was granted a leave of absence for the second semester of the past academic year in order to become Secretary of Administration in the cabinet of Governor George M. Leader of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Robert A. Dahl, associate professor of political science on the Eugene Meyer Public Service Fund at Yale University, will be on leave of absence during 1955–56 to serve as a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

Marshall E. Dimock was visiting professor of political science on the Louis W. and Maud Hill Family Foundation at Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota, during the second semester of the past academic year. Dr. Dimock taught a course in business and government and a seminar in problems of international administration. Before coming to Carleton in January, he spent three months as a consultant to the Administrative Staff College, Henley-on-Thames, in Britain.

Cecil H. Driver, professor of political science at Yale University, will be on leave of absence during the fall term of 1955–56.

Charles Fairman, first holder of the Nagel Professorship of Constitutional Law and Political Science in the Washington University School of Law, has resigned to accept appointment as professor of law in the Harvard Law School.

Wesley R. Fishel has resumed his duties as associate professor of political science and assistant director of the Governmental Research Bureau at Michigan State College. He spent the fall and winter terms in Indochina as a special advisor to U. S. Special Representative J. Lawton Collins and to President Ngo Dinh Diem of Viet Nam.

Vernon Lee Fluharty has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at the University of Pittsburgh.

Charles R. Foster, a Ph.D. candidate at the Ohio State University, served as lecturer in the department of government at Indiana University during the spring semester, teaching the introductory course.

Ernst Fraenkel, of the Free University of Berlin, taught at the University of Colorado during the spring term, taking the place of Henry Ehrmann, who was on leave of absence.

J. Leiper Freeman, formerly research associate with the Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at Vanderbilt University, as of September 1, 1955.

Leo Gross was on partial leave from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy during the past academic year to teach international law at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

Donald E. Hayhurst has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Pittsburgh.

Charles B. Hirsch has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of history and political science and has been named chairman of the newly formed department of social sciences at La Sierra College, Arlington, California.

Colin Jackson, of London, England, was a visiting professor of political science at the University of Nebraska during the second semester, offering work in international affairs while Norman L. Hill was on leave of absence at the University of Washington.

Horace B. Jacobini has resigned from the staff of East Central State College, Ada, Oklahoma, to accept an appointment with the University of Michigan, assigned to the Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines. His assignment began in February, 1955, and will extend to June, 1956.

Philip C. Jessup will be on leave from Columbia University during 1955–56. In his absence, the work in international law will be shared by Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Sir Zafrulla Khan, and Julian Stone. The latter will come from Sydney, Australia, to be visiting professor of international law for the spring session (1956). Sir Zafrulla Khan will be adjunct professor for the first half of the year.

Frederick E. Kidder, formerly lecturer in political science at the Polytechnic Institute of Puerto Rico, has returned to the Institute after several years of graduate study at the University of California (Berkeley). His new post as assistant librarian includes oversight of the Institute's growing collection of government documents.

Charles M. Kneier was on sabbatical leave from the University of Illinois during the spring semester, studying zoning regulations in the United States.

Gertrude Leighton has been advanced to the rank of associate professor of political science at Bryn Mawr College.

Nathan Leites, of the Rand Corporation, has been appointed visiting lecturer in political science at Yale University for 1955–56; he and Professor Harold D. Lasswell will offer jointly the graduate course in political behavior.

Ernest M. Linton, retired professor of government at Indiana University, was called back during the spring semester to assist in the teaching of the introductory course in government.

Oliver J. Lissitzyn has received a promotion to associate professor of international law at Columbia University.

William S. Livingston, associate professor of political science and assistant dean of the graduate school at the University of Texas, has been appointed visiting lecturer in political science at Yale University for the fall term of 1955–56.

Albert B. Martin has been promoted to a full professorship in the department of political science at the University of Pittsburgh.

Dean E. McHenry has resumed his duties at the University of California (Los Angeles) after a year's sabbatical leave in Australia.

Robert H. Menke, one-time member of the Indiana Legislature, served during the spring semester as lecturer in the department of government at Indiana University, teaching a course in legislatures and legislation.

Philip E. Mosely, who has served as director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University since 1951, has been appointed director of studies for the Council on Foreign Relations to supervise its program of research and publication. Dr. Mosely will continue to teach at Columbia on a part-time basis.

Forrest D. Murden, Jr., formerly a member of the United States Mission to the United Nations, has been appointed to the faculty of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy to conduct a seminar on problems of contemporary international organization.

Allan S. Nanes, formerly of Brooklyn College, has been appointed analyst in American foreign policy, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.

Fred Warner Neal, who has spent one year at the University of Michigan and another on a fellowship which took him to Yugoslavia, will return as assistant professor to the University of Colorado in September.

Charles R. Nixon has resumed his teaching duties at the University of California (Los Angeles) after a year's special leave in the Union of South Africa.

Herman Clarence Nixon, professor of political science at Vanderbilt University, will retire at the end of the 1955 summer term after a rich and varied career as teacher, writer, scholar, and sage. To his associates everywhere in the South, as well as in other parts of the country, Professor Nixon's departure will leave a void that will be difficult to fill.

James A. Norton, associate professor in the School of Public Administration, Florida State University, was on leave during the 1954–55 academic year to serve as lecturer on public health administration at the Harvard School of Public Health.

C. B. O'Brien has returned from a sabbatical leave in Europe and has resumed the chairmanship of the department of history and political science, University of California (Davis).

George A. Peek, Jr., of the University of Michigan, has been assigned to the Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, for a year beginning in June, 1955. He will serve as liaison officer under the contract between the two universities for establishment of the Institute.

L. H. Qureshi, former Minister of Education of Pakistan, who joined the department of history of Columbia University as visiting professor in January, 1955, will continue as visiting professor during 1955–56. Dr. Qureshi will participate in a joint seminar on the political, social, and economic problems of the Near and Middle East.

Leo C. Riethmayer will return to the University of Colorado for the second term of summer school after a year's teaching at the University of the Philippines in Manila.

Fred W. Riggs, of the Public Administration Clearing House, has been appointed visiting lecturer in political science at Yale University for 1955–56; he will offer jointly with Professors Walter R. Sharp and Herbert Kaufman a graduate course in comparative public administration.

Carlton C. Rodee has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at the University of Southern California.

Jack W. Rodgers, assistant professor of political science, University of Nebraska, has been appointed full-time director of research for the Nebraska Legislative Council. He will continue with the department of political science on a one-fourth time basis.

David N. Rowe, professor of political science at Yale University, has been granted an extension of his leave of absence so that he may continue during 1955–56 as Representative of the Asia Foundation in Taiwan.

Burton M. Sapin, of the Foreign Policy Analysis Project, Princeton University, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at Vanderbilt University, beginning in September, 1955.

Howard A. Scarrow, instructor in political science at Michigan State College during 1954–55, has been appointed administrative assistant and research associate in the Commonwealth Studies Center at Duke University. He will assume his new duties this summer, pursuing research in Canada.

John A. Schutz has been appointed associate professor in the department of political science at Whittier College.

William C. Seyler, assistant professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh, has been granted a leave of absence to serve as Director of Program and Policy Research in the Department of Administration, Executive Office of Governor Leader of Pennsylvania.

Reed M. Smith, who taught part-time at Brooklyn College during 1954–55, has accepted a position as instructor in the department of history and political science at Baldwin-Wallace College, beginning next September.

Morgan Thomas will be on sabbatical leave from the University of Michigan during 1955–56.

Charles A. Thomson, formerly Counselor of Embassy for UNESCO Affairs, Paris, has been appointed research associate in the department of government at Indiana University for the purpose of collaborating with Walter H. C. Laves in the preparation of an analytical volume on UNESCO.

Frank N. Trager has been appointed research professor in the department of government, Graduate School of Arts and Science, New York University.

Tang Tsou, formerly lecturer at the University of Utah, has been appointed research associate with the rank of assistant professor in the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago.

Vakur Versan, of the University of Istanbul, has been invited to be visiting associate professor of government in the Near and Middle East Institute at Columbia University during 1955–56.

Robert A. Walker, who will return from a Fulbright professorship in Belgium in June of this year, will be on duty during the summer quarter at Stanford University.

Frederick M. Watkins has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Yale University, succeeding James W. Fesler, Alfred Cowles Professor of Government.

Paul G. Willis, assistant professor of government at Indiana University, was on leave during the spring semester while serving as assistant to Paul M. Butler, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

Georgia Wilson has been promoted to an assistant professorship in political science at Brooklyn College.

T. P. Wright, vice-president for research at Cornell University, has been appointed professor of air transportation in the university's School of Business and Public Administration. Dr. Wright is president of the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory in Buffalo and was formerly head of the Civil Aeronautics Administration.

Chitoshi Yanaga, associate professor of political science at Yale University, will be on leave of absence during 1955–56 for field research in Japan under a Fulbright award.

Roland Young, of the political science department, Northwestern University, will be on leave from April through September to study political problems in Tanganyika under a grant from the Program of African Studies at Northwestern.

Belle Zeller was on sabbatical leave from Brooklyn College during the spring semester, studying governments in Mediterranean countries.

## IN MEMORIAM

Stephen B. Sarasohn, assistant professor of government at Wayne University, died on January 5, 1955, from a heart attack. Only thirty at the time of his decease, Stephen Sarasohn had packed those years with the bright promise of high achievement and scholarly distinction. Although plagued by the after effects of rheumatic rever, he secured his B.A. at Wayne University and his graduate degrees, including the doctorate, at Columbia University; his teaching experience was encompassed in a brief tenure at Hunter College and a five-year period at Wayne University.

Admired by his colleagues, Stephen Sarasohn found time to encourage and to stimulate his students to a degree which was most unusual. His productive scholarship was necessarily limited by the brevity of his life tenure, but it included an article in the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, in collaboration with his instructor, Carl O. Smith, and co-authorship of two basic texts in the social sciences. Beyond these works, he was engaged in research in the fields of political parties and behavior at the time of his death. Miss him we shall, but the bright promise of his career, terminated at such an early age, should afford an incentive for greater achievement to those who were privileged to know him.—Charles W. Shull.

# SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

## REPORT OF NOMINATING COMMITTEE

At the annual meeting of The American Political Science Association to be held at Boulder, Colorado in September, the Committee on Nominations (Norman J. Padelford, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chairman) will propose the following officers for 1955–56: *President-Elect*, Elmer E. Schattschneider (Wesleyan University); *Vice-Presidents*, Joseph P. Harris (University of California), Harold S. Quigley (University of Minnesota), Emmette S. Redford (University of Texas); *Secretary*, Harvey C. Mansfield (Ohio State University); *Treasurer*, Edward H. Litchfield (Cornell University); *Members of the Council* for two years, Weldon Cooper (University of Virginia), Paul T. David (Brookings Institution), Herbert Emmerich (Public Administration Clearing House), Claude E. Hawley (U. S. Information Agency), Norman L. Hill (University of Nebraska), Thomas P. Jenkin (University of California at Los Angeles), Louise Overacker (Wellesley College), Charles B. Robson (University of North Carolina).

## CONGRESSIONAL FELLOWSHIPS

Ten Congressional Fellowships, paying $4,000 each to young political scientists and journalists, were announced on May 3 of this year. These fellowships, formerly termed "Congressional Interneships," are awarded annually by The American Political Science Association, which has received a grant for this purpose from the Edgar B. Stern Family Fund of New Orleans, Louisiana. The ten winners will commence their work with members of the House and Senate and with congressional committees on November 1, 1955. They will be given the option of working in the home district of the Congressman of their choice prior to coming to Washington, D.C., for the main portion of the program.

The Congressional Fellows selected for 1955–56 are as follows:

*Political Scientists.* G. Robert Blackburn, assistant professor of government, University of Rochester. Mr. Blackburn received the A.B. degree from the University of Virginia in 1943, an M.A. from Harvard University in 1947, and has been teaching at the University of Rochester since 1949.

MacAlister Brown, of Clearwater, Florida, now an instructor in political science at Dartmouth College. Dr. Brown received his bachelor's degree from Wesleyan University, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University. He worked for a year in Munich, Germany as an analyst for the U. S. Displaced Persons Commission and has been an instructor at Dartmouth since 1953.

Jay H. Cerf, of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, now a research fellow at Yale University. Mr. Cerf received his B.A. from the University of Wisconsin in 1948 and the M.A. from both the University of Wisconsin and Yale University. He has been an assistant in instruction at Yale, and worked for the Central Intelligence Agency from 1948 to 1950.

Charles L. Clapp, of Beverly, Massachusetts, at present a teaching assistant and graduate student completing his Ph.D. at the University of California. Mr. Clapp graduated from Tufts College in 1945 and received an M.A. degree from Harvard University in 1947. He was an instructor in political science at Florida State University in 1947–49, and has been assistant foreign student adviser and assistant director of International House at the University of California.

R. Gene Geisler, of Chicago, Illinois, an instructor in political science at the Gary Center of the University of Indiana. Mr. Geisler received his B.A. degree from George Washington University, an M.A. from the University of Connecticut, and is completing his Ph.D. studies at the University of Chicago.

*Journalists.* Robert P. Dorang, of Buffalo, New York, a reporter for the *Buffalo Evening News* since 1952. Mr. Dorang was graduated from Lehigh University in 1949, and completed one year of graduate work at the University of Oregon, where he was a graduate assistant in journalism. He covered federal and state candidates in the 1954 political campaigns. He has specialized in the coverage of military and civil aviation and air defense news.

L. Boyd Finch, of Ventura, California, assistant city editor of the *Ventura Star-Free Press*. Mr. Finch received a B.A. from the University of Arizona in 1947, majoring in journalism with minors in history and political science. He was awarded the M.A. degree in political science by Stanford University in 1949. Prior to joining the staff of his present newspaper, he was city editor of the *Tulare Daily Advance-Register*, also in California.

Francis J. Kelley, of Humboldt, Kansas, a general reporter-photographer for the *Hutchinson News-Herald* (Kansas). Mr. Kelley received a B.A. in journalism at the University of Kansas in 1951. He was a reporter-photographer for the *Salina Journal* (Kansas) from 1951 to 1953, and has been with his present newspaper since 1953.

Richard L. Milliman, of Coldwater, Michigan, a reporter covering education and state government and politics for the *Lansing State Journal* (Michigan). Mr. Milliman received his B.A. with honors in journalism in 1950 from Michigan State College. He was a reporter for the *Coldwater Daily Reporter* (Michigan) from 1944 to 1949, and a reporter for the *Holland Evening Sentinel* (Michigan), prior to joining the staff of his present newspaper.

Teresa A. Polychronis, of New York City, currently working with the American Broadcasting Company in that city. Miss Polychronis received her B.A. in political science from the University of Utah in 1950. She was awarded an M.S. in journalism by the Columbia University School of Journalism in 1953.

Two alternates were named to the journalists selected: Ralph L. Hamilton, of Hillsboro, Ohio, a research assistant in the department of agricultural journalism at the University of Wisconsin, and Norman I. Gelman, of Denver, Colorado, now currently with the U. S. Army, and formerly a teaching assistant at the University of Colorado School of Journalism.